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Abstract 
This thesis discusses a case study of a psycho-spiritual retreat programme 
comprising an eclectic bricolage of technologies of self, ranging from the 
contemplative, to the artistic and the psychotherapeutic. It explores the possibility 
that such practices can be understood as a Foucauldian care of self, enabling 
teachers to participate in a radical reflexivity around subjectivity. It is argued that 
such reflexivity, whilst not directly concerned with teachers' professional identity, 
is transformative within their professional practice. Evidence to substantiate this 
hypothesis is sought in semi-structured interviews with participating Spanish and 
Mexican teachers. These interviews explore the teachers' understandings of their 
'before', 'during' and 'after'. What had they experienced? How had it affected their 
understandings of themselves? How had these new understandings affected the 
ongoing construction of their identity as teachers? 
Interview data is organized and analysed through three complementary areas of 
problematization; Questions of Purpose, Questions of Order, and Questions of 
Performance. Evidence in and around these fields is embedded in a debate around 
subjectivity, teacher identity and education informed by thinkers of becoming 
including Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and Britzman. Assessment of the value of 
the experience is also made using the psycho-spiritual referents of the retreat 
programme itself, as elaborated by its founder Claudio Naranjo. 
The empirical-theoretical analysis of narrative evidence poses questions about the 
established limits of traditional teacher development opportunities and of the 
'service' oriented paradigm of professional ethics. The care of the self as a radical 
reflexivity, in which the teacher examines their constitution as human beings, 
might provide 'a way out' for teachers stuck uncreatively in their own historical 
subjectivities and the dominant educational paradigms. In such a way concrete 
examples of radical reflexivity in action could usefully contribute to debates 
occurring around alternatives in teacher identity discourse. 
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There is more in my life than any official definition of 
identity can express. I am not exhausted by my 
identity. I am not entirely captured by it, even though 
it is stamped upon me—and even though it enables 
me. This fugitive difference between my identity and 
that in me which slips through its conceptual net is to 
be prized; it forms a pool from which creativity can 
flow and attentiveness to the claims of other identities 
might be drawn. 
W.E. Connolly, 1991, p. 120. 
Introduction 
This thesis is organized in five sections. Section 1, Framing the Thesis, describes the 
origins, motivation and rationale of my evolving interest in a psycho-spiritually 
inspired reflexivity among teachers. It sets out in broad terms what the thesis 
hopes to achieve and what falls outside its pretentions, as well as describing and 
justifying the methodology. The subsequent three sections (Questions of Purpose, 
Questions of Order, and Questions of Performance) are an extended analysis of the 
narratives of the twenty teachers who were interviewed as part of a qualitative 
case study approach to the research. Combined, these three sections form the bulk 
of the thesis (approximately three quarters), not least because the data analysis is 
undertaken in juxtaposition with what I consider to be useful and relevant 
theoretical or empirical positions from the literature. The thesis, therefore, does 
not have a 'literature' section per se, as is often the case; rather, relevant literature 
is used as a means of accessing and interpreting the data. Whilst each of the three 
data analysis sections contains one chapter dedicated to discussion and 
conclusions related to the particular question being explored, the last section of 
the thesis, Situating the Research in the Field of Teacher Identity Discourse, aims to 
open up the debate to a broader discussion of the findings in relation to issues of 
teacher identity, of education and of subjectivity in general. 
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The theoretical thinking brought to bear in the three data analysis sections is 
diverse and is not drawn fully together until this last section of the thesis. I am 
aware that this could present the reader with difficulties as they try to grapple 
with the direction of the thesis. One might say that the principle of bricolage that is 
present in the programme being studied is also present in the thesis itself as 
diverse data and theory are woven together. This lends itself to a potential 
richness in terms of the juxtaposition of ideas that can set the data 'to work' in 
differing but (I hope) complementary directions, but perhaps requires that any 
reader work hard in holding 'the story' together. If, in Deleuzean terms, the 
theoretical matrix can be represented as a multiplicity of 'lines of flight' from the 
data itself, there is also good reason to provide a rudimentary map of the default 
territory from which all these movements are occurring, and the best place for 
such a map would appear to be here in this introduction. 
The key concepts to hold in mind whilst reading the thesis can be found within a 
diversity of thinkers from an eclectic array of disciplines and traditions. However, 
for the sake of clarity it is perhaps useful to imagine them gathered together under 
a loose umbrella of Foucauldian theory. The reference to a Foucauldian framework 
or principle can, I hope, provide the reader with an overarching comprehension as 
to what it is that the thesis is attempting to do. Such a gathering together under 
Foucault does not mean that tensions do not exist within the thesis, that the case, 
the data, and the theory do not appear to be pulling in separate directions on 
occasion, or from certain perspectives; rather, it means that preference or priority 
is being given to the similarities that can be found or imagined between the 
research's component elements (case, data, and theory) on the grounds that 
holding this multiplicity together lends itself to greater possibilities for the 
research to generate friction, heat, and 'get the data working' in the ethico-
political-spiritual field that it is being situated. T 
Three Foucauldian themes are of particular relevance in understanding what the 
thesis is 'doing': the ethics of the care of the self, thought, and the micro-physics of 
power. Regarding the ethics of the care of the self, Foucault's overtly ethical turn 
derives from a later shift in the focus of Foucault's concerns within the triad of 
power-knowledge-subjectivity. While his earlier work (for example, The 
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Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish) was bleakly concerned with 
how the subject becomes constellated within and by power-knowledge (i.e. is 
produced by history), the explorations of his later writings (for example, The 
History of Sexuality), further clarified in several important interviews (see, for 
example the interview 1983 interview with Rabinow and Dreyfus included in The 
Foucault Reader), turn toward the subject's capacity to respond within this 
network of power, that is to say the subject's own productive capacity, or 'agency'. 
Such 'agency' is perhaps best understood as being mediated by what Foucault 
identifies as the technologies of self through which the subject has the sense of 
constituting themselves and entering into dialogue with 'structure'. These 
technologies of self are not opposed to the technologies of power; rather, the 
relations that these two technologies signify are mutually enfolded and 
overlapping. The technologies of self are not fields of absolute freedom; rather, 
they must be understood as products of their time. It is in the dialogue between the 
technologies of power and the technologies of self that a subject's governmentality 
comes into being, meaning the degree to which the subject is (self-)determined by 
dominant discourses or able to create themselves within and from critical thinking 
and experience. 
Foucault's ethos of the care of the self recalls the fact that the subject is in 
permanent danger of being lost to and in history, and as such is ethically bound to 
pay attention to the forces at work in determining who they are and what they 
might become. The ethics of the care of the self, and, by association, the concept of 
the technologies of self, are fundamental to the thesis in as much as the 
programme being studied (the Seekers After Truth programme) can best be 
understood as an assemblage of technologies of self, and what the thesis hopes to 
establish is the value of this assemblage as a medium for the care of the self. One 
central question the thesis is asking is to what degree this programme enables its 
participants to re-position themselves within power relationships in such a way 
that they are freer of their intimate and social history, more able to participate in a 
creative unfolding of the human experience, or specifically in this case to the 
creative unfolding of the identity as teachers. 
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The second Foucauldian concept, or value, vital to 'the work' the thesis attempts to 
do is that of thought. This is not thought, or thinking as conventionally understood, 
by which the subject reflects on an object, an activity, or process and thereby 
constructs and orientates themselves within the world. Foucault is more 
interested not in what we think, but how it is that we came to think in this 
particular way, and what effect this type of thinking has within the subjects self-
other relations. It is this perspective on thinking that Foucault refers to as thought. 
This Foucauldian thought is the means by which we stand back from ourselves so 
that we might perceive our thinking as an object to be interrogated. The value of 
such thought is, above all, that it may allow the subject to become free of 
themselves, free of their unexamined thinking. The importance of thought to 
Foucault can be understood once we recognize that the Foucauldian subject is not 
the rationally autonomous subject of the enlightenment and was born not into 
freedom but into limit, not only a biological, natural limit, but also the political, 
social, historical limit through which we are produced. To escape such limits, the 
subject must engage in the work of Foucauldian thought, they must learn how to 
step back from themselves and to think differently. 
Foucault ascribes a high value to this thought because its necessity encapsulates 
the human predicament - we live and negotiate our experience on the precarious 
frontier between enslavement and freedom, between the past and the future. Any 
practice that enables the subject to escape the past and opens them up creatively 
to the unfolding potential of the future is politically and culturally significant, and 
represents the possibility of spirituality through transgression (without reference 
to a transcendent God or Man). Clear parallels exist with psychotherapeutic and 
spiritual practices that look into and beyond habits of perception and action with 
the intention of transcending the limits of self-other relations. Just as Foucault 
demonstrates a particular approach or method to this critical thought, 
psychotherapy and mysticism have developed other methods, but the goal is 
similar; the individual is invited to embrace the possibility of a subjectivity 
founded on an experience of event and truth that lies outside prescription or 
ideology. In so doing the historical subject can, as Foucault would say, become free 
of itself. What the research hopes to do is to document and situate the programmes 
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ability to generate this type of thought in the participants and to catalyze a 
professional thinking (and acting) that is recognizably different. 
Central to the research, then, is the evidence that this thought has been catalysed 
in individual participants. Moreover, the juxtaposition of this evidence with a 
diverse array of theory, attempts to locate these examples of a shifting 
thoughtscape within broader arguments about subjectivity and to establish their 
possible ethical, political and spiritual importance. More specifically, the 
organization of the data analysis sections reflects recurring themes in the narrative 
alongside a 'before' and 'after' temporality, both of which indicate that I am not 
interested in thought 'for the sake of it'; rather, value corresponds to thought that 
is helping participating teachers to address the difficulties or consolidate the 
strengths and opportunities they encounter in the nitty-gritty of their professional 
lives. 
This brings us to the third concept which is paramount in Foucault's intellectual 
project: the microphysics of power. Foucault's understanding of power as not 
situated in any specific location, but rather as extending out (and created within) a 
matrix of relations, processes, and practices, means that Foucault's interest lies in 
how the subject is bound by and replicates or produces power relations at the local 
level. For Foucault power finds its expression and is formulated in the 'small print' 
of our social relations. If we want to understand power and see how it works it is 
this 'small print' that we need to study. Foucault's interest in how power is 
constellated collectively within society led him firstly to examine the organization 
of truth and procedures of discipline - the technologies of power - that permitted 
the administration of human life and the operation of institutions that were able to 
create and police a describable population from what had once been the 
indiscernible mass of the common people. This is the power that exposed the 
subject and the minutiae of their actions, thoughts and desires, to the objectifying 
gaze of the state and the professional disciplines. It is here, within this micro-
physics of power that the subject must discern the nature of their bondage and 
practice their freedom through transgression. Foucault was not a utopian, and did 
not believe that power could ever be fully disarmed. The subject could never exist 
transparently and outside relations of power, and the work of freedom acquired 
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significance not in the great political and ideological struggles of history, but to the 
degree that the individual was able to embody them in their day to day life. To 
some degree Foucault's later focus on the technologies of self, and the ethics of the 
care of the self, reflect this interest in the micro-physics of power. The question 
Foucault addresses when reflecting on the ethical dimension of these technologies 
is not how the subject can escape power, but how can the subject prepare 
themselves to take up their position inside the relations of power with as little 
harm as possible to themselves or to others. 
This ethical perspective on power-knowledge-subjectivity, the way in which 
Foucault, ultimately, brings our 'destiny' back to a question of individual 
responsibility (and therefore embeds the individual subject and their desire at the 
heart of the social and political matrix) has profound implications for the way we 
might choose to approach the work of politics and/or resistance. This Foucauldian 
take on power, politics and structure-agency therefore provides an important 
backdrop to the methodology of the research, and to its evaluative criteria. It 
makes the focus on the immediate lives of the teachers highly relevant, and, more 
importantly, it makes the insistence on concrete practices totally necessary. 
Nothing meaningful can be said to occur if it has not descended to, or is building up 
from, the micro-physics of these teachers' existence within the games of power of 
teaching. Such games of power are at once personal (idiosyncratic) and 
institutional (role playing), but whatever their grounding they must be embodied 
in specific practices. And conversely, in a reverse of the same logic, evidence of 
local change within the teachers' narratives can be read as politically significant. 
Taken as a whole, the juxtaposition of these three complementary concepts - the 
care of the self, thought, and the micro-physics of power - constitute, or give rise to 
the meta-concept of the politics of ourselves. If there is one Foucauldian term that 
can be said to encapsulate the raison d'être of the research, it is this. The term 
itself points to the meeting of the psychological and spiritual with the ethical and 
political. This is the psycho-social territory that the research hopes to occupy both 
because of the nature of the case in question (i.e. the psycho-spiritual programme 
whose value is being determined by the research), and the way in which the highly 
personalized narrative evidence (those stories of 'ourselves') is embedded in a 
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cross-disciplinary theoretical bricolage. The function of these juxtapositions is to 
dissolve some of the tensions of apparent opposites, for example between the 
personal and the political, and to witness how the multiplicity of the 'event' of 
teaching and learning can be made accessed by reference to the concrete example 
of specific narratives. Hopefully, it will become clear during the reading of the 
sections dedicated to data analysis that the intensely psycho-spiritual work 
produces effects which are patently political. In demonstrating this link, the 
research is arguing for a new site of development, resistance and transgression in 
the professional lives of teachers. This site might best be described as the teachers 
'soul'. Though the 'soulful' accounts in the teachers narratives are not spoken from 
any orchestrated political agenda, and are not representative of the voice of an 
articulated movement, they are evidence of 'souls in transgression', of people 
finding the desire, the motivation to work in the cracks that appear in their 
identities and in the education system, opening up spaces to develop new 
identities and new self-other relations within the highly policed environment of 
schooling. 
If I have succeeded in presenting a synthesis of the argument through which the 
theoretical framework drives, sustains, and projects the work of the thesis, this 
simplified impression needs to be qualified. To start with, Foucault himself would 
have distrusted the 'neatness' of this synthesis, and seen his role as interrogator of 
the smooth surface of appearance. Moreover, the thesis contains important 
tensions that it does not necessarily resolve. I would like to feel that these 
unresolved tensions correspond to what Foucault describes as the "permanent 
provocation[s]" (Foucault, 2000d, p.342) of power-knowledge-subjectivity. The 
provocations between contrasting truths, discourses, and experiences are 
permanent because they cannot be definitively resolved in one direction or 
another, and are obliged to co-exist in continual flux. It is the irresolvability that 
we can find at the heart of non-dualism, both the Foucauldian non-dualism of 
modernity, and the ancient non-dualism of mystical/spiritual teachings. Shunryu 
Suzuki, writing in Zen Mind, Beginners Mind (2006), refers to the condition, the 
event, of "not two, and not one". He illustrates the non-dualistic attitude and 
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potential with reference to the mind-body 'split' so characteristic of Western 
culture: 
If you think your body and mind are two, that is wrong; if you think that 
they are one, that is also wrong. Our body and our mind are both two 
and one ... in actual experience, our life is not only plural, but also 
singular. Each one of us is both dependent and independent. (p.7). 
One parallel with this 'yes and no' position in the thesis is my attempt to use 
Foucault to address a practice (the Seekers After Truth programme) which 
contains many elements that at first appearances appear to be conspicuously 
unFoucauldian. How can this 'work'? Most notably, the enneagram of personality, a 
diagnostic tool at the theoretical and experiential centre of the programme, 
appears to be all the things that Foucault problematized; it presents what appears 
to be a universal, prescriptive, deterministic theory of personality and asks the 
subject to accept a particular description of themselves and to (self-)categorize or 
(self-)diagnose. The enneagram of personality would appear to 'imprison' the 
subject in a discourse not dissimilar to the individualizing and totalizing 
discources and practice of the human sciences and of government. But, by recourse 
to the principle of non-dualism, I would argue that when used 'correctly' the 
enneagram of personality is a map of the human condition that simultaneously 
affirms the imprisonment of the subject and incites the subject to freedom. This is 
very much in keeping with Foucault's method, often criticized for abandoning the 
subject to the prison of history and the effects of power-knowledge in works such 
as The Archaeology of Knowledge or Discipline and Punish. Contrary to his critics 
conclusion, Foucault's point is not to definitively condemn the subject to unending 
tutelage; rather, his interest is in delineating the forces at work in tying the subject 
to their "own identity in a constraining way" (2002d, p.330) as a of inciting the 
subject to take responsibility for their freedom. He reminds the subject that they 
are in constant danger, that they are suspended in a spider's web of power-
knowledge in which the 'myth' of rational autonomy is one more thread of possible 
entrapment. 
It is here that important connections can be made with the work of the Seekers 
After Truth (SAT) programme whose function is to reveal to the subject the 
limitations of their default subjectivity, the poverty of their awareness of self and 
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other; not so that they might remain in this diminished state, but so that they 
might take seriously the dangers associated with such diminishment and be 
spurred into the action which comprises the care of the self. If Foucault reveals to 
us how we have been culturally, politically and socially enthralled to the 
discourses of history, Claudio Naranjo's SAT programme is working in the same 
direction but by different means and in close-up. Whilst Foucault throws in our 
face the discourses of history, our collective, cultural constitutions, Naranjo's 
object is to throw in our face the discourses of the individual, the particular 
philosophy, world view, and set of practices that the individual has adopted as a 
means to negotiate the emotional landscape of power-knowledge-subjectivity. 
Furthermore, personality as defined by the enneagram can be conflated with 
discourse; it is a means by which we understand the world and enter into relation 
with it in a way that is recognizable, a constellation of traits (practices) rooted in 
an emotional and cognitive core. Where Foucault has focused on our social 
systems and institutions, the Seekers After Truth programme focuses on the 
immediacy of the individual's interactions and their survival strategies within the 
threat of power-knowledge. To return to the metaphor of the spider's web, we 
might say that Foucault has mapped out the broad strokes of the web, whilst the 
enneagram is mapping out the way in which the individual attempts to survive the 
'trauma' of power-knowledge as it plays through the self-other relations that this 
web conditions. 
That the individual should attempt to negotiate their survival or flourishing within 
the relations of power-knowledge does not seem to be a contentious idea. What is 
perhaps 'traumatic' to the post-modern critical sensibility is the fact that the 
enneagram of personality identifies and describes a set of nine basic strategies 
which any individual might use. Even if significant nuances exist within each of the 
nine strategies, the idea that each person conforms to one or other of these basic 
strategies is cause for much alarm to the thinkers of modernity. Human diversity 
and idiosyncrasy should not and could not be reduced in this way. We might 
suppose that Foucault would be horrified. However, an automatic reaction of 
supposedly Foucauldian horror perhaps misses the point. Foucault critique does 
take aim at power-knowledge, however, he is never claiming that it is not possible 
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to organize and describe the world, or to experience and speak truths. What he is 
concerned to draw our attention to is that all this activity of the production of 
knowledge and truth does not take place outside power. The question to ask is not, 
can humans be described, could their individuality be mapped and commonalities 
be identified; rather, the question is what is the effect of any particular map or way 
of mapping, how is it inserted into power-knowledge-subjectivity, does it augment 
the degree to which the subject becomes constrained, or does it incite us to a 
practice of freedom? 
We should avoid the black-and-white rendering of Foucauldian thought which 
would lead almost automatically to the conclusion that Foucault would be against 
any attempt to describe the subject. Foucault is not saying that nothing can be said 
about the individual, or about our collective identity, about humanity; rather, he 
would seem to be against what he calls the "government of individualization" 
(2002d, p.330), which is non-other than the symbiosis of knowledge and 
institution through which the state (benevolently?) administers our lives. In this 
format, the individual is described so that they may be subjected to power, and 
become its object. But surely the Foucault who embraced, at least temporarily, the 
Iranian Islamic revolution as an example of an uprising against the status quo, 
would not dismiss the enneagram of personality because it appears prescriptive 
and universalizing, without wanting first and foremost to see what it does. We 
might assume that Foucault would be curious to look beyond the content of the 
Seekers After Truth programme to try to understand its effect, and to locate this 
effect on the continuum between freedom and constraint. 
So regardless of the specifics of its content, Foucault would have wanted to 
consider first and foremost if any such experience could be regarded as 
oppositional? In his essay The Subject and Power (2002d) Foucault identifies a 
profile of modern struggles that oppose power in its prevailing manifestations. 
Whilst all of the six commonalities he identifies are of interest to this thesis, the 
last three are of particular interest and worth citing in full. Today's struggles can 
be considered 'modern' when: 
4. They are struggles that question the status of the individual. On the 
one hand, they assert the right to be different and underline everything 
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that makes individuals truly individual. On the other hand, they attack 
everything that separates the individual, breaks his [sic] links with 
others, splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself, 
and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way. 
Theses struggles are not exactly for or against the "individual"; rather, 
they are struggles against the "government of individualization". 
5. They are an opposition to the effects of power linked with knowledge, 
competence, and qualification - struggles against the privileges of 
knowledge. But they are also an opposition against secrecy, 
deformation, and mystifying representations imposed on people. 
There is nothing "scientistic" in this (that is, a dogmatic belief in the 
value of scientific knowledge), but neither is it a sceptical or relativistic 
refusal of all verified truth. What is questioned is the way knowledge 
circulates and functions, its relations to power. In short, the regime of 
knowledge [savior]. 
6. Finally, all these present struggles revolve around the question: Who 
are we? They are a refusal of these abstractions, of economic and 
ideological state violence, which ignore who we are individually, and 
also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition that 
determines who one is. (ibid. pp.330-331) 
There is much within the SAT programme to suggest that it is, broadly speaking, 
compatible with Foucault's definition of a modern opposition to power. For this 
reason, I feel it is safe to assume that Foucault, at the very least, would have been 
curious about the programme and its effects. It is unlikely that he would locate in 
the SAT programme the scientific and administrative excesses of the regime of 
knowledge prevalent in schooling. Should he have chosen, also, to locate the 
enneagram of personality in the ethical/spiritual tradition rather than the 
scientific field (even though it generates personality categories or types), it is not 
unreasonable to assume that Foucault would have seen the SAT as a manifestation 
of a regime of knowledge distinct to the scientific-administrative regime currently 
ascendant. As such, it sets itself in opposition to the dominant regime of knowledge 
and its particular way of determining who one is. If it is a discourse, then it is a 
discourse that punctures the smooth surfaces of the scientific-administrative 
discourse of modernity and invites the participant to enter into a struggle for a 
new subjectivity. Though tensions do exist between the Foucauldian theoretical 
framework used to analyze the data and determine value, and Naranjo's 
theoretical and empirical scaffolding that runs through the case being evaluated, 
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the possibility of opposition and struggle within these two fields ensures that there 
is a commonality sufficient to justify an insistence on a dialogue between the two. 
By way of an ending to this brief introduction I would like to take the opportunity 
to express my gratitude to a variety of people whose existence or input or material 
support created the conditions in which the thesis could come about: Gerardo 
Ortiz, who introduced me to the world of psychotherapy and who subsequently 
became my mentor and colleague; Angelica Schenerock, who has accompanied my 
doctoral suffering from afar, with love and in faith; my mother, Ann Clarke, who 
was a teacher herself, and whose hunger for life and experience never ceases to 
surprise and inspire, and whose material and moral support have been invaluable; 
to Grazia Cecchini, for her commitment to the vicissitudes of a life and politics of 
head and heart, and her encouragement to finish my thesis and move on; to Alex 
Moore, my supervisor, for his great patience and skilful stewardship of my journey 
through the labyrinth of a doctorate, and for allowing me to discover for myself the 
importance of the relationship between my research and his own; to Tim Trench, 
for teaching me about friendship, and for his invaluable help in editing the first 
draft; to all the teachers who took part in the interviews, generously offering me 
their time, their trust and their candour; to the doctoral students of research room 
576, for their companionship in accepting me as an 'honorary', fringe member; to 
the Council for Science and Technology of Mexico who provided me with the grant 
that made my doctoral studies possible. Lastly, I would like to dedicate the thesis 
to Dr. Claudio Naranjo whose work as a psycho-spiritual teacher and advocate of 
socio-political reform provided me with the experiences necessary to discover in 
myself a commitment to an idea and to a cause, and the drive necessary to return 
to university and the disciplines and wanderings of a doctorate. 
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Section 1: 
Framing the Thesis 
This section comprises three chapters, each of which provides an important 
backdrop to the thesis. Chapter 1, The Story Behind the Story, is a brief 
autobiographic description of the route by which I came across my research 
subject, providing a glimpse of the origins of my 'desire' as a researcher. Chapter 2, 
Getting Behind the Title, provides an overview of the thesis' underlying rationale 
and its evolution by examining the thesis' title and explaining how it evolved over 
time, as well as the significance of some of its terms. Especially important in this 
chapter is a very synthetic description of the psycho-spiritual programme that is 
the object of the case study. Chapter 3, A Methodology, provides the core argument 
in support of the way in which the research was conducted as a qualitative case 
study whose evidence base was comprised exclusively of in-depth semi-structured 
interviews or intentioned conversations. 
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Chapter 1: The Story Behind the Story 
School Trouble 
The research presented in this thesis arises from convictions rooted in experiences 
generated in both my professional and personal life whilst living and working in 
Mexico over a period of fifteen years. In particular, my ten years as the director of a 
small and continually evolving development project to promote educational 
reform in Mexico gave me the opportunity to participate in regional and national 
debates regarding such reforms and to register the resistance to change in schools 
Needless to say, the project's efforts to penetrate the 'system', and to catalyse 
meaningful shifts in educational vision and practice, proved largely impotent in the 
face of the prevailing school culture in Mexico, despite resonating with some 
individual teachers. In part, this may be explained by the team's inexperience, the 
fact that we were learning on the job, but there can be no doubt that the challenges 
to 'getting it right' were enormous, and the growing sensation was one of battling 
with the multi-headed Hydra, two heads springing up where one had been severed. 
With certain particularities the sources of resistance to change in the education 
system in Mexico are universally familiar, and can be broadly defined as: political, 
structural and professional. However, as the years went by I came to suspect the 
presence of another source of resistance, of a more personal and intimate nature. I 
came to sense that, paradoxically, these teachers did not actually believe in 
education in its most profound and radical sense, as might be understood from its 
Latin root educare, to 'bring out', or from its association with a process of 
transformation, a personal and social alchemy by which human potential is 
refined, or refines itself. I am now able to place my dimly perceived conceptions 
within a broader framework for the resistance to learning, such as that offered by 
the psychoanalytic thinking of Wilfred Bion. According to Bion (1961), our cultural 
idealization of education, collective and individual, masks a lack of faith in 
knowledge, and defends us from the anxiety of the experience of uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Deborah Britzman, also writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
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emphasizes that for Bion true thinking must embrace vulnerability and 
uncertainty, and thereby involves the thinker in a "journey of emotional 
significance" (Britzman, 2003, p.100). 
Perhaps, then, Mexican teachers were still unable to claim thinking as their 
adventure of emotional significance, and to incorporate uncertainty and 
vulnerability in their practice as educators. Furthermore, these same teachers, it 
seemed to me, could not testify to the possibility of the 'lived' experience of 
transformation through education. This inexperience becomes what might be best 
described as a lack of faith, not only in the officially sanctioned site of education, 
the school, but more importantly a lack of faith in freedom, human potential and 
the human experience. There is, as it were, nowhere to go, there is only what there 
is. As well as being embroiled, consciously or unconsciously, with the standard 
obstacles to becoming agents of change, the impotence of these teachers also 
derived - in my view - from a fundamental lack of belief whose nature might best 
be described as 'spiritual'. 
Slowly, my attention turned away from the techno-rational concerns of pedagogy 
and didactics toward a concern for the inner world and personal experience of the 
teacher. I began to recognise the invisibility of teachers within a huge bureaucratic 
and highly politicized machine. They were caught between an array of competing 
and often opposing forces: the policy and bureaucracy of government, the politics 
and power structure of their hugely influential union, the aspirations and 
resistance of students, the apathy and passion of parents, and the questioning gaze 
of the wider community. I had, finally, fully grasped the oppressive 'possibilities' of 
the space teachers are asked to occupy and to share, and in which they must 
exemplify and multiply the principles and practices of the liberal, democratic ideal. 
I had begun to ask Willard Waller's question: "What does teaching do to teachers?" 
(quoted in Britzman, 2003, p.84). 
Life Trouble 
"What if the dream of learning is other to the structures of education?" (Britzman, 
2003, p.53). The question posed by Britzman in After-Education is poignant and 
provocative. Speaking from my own life experience it seems now that 'dreamed-of 
20 
learning' began on leaving formal education and entering the 'real' world. In 
retrospect, dreamed of learning would be none other than knowing how to be in 
that 'real' world, how to occupy a space and the relationships within it, how to be 
comfortable in life, comfortable in myself, creative, useful and of service. This 
learning has been slow and spiralling: an unfolding that folds over itself and 
disappears to appear again elsewhere. It is a learning that has required facing the 
unspeakable fears that haunted my own school life, only to find them as much 
present in the here and now as ghosts of the past: 
The terror and constraint of education come from within, even as these 
impositions are found outside. If psychical development is the least 
pedagogical experience because it is so subject to the helplessness of our 
beginnings, to the passion for ignorance, in short, to the unconscious 
and the return of this repressed, then these modes of resistance offer us 
another sense of the difficulties of that other development, namely 
education. (Britzman, 2003, p.21) 
I was not only the subject of circumstance, at a particular nexus of history; I was 
also a prisoner of myself, unable to cease to be what I was, unable to unlearn 
myself, to learn otherness. If I had believed I could think my way out of myself, I 
was to discover that those same 'thoughts' were the very material of that self. This 
realization finds an echo in Michel Foucault's double-helix of subjectification: 
There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by 
control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or 
self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to. (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, p.21) 
Personal revelation, when it finally occurred, came in the form of exhaustion and 
surrender; the exhaustion of my own thought process and the surrender of my 
illusion of autonomy. It could not be done alone, from myself, by myself, with my 
own meagre tools. The eye could not see itself, nor the hand lead itself, nor thought 
unthink itself. In other words, I learnt, slowly, painfully, that my dream of learning 
could not be dreamt in isolation, that its humanity required a humanity larger than 
my own, that its problem was not my problem, its knowledge not my knowledge. 
Help came finally in the form of Gestalt group therapy. Meeting once a week over a 
period of two years, our human ensemble swam and floated through the murky 
waters of me-ness, you-ness, together-ness, and apart-ness, tolerant and intolerant 
of knowledge and communication, both certain and uncertain that something was 
21 
happening to us, akin, perhaps, to Britzman's description of the journey of a group 
brought together under the elusive intentionality of growth by fire: 
To tolerate development, the group must learn from its own uncertain 
experiences of development and from the intelligence of fragility. 
Recognizing fragility is made through language itself, where relations 
between perceptions and reality testing are worked through. It is also 
made from yet another source: the fragility of distinction. Becoming 
distinct requires the recognition of the other's distinctiveness, and this 
learning reconfigures the group's worries over the loss of individual 
distinction and love into the idea of what allows distinction its 
possibility is the vulnerability of each individual. (Britzman, 2003, 
p.120) 
And so, with just such a recognition of individual distinctness and common 
vulnerability, I began a journey that attempted transformation through self-
knowledge. Ten years on it feels too early to know where this journey might end. 
Has change occurred? I think so, it feels so. If I were to summarize that change up 
until now, it would be, ironically, that I have become 'other' by becoming more 
'me'. This circularity echoes Jacques Lacan's definition of the end of the 
psychoanalytic process as "identification with the symptom. The analysis achieves 
its end when the patient is able to recognize, in the Real of his symptom, the only 
support of his being" (2iZek, 2008, p.81). 
One blessing among many on this journey was my fortuitous inscription in a 
programme to promote human growth known as "Seekers After Truth" (SAT), 
devised by the psychotherapist and spiritual teacher, Claudio Naranjo. This eclectic 
formula for promoting self-knowledge, experience and transformation has been 
distilled by Naranjo from spiritual and psychotherapeutic traditions of seeking and 
journeying. Naranjo, with good reason, describes its programme as an "ego-
grinding machine" (ego referring here to the idea of the 'false-self', or 'false-
consciousness'). It is, by design, teaching and learning in the raw, knowledge of 
unknowledge in the flesh, 'self' in the mirror of 'other', 'no-self in the heart of 'no-
other'. If this sounds scary, it is because, as the necessity of the unconscious would 
indicate, knowledge itself is scary, and the 'false-self to be 'ground', that edifice 
whose foundations are sustained within the unconscious, is the alchemic 
transposition of our deeper, inadmissible fears, anxieties and desires. 
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Naranjo's interest in promoting the SAT programme with teachers as a means of 
challenging the "terror and constraint" (Britzman, 2003, p.21) institutionalized in 
schools, and his commitment to changing the world through changing education, 
coincided with my own perceptions of the psychic resistance to learning of 
teachers in Mexico, and the need to 'take on' teacher identity from a less technical 
angle. The SAT programme was duly offered to teachers and social workers in 
Chiapas, Mexico, from 2004 onwards. This thesis is an extension of this work, and 
was conceived originally as an evaluation of the impact of the SAT experience in 
the personal-professional lives of teachers. Stories of transformation in teaching -
if, how, why, and when they were occurring - needed to be recovered as meta-
narrative. And this meta-narrative needed to be 'out there', participating in the 
debate around teacher identity, and directed as protest and affirmation at the 
heart of education. And so, with this conviction, I decided to get out of the 'fire' and 
return to the 'frying pan', go back to school, this time as a doctoral student. 
Research Trouble 
It was early on in my research reading that I was introduced to Michel Foucault's 
Discipline and Punish. What had been dimly felt about my own schooling, about 
schools, about teachers, came alive in Foucault's critique and was projected across 
not just my history but our history. Frank Pignatelli summarizes the full 
implications of Foucault's thought for schools: 
Trenchantly, Foucault described the school as a "block of capacity-
communication-power." The school is a disciplinary site, a locus of 
power/knowledge in a positive, constitutive sense. Schools can be 
dangerous places, not because of the presence of coarse, brutal, and 
illicit forms of power, but because disciplinary instrumentalities, 
ostensibly benevolent, efficient, and in pursuit of the truth about 
teachers, their practice, and their students, extend the self-limiting rule 
of normality and the marginalization-rehabilitation of the deviant. 
(1993, p.420) 
My research world had suddenly expanded. What had been localized to education, 
teacher well-being and psychotherapy, embedded itself in the Foucauldian trinity 
of power-knowledge-subjectivity. From the initial shock of recognition, my journey 
within and under the gaze of Foucault has been a long one. Relatively early on I 
passed through some of his discussions on ethics and was struck by his notion of 
23 
the care of the self. I felt that this, somehow, held the key as to why such psycho-
spiritual work with teachers was important, how Naranjo's esoteric and 
psychological aims and practices could be localized in the wider contemporary 
philosophical and political debate. 
Initially, there appeared to be contradictions raised by Foucault's critique of the 
human sciences. Is psychotherapy itself just another trap, another discourse of 
power-knowledge, sold to us, acquired by us, in our compulsion to 'truth'? Two 
texts spurred me to pursue the 'Foucault connection', to carry on drawing the 
edges of the understanding of my research in co-relation to my evolving 
understanding of Foucault. James Miller's semi-biographical The Passion of Michel 
Foucault (1993) brought me closer to the man behind the thought, the 
philosophical and life sources of that thought. From the perspective of my 
research, one idea stood out, that Foucault, the modern sceptic questioning 
positivist claims to truth, returns us to experience, to truth as event, and returns 
experience to the unruly mysteries of the bios philosophicus. There were echoes 
here of Dionysius and therefore of psychotherapy. 
Subsequently, James Bernauer's The Final Foucault, with its exploration of 
Foucault's "ecstatic thinking", further confirmed the idea that the deconstruction 
and de-centring of positivism's Absolute Man was not 'defeatist', but invited us to 
re-think ourselves in recognition of our transformative potential: 
Embracing an ecstatic experiment beyond Kant, [Foucault's] last 
writings declare the need to escape our inherited relation to the self, a 
declaration which complements and intensifies his earlier 
announcement of the "death of man." "What can be the ethic of an 
intellectual - I accept the title of intellectual which seems at present to 
nauseate some people - if not that: to render oneself permanently 
capable of getting free of oneself". (1994, p.68) 
Within Foucault's scepticism another meta-project emerges - freedom, understood 
as the ability to become free of one's self. As I laboured uneasily forward with 
nagging doubts about the paradoxes within Foucault's thought, encouraged on the 
one hand by Foucault's possibly 'mystic' asceticism, and discouraged by his 
scepticism of human sciences and critique of Freud, the full, liberating, weight of 
that scepticism combined with his ethical turn and "cry for freedom" (Marshall, 
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1996, p.43) began to dawn on me. By reducing all truth claims to discourse, 
Foucault returns power-knowledge-subjectivity to ethics. Truth in this trinity 
becomes secondary to effect; and effect, in turn, is to be judged according to 
Foucault's ethical value of due diligence; and diligence, his critical attitude to the 
present (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, pp.39-42), in turn, to be exercised in the 
name of freedom, transgression, solidarity, creativity, experience, and the unruly 
body. Could Foucault's "politics of ourselves" (Foucault, 1980) be argued and 
located here? And in the same way that Bernauer argues for a negative theology, 
would it be possible to comprehend a negative psychology operating at the 
borders of the human sciences, perhaps not concerned to discover origins but to 
help us master or get free of ourselves? Could such a mystic or ascetic psychology, 
perhaps closer to ethics than to science, provide some kind of antidote or source of 
resistance to the "antiquated humanism and insipid psychology" Foucault 
identifies at the heart of our "barbarous culture" and its monolithic education 
(Foucault, quoted in Miller, 1993, p.172). Such a negative psychology would be 
concerned not to tie us to 'truths' about ourselves but to use its reflexivity, its 
practices and interpretations, to set in motion processes of transformation by 
which we become untied from our own identity and set loose from historical 
contingency, pushing us instead into an uncertain present time and a future 
potentially outside our immediate conception. Such a negative psychology would 
be at the service of a spirit of modernity, epitomized for Foucault by the champion 
of dandyism, Baudelaire: 
Modern man [sic], for Baudelaire, is not the man who goes off to 
discover himself, his secrets, and his hidden truth; he is the man who 
tries to invent himself. This modernity does not "liberate man in his own 
being"; it compels him to face the task of producing himself. (Foucault 
and Rabinow, 1991, p.42) 
Coming to some kind of fragile truce with Foucault enabled me to begin to explore 
beyond the specific domain of his thinking. Notably, I returned to Alex Moore's 
incisive discussion on teacher identity and on reflexivity, The Good Teacher (2004), 
and to Britzman's psychoanalytically informed discussions of education and 
teacher identity in Lost Subjects, Contested Objects (1998). I have also, as will 
become evident, extrapolated from Foucault to Gilles Deleuze, and from Deleuze to 
John Dewey, via the notion of "transcendental empiricism" which unites their 
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thinking according to Inna Semetsky (2006, p.25). Lastly, I 'discovered' Slavoj 
2iek's Lacanian-Communist discussions of our present socio-political 
predicament, Living in the End Times (2011) and his previous psycho-social 
discussion of ideology, The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989/2008). Needless to 
say, although I was concerned not to avoid making the research overly self-
referential, the thinking, practice and writing of Claudio Naranjo provided a 
continuous backdrop for the research in juxtaposition with these other theorists. 
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Chapter 2: Getting Behind the Title 
Unsurprisingly, the title of the thesis has undergone changes: the original working 
title, Humanising education for the 21st century: an evaluation of therapeutic tools in 
the professional development of school teachers in Mexico and Spain, evolved, post 
upgrade and with much soul searching, into Radical Reflexivity? Using Foucault to 
assess the value of psycho-spiritual practices as a 'training' for teachers. This title 
was functional until a crisis of re-organization in the last throes of writing up, 
which resulted in the falling from prominence of Foucault, and the birth of the title, 
Radical reflexivity? Assessing the value of psycho-spiritual practices of self as a 
medium for the professional development of teachers. In a final twist, and at the 
suggestion of Professor Paul Standish, who kindly served as internal reader, the 
qualification of 'Radical reflexivity' with a question mark was dropped, thus 
reducing the emphasis on a problematization of this concept, leaving it instead to 
stand in affirmation as a statement of possibility. The evolution of the title to its 
final version (Radical reflexivity: Assessing the value of psycho-spiritual practices of 
self as a medium for the professional development of teachers) represents the 
synthesis of many substantial progressions in my understanding of the 'problem' 
of the research, and of what the research could effectively 'do'. Of most 
significance, perhaps, was the 'discovery' of the term radical reflexivity as a means 
to both situate the 'case' within the recognizable discourse of reflexivity, and to 
differentiate it from mainstream practices of reflexivity within teacher education 
on the grounds of its unusually extreme or radical commitment to self-knowledge. 
Unpacking 'radical reflexivity' 
As a further development from the modus operandi proposed by advocates of 
reflective practice in teaching, reflexivity moves the spotlight of critical thought 
toward the historically positioned subject, thereby locating reflection within wider 
personal, social and cultural contexts (Moore, 2004, pp.147-150). Moore, in The 
Good Teacher, and as a conclusion drawn from his participation in his Reflective 
Practice Project, goes so far as to conclude that reflexivity "offers practitioners the 
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best hope ... of long-term professional happiness and improvement of classroom 
practice" (ibid. p.141). If reflectivity can be regarded as encouraging and 
facilitating teachers to critically address the why, what, when, where and how of 
teaching, reflexivity incorporates and emphasises the who of teaching. Whilst 
reflectivity seeks to go beyond a mechanistic use of strategies and places maximum 
value on a teacher's capacity to think and operate strategically, reflexivity goes 
beyond such strategic thinking to establish critical thinking around teacher 
identity, both personal and professional. Whilst reflective practice attempts to 
situate agency within structure, creative and strategic efficiency within 
institutional goals, reflexive practice situates structure within agency, the 
obligations of history and contingency within professional freedom. Within 
reflexive practice another question begins to take shape: no longer What is to be 
done to be a good teacher; rather, Who are we as teachers? What ought I to do as a 
teacher? 
Significant parallels exist in the three formulations of reflexivity that present 
themselves in three apparently distant fields of thought and practice the thesis 
draws from - teacher training, psycho-spiritual 'seeking', and the Foucauldian 
critique of the subject. Whilst these three reflexivities arise within different 
contexts, it would appear that their central technology and telos overlap. In all 
three contexts it is the gaze that turns upon itself, the subject that becomes its own 
subject-object, the rationally autonomous individual that enters the labyrinth of 
our historical condition(ing), confronting the appearance of things in the attempt 
to transform or transgress that same condition(ing) and to create a subjective and 
experienced truth that serves as a basis from which to act. 
It is these same parallels that point to the possibility of a radical reflexivity in the 
context of this case study. Firstly, 'radical' in the sense of extreme. Extreme in as 
much as the SAT programme immerses teachers in a reflexive practice that goes 
beyond the practices normally available to teachers, and also in the sense that the 
reflexivity of the SAT programme does not address itself to teaching; rather, its 
gaze falls upon the person/teacher as a human being, on their humanity. Far from 
aligning teachers within a concept of 'good' or 'necessary' practice, it bears more in 
common with the 'transgressive' ethos of the limit-attitude proposed by Foucault 
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in What is Enlightenment? According to Foucault, the critical, transgressive 
practice of reflexivity: 
[...] will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we 
are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, 
do, or think ... it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as 
possible to the undefined work of freedom. (Foucault, 1994, pp.315- 
316) 
This leads to a second reading of 'radical' that sits alongside 'extreme'; radical in 
the sense of offering an alternative or resistance to the dominant discourses that 
attempt to determine in absolute terms what is viable and desirable practice in 
teaching and teacher training. By virtue of their truth claims, dominant discourses 
of education are not only sites of production, but also sites of exclusion, requiring 
for their existence the marginalization of competing claims to truth. Thus, a 
practice of reflexivity among teachers that can be said to exceed the parameters 
established and maintained within a territory 'policed' by the state and its 
institutions - schools, universities, officially sanctioned centres for teachers - can 
be regarded as a potential site of resistance and insurgence, as potentially radical 
to the degree that this experience generates an alternative and persuasive truth on 
which teachers might base thought, action and feeling. 
Finally, moving beyond the immediate realms of teaching, this reflexivity is 
'radical' in that Foucault's ethical thinking around the care of self allows one to 
embed the reflexive practices of spiritual traditions and the psy-sciences (Rose, 
1999) within the framework of a (radical?) "politics of ourselves" (op.cit.) or of 
"politics as an ethics" (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, p.375). By taking up the 
ascetic challenge of self-transformation, albeit through the technologies currently 
and historically available to us, the subject participating in a particular psycho-
spiritual programme can be regarded as entering into an ascetic paradigm that 
offers the possibility of transgression within Foucault's triad of power-knowledge-
subject. Within Foucauldian ethics, ascetic work done on the self offers the 
opportunity to create a new perspective from which to survey the productive 
formulations of modernity's dominant discourses of power-knowledge. Such work, 
in the Foucauldian universe, or multi-verse, takes shape on the overlaps between 
the personal and the political, the intimate and the collective, the ethical and social. 
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For Foucault, the problem of the subject is a problem of truth, of the separation of 
true and false, and how this separation both creates us and limits us. If we are 
compulsive creators of forms, forms that involve new permutations for the 
separation of true and false, the tragedy of history is the permanent danger of 
becoming trapped within those same forms. Our greatest danger, then, is that we 
build our own prisons, and it is upon the shifting walls of this permanently 
evolving prison that we must project our struggle for freedom (Foucault, 2000). 
By examining the narratives of participating teachers for evidence of a 
transformation in the way they occupy the politicized identity of 'teacher', the 
research will flesh out Foucault's argument for the care of self as a practice of 
"political spirituality". How does a particular type of care of the self play out in the 
institutional arena of a school (a privileged site of power-knowledge)? Does their 
contingent identity as teachers fragment under the gaze of self-examination, and, if 
so, does it subsequently coalesce at some other gravitational centre? Could we 
conceive of a training scheme for teachers that makes no reference to teaching, but 
focuses rather on their collective and individual humanity? Do we indeed see, as 
Foucault might have hoped or expected, that the care of self as exemplified by a 
particular psycho-spiritual practice leads people to "acquire the rules of law, the 
management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of the self, 
that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as 
possible" (Foucault, 2000a, p.298)? 
Unpacking 'value' 
The title of this thesis claims that the research will assess the 'value' of a certain 
psycho-spiritual training for teachers. However, it is not my purpose here to 
defend or argue for the truth claims of this particular psycho-spiritual programme. 
The value being explored does not derive from the programme's truth claims. If the 
debate around truth claims is avoided, this, in part, is because to argue for and 
against its psychological and spiritual foundations is a thesis in itself and would 
preclude the possibility of examining the data from the narratives. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, the Foucauldian theoretical framework, in which true 
and false in the human sciences cease to be absolutes, allows the researcher to 
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leap-frog 'truth' and to focus on the effects of any particular discourse. Thus, the 
thesis does not include a detailed description of the theoretical groundings, both 
psychological and spiritual, that underpin the curriculum of the SAT programme; 
rather, the description of the 'training' programme, presents the contents of the 
technologies of the self to which the teachers were exposed only in the broadest of 
terms. Nor is it assumed that the teachers involved in the study are ascribing 
absolute truth-value to their associated experiences. The focus of attention is on 
the significance of the exposure to and experience of these technologies of self as 
they manifest themselves within the diverse and divergent discourses that are 
present within their professional and personal lives. Thus, it is not the issue of 
truth that is of concern, but the 'practical' implications of a perspective that is 
intentionally radical within the context of teacher training. 
Obviously, something must also be said regarding 'value' in relation to the subjects 
of the study (teachers drawn from Spain and Mexico). Although this group of 
subjects would permit a comparative study between Mexican and Spanish 
teachers, value is assessed in local terms, that is, the value that might be evidenced 
within the specific experience of each teacher included in the sample. Although this 
specific experience is conditioned by the institutional, political and cultural 
generalities of Spain or Mexico, I usually avoid drawing conclusions with reference 
to 'Mexican' or 'Spanish' realities, though some references to context are 
inevitable; rather, the focus is on value as it relates to the subjects' ability to 
transform themselves, to engage in the "undefined work of freedom" (op.cit.) 
within the limitations and possibilities of their specific contexts, whatever they 
might be. 
Unpacking 'psycho-spiritual' 
If the term psycho-spiritual implies two distinct fields within its composite, these 
can be differentiated in the following way. 'Psycho', derived from the psychological 
sciences, refers to what Foucault characterized as the "science of the individual" 
(Foucault, 2000b, p.251), that is to say, the attempt to explain the forces at work in 
the way an individual comes to be themselves. 'Spiritual', on the other hand, is 
taken to refer to the beliefs and practices that work upon that same individual with 
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the aim of addressing a given condition within a commitment to the notions of 
transformation, growth, development, betterment and transcendencel. Such a 
definition of psycho-spiritual encompasses a great diversity of discourses and 
practices, from the 'scientific' to the therapeutic and the mystic. 
It can therefore be used to describe the field of attention of the 'training' 
programme "Seekers After Truth" (known by its acronym, SAT), which is the case 
study of this research. This 'training' programme was originally developed in the 
1970s by Claudio Naranjo, a Chilean medic who had subsequently crossed over 
into psychiatric research and then on to an interest in esoteric and psycho-
spiritual traditions. As an active "seeker" of knowledge relating to the condition of 
the self, Naranjo came into contact with a diversity of influences from Gestalt 
therapy, to the anagram of personality (a diagnostic map of human error and 
virtue said to originate in the Christian esoteric or Sufi mystic tradition), to 
Buddhist philosophy and practice. Whilst his original development of the SAT 
programme in the 1970s was somewhat improvised it was, he comments, 
underscored by a deep structure that took its inspiration from his eclectic studies 
and practices: 
I knew that I would want to bring together spirituality and 
psychotherapy; and I also intended to include the body, and also a 
theoretical panorama—along with meditation and work on the affective 
domain. In this, I was expecting from the outset to follow the basic 
scheme of Gurdjieff s work, which claimed to engage the physical, 
emotional, and mental spheres in a balanced manner while emphasizing 
a "fourth factor": the mind in itself, beyond its cognitive, rational, and 
active aspects. (Naranjo, 2010, p.161) 
Over time Naranjo came to the view that psychotherapy itself constitutes a dual 
path which embraces both self-knowledge and spontaneity, and as such can be 
viewed as a synthesis of the Apollonian and Dionysian spiritual traditions. In this 
sense, the SAT programme can be conceived as the integration of four spiritual 
1  In the interview entitled The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom Foucault says 
the following about spirituality: "By spirituality I mean - but I'm not sure this definition can hold 
for very long - the subject's attanment of a certain mode of of being and the transformations that 
the subject must carry out on itself to attain this mode of being" (Foucault, 2000a, p.294). 
Foucault's characteristic wariness with precise definitions also speaks to the difficulty that exists 
around our cultural associations with the loaded notion of spirituality. 
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paths - Esoteric Christian, Buddhist, Dionysian and Apollonian - and viewed as the 
experiential melting pot of these diverse dynasties. 
The overlapping edges of these combined traditions are placed alongside each 
other within the SAT programme, with the intention of systematically addressing 
our collective and individual truths through the deliberate experiencing of self 
and other. These truths of collective and individual being are approached through 
a variety of technologies that facilitate the exploration of the self on three levels: 
firstly, the experience of the self as ego or mask, essentially limited and limiting in 
nature, necessarily and ontologically 'fallen' from the grace of full awareness; 
secondly, the experience of the self's potential for thinking, feeling and doing 
above and beyond the ego's limitations; and thirdly, the experience of the self as 
the experience of consciousness, the unifying ground or stage on which our 
psychic life is played out. The 'truth' to be experienced is a continuous thread of 
these three intertwined dimensions of self, and the resulting experience of 
identity as perhaps more uncertain and shifting than what Aristotle called the 
"unexamined" identity. 
As we can see from this brief description of content and intent, the SAT 
programme is conspicuously, unashamedly, an assemblage or bricolage. A 
participant going through the full SAT programme will be exposed to the 
enneagram of personality, Buddhist meditation, spontaneous movement, group 
therapy, theatre for reparation, re-parenting, re-birthing, peer therapy, and a time 
line (a replay of similar problematic scenes stretching back into childhood, and 
adapted from Neuro-linguistic Programming). Of these the enneagram of 
personality, Buddhist meditation and peer therapy are the only constants across 
the three or four eight day residential retreats that comprise the programme 
(these retreats are normally programmed at yearly intervals). From the 
perspective of the disciplines, such a bricolage is an anathema, creating as it does 
a territory occupied by apparently conflicting discourses, and therefore lacking 
the rigour of a sustained and exclusive claim to truth. However, the principle of 
bricolage is easily sustained within a Foucauldian ethos in which the disputed 
territory of absolute truth as generalizable is replaced by a consideration and 
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embrace for difference, diversity and specificity and the relations of power 
between discourses and practices. 
Whilst this idea of the bricolage is conceptually relevant, in terms of participants' 
experience it is the enneagram of personality that stands out as the most clearly 
defined body of knowledge that participants are actively and consciously learning. 
This diagnostic tool provides an ongoing point of reference for the other 
components of the SAT programme; it is, so to speak, the glue that holds the 
bricolage together. It is worth, therefore, spending a little time describing this 
particular "technology of self' (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000c, pp.223-251), said to 
derive from the Christian esoteric tradition. Whilst some special attention to the 
enneagram of personality perhaps desirable, given its central role in the SAT 
programme, bearing in mind the deliberate eclecticism of the SAT programme, it 
is perhaps more useful to focus attention on an overarching ethos than to dwell on 
each of the component elements (for a general description of the psycho-spiritual 
principles underlying the enneagram see Appendix 1.). This ethos can be seen as 
being rooted in Naranjo's origins as a Gestalt psychotherapist. If Gestalt 
psychotherapy as an overt and active 'technique' has a relatively minor part to 
play in the curriculum of the SAT programme, its spirit informs the experience as 
a whole, not only the interpretation of the 'problem' (i.e. the interruption of 
humans' organic wisdom) but also with its proposed 'solutions'. To illustrate 
Naranjo's perspective on this ethos it is worth quoting at length from his book 
Gestalt Therapy: The Attitude and Practice of an Atheoretical Experimentalism 
(2000). As the title of his book suggests, the Gestalt approach in which Naranjo is 
interested is derived from a central valuation of the raw material of human 
experience in determining the value or 'quality' of an individual and their 
relations. The richness of experience as a source of understanding stands in 
contrast to the 'emptiness' of technical knowledge: 
Much has been written on psychotherapy as technique - that is, from the 
standpoint of effects upon the patient of the therapist's actions or 
interpretations. In discussions of this sort, the patient's experiences are 
always seen as elicited by deliberate choices of behaviour on the part of 
the therapist. What is left out, however, is the notion that experience may 
be passed on, and that, as life proceeds from life, a certain depth of 
experience may perhaps be only brought about by the presence of 
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another being partaking in that depth, and not by manipulations. If 
attitude is a deeper issue than technique, and if technique issues from 
attitudes, experience is still a deeper issue than attitudes and constitutes 
their source. Without the appropriate attitude techniques become empty 
forms. Without experience even attitude becomes second-hand dogmas. 
Just as a dead organism cannot reproduce itself, mere dead attitudes 
cannot engender any corresponding attitude in another being. 
Experience, on the other hand, is self-duplicating. It creates the external 
forms that convey its pulsating heart. (Naranjo, 2000, pp.16-17) 
The intention of the SAT, therefore, is to create an environment in which trials, 
tribulations and joys of character and beyond character can be experienced, 
individually and collectively in such a way that certain knowledge and attitudes 
are awoken or promoted which favour creative growth and carry forward the 
individual psycho-spiritual journey. But what are the attitudes proposed by Gestalt 
therapy? Naranjo identifies three attitudes as follows: 
These three [attitudes] - an appreciation of actuality, of awareness, and 
of responsibility - constitute the core attitudes of Gestalt. Though three 
different attitudes in appearance, they are but aspects of facets of a 
single mode of being in the world. To be responsible (response-able) 
entails being present, being here. And being truly present is being 
aware. Awareness, in turn, is presence - reality - and a condition 
incompatible with the illusion of irresponsibility by means of which we 
avoid living our lives (or knowing that we do live them, whatever we 
may think). (2000, p.7) 
Whilst Naranjo describes values specific to Gestalt therapy, this description is 
transposable to the SAT programme. These values are intended not only to speak 
to us as a potential mode of subjectivity, a means of being in the world and 
experiencing self and other, they are also intended to inform and create a style or 
principle of transmission of experience, teaching and learning; in short, a 
pedagogy. This pedagogy is characterized, as Naranjo makes explicit in his 
description of the Gestaltian therapeutic relationship, by a principle of contagion. 
This contagion is made possible by the quality of the relationship, and the quality 
of the relationship is in turn made possible by the depth of experience of its 
participants and the possibility and practice of authenticity; in short, by presence. 
This pedagogy of presence can be considered especially significant for the teachers 
who participate in the SAT. Having said this, it is important to underline that the 
SAT programme was not designed for teachers. If teachers have been encouraged 
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to participate as part of Naranjo's commitment to the "democratization of 
psychotherapy—or, on a broader scale, an education that teaches people to work 
spiritually and psychologically on themselves" (Naranjo, 2009, p. 169), the teacher is 
primarily involved and addressed as a person and not as a teacher. This 
'accidental' nature of the involvement of teachers means that the SAT programme 
is not designed with teachers in mind, and it does not aim to address the specifics 
of their professional situation, and thus falls outside what would commonly be 
regarded as professional development in teaching. Ironically, it is this 'outsider' 
status and flavour that perhaps makes the SAT interesting. By falling outside 
dominant discourses the SAT programme takes on the condition of being sui 
generis, and thus offers teachers the benefit of something new, offering the 
challenge and interest of an experience that comes from 'left field'. Considering 
Pignatelli's (1993, 1993b) call for a new way of teachers knowing themselves, this 
is highly significant. Pignatelli challenges the status quo of teacher identity work 
from a Foucauldian perspective that calls into question the progressive agendas 
rooted in the 'truths' of the human sciences, and proposes instead an ongoing 
refusal to unquestioningly 'tow the line' and a parallel development of alternative 
teacher agencies: 
Freedom emerges as a call to refuse oppressive, debilitating identities 
'discovered' through the human sciences; as skepticism toward well-
meaning, progressive agendas; as a restless imagining; as, in fact, a risk. 
This has important consequences for framing a notion of teacher 
agency. Where agency is guided by technicist or therapeutic [teacher as 
'saviour] concerns, it remains indebted to, and enmeshed in, the work 
of the human sciences . . . Put differently, truths arrived at through 
orderly method, scientific inquiry, and prescriptive theorizing 
predispose and deeply constrain the way one understands and 
practices teacher agency. Therefore, proposing an alternative way of 
thinking about teacher agency involves teachers finding alternative 
ways of knowing the truth about themselves. (1993b, p. 420) 
It can be argued that the SAT programme addresses the need identified by 
Pignatelli to attend to teacher agency, replacing the technicist or 'teacher as 
saviour' discourse with a psycho-spiritual discourse which seems far removed 
from the standard fare of institutional school life. 
However, whilst the SAT is notably 'left field' and does not sit easily alongside the 
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standard fare of contemporary teacher development opportunities, there are some 
features of the SAT experience that are `schoolish'. If 'school' is not explicit in the 
SAT's 'content', it is present in other forms, indeed the SAT programme is 
sometimes referred to as a "school" by Naranjo (2009). This is not the institution 
of school, and reference to the SAT as a school is best understood in a spiritual-
philosophical body of knowledge-practice, a site or situation of teaching and 
learning. Whilst not 'institutional', the programme contains basic elements that 
will be familiar to teachers - there is a loose timetable, different 'subjects' divided 
into different periods of the day, and there is a recognizable group of 'teachers' and 
a larger body of 'students', and, accordingly, a loose distribution of 
power/authority. Recognizable 'teaching' occurs, and recognizable 'learning'. It is a 
recognizable pedagogic environment despite the teaching and learning experience 
(characterized by respect for others, listening, flexibility, purposive informality, 
physical ease, and 'authenticity') being noticeably alternative to highly managed 
institutional settings, even where these settings are grounded in a similar 
'institutional' rhetoric. The fact that the SAT programme is easily recognized as a 
pedagogic experience is perhaps one of its most important features when 
considering the participation of teachers. The fact that significant teaching and 
learning occurs within a group under conditions that are simultaneously 
recognizable to teachers, yet different in many key aspects, permits critical 
comparisons to be made, and permits teachers to situate the knowledge base of the 
SAT within the pedagogic exchange. Teachers studying the same information and 
concepts in books, or doing distance learning online, are unlikely to be able to 
make the same connections with their own working life, as teachers immersed in 
the group learning experience provided by the SAT. 
Ultimately, it is intended that the knowledge, ethos and intense experience of a 
shared humanity, a shared journey, the balm and longing for community and 
communication of that same journey, will provide the fertile and 'magical' ground 
for transformation. The conceptual and practical or experiential bricolage 
assembled by Naranjo would appear to be in no small measure at the service of the 
creation of an authentic, if temporary, community, and Naranjo attributes what he 
sees as the SAT's effectiveness in no small measure to the 'magic' that can occur in 
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groups (Naranjo, 2010, p.168). Undeniably, the fact that 50 - 100 people separated 
from their routine and their familiar circumstances are 'thrown' together over a 
period of 9 days, and will (ideally) all come together again during a total of 3 or 4 
retreats, is a significant feature of the experience. The importance of this group 
cannot be underestimated, not only because people come to recognize the truth of, 
learn about, and negotiate 'otherness', or because they can see their idiosyncrasies 
and commonalities reflected in others, but also because, according to Naranjo, 
'healing' occurs in relationship, just as the madness of character or neurosis is 
formed in relationship (Naranjo, 1994). The SAT is a microcosm of the relational 
world - and intensity and ambiguity of relationship, or of a resistance to 
relationship, is a key experience in disturbing the fixed ground of personalities. 
Furthermore, it is the group format that permits a democratization of the 
psychological and spiritual and facilitates an economy of participation that means 
that teachers' psycho-spiritual growth can feasibly be attended to en masse. 
As a collective experiential rollercoaster, Naranjo likens the SAT programme to an 
"initiation" (2010, p.168), a shared cultural form that denotes a point on a journey, 
a rite of passage marked by a sense of a before and after, whose survival implies 
merit, not necessarily from the achievement of set goals (our all too familiar 
'targets'), but by virtue of participation. The SAT is to be regarded as an initiation 
"in the sense that it brings people to an unknown dimension: it sets them forth on 
a path that—in spite of not being a predetermined one—is a process that becomes 
irresistible as the journeyers begin to comprehend its meaning" (ibid.). An 
important parallel can be made here with Foucault's understanding of testing2 -
produced as an "event" and occurring through struggle, ordeal, contest (testing 
almost as a right of passage) - as the source of a now discredited truth (Miller, 
1993, p.2'71). This is a form of truth accessed or 'created' through what Foucault 
terms the limit experience, and requiring and fostering a "limit-attitude" (Foucault 
2 This idea of testing should not be confused with examination which is the term that Foucault uses 
to describe those techniques of power that are used to describe individuals and to distribute them 
around a norm. Teachers are normally highly implicated in the procedures and consequences of 
examination. Testing, on the other hand, can be understood as the harder ethical or material 
challenges of life, through which we come to grow as psycho-spiritual entities. Testing can be 
understood as the central experience of mythology and fairy tales. 
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and Rabinow, 1991, p.45, emphasis in original). It is, in part, this truth as event that 
stands out as a resistance to the problematized political, economic, institutional 
regime of the production of truth in which teachers find themselves so implicated. 
Up until now this description the SAT programme has been largely theoretical. As a 
final touch of perspective, the addition of another dimension, I will briefly try to 
describe a typical day in the SAT programme, a kind of 'Day in the Life Of a SAT 
participant. This is relatively easy to do if we were to limit the description to the 
mornings, but becomes more difficult when including the afternoons, as the 
content of the afternoons varies greatly at each level of the SAT. The variation in 
the afternoon sessions is part of what marks the progressive, sequential nature of 
the programme. This said, I will describe an typical day of the SAT 1, said to be the 
'Dionysian SAT', involving above all the exploration of self and the embrace of its 
limits and possibilities. The day begins at 7.30am with the group all together doing 
some kind of body/movement work. This work is not thought of as exercise, nor is 
it purely expressive; rather, it looks to establish a contact between the physical 
body, thought, and emotion, and to open up the communicative possibilities 
between these three elements. To use a rather common metaphor, the movement 
work of the morning can be seen as the ploughing of the field in which the seeds of 
the day's themes will be planted. The aim is to upset the body-mind-soul 
constellation described by Foucault as 'docile', and to expose the fertile 
possibilities of its underside. This bodywork takes between 60 and 90 minutes, 
and is followed by breakfast. At 10am the group comes together again for a 
meditation session which, between explication, meditation 'proper', and comments 
and questions, lasts approximately one hour. The style or focus of this meditation 
will vary - in SAT 1 it is Taravada, SAT 2 it is Zen, in SAT 3 it is Tibetan. These 
variants can be considered as different methodologies for the exploration of the 
mind, and the question 'Who are we?' As I am describing a day of SAT 1, the 
Taravada meditation will focus on two practices - that of awareness (i.e. what is 
occurring here and now), and shamata (to stop doing and enter into silence). 
Whilst meditation is generally associated with esoteric, other-worldly aspirations, 
the intention of meditation in this context is rooted firmly in the idea that 
meditation provides the subject with 'laboratory' conditions for the exploration of 
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self, it is a microscope in which the patterns and compulsions of our thinking are 
magnified on a neutral backdrop of inactivity. If the 'goal' is inactivity, we become 
all too aware of the nature of our activity. It is important to add that the meditation 
practice in the SAT contains the important variant of being conducted in pairs. 
Participants do not generally meditate alone, but sitting in front of another person, 
and at some point visual contact is established. The inter-personal nature of the 
meditation, the meeting of (un?)defended gazes is one of the most powerful 
experiences and possibilities that takes root during the SAT. For some people it 
may be the first time that they have met and held the gaze of another person. The 
end of meditation 'proper' is followed by an opportunity for people to share their 
experience with their meditation partners, and then to put comments and 
questions to the facilitator. 
Following on from meditation, the morning session continues with enneagram 
related activities. Some part of enneagram theory will be explained to the group, 
and participants will engage with this theory either through individuals reporting 
to the whole group, or though work in pairs or larger groups. Generally this work 
is exploratory; participants will explore their experience/behaviour, or help 
others in their explorations, in relation to a question, or a theme that is in some 
way generated by the enneagram and its theory of personality/neurosis. An 
example of a question/theme explored in the SAT 1 is 'What are you like in 
respect to money, work, friendship, romance, family?'. This question is explored in 
fairly large groups who are working together because they believe they are the 
same personality type. The group is asked to look for differences and similarities 
in behavioural and attitudinal patterns and to be as concrete as possible, giving 
examples of 'typical' or 'default' positions. This group experience is often highly 
animated and sometimes tensions arise as people try to match 'theory' and with 
the diversity of their experiences. Some people may feel themselves to not quite 
'fit' with the group in important areas of their life and can move on to another 
group to see if there is a better 'fit'. In other cases the group may report to an 
individual that they feel them to be 'different'. This group work will probably take 
place about half way through the SAT 1, and is a watershed moment in 
establishing a principle of self-exploration. Ultimately, each individual is 
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responsible for identifying in which group they feel there is the best fit. This can 
be a painful and difficult process, one which often reveals how far a person is from 
being able to 'see themselves', and it can provide clear evidence of the subject's 
inability to get a perspective on themselves, their difficulty in establishing a 
vantage point for Foucauldian thought. At some point, depending on time, these 
personality groups will be expected to report back to the whole group on their 
findings, and this gives further opportunity for people to familiarize themselves 
with the 'profiles' of the different groups and to see themselves in relief. 
As well as this type of group work, very closely related to the enneagram, the 
morning session will very often include a practice known as 'mutual therapy'. This 
is essentially an opportunity for participants to engage in peer therapy through 
the organization of a chain therapist-client-therapist-client that runs through the 
whole group. Each participant will be the therapist of one person and the client of 
another, these two relationships remaining fixed throughout the retreat (i.e. 
people stay with the same patient or therapist). If peer therapy is 'on the menu' on 
any day, each person will spend some time in the role of patient and some time in 
the role of therapist. The 'turns' generally last from 15 to 45 minutes. Clients and 
therapists are given instructions regarding the theme and how to work together 
in any particular session. Particularly important given the possible stress of 
assuming the role of therapist among participants who do not feel themselves to 
be 'qualified', the sessions in the SAT 1 emphasize a basic attitude of listening, 
sometimes with the possibility of very basic interventions. From this perspective 
the 'therapist' is not a figure who understands the secrets of the clients soul, and 
can conjure up a cure for their 'illness'; rather, they are a person who is making 
themselves available to their client through the cultivation of listening and an 
empathic presence. It is this availability that is the a-theoretical 'skill' of the 
therapist, the key feature of their role. The therapist does not provide answers, 
advice, or interpretations; rather, they facilitate the client's self-exploration. The 
role of therapist is difficult for different reasons - some will find the more 
neutral/passive attitude of the role the most difficult, accustomed as they are to 
act vigorously upon the other, while some therapists will find it more difficult to 
become increasingly active in a session, worried as they might be about getting it 
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right and feeling exposed because they are not 'professionals'. Likewise, the client 
will often face their difficulties when asked to talk about themselves outside of the 
conventions of conversation. 
The mutual therapy ingredient in the SAT is the opportunity to establish an 
intimate relationship within the group experience of the SAT, at least in terms of 
the formal content (other spaces for fostering 'special' relations exist in the rest 
times). Ideally the client-therapist relationship will be one of the most important 
points of reference for participants, an anchor which the participants return to 
repeatedly over the days. Much can be learnt about the self and other in this 
space, which is formalized (i.e. has clear roles) but at the same time democratized 
(i.e. the therapist is not working from a basis of being a qualified 'expert', but from 
the basis of being human). This has interesting effects in terms of the relations of 
power occurring in the mutual therapy relationship. Both therapist and client are 
very much exploring, together, a terrain filled with uncertainties and ambiguities. 
Finding a way together through a relationship with ambiguous referents of power, 
or, conversely, floundering in anger, dissatisfaction, and inauthenticity, mutual 
therapy, when included, is an important part of the days activities, and one in 
which the person is revealed to themselves and to the other in a variety of ways. 
The morning session over, a two-hour lunch break follows. Whilst this may 
appear ample time in the first days, as the week progresses two hours begins to 
feel too short as people take advantage of the lunchtime to catch up on their rest 
and recharge their batteries. This will be needed because the afternoon sessions 
are usually intense and can finish late. If the morning can be described as more 
theoretical learning, the afternoons could be considered a time for experiential 
learning. In the SAT 1 two different stages for experiential learning are provided -
the first, spontaneous movement, looks to develop outer activity or movement 
from an inner attention or self-relation, and the second, theatre for reparation, 
looks to develop inner activity or movement from an outer attention or relations 
with others. The group, sometimes divided into two depending on numbers, will 
spend approximately two hours in spontaneous movement, and two hours in 
theatre, with a break in between the two. Spontaneous movement is a practice 
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that can be likened to a meditation in movement. Its aim is to cultivate the ability 
to establish an ongoing connection with the instinctual communication of the 
body; the impulses that reflect the bodies 'understanding' and expression of 
desire and need, or that reflect its truth. If, normally, the body is a 'docile' 
appendage to our reasoned intentionality, a tool at the disposition of our life 
project and subject to the ethical and institutional discipline of our times, then 
spontaneous movement looks to create a knowledge of what the body does or 
does not do when left to its own devices. The work requires the creation of certain 
roles (mover and witness) and certain conditions (the person moving has their 
eyes closed), but beyond a very loose framework the participants are set free into 
a space/time continuum which is characterized by a lack of rules/indications. 
During the two hours dedicated to spontaneous movement each afternoon a 
participant will be both witness and mover, and nearly always will have 
participated in some preparatory activities of bodywork. Movers and witnesses 
work in pairs, alternating roles, and they get an opportunity also to share their 
experiences. Sharing provides an opportunity to attempt to 'make sense' of what 
has been a non-verbal exercise (sounds but not words are permitted when 
moving). 
The inner to outer gesture of spontaneous movement (facilitated through having 
eyes closed) is inverted in theatre which, as a rule, relies upon creating a dialogue 
with the other (including the audience). From this situation of dialogue with the 
other, frequently taking the form of a conflict (i.e. x wants to divorce y, but y is 
certain that their differences can be resolved), a greater understanding of self is 
cultivated and perhaps some inner movement generated which will allow the 
'actor' the go through an inner 'reparation' and movement, and thus to go out 
toward the other through a gesture that might previously have been unavailable. 
Theatre is perhaps the most feared activity of the SAT 1. Though the different 
theatre teachers have different ways of working, it is likely that a participant's 
turn to 'act' is seen as their moment of greatest exposure. Even if levels of 
exposure can vary greatly - from being on stage alone, to sharing it with ten 
people - the fact of a stage and an audience, and the possibility of conflict, and of 
being proven insufficient to the event, is what generates the dramatic tension that 
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underlies each performance. In most cases participants, when they are on stage, 
are operating at the limit of the possibilities. The theatre teacher will, generally 
speaking, direct the improvisation to a point that the actor, or actors, becomes 
'cornered', and, in order to survive the moment and remain viable as a dramatic 
personae, must become aware of the impasse and find a new response within 
their repertoire. The actor thus finds themselves doing, saying, and feeling things 
that they would not normally do, say or feel. This 'metamorphosis', even if 
temporary, is powerful, and is all the more powerful because it is witnessed by the 
audience and the other actors on stage. It becomes a collective experience of the 
'otherness' that might be cohabiting the familiar 'meness'. 
Theatre normally marks the end of the working day in the SAT 1 programme. It 
will probably be late - anytime between nine and ten o'clock. If normal activities 
have finished relatively early a film might be shown before bed, otherwise people 
are left to their own devices. Such is the nature of the programme that sleep is 
often difficult to come by. People are too nervous to sleep well, or are sharing 
rooms and get disturbed by others, or will stay up late talking. Come what may, no 
matter how tired, people are encouraged to make the effort to get up early to start 
the daily cycle again with early morning movement. And so as the days go by, 
people become progressively more tired, and, usually, progressively more 
comfortable within the previously unfamiliar dynamics of the programme. It is 
most likely, as they fall into the bed at the end of each day, that most participants 
would agree with Naranjo's description of the SAT as a kind of "initiation" (op.cit.), 
a rite of passage which requires strength and courage to sustain yourself within, 
and comprises a series of mini-victories at the edges of self. 
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Chapter 3: A Methodology 
A Qualitative Case Study 
This research is conceived as a qualitative case study to evaluate a specific 
contemporary phenomenon - the participation of teachers in a psycho-spiritual 
retreat programme - and uses theory to support and inform the generation of data 
and to place that same data within an analytical framework. The case study 
approach has been chosen for its evaluative tradition and because the research 
questions circulate around a central 'how' question, broadly defined as 'How do 
teachers experience the SAT programme and how does their experience of 
themselves within that programme subsequently play out in terms of teacher 
identity and professional practice?' The use of case study is supported by Yin's 
definition of the circumstances for preferring the "explanatory" form of the case 
study: 
In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life context. (2003, p.1) 
Yin provides another argument for the suitability of case study in relation to this 
particular research; the importance of context: "You would use the case study 
method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual conditions -
believing they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study" (ibid.). 
Context is critical to my conception of the research: on one level, it is the context of 
the subject themselves and the way in which this subjectivity has been 'worked-on' 
during the programme, and on the other level it is the organizational context of 
schools and schooling. The interest in the broad context compensates for the fact 
that this research presents a "situation in which there will be many more variables 
of interest than data point". For this reason "the case study may be used to explore 
those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set 
of outcomes" (ibid., p.15). 
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It is evident that the diversity of subjectivity, and the diversity of contexts in which 
this subjectivity takes shape and operates, means that the research has to 
encompass any number of outcomes, some of which may be 'predicted' 
theoretically and from experience, others that may arise out of the particularities 
of teachers as people and as professionals or the particularities of any specific 
context. If and when particularities arise, the research focus will remain on the 
"holistic" or global nature of the research as informed by the theoretical 
background (Yin, 1994). If the individualizing nature of the intervention being 
studied (the SAT programme's focuses on both the generalities and particularities 
of self), necessitates a regard for the whole person in data collection, their story as 
they tell it, data analysis is filtered through global concerns generated theoretically, 
by way of Foucault and other thinkers. This is in keeping with Yin's definition of 
the features of case study as benefiting "from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis" (Yin, 2003, p.14). 
Data Collection 
Although the case study has often been characterized by multiple methods of data 
collection (Robson, 2002, p.178), this feature has not been applied in this research. 
From the outset the interview was conceived as the only way to access the 
complexities of self and its interactions with context and with itself The use of 
interview clearly has its disadvantages for the researcher, such as: the lack of 
standardization and possible biases generate concerns about reliability; they are 
by nature time consuming, especially when one-to-one and when considering the 
task of transcription; also, they can be difficult to analyse, especially when open-
ended questioning is used. However, such disadvantages were considered to be 
outweighed by the interview's "potential of providing rich and highly illuminating 
material" (Robson, 2002, p.273). Open-ended questioning when combined with a 
semi-structured format (as was the case in this study), allows the interviewer 
greater flexibility in the approach to gathering data, and facilitates attempts to 
elicit what the respondent really believes, as well as a co-operative approach to the 
construction of this 'knowledge' which should be based on rapport. As long as the 
interviewer can maintain a certain control over the direction of the questions and 
answers, the responsive nature of the semi-structured, open-ended interview 
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means that a good interviewer can follow the train of thinking that is emerging 
from the respondent rather than coming at the field from a series of fixed 
assumptions or preconceptions, such as might be the case in a highly structured 
interview in which all questions are pre-determined. The 'tailor-made' possibilities 
of the semi-structured, open-ended interview are enhanced when this is carried 
out in a one-to-one format (as opposed to a focus group, for example). The focus on 
one interviewee enabled me to 'construct' the interview as it unfolded, creating the 
sense of rapport that was one of the key means by which I hoped interviewees 
would feel they could speak freely and honestly. 
This is not to say that I arrived at the interview as a 'blank slate'. The interview 
technique adopted most resembles the "focused interview" as conceived by 
Kitwood (in Cohen and Manion, 1994; see also Merton et al., 1956); i.e. "situational 
analysis" previous to the interviews was used to generate an interview guide 
covering the major areas of enquiry and research questions. The interviews 
subsequently concentrate on the subjective experience of those involved. During 
the pilot interview stage, the prior knowledge informing the interview was not the 
result of a specific "situational analysis" within the framework of the research; 
rather, it was a knowledge accumulated by myself prior to beginning the research. 
This knowledge comprised a long experience of working with teachers and 
considerable familiarity with the theory and practice of the SAT programme. This 
proved invaluable in eliciting "thick description" (Geertz 1973) from teachers. As 
the research progressed, theoretical reading provided a further element by which 
to focus interviews. As Merton and Kendel argue: 
Equipped in advance with a content analysis, the interviewer can readily 
distinguish the objective facts of the case from the subjective definitions 
of the situation. He [sic] thus becomes alert to the entire field of 
'selective response'. When the interviewer, through his familiarity with 
the objective situation, is able to recognise symbolic or functional 
silences, 'distortions', avoidances, or blockings, he is more prepared to 
explore their implications. (Merton and Kendel, in Cohen and Manion, 
1994, p.290) 
If Merton and Kendel highlight foreknowledge's potential for overcoming negative 
possibilities, in my own experience foreknowledge helped 'guide' or facilitate the 
interviewees' elaboration of their own experience. In this sense, foreknowledge 
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facilitated what might approximate to the therapeutic relation as understood by 
Naranjo's characterization of the Gestalt therapist as one who can facilitate 
experience from the grounds of their own experience (Naranjo, 2000). Moreover, 
my own psychotherapeutic training in the humanist school enabled me to occupy a 
therapeutic style as proposed by Carl Rogers: 
Rogers [...] identified a number of qualities in the interviewer which he 
deemed essential: that she bases her work on attitudes of acceptance 
and permissiveness; that she accepts the client's responsibility for his 
own situations; that she permits the client to explain his problem in his 
own way; and that she does nothing that would in any way arouse the 
client's defences. (Cohen and Manion, 1994, p.288) 
These interview techniques and styles were seen to be consistent within the 
broader context of the research, as the interview itself, both for the researcher 
and the interviewee, grew out of their interest in and experience of the 
psychotherapeutic genre, which provided the common point of reference, the 
shared language. If some level of empathy could be assumed by the interviewees' 
willingness to be interviewed and by a common history, a solidarity, this had to be 
nurtured, not just so that interviewees would talk, but that they might also talk 
from the heart, that it would acquire the consistency, and eloquence, of natural, 
undefended speech: 
[T]he main purpose of using the interview in research is that it is 
believed that in an interpersonal encounter people are more likely to 
disclose aspects of themselves, their thoughts, their feelings and values, 
than they would in a less human situation. In other words, the 
distinctively human element in the interview is necessary to its 
'validity'. (Kitwood, in Cohen and Manion, 1994, p.282) 
Naturalness was intended as the baseline condition of the interview. Its intensity 
varied across a spectrum from relaxed, friendly and light-hearted, to densely 
thoughtful, to emotive and emotionally charged. 'Felt speech', sometimes 
accompanied by tears, can, above all, be seen to be further evidence of a subjective 
truth being elaborated and communicated. At such moments, questions of 
reliability or duplicity of interpretation appear churlish. 
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Hearing is Believing? 
There is very often an underlying assumption within the use of interviews of "pure 
information transfer", whereby "if the respondent is sincere, accurate information 
may be obtained", and "there is a permanent, consistent 'core' to the personality, 
about which a person will give information under certain conditions" (Kitwood, in 
Cohen and Manion, 1994, p.274). However, in general 
[i]t has now come to be recognized that insight of this kind is very 
rarely achieved and that when it is, it is after long and difficult effort, 
usually in the context of repeated clinical interviews. (Cohen and 
Manion, 1994, p.283) 
Convery (1999), talking specifically about research with teachers, also casts doubt 
on the assumption that the information offered to researchers by teachers is not 
'manipulated', consciously or unconsciously, by the teacher who knows themselves 
to be situated in a field criss-crossed with expectations. It is undeniable there are 
indeed problems with the reliability of data in such an intimate exchange. We can 
be fairly sure that most interviewees will want, at the very least, to be liked by the 
interviewer, and vice versa. Furthermore, some interviewees may feel compelled 
by a desire to impress with their answers. The search for reliable data is certainly 
compromised by the social visibility of the respondent in the interview setting, a 
visibility that can be avoided by the use, for example, of anonymous 
questionnaires. 
However, there is a case to be argued that significant knowledge and 
understanding can also be constructed in the interview setting, i.e. in dialogue. 
Respondents can, perhaps, come to know and understand things over the course of 
a conversation that they would not necessarily know when sat in a room on their 
own with a questionnaire. Clearly, in adopting the interview as the method of data 
collection one enters into a situation of swings and roundabouts. I would argue 
that the interviews of this study took place in particularly favourable 
circumstances with respect to the respondents' disposition to talk openly and 
freely. All respondents had been voluntarily examining themselves within a 
challenging process of 'self-knowledge' and its uncomfortable truths, and were 
'sensitized' to the possibilities for authenticity and transparency. This represented 
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a privileged opportunity to 'get under the skin' of teachers. The risks, both of wilful 
distortions and silences, were, I believe, considerably reduced and favoured the 
avoidance of the "bad faith narratives" identified by Craib, in which the 
respondents storytelling naïvely (and perhaps totally unconsciously) serves to 
defend them (and us) from truths too difficult to be borne, or simply to place us 
within the "conventions and usages our culture provides us with" (2000, p.65). 
If there is a possibility of "bad faith" within the research, it might perhaps be found 
in the uncritical adoption of the new language of subjectivity provided by the SAT 
programme, and, in relation to this, the prevalence of responses within the 
interview aimed simply to please the interviewer. Attempts to mitigate this were 
built into the interview design/style through a concern to elicit concrete examples 
that illustrated changes 'in action', in the belief that new or evolving 'behaviour' 
gives the most compelling and important evidence for changing beliefs and is 
difficult to fabricate convincingly. Also, the questioning style, in the main, was 
analytic: that is to say, it required the interviewee to elaborate, interpret, and make 
connections. This means that the interviewees' attention was firmly situated 
within the nexus of their own narrative. For example, one such 'starting' question, 
'What was the most significant thing you learnt in the SAT programme, and how do 
you think it has influenced you at work?', demands an answer that is not easy to 
manipulate; rather, it must be elaborated in the moment, as learning or 
communication. These answers come alive by being perceived at the point and in 
the moment of telling. It is from here that language "sings". This valuation of the 
'internal' quality of language as grounds for its validity has exponents, as Robson 
(2002) points out: 
Altheide and Johnson (1994) argue that the fields in the humanities such 
as history and literature employ evaluative criteria such as elegance, 
coherence and consistency which provide more appropriate standards 
for qualitative studies. While they may appear imprecise to traditional 
positivistically inclined researchers, it is worth noting that even a notion 
so vague as elegance is used as a central criterion for the choice of one 
explanation over a rival in fields such as theoretical physics, the very 
heartland of natural science. (pp.167-168) 
In relation to validity-reliability, triangulation between data from interviewers was 
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used to look for some kind of coherence. The global or holistic evaluative picture is 
based upon the coherence of trends balanced by an understanding of the 
individuality of each interviewee. In building this collage, data analysis has been 
concerned not just with volumes of evidence to cram into the code 'bins', rather 
evidence was deemed to be evidence on the basis of its internal qualities as 
narrative, and its plausibility within the larger narrative of the interviewee 
(plausibility, in part being assessed in psychological terms). 
Some Logistics of Talking 
The research began with a series of 4 pilot interviews in Mexico, followed by 6 
interviews in Spain. Although these interviews were focused by virtue of my own 
knowledge and experience, and provided what I consider to be significant data, 
they simultaneously provided me with the "exploratory pole" for the subsequent 
research design (Robson, 2002, p.185), used by researchers "to refine their data 
collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to 
be followed" (Yin, 1994, p.74). Procedures included explaining the context and 
broad objectives of the research, describing the way I had come to be doing the 
research, and the deliberate creation of a relaxed, informal setting. The interviews 
were audio taped, and full transcriptions subsequently made. Over the course of 
the pilot interviews, the theme/question guide became less and less important, 
and the interview unfolded more conversationally, the themes and focuses held 
exclusively in my head. This conversation was facilitated by moving my attention 
away from the guide and towards the answers being given. 
One other evolution in interview technique was how to end the interview, which 
had proven more difficult than beginning the interview. If all interviews began 
with some professional details (length of service etc), on the basis of the pilot 
experience one 'formal' question was added to finish the interviews as an attempt 
to explore the interview as a formative experience: 'Is there anything that you have 
learnt during this interview? Is there anything that surprised you?' Different 
answers arose from this question, but a common theme was surprise at the depth 
of the interview, implying that it had been felt as a journey through something, a 
small-scale Foucauldian 'event'. 
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The interview style, developed over the course of the pilot interviews, and lasting 
between one hour and two hours, served as the basis for the additional 10 
interviews conducted during the research, bringing the total number of interviews 
to 20. All participants were volunteers who responded either to an invitation to 
participate in the research extended to them during a SAT, or via an email 
distributed via the SAT database. Those responding positively to the invitation 
were chosen on the following basis: 
• Enneagram number - as enneagram theory and practice locates different 
ethical problems for different personality types, it was important that 
kaleidoscope of possible transformations was reflected in the study. A view 
of changing teacher identity dominated by one character type would have 
skewed the true multiplicity of learning around teacher identity and agency. 
If we are to believe enneagram theory, or at least the validity of teachers' 
identification with a particular character type, then a balanced sample 
permits a more generalizable theoretical application across the teacher 
population as a whole. 
• Accessibility. I had to be able to reach them fairly easily. For this reason 
Spanish respondents are from Barcelona or its surrounds, and Mexican 
respondents from Chiapas. 
• Nationality. The research proposed roughly equal division between 
Mexican and Spanish respondents 
• Gender. Though the SAT programme attracts a larger proportion of women, 
an effort was made to include a significant number of men (6) in the 
sample. 
• Age. A variety of ages was deemed desirable, but not determinate in 
selection or non-selection. 
• Teaching level. A variety of teaching levels from pre-school to university 
was deemed desirable, but not determinate in selection or non-selection. 
This diversity was intended to illuminate and reflect common themes 
running through teacher identity, especially in relation to structure and 
performativity. 
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The total of twenty interviews were finally made up of eight interviewees from 
Mexico and twelve from Spain. Five of the Spanish interviews took place in an 
office in Barelona that had been lent to me for the purpose. These Barcelona 
interviews were conducted with people who responded to the email invitation 
sent out by the SAT's organizers in Spain, and was restricted to people who were 
living relatively nearby and could travel to the office. In this case, the interview 
was the first time we had met, although we will have had email or telephone 
exchanges to organize the day and time. Also, seven interviews in Spain were 
conducted 'on location' in a SAT programme. Interviews taking place during a SAT 
programme were done on the basis of an informal invitation, and time was found 
during one of the breaks. I did not 'know' these interviewees either, in any 
significant way, although we might have seen each other, or had some 
conversation during the days previous to the interview. In the case of Mexico, 
because of my more direct involvement in organizing the SAT programme in 
Mexico, I had had previous contact with all of the Mexican interviewees as I had 
been present during their SAT itself. Three of the Mexican interviews took place 
during one of the SAT retreats, whist the other five occurred in a variety of 
locations, including houses and restaurants. In the case of the five interviews 
occurring outside the SAT, emails were sent out to people who had been identified 
as teachers asking if they would be willing to participate.. 
A brief description of each interviewee is provided below: 
Angeles (Mexico). Having worked in 'popular' education with adults, Angeles had 
entered secondary education in a small, progressive private school in Mexico. At 
36 years of age, after four years of teaching experience she had been promoted to 
school director where she was currently working. Though she still recognizes 
herself as a social activist, she can also see that in becoming a teacher she has, to 
some degree, climbed out of the front line 'trenches' to be absorbed within 
another, less confrontational ethos addressing itself to building the new society 
(generations) rather than opposing the existing structures. Angeles had arrived at 
the SAT programme because she had become involved in therapy subsequent to a 
break up with her partner and father of her child. Faced, she jokes, with a choice 
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between killing herself and entering the psychotherapeutic world, she chose the 
latter. At the time of the interview she had completed the SAT programme. 
Antonio (Spain). A young male teacher of 28 years, who just starting teaching in 
Spain after some experience teaching maths in the USA where he had experienced 
some difficulties fitting in to what he saw as a very different work culture. 
Antonio's first love is music, and he has come to teaching as not as a vocation but 
because of the need to find employment. At the time of the interview Antonio had 
just begun the SAT programme, his participation in part responding to his pre-
existing interest in esoteric, psychological and philosophical reading. 
Araceli (Spain). A 52-year-old female teacher with 24 years experience in 
different posts in the Spanish education system. At the time of the interview she 
occupied a leadership role within the department concerned with providing in-
service training to teachers. Though she had arrived at a position of responsibility 
and influence, Araceli's professional career had been characterized by her 
oppositional, conflictive and imposing tendencies. She regarded herself as having 
been a 'black sheep' and had suffered her whole life from a sense of being marginal 
and simultaneously too big, too imposing for normal life. The interview took place 
at during the fourth module of the SAT programme. She was, at the time, 
recovering from a physical collapse that had left her unable to continue 'business 
as normal' and had forced her to acknowledge, permit and to express her 
vulnerability. She regards this as a watershed moment, and there is a sense in 
which it can be seen as the moment for which the SAT programme has been 
preparing her. 
Conrado (Spain). A middle-aged foreign language teacher at the primary school 
level in Spain, and specializing in English. Conrado, from a family of teachers (he 
jokes that they could open a school between them), began his teaching life at the 
age of 20, working for 10 years before a crisis which precipitated a 6 year break 
which saw him return to his home town and a life of more manual labour. During 
this time he is witness to the gap between his own ideals (that in part drove him 
out of education) and the reality of his daily thinking and feeling. Partly in 
response to encouragement (or pressure?) he was able to return to teaching 
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perhaps without the same idealistic drive, but in some ways better prepared to 
face the vicissitudes of institutional life and the power relations that Conrado 
found so difficult to negotiate. He had arrived at the SAT programme as a result of 
the recommendation of his therapist, who he had been consulting as a response to 
the feeling that he was losing his head, and this in turn in part provoked by difficult 
experiences related to his leadership role in a school. His interview occurred 
during his participation in the fourth and last module of the SAT programme. 
Carla (Mexico). A female teacher of 58 years with 25 years of service. She teaches 
dressmaking in a state secondary school in Chiapas, Mexico. She herself had only 
completed her secondary education and finds a lot of the in-service teacher 
training she receives dry, theoretical and verbose. She describes herself as 
observant, practical, orderly and intelligent. She had no previous experience of 
psychotherapeutic processes and was persuaded to attend the SAT programme by 
her sister who had attended the year before. Carla's sister, knowing difficulties at 
work and in her private life, encouraged her to go, and the SAT programme had 
been her first experience of psychotherapeutic work. At the time of the interview 
she had attended the first three SAT retreats. 
Cecilia (Spain). A female mathematics teacher in her early fifties. At the time of 
the interview she was working in a secondary school in Madrid and has been a 
teacher since 1980. She came to teaching during a period of seismic change in 
Spain with the end of the dictatorship of Franco. Her career had clearly been 
influenced by the political and ideological conflicts and shifts of those times. Her 
long career in teaching has given her ample opportunity for reflection and 
significant evolution, and this appears to have been furthered by her experience in 
the SAT. Notwithstanding, she is clear that she entered into the SAT programme 
for personal reasons, and had had various different experiences beforehand of 
psychotherapy and was familiar with an eclectic array of technologies of self. 
Dora (Mexico). A female teacher of 43 years with 24 years experience. She trained 
as a pre-school teacher and works within the state pre-school system in Chiapas, 
Mexico, and, at the time of the interview, was on placement to the technical team of 
a school supervision, where she was responsible for overseeing the work of 
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teachers in schools. Her main functions at the time were on-site supervisory visits 
and training. At the time of the interview she was considering returning to 
classroom teaching, as the experience of the SAT had awoken a fresh interest in 
being with children. She had had some involvement with psychotherapeutic 
processes outside the SAT programme. At the time of the interview she had 
completed the first two SAT retreats, and the interview took place during the third. 
Erendida (Mexico). A female teacher of 40 years with nearly 20 years experience. 
She trained and worked as a pre-school teacher, and works in the state pre-school 
system in Oaxaca, Mexico. She had been a classroom teacher but at the time of the 
interview she had taken up a 3-year placement to the State Advisory Commission 
and her work now involves leading colleagues in various technical and 
organizational processes. She has some previous and ongoing involvement with 
psychotherapeutic processes, and described herself as being in difficult personal 
circumstances and looking for help when she decided to enter the SAT programme. 
At the time of the interview she had completed the first two SAT retreats, and the 
interview took place during the third retreat. It is worth noting that Erendida is a 
keen publicist of the SAT and has been responsible for persuading a number of 
teachers from Oaxaca to attend the programme. 
Fernando (Mexico). A middle-aged, male special education teacher with 22 years 
experience in primary schools in Mexico. Previous to his participation in the SAT 
programme, he recognizes himself as having been full of fears and paranoid 
thinking. He also recognizes himself as having spent much time in using his 
professional role as a vehicle for his exaggerated pretentiousness, and this made 
him unlikable. His professional pretentions also made themselves manifest when 
he spent a period as a director of a school. Fernando was obviously a keen 
observer of the education system, with an eye for the politics and for the 
machination of power. This made him a particularly astute witness of the situation 
in which teachers find themselves. At the time of the interview Fernando had 
completed the first three levels of the SAT programme. 
Irene (Spain). A female philosophy graduate of 34 years, who is beginning her 
teaching career in Barcelona, Spain, and has embarked on the established route of 
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serial substitutions of varying lengths which will eventually give her a possibility 
of gaining a permanent post. She had had previous experience of Gestalt therapy 
and entered the SAT programme on the recommendation of her therapist, with 
whom she had shared some of the problems she was having at a particular school. 
She had taught at a variety of schools and educational environments, notably a 
college serving a highly marginalized community of Gitanos and Moroccans. At the 
time of the interview she was awaiting her next substitution having recently 
completed a period in a primary school. The extension of primary school hours in 
Spain means that she is more likely to be employed in the primary sector, where 
she has received no specific training. Cutbacks in philosophy teaching at the 
secondary level means it is highly unlikely she would ever gain a post teaching her 
subject. Generally speaking she appears optimistic and happy at the prospect of 
working in the primary sector. At the time of the interview Irene had participated 
up to the second module of the SAT programme. 
Igor (Mexico). A male teacher of 28 years with a little over 5 years' experience at 
the time of the interview. Three of these years were previous to his beginning the 
SAT programme. He teaches maths, physics and computing at an urban 
preparatory school (equivalent to high school or sixth form) situated in Chiapas, 
Mexico. As is common at the preparatory level, he came to teaching through his 
professional training in engineering, and his only pedagogic training was a short 
induction course. He had subsequently begun a Masters in Education which he did 
not finish, finding its theoretical orientation did not transfer readily into his 
practice. At the time of the interview he had completed the first two SAT retreats. 
He describes his motivation as "curiosity" rather than any personal crisis; he 
wanted to know a little more about his personality. He gave no indication of having 
been, or being in any other psychotherapeutic setting. The interview occurred 
during the third retreat. 
Julia (Spain). A 40 year-old female philology professor at a Spanish University. 
Julia teaches French language and literature and conducts research. Her 
experience as a post-graduate university student, teacher and researcher is 
notable for the sense that professionally speaking, and perhaps in her private life 
too, she is adept at going through the motions and jumping the hoops without any 
57 
clear indication that her motivation is self-generated; rather, she gives her career 
path would appear to be an example of someone on automatic pilot. At the time of 
the interview she had completed the second module of the SAT programme and 
was about to enter the third. She had also been involved in Gestalt training and in 
individual therapy, where she identified her difficulty and confusion in her 
intimate relationships as being the principal reason for beginning therapy. She 
entered the SAT programme partly on the recommendation of her therapist. 
Juan (Mexico). A middle-aged science and maths teacher with 22 years of service 
teaching college level students in Chiapas, Mexico. Juan describes his professional 
life as having been permeated by arrogance and irreverence, and the SAT 
programme provided him with the cruel shock of comprehending the lack of 
'natural' or 'real' dignity as a teacher. In constant activity and seeking hyper-
stimulation, José default identity as a teacher could be described as de-centred, he 
has consistently constructed his experience from the outside-in, and not from the 
inside-out. A perplexing pattern of behaviour has led him to crisis in his family life, 
and though he jokes about his reason for attending the SAT, it would seem that this 
crisis, and the need to understand himself is what brought him to the SAT. At the 
time of the interview he had completed the SAT programme and was an overtly 
enthusiastic 'fan'. 
Lorena (Spain). A 27 year-old female teacher who was trying out teaching as a 
possible career. With three years experience in primary education in Spain she is 
still unsure if the institutional environment is a place she wants to be. Lorena is 
conspicuously 'progressive' in her aspiration for education and is uncertain as to 
whether or not her progressive outlook can find their expression, and thus if her 
aspirational vision of herself as a social change agent can be realized within the 
education system. On the one hand she sees that teachers have a relatively high 
degree of autonomy in the classroom. And on the other she sees that the many 
external pressures (including the worries of parents for their child's success) are 
constantly undermining this autonomy. At the time of the interview she had just 
begun the SAT programme. 
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Muriel (Spain): A teacher by vocation, Muriel, now in her late 40s had been 
working in Spanish pre-school and primary level education for 26 years at the time 
of the interview. She sees teaching simultaneously as a vocation and as her refuge 
from the 'real' world. Whilst she values the role, and the importance of the example 
of the teacher in the lives of children and adolescents, she is also highly critical of 
an implicit immaturity in this person who has, effectively, never left school. The 
interview took place during the fourth module of the SAT programme. Muriel had 
been involved in various other experiences and processes from in the field of 
psycho-spirituality and her participation in the SAT programme derived from her 
vocation as a 'seeker' rather than as a teacher. Her vocation as a seeker is rooted in 
her awareness of perception of an existential discomfort, of being somehow 
inadequate. 
Minerva (Spain). At 58 years of age, Minerva was very close to retirement at the 
time of the interview. She had spent 15 years teaching primary education and 22 
years teaching maths in Spanish secondary schools, including time spent as a 
school director. Minerva looks back with fondness on her years of teaching, clearly 
identifying herself more on the side of the students, and the possibility of 
relationship, than with the institutional project of education which she portrays as 
overly intrusive. Minerva becomes emotional and tearful during the interview 
when she talks about coming to the end of her career. Though she finds her 
identity as a teacher problematic in many respects, clearly to be without this 
identity holds a different series of difficulties. At the time of the interview she was 
participating in the fourth module of the SAT programme. 
Nieves (Spain). A 47 year-old female teacher with 18 years of service teaching 
physical education in secondary schools in Spain. At the time of the interview 
Nieves was functioning as the director of a newly created school, leading a 
committed team that had gained a reputation for its innovative approach to 
education. Nieves' involvement in this new project reflects both her commitment 
to education and her capacity for leadership. Her continued participation in the 
SAT programme has come to be synonymous with her commitment to her own 
personal and professional flourishing and her commitment to be involved in wider 
efforts at education reform. Interestingly, previous to the interview she had 
59 
become actively involved with a group of teachers seeking to reflect on and 
promote the SAT programme among teachers and with education authorities. 
Nieves was participating in the fourth and final module of the SAT programme at 
the time of the interview. She had also participated in training in Gestalt therapy. 
Rebeca (Spain). A female Spanish language and literature teacher in her early 
thirties. Rebeca has a total of roughly 10 years experience in the education system, 
the first seven occupying positions as a substitute teacher and the last 3 with the 
benefit of a permanent post and appointed to a secondary school in Barcelona. 
During her years as a substitute teacher she worked in over thirty state schools. 
Whilst this was difficult at the time she appreciates that this has given her a 
greater awareness of the overall picture. She is highly convinced of the virtues of 
teaching and learning language and literature and describes herself as getting on 
well with the students whilst at the same time being demanding and rigorous. She 
had had no experience of psychotherapy before entering the SAT programme. 
Reina (Spain). A 42 year-old Linguistics professor at a University in Spain, Reina 
has 18 years of experience in academia, including as a researcher and a teacher of 
Spanish to foreign students. Her experience of herself as a professional academic is 
more closely related to her sense of herself as a dogged and determined worker 
than as a creative thinker. She is haunted since childhood by her sense of 
inadequacy and this extends into her professional identity and the feeling of being 
of unequal intelligence to her more gifted colleagues. At the time of the interview 
she was participating in the SAT 4. Reina had also been involved with a training in 
Gestalt therapy and entered the SAT programme on the recommendation of her 
sister. 
Yvete (Mexico). A middle-aged female primary school teacher with 26 years of 
experience in Mexico. At the time of the interview Yvete was working special 
education, assigned to attend children with learning difficulties. However, during 
the interview it becomes apparent that her principal identification as a teacher has 
been with the teachers' union and with the ongoing struggle with the government 
over pay and conditions. Her keener self-perception post-SAT has allowed her to 
discriminate between caring for and bullying her fellow union members. She is the 
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member of a family in which has seen the participation of representatives of three 
generations, and she herself is one of four sisters who had participated, three of 
whom were teachers. At the time of the interview she had completed the SAT 
programme. 
The Interview as a Meeting of Fellow Travellers 
Though a brief description of myself and the way that I came to be doing this 
research was given in Chapter 1, I feel it would be useful here to further develop 
this profile of myself as the 'other half of the interview exchange. If a description 
of each interviewee is important, a description of the common denominator of all 
the interviews (i.e. myself) is possibly more so. Who were the interviewees 
meeting when they sat themselves in front of me? Where, if anywhere, was the 
point of connection that would allow the interview to bear fruit as a positive and 
creative experience for both? For the research to be a success this contact could 
not be idiosyncratic - I could not afford to 'click' with one or two interviewees and 
go through the motions with the rest. To get a body of high quality data I needed to 
be able to access a language, or achieve a perspective, that was shared across the 
group. All the interviewees had to be able to see in me something that they could 
recognize and talk to (or at), and vice versa; I had to able to see in them something I 
could recognize and question, probe and circumnavigate. With the benefit of 
hindsight I would say that what this something was was a sense of shared journey. 
What I saw in them and what they saw in me was someone who had crossed, or 
was in the process of crossing, the same difficult terrain. It is this meeting that 
characterized the interviews and gave them their general 'flavour' or 'quality', and 
generated an atmosphere of trust which permitted me to use my specific 
knowledge about the trials and tribulations of teaching and about the SAT and the 
enneagram as I honed in on the particularities of each interviewee. 
To draw an obvious parallel, these interviews held much in common with an 
interview being conducted between two (ex)alcoholics in that they were 
permeated by a common experience having a potential to generate a 'distilled' 
knowledge. It is difficult to imagine the interviews as they came about without this 
common ground. Likewise, it is difficult to imagine them as anything but the 
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'logical' conclusion of my own journey of (self) discovery; the 'fact' of the interview 
situation was itself symbolic of the convergence of so many threads in my life up 
until then. Sitting in front of the interviewee was an interviewer who had been 
professionally dedicated to education reform, and privately dedicated to self-
reform. Someone who had been taking steps toward bringing together their 
professional experience in the world of teacher training with their personal 
experience in 'seeking'. Setting up the SAT programme for teachers in Mexico had 
been a big step for me, but there remained a schism between my work as the 
director of a centre for educational innovation (involving me in the horrors of 
management), and my personal interest in the labyrinth of the human 'soul'. At 
first my work in bringing the SAT programme to teachers in Mexico remained a 
relatively small part of my responsibilities within the organization. It was a 'pet 
project' employing one part-time coordinator in an organization that employed 
over thirty full-time staff for whom I was ultimately responsible. So, renouncing 
my work in management to take up full-time research focused on the SAT 
programme represented an important step in taking my own interests more 
seriously. My sense was that my life up until then had been determined by a series 
of chances, that things had happened to me, or that my movement through life had 
more to do with moving away from, rather than moving toward. Applying to study 
a doctorate focused on the SAT, and organizing a grant for myself, felt like a sea-
change in my ability to make a positive choice in a particular direction. I was very 
much aware of this, and in this sense, the interviews, especially the first ones, were 
the palpable consummation of my own journey of self-reform, a journey which was 
taking me from being 'lost' in an accidental job, to 'found' through a passionate 
interest in something. The very fact of being 'the interviewer' was in some ways a 
testament to my own transformation, in no small measure catalyzed by my 
experience as a participant of the SAT programme. I felt myself, therefore to have 
some understanding of how a professional identity might become radically 
reframed as a result of the learning of the SAT programme. I had become, not only 
a person who was interested in the SAT, I had become a person who was able to 
nurture that interest. This was the narrative that I brought to the table. Though it 
was hardly ever the explicit subject of conversation, it was, in a positive way, the 
elephant in the room, making its presence felt without being referred to. This 
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narrative spiralled around myself as interviewer and extended toward the 
interviewee as curiosity, at the same time inspiring a belief that what people 
visibly do, or stop doing, can be indicative of 'invisible' changes that are occurring 
in the subject's identity, and that the job of the interview was to locate and weave 
together the visible and invisible of identity as it comes into contact with otherness 
(including myself in the specific case of the interview situation) and the stories of 
otherness. 
Data Analysis and the Narrative Spiral 
The 'discovery' of narrative has [...] as its main benefit, the possibility of 
opening up new spaces for investigating relations between subjects and 
structures. The study of narrative is not of cultures of individual 
subjects, but of their relations. Individuals and collectivities can be seen 
to be making their own history, but not, as Marx [...] pointed out, in 
conditions of their own choosing. (Andrews et al., 2000, p.9) 
The interviews were essentially treated as narratives, in the sense that they 
concern temporality and report a before, during and after centred around an event 
(the SAT programme). Each narrative is a story (transformation of practice), 
within a story (the transformation of the self), within a story (the collective 
'dream' of the SAT programme), within a story (human life). But the narrative turn, 
or spiral, does not end here. It is also a story of stories arising from, placed within, 
and read by the narrative voices of other stories, or discourses: the education 
system, the mystic's tales of the path, psychologies representations of ourselves, 
and Foucault's historical 'fictions'.3  
Viewing the data as narrative in a world of narratives has its problems. The story 
stands for itself, is enough unto itself, and resonates through its "foreclosure" 
(Freeman, 2000). And yet it is vulnerable, a tentative voice among others. As 
Silverman (2006) argues, it is the job of qualitative research's "deep analysis" to 
leverage narrative's small body by its juxtaposition with theory, with 'objectivised' 
narrative or discourse, so that one position informs the other and the hybrid story 
3 Needless to say, each narrative is also a story within my own story as researcher and 'historicized 
self, read, 'understood' (or interpreted) and presented through the lens of my own subjectivity and 
its desire. 
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can be told as a hyphenated phenomena. The purpose of such analysis can be seen 
as the transcendence of the local through the elaboration of large stories that 
speak out: 
We live in stories, and do things because of the characters we become in 
our tales of self. This narrated self which is who I am, is a map. It gives 
me something to hang on to, a way to get from point A to point B in my 
daily life. But we need larger narratives, stories that connect us to 
others, to community, to morality and the moral self. (Denzin, 2000, 
p.xiii) 
With the pervasive relativism of the post-modern world, it is difficult, and perhaps 
unnecessary, to hunger for 'scientific generalizability' through such new stories 
forged within the human sciences. Rather, we can, as I do here, aspire to another 
form of generalizability, that of narrative persuasion. Here, following Foucault, the 
issue is not truth, but effect. Here Denzin's "larger narrative" can be, in the 
Foucauldian sense, a technology of self and of power. It can be used upon ourselves 
and by ourselves, not as Truth, but because it might serve to relocate subjectivity 
within power and knowledge. This is Denzin's large narrative as ethical discourse, 
and research as ethics. Its power resides not in objectivity, though it may claim the 
discourse of objectivity within its rhetoric, but in its persuasiveness, or the 
persuasiveness of its usability, its effect. Narrative is the point where the individual 
and the cultural meet, where we see the individual forged by culture, but 
conversely culture forged by the individual and the local: 
[Narrative] is the realm where sociology overlaps with psychology and 
neither the 'social', the subject matter of traditional sociology, nor the 
'individual', the subject matter of conventional psychology, is privileged. 
Rather both are constructed in relation to each other, not in the 'outer' 
realm of society and culture, or the 'inner' realm of personality 
characteristics, but in a distinct, 'psychosocial' zone. (Andrews et al. 
2000, p.1) 
A sensibility to narrative is therefore not only central to accessing the teacher's 
transforming identity as a psychosocial phenomenon, it is also central in holding 
the research together around the superficial cohesiveness of lived experience. 
Practically speaking this narrative sensibility comprised two moments. The first, at 
the time of interview, ensures, through appropriate questioning, that there is, 
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indeed, a story being told that includes 'emplotment' and temporality. The 
questioning behind this 'emergent narrative' was concerned not only with 
uncovering or weaving the story, it was also informed by my knowledge of the 
personality psychology of the enneagram and, as the research progressed, by my 
understanding of Foucault, especially the interest in relations of power. The 
second moment, in the reading of transcripts, provides an overview of the change 
process, a globalized sense of the issues, subsequently used to identify and select 
the critical moments from any one story. This process of selection had two 
functions: it attempted to identify the key transformations occurring within each 
singular narrative, and those common themes across narratives that might have a 
bearing on the reading of the data through a more theoretical lens. 
This second moment of organization went through various evolutions. Firstly, my 
attention was drawn to the themes of power. Subsequently, the Foucauldian 
perspective, centred on power, was dropped in favour of the themes of purposes, 
orders, and performances. These were further analysed through Foucault's 
fourfold analysis of ethical relations of the self to the self as explored in David 
Blacker's essay Intellectual at Work and in Power: Toward a Foucauldian Research 
Ethic (1998). Blacker's transposition of Foucault's fourfold analysis of self-
relations to the intellectual sphere, to the university teacher/researcher, is 
achieved by using Foucault's critique of the 'decadent' or universal intellectual, a 
tradition of thought concerned with 'revealing' universal truths about individual 
and collective human phenomena. Blacker is concerned to delineate the ethical 
practice of the intellectual who seeks to leave behind the decadent tradition and to 
create themselves as 'specific' intellectuals, concerned to delimit their intellectual 
activities and truth claims and to recognize the historical contingency of 
knowledge and its necessary relation to power. 
Seeing the potential to extrapolate from Blacker's adoption of the fourfold ethical 
framework for specific "intellectuals at work and in power" to specific teachers at 
work and in power appeared to be a key moment in the research. However, whilst 
this still holds true conceptually, the use of Foucault's categories of ethical 
substance, mode of subjugation, ascetic practice and telos were subsequently 
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abandoned as an organizational principle as it resulted in an over-complex double 
layer of organization - one purely theoretical, the other arising from the data. In 
the end I returned to a structure for the thesis that is rooted in my initial analysis 
of data, notably in the identification and organization of critical movements or 
shifts described by teachers in their narratives. These critical movements or shifts 
were generally divided into a 'before' and 'after' (I used to be, or to do such and 
such, but now I am more like, or have begun to do, so and so). The value of the SAT 
experience for teachers is thus being determined in relation to the patterns in 
these changes that can be identified, patterns that can be read in some cases as 
revealing a shift in teacher identity and agency in certain common directions, and 
in other cases demonstrates an idiosyncratic component to the way in which 
teachers respond to the knowledge and experience of the SAT programme. 
At the eleventh hour of assembling the thesis, a return to the data as the 
organizational principle involved considerable re-writing and much soul 
searching, but I concluded that the advantage of greater clarity would outweigh the 
disadvantages in terms of time and effort. What resulted is an analysis of data 
around three central issues or questions that circulated implicitly within the 
narratives: the purposes of teaching, the order(ing) of teaching, and the 
performance(s) of teaching. Purpose, order and performance were the terms I 
chose to capture three broad nodes of experience surfacing within the narratives. 
Whilst these terms can be understood in reference to the more classic terminology 
of philosophy, structure, and agency, I have not used these terms because the data 
that they encompass is more chaotic and far reaching than the use of these 
standard terms would imply. 'Purpose' includes more that a vision of what 
education should be like, as we find in the narratives important information as to 
the 'whys' and 'wherefores' of how these teachers became teachers, that is to say 
their understanding of their motivations. Likewise, 'order' is more than the 
operation of different systems and practices of control, it also captures teachers' 
relations to education's obligation to knowledge and the ordering of students 
through diverse mechanisms of examination. 'Performance', also, is more than the 
evidence of the shifts in the way teachers exert their agency within the dominant 
structure and its philosophy, it is also the 'performance' of their identity as a 
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deliberate or unconscious elaboration, the performance of a teacher's mask, and 
how this particularly psychological agency may have evolved as a result of the SAT 
experience. Needless to say, if these three categories for the analysis of data were 
rooted in the data, it is unlikely that I would have arrived at this reading had I not 
previously been deeply immersed in a more theoretical position; the data came 
into relief through the light and shadows of my theoretical meanderings. 
Ethical Considerations 
Two principal ethical concerns exist around this study: reliability and 
confidentiality. 
The question of the reliability of the data gathered can be further divided into 
various components, some of which, such as the psycho-social manipulations 
inherent to the interview setting, have been touched on already and can be said to 
be more technical. These more technical concerns relate to the question of how we 
can ensure the interview process is as 'clean' as possible research (see above, 
Hearing is Believing? and Data Analysis and the Narrative Spiral). Other factors that 
impact on reliability, however, can be located closer to the ethical axis. Notable 
amongst these is my own involvement in the 'case' being studied. As I have 
previously described (see Chapter 1. - The Story Behind the Story), I came to be 
doing this research on this case (i.e. the SAT programme) because of my direct 
involvement in it. Clearly then, my starting point is clearly not impartial. This is 
perhaps not overly problematic if the research were descriptive in nature. 
However, this case study has is essentially evaluative, and, moreover, the 
evaluation it proposes is not "formative" (i.e. seeking evidence on how to improve 
the SAT programme); rather, it is "summative" (Robson, 2002, p. 208), and seeks 
to establish the effects and effectiveness (i.e. the value) of the SAT as a training for 
teachers. Thus, the study is outward looking, not self-referential, and as such must 
be able to claim some degree of objectivity. That is to say, it needs to convince the 
reader that my 'bias' as a researcher internal to the case, is more than offset and 
compensated for by my ethical propriety. 
Given my involvement, obvious questions arise around the possibility of over-
directive questioning (i.e. fishing for suitable answers), and an unrepresentative 
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use of the data (i.e. choosing the good bits from the transcripts and 'losing' the 
negatives). To some degree these concerns can be addressed simply by including 
the transcripts as 'proof of good practice. And yet to include all of the transcripts 
would swell the study to enormous proportions, and is therefore unfeasible. 
However, I have included a representative sample of one of the shorter interviews, 
conducted with Reina in Spain (see Appendix 3.), and this should give some idea of 
how the interview was conducted and how the transcript became data within the 
body of the thesis. 
The question of bias and manipulation of data does not end here, however, as the 
respondents are also invested in the programme, especially those who have 
completed the last modules. This raises the possibility of them saying what they 
say, and how they say it, because they want to be convinced of its success. The 
possibility that the interviewees might be 'gilding the lily' is compounded by the 
nature of their relationship with myself, someone they clearly identify as being 
involved in the organization of the programme. Might these teachers just be telling 
a good story, and telling it to me, the one they know really wants to hear a good 
story? Could they, consciously or unconsciously, be feeling compelled to please? 
What has been the effect, if any, of the power I might exert over them in my 
position as researcher, and as a man interviewing a sample primarily composed of 
women? In what way would the data have changed if the interviewer had been a 
woman? 
Following on from such questions, and still within the theme of reliability, we 
might ask if these narratives are truly representative of the larger group of SAT 
participants, of those that didn't volunteer to be interviewed, and of those that 
dropped out of the SAT programme after the first or second module (the 
programme's drop out rate is relatively high). There is a point, here, at which to 
answer yes or no becomes almost impossible within the confines of the present 
study and its limited resources. Measures could have been taken to ascertain the 
accuracy or truthfulness of the data (for example: obtaining corroboratory 
evidence from colleagues and students; using a third party, uninvolved, 
interviewer; or the subsequent avowal and/or correction of transcripts by 
interviewees). However, such doubts and their associated measures follow, 
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perhaps, a law of diminishing returns. It is unlikely, for example, that an 
'independent', 'objective' interviewer would have elicited the highly focused 
information that I was able to 'access' because of my knowledge of the process. 
There comes a point at which, I believe, it is necessary to suspend disbelief and 
turn to the 'persuasiveness' of the events. Have these teachers recounted real 
things occurring in their practice, things that ring true, things that are surprising 
and not necessarily formulaic (and therefore manipulable as false responses)? And 
are they, independently, reporting things that coincide? It is precisely, perhaps, in 
the turn to data analysis that much of the ethical concerns around reliability can be 
addressed. My intention here was not so much to focus on one persons (easily 
manipulable) responses, but rather to seek out trends across the respondents that 
could be exemplified by particular testimonies. 
The second broad area of ethical concern is consent and confidentiality, as the 
experiences and opinions expressed by teachers were expected to be of a sensitive 
nature. For this reason the teachers interviewed were asked to sign a consent form 
(see Appendix 4.), which explained how their interview material would be used as 
part of a doctoral thesis and made available to others. Different degrees of consent 
were available to participants in the signing of the form, which was done after the 
interview so that each participant could weigh their degree of consent in the light 
of what they and 'revealed' in the interview. The options available to them were to: 
• Authorize the use of my interview in the terms specified, and with the use 
of my name. 
• Authorize the use of my interview in the terms specified in anonymity. 
• Require the interview information to remain completely confidential. 
In the event all participants gave the fullest degree of consent permitting the use of 
their real names to appear next to any material cited. Originally, this had been 
deemed desirable as it was in keeping with the ethos of the SAT and of the 
research. However, subsequently the decision has been taken to change all of the 
names of participants, thus assuring their anonymity. This has been done to avoid 
any complications in the future and, especially to conform to any more exacting 
ethical considerations in any possible future publications. 
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Limits and Possibilities 
This research does not generate new theory; rather it brings into contact theories 
and practices from apparently divergent fields and sources. It does this by creating 
a meta-narrative, perhaps best described as psychosocial, from the empirical 
material of teachers' professional narratives. This meta-narrative is not put 
forward as scientifically generalizable, however, it claims validity to the degree 
that it is able to persuade the reader through the plausibility of the picture that 
emerges from the different empirical voices and their juxtaposition with 
theoretical voices. By documenting and subjecting the narratives of teachers 
involved in 'deep identity work' to a Foucauldian informed analysis, the research 
professes to draw out how teachers' self-knowledge and resultant psycho-ethical 
work upon themselves can be seen to play out politically in the vision and practice 
of their 'discipline'. In doing so, it is hoped to provide some basis of evaluating the 
real-life relevance of the ethical turn, summarized as the knowledge and care of 
the self, as an 'answer' to the problematizations of teacher identity. In this way the 
research positions the SAT programme within contemporary debate around 
subjectivity, teacher identity, teacher well-being and professional ethics, teacher 
education and practical training. 
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Section 2: 
Questions of Purpose 
The 'purpose' of the title refers to the function, role and ethical underpinnings not 
only of education and schooling, but also, more specifically, to parallel issues in the 
professional lives of teachers. How is it that teachers come to be teaching? What 
forces, desires and needs carried them to the classroom door and beyond? There is 
no attempt at an exhaustive account of a philosophy of education, and only a few 
angles will be explored in as much as they complement the general direction of the 
discussion and positions surfacing in the teachers' narratives. Three themes are 
developed: Chapter 4, Making Knowledge Count?, examines narrative evidence and 
some complementary theoretical perspectives around the field of knowledge; 
Chapter 5, Dropping Out or Tuning In?, explores personal and professional 
motivations; and Chapter 6, Keeping the Faith?, explores the question of how faith 
in education is both lost and maintained by teachers. Each of these themes 
presents a loose `before' and 'after' organizing principle, the former involving 
expressions from the default position of the teachers prior to participating in the 
SAT, and a 'revisited' section presenting movements and transformations 
occurring as a result of the SAT experience.4 In general, the use of the "revisited" 
motif here is similar to the psychoanalytic definition of learning and development 
as "new editions of old conflicts" (Britzman, 1998, p.29). Finally, Chapter 7, 
Discussion and Conclusions, presents a development of the theoretico-empirical 
findings of the three previous chapters as a means of arriving at a general 
perspective of the significance of the evidence from the narratives within the 
discourses of educational purpose. 
4 An exception is Cecilia's tale in Dropping Out and Tuning In, which is an example of a 
transformational process over the course of her career and includes transformations occurring 
prior to participation in the SAT. 
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Chapter 4. Making Knowledge Count? 
Anna Freud describes early education as 
[...] a kind of "guerrilla war" between educator and child. Education 
wants to substitute for love of dirt a disgust of dirt, for shamelessness a 
feeling of shame, for cruelty sympathy, and in place of a rage for 
destructiveness a desire to cherish things [...] Step by step education 
aims at the exact opposite of the child's instinctive desires. (1931, p.55) 
There is evidence that some teachers in the study were aware of this oppression of 
children, and of their central role in its implementation. Dora5, reflecting on her life 
experience, had awoken to the possibility that education involves the systematic 
oppression of the child's interests and spirit: "I liked to play, I liked to eat, and I 
liked to sleep. I liked three things; I didn't like for them to tell me `go on and do 
your work'; that was my martyrdom!". We may not agree with reducing a child's 
interests to play, food and sleep, yet Dora's account captures the painful realization 
that her childhood had been 'stolen' from her, the awareness that her early 
accommodations had set her on the path to becoming the obsessively correct 
person she now found intolerable. An intolerable correctness she inflicted on her 
own pre-school students in a regimental campaign of teaching and learning: 
And then the children would say to me 'Teacher, the crayons weren't 
here yesterday', [and I'd tell them] 'Well, that's where they're going to 
be now!'. But I was really something, moving things around ... This thing 
about having everything so organized, everything so nice, everything 
without so much as a speck of dirt, [everything] just so ... well, so not a 
school. (Dora) 
Narrative evidence suggests Anna Freud's "guerrilla war" extends right through to 
secondary education. If teaching is difficult, it is perhaps most difficult because the 
teacher is the visible and exposed foot soldier of a fundamental clash of values, 
arbitrator of a "permanent provocation" (Foucault, 2000d) between the potential 
for order and work, and the potential for play and spontaneity. To continue with 
Anna Freud's analysis, if play and spontaneity are to be expunged in the meeting of 
5 Dora is one of the Spanish interviewees. See p. 35 for brief description. 
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generations, this is done in the name of knowledge and civilization represented 
and embodied by teachers themselves. An illustration of this is found in the 
testimony of Rebeca's6 valuation of learning; she is "grateful to have been taught 
language, literature, maths, physics, natural sciences, and everything" and feels she 
has personally invested in students' academic achievement. Having been "rational 
and cold" in her evaluation of student progress, her concern was to measure 
proven accumulation of knowledge. Her penchant for Cervantes and attempts to 
convince students of his value can be understood as more than an accident and 
clash of tastes: "I arrived in the class," she says, "thinking Cervantes, Cervantes, 
Cervantes," and faced students who "didn't give a damn about Cervantes". Her 
preference is pre-loaded with the causes and effects of power, and the dissonance 
between 'high' culture and the 'popular' interests of the young. An implied 
imposition of Cervantes is symptomatic of the attempt to mould the next 
generation 'in the image of the present'. Writing in the first half of the 20th Century, 
Anna Freud identified a corrective principle behind all education: 
The universal aim of education is always to make out of the child a 
grown-up person who shall not be very different from the grown-up 
world around him [sic] [...] education struggles with the nature of the 
child or - as the grown-up usually calls it - with his naughtiness [or 
rebelliousness in the case of the adolescent] (1931, p.19: see also 
Bernstein's notion of 'regulative discourse', 2000). 
It would be wrong to infer the operation of an oppressive principle in Rebeca; 
rather, Rebeca believes in an education capable of communicating value and values. 
She believes in Cervantes as beneficial, necessary, individually and collectively. If 
teaching requires exerting control over the territory, discipline was not her 
primary objective. Rebeca 'knows' what 'ought' to be handed down, but cannot 
guarantee that it will be received. She has felt the "weight of responsibility" of this 
transmission, not as something external to her; rather, she experiences it as 
something close to her own heart. Rebeca's own discourse is a mirror of the official 
discourse, and vice versa. She has learnt "to look for the ideal in knowledge" ("and I 
demand it of those poor [children]"). 
6 Rebeca is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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Rebeca strives to `teach' Cervantes, making demands on her students that she 
considers proportional to her efforts: "I used to think `OK, I do a lot of preparation 
for classes, I put in a lot of interest, a lot of effort . . . And you [students] haven't 
taken in enough, you haven't taken in enough, you haven't made the grade—. We 
might speculate that there exists a manifestation of an "economic" discourse 
hidden in Rebeca's commodification of knowledge. Take, for example, her 
following comment: 
[...] up until now it appears that our work has consisted only in 
putting out contents and then gathering them back in again. And 
when they returned them to you, well you felt frustrated. They've 
cheated me! I've given them so much, and they only give me half back 
[laughter]. (Rebeca) 
Tamara Bibby (2011, p.37), in her psychoanalytically informed research on the 
relational dynamics of the modern classroom, documents a telling conversation 
between a researcher and two year 6 primary school children. Asked by the 
researcher why they thought their teachers got so stressed, the following exchange 
occurs: 
Minnie: Because they want it to be perfect. 
Rani: Yes, it all has to be perfect. 
Minnie: They think we are perfect children, but we are not. We are just 
children. 
Rani: Yeah, every child ain't perfect. There is always something... 
Minnie: [interrupts] Wrong with them. 
Rani: Not wrong with them. But they ask that we all be perfect. 
`Perfection' is the price these children feel themselves expected to pay for the 
privilege of education, and the satisfaction of their 'hungry' teachers.? Other 
evidence from the narratives points to a new slant on the `knowledge economy'. 
Take Carla's8 more explicit statement about her own grading: "you owe me this, 
you owe me that, almost charging them. No? Not that they owed me money, but 
7 Yet we should not forget that these same teachers are also subject to demands for perfection 
through the mastery of competences and the achievement of their students. Even Bibby's reading of 
the voices of students contains within it a criticism of the teachers at the centre of these relationally 
fraught classrooms. Bibby implies the teachers do not display the required amount of sensitivity to 
the children and her research pointedly reveals their weaknesses 
8 Carla is one of the Mexican interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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they owe me pieces, they owed me work. Come on, hurry up!". Similar sentiments 
appear in Nieves'9 description of the teacher-learner 'contract': "I sometimes see 
myself offering them possibilities so that they can take them, but all of them!" She 
describes an ongoing, almost comical, conflict with her physical education students 
around showering, which to her represents the completion of a virtuous cycle of 
warm-up, activity, wash-down. Nieves meets the students' resistance with a 
variety of counter-attacks, from cajoling, to insisting, to including the shower in 
her grading criteria. Whilst students may accept a trade-off between grade and 
showering, she herself feels what almost appears to be a physical pain about the 
asymmetry of the 'showerless session'. 
It's hard, hard, hard. It is like renouncing something that for me is like ... 
you have to do the whole the class, and the whole class is warm up, so 
and so, and SHOWER. [...] And so its hard to give it up [... and] I keep 
getting wrapped up in "oh no, they need to shower, they need to 
shower!" Then they go and say, "Oh, they didn't shower, and they left 
like that". And I'm going to feel bad, no? I'm going to say "Oh no! They 
are making a fool of me", no? Obviously, there is a contradiction here. 
From here, against whom do I turn? (Nieves) 
Buried in this, perhaps, is an uncomfortable truth, a tendency for teachers to feel 
they must control the environment and make teaching and learning a total 
exchange of raw materials and products. 
Whilst Nieves' relationship with herself and with her students becomes 
problematized around this idiosyncratic conflict in the shower room, her dilemma 
and its ramifications might be seen as representative of an education increasingly 
concerned to micro-manage the 'total experience'. Nieves' pedagogic gaze extends 
into student hygiene and beyond into an attempt to 'normalize' the shared 
experience of nudity, and to facilitate a mutual confession of teenage bodies which 
many students resist with creative resolve. This particular 'showering' appears to 
be in danger of becoming a competence, and demonstrates that schools' obligation 
to knowledge is about much more than Cervantes. Nudity is to be mastered, tamed, 
in an addendum of the physical education curriculum, itself an addendum, a soft 
underbelly, of the 'hard' curriculum. We must learn to get on together, even amid 
9 Nieves is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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the (unspoken) anxieties of teenage nudity. No doubt Nieves' ends are laudable; 
she is attempting to provide some curative experience by which the learning of 
`shame' and/or awkwardness is replaced by acceptance and naturalness. She is not 
alone in her concern for a cure. As Britzman makes clear, in the confidence of its 
'youth', psychoanalysis' original move toward education was curative; it posed the 
promise of a compensation and offered 'advice' to educators: 
How can education recognize and repair the harm done not just by 
others but the harm that occurs under the name of education? [...] 
Freud offers a balance as precarious as his metaphor [...] "Education 
has to find its way between the Scylla of non-interference and the 
Charybdis of frustration". (Britzman, 1998, p.9) 
Non-interference and frustration criss-cross Nieves' shower room in bewildering 
complexity as she attempts to 'repair' her students' learning about nakedness. But 
this complexity is rendered yet more nuanced once we acknowledge that Nieves' 
curative intention cannot be isolated from its broader context; in a culture in 
which learning might be described as sterilized - i.e. unambiguous in its 
desirability and measurability - how can Nieves convince her students that the 
highly conflicted experience of nudity, its imposing multiplicities, qualifies as 
'education'? How can she hope to persuade them that such confusions are for their 
own good and will, in some way, prepare them for the world? How will she 
convince them that this is not one invasion too many, the point where compliance 
must become resistance if they are to protect themselves from the anxiety of over-
exposure? Does her curative intention take on accidental dimensions, becoming an 
interference of interference? During the interview Nieves' uncertainties surface 
around her insistence on the holy trinity of `warm-up, activity, shower-down'. She 
confronts the difficult knowledge of the obligation she attempts to impose on her 
students, and is at some point of transition in her perception of her own practice. 
Perhaps in the 'confession' of her students' opposition a definitive transformation 
around her obligation to knowledge is taking shape. 
Of all the narratives, Nieves' depiction of this conflict around nudity is the most 
poignant in that is speaks of something lost to education (naturalness), that 
education attempts to reclaim, losing itself in the process. Siegfried Bernfeld writes 
that, 
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No theory of education can resolve the antimony between the justified 
will of the child and the justified will of the teacher; on the contrary, 
education consists of this antimony. (1973, p.xxvii) 
In Nieves' case her practice would seem about to resolve itself in her own 
"Charybdis of frustration". But to allow this to happen is itself a transformation of 
the pedagogic relationship, a ceding of ground to the timidity of her teenage 
students. 
Making Knowledge Count: Revisited 
Nieves' testimony suggests that her transformation is still nascent, her growing 
awareness may or may not manifest as a change in practice. However, the 
participants' narratives in general are replete with changes already in motion. A 
conspicuous expression of transformation occurring in Cecilia'slo practice is in the 
area of content; silence (and stillness) has begun to enter her classroom as a value 
in itself. 
I believe that what they like to feel to feel is that they become calmer. It 
is a sensation that they don't normally have in their lives. [...] I don't 
think that they would verbalize it like this, but I can see it, [in] how they 
me ask for it [immediately]. One girl student once told me, when I met 
her in the street, that she had had a conflict with a friend who had a dog 
who almost bit her and so on, and she said to me? I remembered your 
spiral and I began to breath. (Cecilia) 
The meditative spiral Cecilia uses at the beginning of her class does not generate 
the productive silent stillness that permits other things to be done, such as 'silent 
reading'; rather, it evokes the silent stillness that refers to itself. In a hyper-active 
school, driven by curriculum amid a fervour of communications, silent stillness 
interrupts the turbulent surface of school life. As Cecilia says, "it is extremely rare 
to see a student being still, they are all with their chairs and with their hands ... 
there is always hyperactivity". Influenced by experience in meditation, Cecilia 
introduces this exercise at the beginning of her class as an approximation to 
meditation, yet draws back from labelling it meditation; rather, she introduces it to 
10 Cecilia is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2.for a brief description. 
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her students as an exercise to clear the mind and aid mathematical thinking. Whilst 
she takes the register the class is invited to concentrate on a spiral drawn on the 
blackboard, and to remain still, silent and aware of their breathing. Students who 
were able to maintain this state throughout the register call get points added to 
their grade. 
Simple! But underneath this conventional reward mechanism other more complex 
shifts are occurring. Cecilia reports that students' initial enthusiasm for this 
strange exercise was dependent on the reward, but that this was soon replaced by 
an enthusiasm for the sensation of stopping ("I think they loved that thing of 
stopping"). Silence and stillness are given a therapeutic value by Cecilia. Her 
experience of invoking their presence in the classroom leads her to conclude that: 
Of course, beginning the class with everyone in silence for five minutes 
can't compare with a class where one person is shouting, another 
throwing paper, another grabbing a classmate by the neck, and 
someone right at the back kicking the door. (Cecilia) 
Cecilia's new practice could be reduced to behavioural control, a means of assuring 
better student performance, but surely there are more interesting and valuable 
perspectives that can be applied to silent stillness. Blake et al. (2000) in their essay 
Solitude, Silence, Listening propose the value of these practices as a positive and 
necessary response to our over-communicative cultural style and the explosion of 
'messages' made possible by new technology. They propose a number of purposes 
for silence centred around better communication and a "non-polemical cultural 
style" (Corriada Fiumara, quoted in Blake et al., 2000, p.150). Whilst these 
principles are important, silent stillness is more than cultivation of a stage for 
significant communication. The practice contains its own activity, as students are 
forced back into their own minds, their own thoughts, as if in a sanctioned 
daydream. Without interference they are able to follow the uninterrupted free' 
flow of thought, perceptions and sensations. For a brief instance their own mind is 
the 'curriculum'. 
Cecilia asserts that part of the activity's appeal is that it contains no great mystery. 
Indeed, we are a long way here from the elaborate lesson plans of the competence 
discourse (Moore, 2004). However, other teachers in the study have also 
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attempted similar activities, without the same success. The simplicity of the 
exercise and its unassuming worldly pretentions are inversely proportional to the 
difficulty of achieving the goal: in attempting to experience nothing one must do 
nothing, and we soon find ourselves incapable of doing nothing. 
Unsurprisingly, Cecilia is interested in what the students discover during the 
exercise. But with what authority does she invite her hyperactive students to stare 
at a spiral? We would expect them to find nothing that draws them in and 
maintains their interest. So why might students like it? A clue to their surprising 
engagement might be found in Naranjo's identification of the shift occurring 
between the conditions of "not finding anything" and "finding nothing" (Naranjo, 
2004, p.285). According to Naranjo, spiritual tradition teaches that finding nothing 
is an encounter with the presence of Being, an encounter we thirst after and 
erroneously seek in doing and having. Applying oneself to the search for nothing, 
the action of no-action, involves a pedagogy that is diametrically opposed to the 
direction of learning in schools involving the accumulation of knowledge and skills. 
The difficult knowledge of meditation, on the other hand, is approached by the 
constant return to the beginning, which is the same as the end, and can be 
generalized as a 'letting go'. The Zen tradition describes this return to ground zero 
as "beginner's mind", the development or cultivation of the attitude of the novice 
(Suzuki, 1973). Tea ceremonies and such repetitious practices stress not so much 
the nature of the act, but the attitude in which it done, the quality of the doer. It is 
attention to the action, regardless of its apparent worth or its possible outcome, 
which makes the event 'true' or a thing of beauty, and denotes the quality of the 
doer. As in art, the perfect act is inseparable from the perfect state of mind. 
Though references to Yoga and Zen might appear to be a digression, they draw 
attention to the existence of philosophies and practices of learning radically 
different from the dominant paradigm of Western(ized) schooling. In the light of 
such perspectives we can read into Cecilia's experiment a fundamental, if 
momentary, inversion in the direction of travel, the eruption of an 'alien' discourse 
within a dominant educational paradigm whose roots Foucault described as "the 
most insipid psychology, and the most antiquated humanism" (Foucault in Miller, 
1994, p.172). Though she does not say so, one might suspect that Cecilia, who had 
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recently completed a specialized course in meditation, has begun to discover the 
possibility of an alternative humanism and psychology. Perhaps, like Foucault, she 
has seen that: 
Behind the visible facade of the system, one posits the rich uncertainty 
of disorder, and beneath the thin surface of discourse, the whole mass 
of a largely silent development: a 'presystematic' that is not of the 
order of the system; a 'prediscursive' that belongs to an essential 
silence. (Foucault, 1969, p.76) 
Could it be that these new perceptions, not yet formulated discursively, generate 
the courage needed to share the knowledge of silence with her students? If so, it is 
an invitation that the students have responded to with apparent zeal. Can we 
presume that this success derives from a pedagogy of "contagion" as underlined by 
Naranjo? It assumes that 
[...] experience may be passed on, and that, as life proceeds from life, a 
certain depth of experience may perhaps be only brought about by the 
presence of another being partaking in that depth, and not by 
manipulations. If attitude is a deeper issue than technique, and if 
technique issues from attitudes, experience is still a deeper issue than 
attitudes and constitutes their source. (2000, p.16, emphasis in 
original) 
The experience of contagion as a communication of experience, is touched upon by 
another teacher, Reinall. It is something that she has benefited from as student or 
learned, but perhaps has not known how to value. It is precisely in the context of a 
meditation exercise that she begins, following a session at the SAT, to reflect on the 
importance of contagion in her own academic life: 
This morning, when Claudio was talking about contagion in meditation, 
I think that there is also a contagiousness in the teaching-learning 
process. There is contagion there, because for me, after my degree 
what I learnt most from my teacher was through contagion. It was like 
you are a disciple [...] But if you ask me what they taught me, if he ever 
gave me a class in linguistics, no, never. I learnt by being at their side 
[...] so it wasn't about theory. (Reina) 
Contagion as pedagogy stands in stark contrast to the manipulations and 
deliberations of the competence discourse for good teaching. This discourse, with 
11 
 Reina is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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its profiles (lists) of standards and competences, is, according to Moore, 
underpinned by a 
[...] belief that teachers do need to have sufficient subject knowledge to 
teach their students effectively, that they do need to be effective 
planners and classroom managers, and that a high level of personal 
organisation and preparedness is one of the principal requirements of 
good classroom teaching. (2004, p. 79) 
Though, in contrast, the principle/practice of contagion approximates to what 
Moore describes as a charismatic discourse (2004), we can, I think, assume that 
indefinable 'charisma' is not what permits Cecilia to engage her students; rather, it 
is her own hard-won knowledge of silence. It seems more probable that it is not 
Cecilia's force of character that is carrying her students towards an experience of 
silence, but the weight of her own experience, the courage of her own conviction 
(knowledge). Have Cecilia's students also begun to partake of her own deepening 
experience of the difficult knowledge that is finding nothing? Have they caught 
something from her? And does this something include rewards that are greater 
that the remedial reward of an absence of agitation? Has it soon become more to 
them than an anti-stress therapy, but rather a door to some other "presystematic" 
place that is experienced as unfamiliar, yet pleasantly vital? 
Cecilia's practice of silence is conspicuously teacherly; it is something that she 
'invites' her students to partake in. But the participants' narratives reveal silent 
developments of another order. Conrado12, for example, is developing a new 
pedagogical space for himself in which silence is imminent. This new space takes 
shape around the sense of his own, unadorned human presence and his ability to 
sense this presence in others: 
I can arrive in class, look at them in a loving way, with affection, giving 
time to each person, the moment of fame for you, for you, for you. If it 
is in the morning, then a pat on the back [...] and so from this starting 
point the English classes have been going through big small changes 
[...] everyone has their own vital space and has their moment. So I feel 
like I am at a moment in which I am applying tools such as these I have 
mentioned: the greeting, the goodbye, and the silence. The silence has 
been really enjoyable for me. (Conrado) 
12 Conrado is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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Are we to believe that an attention to saying hello and goodbye might represent an 
important professional development for teachers? Where does the bigness of 
Conrado's small changes lie? Could it be in the creation of relational space in which 
teaching and learning might occur? Bibby's study of classroom interaction in an 
English primary school supports the idea that Conrado's 'simple' activities of 
student recognition are unusual: 
Our field notes recorded very few examples of children giving evidence 
of feeling seen, valued and acknowledged [...] In Grafton School, it was 
remarkably rare for a teacher to give an individual specific positive 
feedback, and when it happened it tended to take place in complex 
circumstances that might have muddied the message. (Bibby, 2011, 
p.38) 
Bibby's psycho-emotional focus reveals a classroom in which the students' craving 
for attention and relationship with the teacher is manipulated and muddied 
through the obligation to knowledge. Bibby's documentation shows that students' 
often desperate desire for recognition (relationship) can become uncomfortably 
entwined with answering questions, and more uncomfortably so when these 
answers are incorrect. The complex circumstances she refers to appear to be those 
of teaching and learning itself. Conrado, on the other hand, seems to dedicate time 
to the child's need for attention as a "starting point". 
If Conrado is attending to the relational space directly, albeit briefly, as a "starting 
point", there is narrative evidence to indicate that he is most concerned with fully 
establishing his position within this relational space: 
I allow myself not to go so directly into an activity [...] [I always used 
to] be in accelerated movement, and now I can spend five minutes 
observing, watching, sensing myself a little, getting into contact with 
my body, which is difficult for me, but that is where I am. No? And it 
gives me a little wisdom, a little margin. (Conrado) 
Conrado's presence in the classroom and his ability to engage with his students' 
presence could develop simultaneously and be interdependent. However, a 
developing sense of self is what allows to him to occupy teaching with more vitality. 
It is a self more fully conscious of its own body, its own affect, and not so enslaved 
to the intellect. He owes this liberation from excessive thinking to an experience in 
a drama exercise: 
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I realised that there was something very powerful [in my 
performance], yes! And that there are connections that sometimes, 
often, I used to forget, or [still] forget. And if I am connected a little 
more, which is difficult for me, but if I do connect a little more, with my 
body, my feelings, my emotions, this [pointing to his head] works less, 
or I allow it to work less, or it has less voice, or I silence it, and so 
things become a little easier. Not only easier, but also things can give 
me pleasure, a situation can give pleasure that before would have been 
very stressful, tense. No? And so I realize that I am on the right path. 
(Conrado) 
The moment that Conrado described did not actually take place in the SAT, but it is 
the type of experience that occurs in the theatrical work undertaken in the SAT 
programme. Once more, we are a long way from the difficult knowledge of the 
competence discourse. A long way from the commonplace that a teacher must think 
and analyse their way into good teaching. For Conrado, getting connected means 
learning to turn down the volume of his overactive mentality and turn up his 
emotional and physical registers. He struggles to get connected, not with a set of 
teaching skills or activities, but with his own experience of himself. In this sense 
Conrado's narrative implies that there is something to (re)learn that is prior to 
techno-rational competence, something in which techno-rational competence may 
take root and become properly situated. 
Drawing on Conrado's account we might conclude that this 'something' is 
wholeness, a connection to the messages of his own multiplicity, forming a new 
pedagogic space from which to teach. As the relation to himself increases, so do his 
relations to the multiplicity of the group. This wholeness is one of the values 
underlined in Naranjo's (2000) Gestaltian framework, where it is coupled to the 
difficult knowledge of responsibility. We must be responsible for expanding our 
knowledge of ourselves, thus becoming consciously whole, just as being conscious 
of what is occurring makes the evasion of responsibility more difficult. To take full 
responsibility for the learning of his theatrical 'performance' Conrado needs to 
apply this learning across his whole mode of being, including teaching, acquiring a 
fuller, rounder, stage presence. Not that he is acting; rather, he is learning to act 
differently. His employment of silence is more than just a prop, it is the medium 
through which and by which contact can occur. What is silenced and cleared from 
stage, even if briefly, is not just the noise of his own techno-rational bias, it is the 
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noise of the curriculum. As with Cecilia, where silence occurs the curriculum is in 
abeyance. What is more, silencing the curriculum allows Conrado to sense the 
pedagogic relationship in its nakedness, to (re)discover the emotional physicality of 
teaching, this fact of sharing a temporal, spatial and spiritual domain with these 
newly embodied souls. 
Conrado, an English teacher, who describes himself as having been "a normal 
teacher" - dependent, rigid, insecure - is interested in the power of doing things 
differently and giving character to his actions. He details lessons in which he has 
taken his surprised students on expansive pedagogic journeys: 
The students didn't recognize me! And, well, it's been wonderful to 
allow myself to do things [differently]; go out into the school patio and 
greet each other by the hand, and in pairs. Today is Mothers' Day and of 
the 13 Grandmothers of the Earth, but all this is in English with 5th and 
6th grade [of primary school ...] The kids proposing ideas for what these 
Grandmothers would want for our planet, and with our water. Each pair 
gave you an idea. Now go to the fountain, and wet your hands [...] "That 
was brilliant Conrado! Obviously, because I can see you, perceive you, I 
don't know what, you seem closer". For me a wonderful comment from 
a kid was "That class was brilliant!" I mean my classes [used to be] 
normal, and so when they say something like that, it's great. (Conrado) 
Conrado senses that this unfolding practice is not made possible by the addition of 
some new personal faculty, but rather from the removal of the interferences that 
were inhibiting their expression in the first place. He describes himself as having 
been in "stand by" for most of his career, sitting anxiously atop an untapped 
potential. Teaching, he says, is now "hooking [him] into life." Echoing Nietzsche, we 
might say that he is becoming "vital" whereas previously he had been "decadent". 
Conrado, without appearing vain, would seem to be conscious of what Friedrich 
Nietzsche might have called a growing "nobility" rooted in the heroism of an amor 
fati (Blake et al., 2000, p.124): that love of things as they are, the love of his 
teaching life and its tragicomic stage. 
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Chapter 5: Dropping Out or Tuning In? 
Conrado, post-SAT, is learning to occupy his role with greater gusto, to step 
forward into his own skin (see chapter 4), but narrative evidence reveals the 
primary movement underlying many teaching identities has involved a recoil from 
the world. The world as an inhospitable and hostile place is a recurrent theme in 
the descriptions of their teaching origins, and clearly a 'negative' motivation for 
becoming a teacher. Araceli13, for example, felt she had been born on the wrong 
planet. For Araceli, teaching represented at once the opportunity of a retreat from 
the world, and a battleground for her attempt to transform the world in her own 
image. Her frontal attacks on what she saw as the tedium and stupidity of 
professional dialogue in schools came to nothing, and once it was clear her 
defensive citadel was not amenable to demands for a new way of being and doing, 
she entered into depression. 
There was a point at which I fell out completely with my profession 
because I felt that when I was in the staff team everything was totally 
neurotic. For me it was unacceptable. There were things that were 
obvious that we tried to transmit to the students through the school's 
project. But then between the teachers the envies were brutal. And so 
for me that was so chaotic that I could not tolerate it. [...] Perhaps I 
thought that by becoming a teacher I could change the world, and I 
realized that that was not possible. And that was when I entered into 
depression. (Araceli) 
Muriel14 traces her motivation to become a teacher to feeling incapable of taking 
up a place in the world of adults. Children were the easier option. She sees this as a 
generalized condition among teachers and one of the great problems of education. 
She describes school as a "refuge for those who do not dare to do something else". 
"You use the child," she says, "and [this teacher] is really the person least suitable 
to work with children ... that is how I felt, there was something inside me that hurt 
and I didn't know how to do anything else." She portrays schools as peopled by 
13 Araceli is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
14 Muriel is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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marginalized adults, often incapable of operating effectively even in the relations 
between colleagues. For example, Muriel's academic leadership within a school 
foundered in difficulties expressing and arguing her ideas for change among 
colleagues. Such individual and collective inadequacy is a long way from the 
professional, political and ideological imaginary of the teacher as 'exemplary 
adult'. Muriel's teachers are conspicuous for their immaturity. "What you cannot 
do," she says "is manage yourself with a group of grown ups". 
Whilst Muriel's experience is plagued by insecurities, Fernando's appears more 
robustIthe school] is my world, and in my world I am King". Fernando dominated 
school through intellectual prowess and hard work. But this contrasts with 
difficulties in other environments, including continuing fears and paranoia on the 
street. In comparison, school is a safe place, a refuge: "I always gained recognition 
at school, was applauded, I was a grade A student". This schism between an 
uncertain 'real' world and the known, controlled "refuge" of school led Fernando, 
and others, to increasingly dedicate their energies to professional life. Fernando 
declares he "lived to work", and this dedication further separated him from his 
own life. 
Reina, also, describes work as the "motor" of her life. "An ugly girl, a clumsy girl, 
the girl with braces, the girl with glasses" and competing with an attractive and 
clever sister, Reina sees that from an early age she came to identify hard work and 
success with a basic "right to exist". Her life was a long struggle to gain acceptance 
in the world. There are echoes here of Bernfeld's depiction of human destiny since 
the Fall, whereby "man is forced to create a substitute paradise of his own by 
sweat, renunciation and the sense of guilt" (1973, p.55). With so much hanging on 
her working identity, Reina was never able to verbalize the fact that she does not 
actually like linguistics (her academic discipline at the university). Her interview 
proved to be watershed in this respect. 
Araceli, Muriel, Fernando, and Reina provide examples of the strange phenomenon 
in which people wary of taking up the challenge of the 'outside world' have become 
the teachers who, supposedly (and ironically), prepare others to take up that 
15 Fernando is one of the Mexican interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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challenge. Is this paradox ontological to the identity of all education professionals, 
especially those dedicating their entire professional careers to educational 
institutions? 
The school, I say, is just like a family. There is the father with the 
handsome title of principal who commands and punishes, who is kind 
to those who behave themselves but remains above all remote and 
overpowering. There is the mother, the woman teacher, friendly, close, 
loving, yet moody, and in fear of the principal. She too can be won over, 
and more demonstratively so, by anyone who is a good boy. Finally, 
there are the child's schoolfellows, brothers and sisters, and equals by 
all law and custom. Still, free competition prevails and anyone who is 
able - in learning, cheating, flattery - or who is full of energy can get to 
the top of the class and first place in teacher's heart. The educational 
content and mission of this institution consists in making bookish 
knowledge supreme and placing its value beyond doubt. (Bernfeld, 
1973, pp.77-78) 
Bernfeld's analogy, though dated in some respects, is nonetheless evocative. 
Significantly, perhaps, the two university teachers interviewed as part of this 
research - Reina and Julia16 - reveal a disconcerting disconnection from their own 
professional involvement in the pursuit of "bookish knowledge". Reina owes her 
career as a linguist to the fact that those were the post-graduate grants available at 
the time, while Julia summarizes her academic career to date as a series of 
formalities and automatisms. 
I started doing doctoral courses, then the thesis [...] in 94. I defended 
the thesis at [...] the end of 96. I think I stopped the research itself a 
short while ago. I don't really know what to say to you. I'd almost tell 
you that I haven't really begun yet. Really, I'm still in the administrative 
process of doing a doctorate in linguistics [...] and then continuing to 
publish, and then getting a [university] position in 2001 [...] And then 
there was a moment 4 years ago when I began Gestalt and those things, 
when I decided not to publish any more if it didn't come really from me. 
(Julia) 
There is a sense here in which Julia does not actually sense herself as being present 
in her own life; rather, things seemed to just happen to her, she became 
enwrapped (and enrapt?) in predetermined procedures and processes. Far from 
critical minds, Reina and Julia paint a picture of intellectual conformity, of jumping 
16 Julia is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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through education's hoops and going through the motions of academia. They were, 
in short, both invested and dependent. 
If Bernfeld's analogy of the school as family is accurate, we might conclude that 
teacher identity is constructed around a central non-development; that of never 
having flown the nest. Perhaps this fledgling condition goes some way to 
explaining the great conservatisms of teaching. Here the permanence in education 
reflects a desire for continuity. School is not returned to with the aim of 
dismantling or making unrecognizable. Things might be tweaked, but the essential 
characteristics are to remain intact as they form the basis of the sought-after 
'familiar' (and 'familial') relationships. Christopher Bollas talks of a going forward 
in life that is in truth a going back, a "transformative regression" most clearly 
evidenced in the replaying of the family, this time as parents. Regression is a 
response to the "too hard to bear" realization of the complexity and isolation of 
one's own mind. We seek, instead, the comforting "places of the mother and father" 
which stand superficially in contrast to the "madness always latent in groups: to 
the groups of social life, and more so to the group that is mental life" (1992, 
pp.241-242): 
[We] retreat [...] from the anguish of having a mind and living within a 
social order that outstrips our early childhood structures and wears 
thin our illusions of unity. We retreat very subtly back to transformed 
dyadic affiliations, back into triangular structures when we generate 
our own family, forward into passionate beliefs in the veracity of a 
single vision of reality (whether a psychoanalytic view, a political 
opinion, or a theological perspective), all unconsciously soothing -
even when [these are] the occasions of mental pain themselves -
because the mentally objectifiable dilemma is always preferable to the 
complex that is beyond its mental processing. (ibid., p.244) 
The harder we look at teacher identity the more troubling it becomes. If, like 
Muriel, they have fallen in love with the figure of the 'teacher,' then have they not 
confused the message with the messenger? If they have fallen in love with the 
subject, why are they not 'doing it'? If they have fallen into teaching out of 
necessity, does this mean they are unsuitable for any other profession or trade? 
The last of the three options is recognized by popular culture in the brutally 
succinct saying, "Those who can do, and those who can't teach." This saying goes so 
far as to imply teaching is not a 'proper activity', that the teacher is not actually 
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'doing' anything, they are teaching. It also assumes teaching to be the easy option, a 
known entity with long holidays. 
But evidence of high teacher burn out and turnover would suggest otherwise: that 
teaching is in fact a site of often unbearable tensions (Vandenberghe and 
Huberman, 1999). One such tension is that of status. Whilst a teacher may aspire to 
the status of 'good teacher', whilst they may be admired and loved by their 
students, respected by colleagues, once outside the school gates teachers' 
professional status is relatively low. Teaching suffers from this schizophrenic 
valuation, as a profession it is simultaneously admired and pitied, its status shifting 
and uncertain. In Mexico teaching is openly recognized not as the 'status' option 
but the 'security' option, guaranteeing a job for life, social security and a 
reasonable income. The Mexican narratives of Igor, Erendida, Fernando and 
Yvetel7 attest to this situation. Fernando, for example, is clear that what many 
teachers see reflected in the faces of their students is no more than their pay 
cheque. Similarly, Igor testifies to a generalized mediocrity sanctioned by the 
union. The teaching Igor, Fernando and Erendida and Yvete point to is not a 
vocation, it is an occupation, a way to sell your time in return for salary. 
If 'true vocation' is rare, it is unsurprising that in Mexico teacher identity is 
permeated with a discourse of collective and individual rights arbitrated though 
the union. This stands in contrast to the discourse of obligations increasingly 
dominant in the neo-liberal model of 'advanced' democracies. In Mexico vestiges of 
a teacher identity discourse are still visible, characterized not by the discourse of 
competence but the 'old' relations of power. Through the lens of labour relations 
any individual teacher aspires to be seen and to act not as an autonomous 
professional, but as a representative of a collective brought together around a 
common relationship. The Mexican Teachers' Union (Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores en Educacion), with around 1.6 million members, is the largest and 
historically most powerful union of any kind in Latin America. Under such 
conditions, teachers collectively remain a socio-political force in Mexico and have 
17 Igor, Erendida and Yvete are among the Mexican interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief 
description. 
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remained active in political life, seeing themselves as direct objects of oppression, 
injustice and exploitation. 
Yvete is an example of this politically 'tuned in' teacher. However, her narrative 
shows that whilst 'tuned in' politically, she had 'dropped out' of teaching itself. This 
is a dilemma that Fernando warns against when casting the 'politicized teacher' as 
one who has no time for their students. Yvete's case conforms to this stereotype: 
her "concern was to comply with something" sufficiently to avoid sanction. 
I had to hand in reports and teaching plans for all the year [...] because 
the head didn't revise these each month [as they were supposed to]. So 
as they didn't check, I would let it pass, and at the end of the year, what 
would I do? I invented everything, in one night I would finish all the 
documentation. What that means is that in my [day to day] work I 
improvised a lot. (Yvete) 
Her situation is reminds us of Britzman's description of students who have 
perfected "getting by" through a series of "survival strategies" whose "furtive 
movements might be thought of as the learners' means to defend herself or himself 
against the demands of educators or, more pertinently, against the demands of 
learning" (1998, p.24). In Yvete's case she defends herself from the demands of 
teaching, a defence she must make against both students and the institution. 
Yet whilst being negligent in her teaching, she is not negligent as teacher; she 
works hard as a union representative, even spending her own money to print 
flyers, to attend meetings and demonstrations. The principle that moved her was 
justice ("not allowing them to impose, not allowing corruption to continue, not 
allowing them to violate our rights"), and her responsibility is to the teacher as a 
collective socio-political identity, not to the teacher as a person, as a human being, 
nor to the student as systemic 'victim'. She has pushed her participation beyond 
what she now considers to be physically and emotionally bearable, and pulled 
others along with her, organizing, cajoling, bullying. 
Yvete's union work demonstrates that this third pillar of the responsibility triangle 
(student, institution, teacher) can be taken up from different and contradictory 
perspectives. In attempting to give a collective voice to teachers, Yvete has, at 
times, trampled on some individual voices, not least the voice of her own 
overstretched body. Perhaps more worrying is the central discrepancy between 
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her declared irresponsibility regarding those more marginalized than herself, i.e. 
her students, and her own appeal to be the beneficiary of the state's consideration. 
She was unable or unwilling to bear the full weight of her responsibility to the 
students, preferring to concentrate her attention and effort on a cause more 
immediate to herself and to her own teacher 'clan'. There is a polarity in Yvete's 
demonization of the state and defence of teachers reminiscent of the dyadic 
relationships characteristic of Bollas' "transformed regression" (op.cit.). Within 
this dyad, Yvete plays the `saviour', superheroine and defender of the weak. 
Whilst we might point to her lack of commitment to teaching and learning, and 
doubt the maturity of her position (all take and no give), we can nevertheless 
admire her political commitment. Yvete's self-professed sensibility to power and 
authority, bitter fruit of her relationship with her father, renders her keenly alive 
to dangerous games of power and their injustices. Such power must be checked, 
resisted, contested. Nevertheless, most of the narratives are not actively concerned 
with the political and economic oppression of teachers; rather, they are filled with 
utopian sentiments more broadly directed towards students and society. This 
broad-brush utopianism is more common than Yvete's localized and focused 
political identity. Its advocates take up the charge of saving children from injustice, 
cruelty and an unseen life on the margins. Araceli's idealisms stemmed from a 
personal political agenda, as a way out of her own darknesses. She joined Brigades 
going to El Salvador and Nicaragua, and closer to home she would aggressively 
take up the call to push for change in schools: 
[...] it was that neurotic part that believed I had come to this world to 
improve it, that neurotic part that thinks we've come to take the place 
of God. Yes, of course, I'll take responsibility for the other, I'll take 
responsibility for the situation, I have to control this, I have to control 
that, because that is the job God gave me. (Araceli) 
Like Yvete, she now identifies her campaigning zeal as problematic: she herself is 
subsumed by the effort required to 'right' the world from its inequalities and 
dominations; yet she herself uses the privilege of her position (and forceful 
character) to dominate others. 
Cecilia describes a similar situation: 
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I believed I was the saviour, because that happens to many teachers, 
and it happened to me as well. We believe we are the saviours of the 
world. We see a student with a terrible family, and their life is like this 
or that, and so we're going to do something... (Cecilia) 
Cecilia and Araceli display what Britzman identifies as a fantasy of omnipotence 
within education. Naturally, the demands of being a 'saviour' made living with 
ongoing social injustice and its institutionalized manifestations in school very 
difficult.18 
Dropping Out or Tuning In: Revisited 
Cecilia's Yellow Brick Road: An exemplary narrative as fable 
In a deviation from the 'before SAT - after SAT' analysis of interview data, this 
"revisited" section is more concerned to chart the transformations in a particular 
teacher's internal motivation/orientation across a career, the way in which their 
point of departure for professional activity has evolved. I have chosen Cecilia 
because she identified important shifts in her positionings and 'purpose', and 
regards herself as a successful classroom teacher (in part because after 30 years 
she still has enthusiasm for teaching). Whilst many transformations occurring in 
her professional life are pre-SAT it should be remembered she is talking from a 
post-SAT perspective. Towards the end of the account I will also include shifts in 
her practice identified by her as resulting directly from experiences in SAT. 
As a 'novice' teacher in the period immediately after the fall of Franco, Cecilia's 
reaction to the repressive potential of government and schools had originally 
compelled her to adopt a 'total response' to the system, rejecting all of its facets, 
and anything within herself that might cause her to be confused with that same 
system. From this highly oppositional and discursive position, which she 
subsequently came to see as an ideological enslavement in itself, Cecilia underwent 
a series of evolutions - changes mostly resulting from her reflexive practice in the 
18 Agents provocateurs such as Cecilia or Araceli share at least one point of contact with a systemic 
tendency; the status quo of schooling does not cease to be utopian in its claims to be preparing the 
coming generations to participate productively and benefit from a history of ceaseless economic 
and social progress - the present of the child (and the teacher) must be rigourously framed and 
qualified by this adult future. 
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face of experience. Over the years, then, Cecilia retreated from what Nietzsche 
might have described as "the negative nihilism of transcendental values" (Blake et 
al., 2000, p.4'7), constructing in their place a value "within life and not outside it". 
This involved Cecilia in a new realism, "a richer and more detailed appreciation of 
'how it is'" (ibid.). According to Blake et al. we could conclude that Cecilia has 
undergone a Nietzschean education involving the "obligation of realism", an 
"attention to the way things really are, stripped of illusion and delusion: of 
acceptance of reality and assertion of what value one may hold in this worldly 
context, without reference to transcendent abstractions" (ibid.). Experience taught 
her to accept the generalized sweep of power within the education system as a 
historical fact, and to look for freedom in the spaces or cracks always appearing in 
and inherent to a dynamic relationship of permanent provocation. She no longer 
opposes official ideology with personal ideology; rather, she undermines (or 
complements) official ideology with a personal strategy (or practice) of freedom. 
Once again there are echoes of Nietzschean themes: 
[Nietzsche's] demand on us to transform our life, to make something of 
ourselves, is not the common idea of self-creation, rather it is a matter 
of giving one's life style: of overcoming the resistance to recognising 
the particular life one has. What is 'invented' is therefore a kind of self-
recognition, becoming what we are is a matter of finding oneself, of 
properly understanding what we have become. Human life is seen here 
as a struggle against our unwillingness to let ourselves be intelligible. 
(Blake et al., 2000, p.79) 
Cecilia, recognizing herself as 'teacher', is thoroughly situated in the subjective 
space where teacher, institution and student come together. She is neither an 
official player, nor an opposition player; rather, she is increasingly attuned to 
finding herself infinitely implicated in her environment, and discovering a 
Deleuzean enfolded subjectivity in the "very middle and muddle" (Semetsky, 2006, 
p.16) of schooling. From within this 'muddled middle' Cecilia achieves clarity 
through a negotiation with herself and with her colleagues whose objective is 
agreement and compromise, whilst avoiding agreeing to things that are in clear 
contradiction with her core beliefs. 
In accordance with her highly-developed reality principle, her concern, which can 
be considered Nietzschean, is to pursue what functions within the historical 
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limitations of reality. What works is determined by critical observation of what is 
'given' - the system, her students, her self - not so that she might collude with the 
status quo, but in order to 'freely' weave her own narrative from these unavoidable 
ingredients. 
Below is a statement giving credence to the argument that she is developing a 
Foucauldian practice of freedom: 
I have gained a lot of space for myself: because there is an external limit 
that is unquestionable, it is the limit of the law ... I don't fight with that 
anymore. The field is given, the framework, and then within that, you 
can do things lots of ways, with lots of styles, and within that I allow 
myself to determine the objectives that I will give myself, I prioritize 
them and that gives me a great tranquillity to be able to develop them 
myself. (Cecilia) 
By desisting from frontal opposition to the system as it stands, by working in the 
Foucauldian cracks, Cecilia feels she has been able to maintain her enthusiasm. 
This in itself can be regarded as a major achievement. Cecilia has undergone a 
metamorphosis which saw 'revolutionary' frustration become adaptive 
enthusiasm. It seems that this enthusiasm owes itself to her ability to carve out a 
'micro-purpose' within the 'macro-purposes' of education. This micro-purpose is 
to moderate between the three voices of the classroom - teacher, student, and 
curriculum. There is reason to believe Cecilia's motivation is to become, after 
Donald Winnicott (1993, p.10) and Bruno Bettelheim (1979, pp.127-141), a "good 
enough teacher", able not only to "engage the student's capacity for illusion and 
disillusion, the capacity to express and understand, and the capacity to tolerate 
times of being misunderstood and not understanding" but also to "help herself in 
tolerating the results of her or his own frustration" (Britzman, 1998, pp.41-42). 
Britzman overlooks one important feature of "the good enough" teacher as 
embodied by Cecilia: the ability to countenance the frustration of the curriculum 
and its gatekeepers. Cecilia's good enough teaching involves holding the 
'authorities' at bay, purposefully frustrating its intentions and pretentions. 
Liberation from her own pretentions to 'save' the mass of poor students, and an 
attention to what she herself can control and to "the power/knowledge 
arrangements existing under [her] very nose" (Blacker, 1998, p.362) signal her 
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engagement with the micro-physics of power advocated in the political philosophy 
of Foucault: 
All those on whom power is exercised to their detriment, all who find it 
intolerable, can begin the struggle on their own terrain and on the 
basis of their proper activity (or passivity). In engaging in a struggle 
that concerns their own interests, whose objectives they clearly 
understand and whose methods only they can determine, they enter 
into the revolutionary process. (Deleuze and Foucault, 1977, p.216) 
This "revolutionary process" occurs in the immediacy of Cecilia's classroom and its 
relations of power-knowledge. She re-constructs her own authority to the degree 
that she can moderate her official obligations to 'knowledge', thereby creating her 
own priorities as a response to the real (and challenging) situations she finds in 
the classroom, which permits her to exercise a 'moral' authority rather than an 
oppressive authority. "I have come to see," she says, "that it is possible to have 
authority without there being fear of authority". This critical awareness of the 
nature, challenge and necessity of permanent adversity stands in contrast to the 
defeat she identifies in so many "bitter" and "frustrated" teachers: 
[...] those that spend all day complaining about the system, and how bad 
the kids are, and how bad the government is, and how bad the state is, 
and how bad the families [...] It is they who are the most frustrated 
personally, they are people that are disconnected from themselves and 
their needs, and I can see that very clearly, right, because this job is like 
a mirror. The enthusiastic people that you see, who see potential in the 
kids, that something can be done, and that begin projects, and that have 
hopes, it's those people that are connected with themselves and the 
people that are frustrated and bitter, well, it's a disaster, that just seems 
to be a disaster to me. (Cecilia) 
In the case of Cecilia, for example, as an ideologue she was anti-authoritarian, but 
by examining herself she was forced to recognize her own authoritarian streak, a 
recognition that will have had repercussions in her relationship to external 
authority. We might conclude that Cecilia's sense of purpose within teaching has 
become to remain 'connected' with herself, which also means resisting those forces 
that seek, accidently or purposefully, to sever that connection. Such a purpose, 
evolved over nearly thirty years of teaching, can be summarized as dropping out 
(from discursive/ideological agendas) and tuning in (to the authority of her own 
experience and of her students engagement or resistance). 
95 
Having apparently found a balance between the demands of the curriculum and 
the demands of reality, Cecilia now faces what for her is the most intractable 
problem of education: 
[...] the biggest conflicts for teachers are mostly amongst ourselves, not 
with the students [...] with the students and the adolescents it is easier 
to situate yourself [...] the important work would be to see what 
happens amongst teachers themselves, in those micro-universes that 
are the school staff: there are the hierarchies, the second in commands, 
the unabashed that don't do much and get carried by everyone else, 
those that do marvellous and wonderful projects and believe themselves 
to be saviours of the world. (Cecilia) 
Cecilia identified her own 'issues' in relation to this multiplicity in the SAT, 
stumbling upon an awareness of a masked competitiveness that repeatedly 
spiralled into serious conflicts with colleagues. The admission has enabled her to 
step back from conflicts as they begin to surface, and to see herself not as the 
'victim' of confrontation but as 'participant'. We can perceive in this movement an 
increased capacity and willingness to decipher her own behaviour, and take 
responsibility for its less attractive components. If, as Britzman states, we defend 
ourselves against our own vulnerability, then Cecilia's admission of her need to 
compete (i.e. to confirm her value) represents a difficult act of deconstruction: 
"After all, confronting the unconscious means de-idealizing the self, accepting one's 
constitutive vulnerability, and noticing the fragility of consciousness" (Britzman, 
2003, p.109). 
This attention to conflict is symptomatic of a twist in Cecilia's tale of dropping out 
and tuning in. Questions of authority are omnipresent in Cecilia's early 
professional life; she was fully engaged, emotionally, ideologically, and structurally 
in highly polarized games of power. Her troubled and volatile positioning on the 
continuum between domination and freedom was fraught with ambiguity and 
affected by psychic and social forces that would appear to be beyond her capacity 
to negotiate cleanly. For Cecilia "authority is always present, to be confronted, or to 
submit to, always being positioned". She learns to occupy authority in a new way 
over the course of a career, becoming increasingly her own authority in the 
classroom. She has, like the Lion of Oz, admitted her fear and learnt to make a 
stand, becoming "self-supportive" (Perls, 1973) in her teaching. 
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Whilst there is a satisfaction of 'arrival', her narrative indicates that this arrival is 
perhaps the starting point for a second journey whose negotiations will take place 
around questions of subjectivity. This second 'tuning in' to subjectivity is more 
concerned to establish a relational porosity and transparency. If the questions of 
Cecilia's turn to authority were 'Who can legitimately do what?' and 'What can I 
legitimately do?', the questions of her relational turn are 'What are my affects and 
effects?' and 'What is it that occurs between us?'. It seems that this branch of the 
Yellow Brick Road is epitomized by the Tin Man's search for a heart. 
Cecilia is clear that her experience in the SAT has been important to both legs of 
the journey, as we can see when asked how the SAT has contributed to finding 
solutions to many difficult situations of teaching; above all, she says: 
[...] in the acceptance of myself, to not doubt myself, to accept my 
limits, and to have clear objectives also, to be clear that I am doing 
something I believe in and consider worthwhile. And also it has helped 
me to improve the quality of my emotional relationships with the 
students. That is the most difficult thing for me as it easily occurs with 
two or three, but not with the whole group, and especially not with 
some. This has been part of the work that is the longest journey for me. 
(Cecilia) 
From the inward consolidation of self-acceptance and contact, Cecilia's purpose 
has now become the outward movement toward acceptance of and contact with 
the other. She presents this shifting focus as a natural and inevitable development, 
the more contact she has with herself the more she can have with the students. 
Such contact between student and adult is identified as lying at the heart of her 
students' needs. Though Cecilia herself has historically favoured knowledge 
transfer, she is increasingly aware that her students' real need is something else. 
What her students want above all, she concludes, are limits, values and affection. 
Cecilia's sense of her educational purpose is now far removed from the 
transmission of curriculum. Her institutional purpose is to teach mathematics, 
whilst her cultural purpose is to assure a communication between the generations. 
With her presence, she reminds her marginalized students that they have not been 
completely forgotten. Unlike Juan19, who begins to understand the implications of 
19 Juan is one of the Mexican interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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his position as exemplary adult only after his experience in the SAT (see chapter 
14, Great Expectations), Cecilia seems to always have had an awareness of the 
potential to communicate moral authority through teacher identity: 
I am always very aware of this when I go to a class. I try. I think that I 
always remember when I was little. Recalling my school days, I 
remember that there were key people as teachers, who maybe didn't 
even speak to me personally, but whom I saw and whom I sensed as 
important for me. (Cecilia) 
Cecilia attests to the power of an adult presence in her life. Her intention is to 
provide this same presence for her own students. More than a communication of 
mathematics, Cecilia hopes to learn how to provide her students with a mirror of 
compassion, a mirror in which they see themselves being seen as singular, unique 
and of value. Asked what she would hope to achieve through her 'tuning in' to the 
heart, she replies: 
Not only look at them coldly, the objectivity of "this one is here and has 
to get to here", I have to include that, and that seems right to me. But I 
think the other is also necessary, I think the students also sense it, 
when you look at them with affection. The other is to singularize, the 
capacity when you are in front of a group to singularize each and every 
student and be able to look at them. (Cecilia) 
Such sentiments testify to a retreat from psychoanalysis' violence of the superego, 
its "compulsive character which manifests itself in the form of a categorical 
imperative" (Freud, 1923, p.35), or from what Foucault ventured as an unforgiving 
extension of the norm into the privacy of the subject (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, 
pp.189-213). The compassion that Cecilia seeks to cultivate takes shape as an 
antidote to the dispassionate play of teaching and learning, and as a recognition of 
the ubiquity of the anxieties of difference. Her aspiration toward an awareness of 
the classroom's multiplicity of singularities is perhaps indicative of an imaginative 
disposition to take the side of the learner, a position exemplified in August 
Aichorn's (1983) 'educational' work with youth considered to have lost their way. 
As Britzman explains, this taking sides 
[...] has to do with considering the logic of the student and allowing this 
logic to guide the work of making education. Teachers might then see a 
great deal of their work as a problem of redirecting the address of 
anxiety (beginning with their own), as opposed to viewing the 
circulation of anxiety as an interruption of education. But in doing so, 
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the teacher must become interested in embodying, purposefully, an 
ambivalent position, entertaining some promises, foreclosing others. 
(Britzman, 1998, p.46) 
Interestingly, Cecilia's narrative seems to support Foucault's assertion that the 
ethical practice of care of the self is antecedent to the care of ()therm. Cecilia's first 
'tuning in' to her own authority can be broadly regarded as a care of the self, and 
her second 'tuning in' to relationships appears to direct itself principally to the 
care of other. Having situated herself within authority, Cecilia turns her attentions 
to using this 'certainty' to address the ambiguity of her relations. Cecilia is not 
waiting for education to become 'compassionate', she is experimenting with her 
own ambivalent capacity for discernment and compassion, set within her duty to 
teach the subject. This working within and through ambivalence "is an 
achievement in the emotional development of the individual" (Winnicott, 1986, 
p.81). 
If Cecilia is trying to straddle the site of 'law' (always trusted to be 'just') and the 
site of 'life' (always trusted to 'resonate'), this attempt reflects one of education's 
central dilemmas; how to reconcile the justified will of education (concerned with 
the survival and advancement of civilizations) with the justified will of the 
educated (concerned with their own survival and advancement): 
The interminable goal is to craft a love and understand that it can 
tolerate the difference and the surprising relations that might be made 
between what we have been calling "the domains of law and life." But 
for this to occur the teacher must also reckon with her own psychic 
events. (Britzman, 1998, p.45) 
By way of closing this discussion of Cecilia's professional journey, it would seem 
fitting to cite an example of her progress as regards her current concern with her 
empathic capacity. She mentions she has made small advances, and feels "very 
much more relaxed and very much closer than before to a variety of students". She 
refers to the example of one 'problem student', a non-learner, whose raison d'etre 
in the class had become to cause trouble. Whilst this used to provoke a "very 
20 In an interview entitled The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom, Foucault 
states that "Care for others should not be put before the care of oneself. The care of the self is 
ethically prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior" (Foucualt, 2000a, p. 287). 
He goes on to point out that the care of the self can and has been considered as a necessary 
preparation for the care of others and for a subjects insertion in games of power. 
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aggressive" response from her, she has learnt to distinguish the boy from his 
actions. She gives him some slack, comes down harder when necessary, but, 
importantly, if she meets him later in the corridor she is able to get on with him, 
she bears no grudge: 
[...] so once in a while I can even look at him with a certain tenderness 
[...] because I can see all that lies behind him, how his family is, how his 
circumstances are. I can soften a little in seeing what kind of situation 
he is in, and that for me is very important. (Cecilia) 
And perhaps Cecilia's 'tuning in' to this student might contribute to keeping him 
from completely 'dropping out' from the possibilities of teaching and learning. 
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Chapter 6: Keeping the Faith? 
Cecilia's growing acceptance of her difficult student (see Chapter 5, Dropping Out 
or Tuning In) aligns her with a position of faith - the faith that the student is not 
per se a bad person. A politics of compassion places the student 'beyond good or 
evil', situating them squarely in their own history. From this historical perspective 
responsibility for the student's actions becomes socially embedded, thereby 
implicating Cecilia. A relationship cannot be denied, and knowledge of relationship 
inclines Cecilia toward taking the side of the student and away from the institution. 
She now must face not only the exasperating specifics of the student's disruptive 
behaviour in class, but also the knowledge of his totality and of herself as part of 
the student's life experience, part of the Lacanian mirror through which he knows 
himself (Bibby, 2011). 
If Cecilia has renounced 'saving' students, her developing concern is to 'protect' the 
student from the worst excesses of discipline and punishment. This she achieves 
by separating the student from his acts. She relinquishes the claim to know him by 
his deviance from the norm (Foucault, 1991, pp.188-213). She relinquishes the 
enactment of education's "categorical imperative" given voice through the three 
strategies identified by Otto Fenichel: "direct threat, mobilization of the threat of 
losing love, and the promise of special rewards." (1954, p. 328). In trying to 
assume a more neutral position toward this disruptive student, Cecilia is 
withdrawing from the technologies of objectification by which "each individual 
receives as his status his own individuality" (Foucault, 1991, p.204). Her 
responsibility, it would seem, is increasingly understood by her to lie elsewhere, 
perhaps in maintaining some kind of contact, a relationship. 
Fernando makes a telling statement that goes to the heart of the issues of 
responsibility inhabiting teacher identity: 
[...] a teacher can be very good, but they will still go crazy if they want 
to achieve all that is asked of them. So they need to have priorities, and 
I believe that the number one priority has to be themselves. So, like I 
tell them [my students]; "You have to open up your umbrella and bring 
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the students under the umbrella, and work under the umbrella. It's 
going to rain down hard on you, but you have to know who you are 
with. Are you there to serve your paymaster? ... Or are you there to 
serve your kids? You have to decide. It's tough - if you decide to serve 
your bosses you are going to have a hard time, and if you decide to 
serve the kids then you are going to have a hard time. You will have to 
make a moral choice, because you can't keep them both happy". 
(Fernando) 
A 'Catch 22' of responsibilities. What would it mean for a teacher to assume 
responsibility for themself? Fernando implies that a teacher's priority must be a 
responsibility for what they themselves do and don't do. What is at stake here is 
not just "getting by" within the impossible play-off between the contingent and 
idiosyncratic and the universalizing project of education; rather, embracing this 
"Catch 22" can elevate "getting by" into Britzman's "arts of getting by": 
Across the spectrum of education, the arguments between the domains 
of law and life return in smaller events such as the curriculum, the 
school rule, the university grade, the peer relations, the community 
demand, the teacher's intervention, and the student's refusal. Practices 
such as these lend their intrigue to all kinds of ambivalent relations 
that act upon and within the work of learning. A fugitive moment is 
also at stake, something more impertinent than the old story of 
adaptation, conformity, and compliance to the law, something quite 
elusive, called the "the arts of getting by". (Britzman, 1998, p.23) 
Fernando would seem to indicate that in getting the balance right between student 
and institution, the teacher is also taking responsibility for their own professional 
well-being; 
If you choose the kids, well at least you will know that you are doing 
something well, congruent with your professional ethic. Here, your 
professional training is not the question. Everything else is external - if 
you know maths, if you don't know maths. (Fernando) 
Britzman asks, "Can pedagogy take the side of the learner?" (1998, p.47). 
Fernando's testimony reveals, at the very least, an intentionality in this direction. 
To choose the children is, for Fernando, to keep the vocational faith. And, from his 
post-SAT perspective, it is also to keep the faith with one's own history, the fact of 
one's own 'lost' childhood. What is more, it is also to keep the faith with yourself as 
knowing and discerning teacher. Importantly, the essential assumption behind 
Fernando's umbrella metaphor is that the institution is not truly interested in 
either the children's or the teacher's well-being. This conclusion is experiential as 
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well as political; he knows firsthand the heavy-handed pastoral attitude of 
schooling and its over-laden curriculum. Fernando is sceptical of an educational 
discourse "grounded in an economic pretext", even when it lauds its "humanist 
variants" (Atkinson, forthcoming). Fernando's teachers and students are not being 
saved by schooling, they must be saved from schooling. His scepticism is matched 
by Erendida's belief that the 'official' discourse of government around the 
desirable and necessary competencies of teachers masks the real intention that 
teachers remain inadequate to the task: 
The state wants teachers with certain characteristics - well at least in 
writing they do, because I think actually it's more convenient for them 
to have teachers like they have—and so on paper it says what you want 
in a teacher, that you want such and such education, etc. etc. - and 
obviously someone who is going to teach has to have some specific 
characteristics, but the colleges don't give those elements to the 
teachers studying there, nor do they give them to the teacher who is 
already a teacher, or some sort of encouragement to keep growing. 
(Erendida) 
Her interpretation of the sub-standard training and support teachers receive is 
that 'empowered', 'critical' and 'engaged' teachers are a political inconvenience to 
Mexico's patrician state. Fernando and Erendida's testimony might be seen to 
support Bernfeld's assertion that we "distrust pedagogy because we don't believe 
that the tasks it sets education represent its actual social function. We rather 
suspect that this function is meant to be concealed and to remain unknown" 
(Bernfeld, 1973, p.33). 
Once schooling has been discredited by a teacher, and is no longer assumed to 
have the well-being of teacher and learner at its heart, then the questions of who 
has responsibility for what occurs and doesn't occur loom ever larger. In Mexico's 
highly centralized education system (for example, post-revoltion Mexico has 
always had a national curriculum), Fernando invokes a negative responsibility for 
teachers; a duty to protect and remove teaching and learning from the worst 
excesses of administrative and political imposition. Response-ability - to take 
students and self into account - is to barricade the classroom against the 
institutional agenda and to create a semi-permeable bubble in which both teacher 
and child can 'relax' into less driven relationships. Two attributes are required for 
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this defensive huddle - the strength to resist the demands of the system, and an 
appreciation of the world of the students. These are not faculties that came 
automatically to Fernando. He describes himself as having had an overdeveloped 
"sense of duty" that for many years fed his search for the good opinion of his 
colleagues. He had been a matado, a slogger, a workaholic, but by his own criteria 
he has not necessarily acted ethically in putting his professional status before his 
students' well-being. We can conclude from Fernando's analysis of his 
responsibility to the students that ethical correctness and faith in the importance 
of the relationship between teacher and student should not be confused with hard 
work and professional achievement in an institutional sense. Both Fernando's and 
Erendida's experiences are fraught with questions of motivation, of who they are 
working for, which amounts to a crisis of agency. Like Foucault, they have turned 
their attention to a characteristically Foucauldian question: What is it that what I 
do does? (Foucault, 1983, p.187). 
It is a commonplace of teachers' professional ethics that teachers' core 
commitment is to the well-being of their students (Campbell, 2003). However, 
going beneath the surface of this commitment, the picture can become blurred. 
Magdalena21, a teacher benignly 'in service' to the students says that she now sees 
her "compulsion to care for the other by way of action" as motivated by her own 
compulsive aversion of conflict. In the language of Fritz Perl's Gestalt Therapy she 
can be described as exhibiting the "boundary disturbance" of "confluence" (Perls, 
1973) with its inability to distinguish between self and other and intolerance of 
difference (conflict). As such her 'commitment' is not to the well-being of others, or 
of the school as a whole; rather, it is to her own need to "be loved, accepted, to be 
useful, to not be a bother, to be a central part of the machine". In desperately 
needing to belong, Magdalena is 'obliged' to separate herself from 'reality' by 
ignoring its real and necessary differences. What her doing does, first and 
foremost, is reduce her own anxiety. 
21 Magdalena is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix. 2 for a brief description. 
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Post-SAT Dora is able to identify what she now sees as a demanding dependency of 
being accepted within her apparent commitment to the proper education of the 
children: 
Well, [I'm] not a person who does things well because [that's how I 
feel] deep down inside, not from my love for another person, but 
instead based on a requirement, a demand: 'Look! I'm doing this, but 
love me for it'. (Dora) 
What is more, doing things "well" for Dora means that "nothing should be 
disorganized". It also means bossily extending this organization across her 
surroundings, and this, paradoxically, sets her at odds with the messiness of others. 
Yvete also recounts frustrated efforts to achieve belonging through service: "How 
many things have I done so that I wouldn't be rejected? Or how many things do I do 
so I won't be rejected?" Despite great effort to ensure acceptance, Yvete is now 
aware that she did not 'belong' in the world as she imagined: 
I felt I was the most loving woman in the world, kindness on legs. No? 
So then to realize that neither my gaze, nor my presence, or anything 
about me communicated this, but more like I generated fear [...] That 
has been difficult. (Yvete) 
On realizing the discrepancy between her conscious intent and its effect on others, 
Yvete is thrown into doubt: 
I would say 'And what about me? What about my objectives? What 
about my goals? What about my family? My children? My partner? 
Everything! .... What? So, then, what am I? And what about the [union] 
struggle? And what about love? Like, why love? Love, what for?' 
(Yvete) 
It appears that what is becoming clear to Yvete is that personal and professional 
negotiations around 'service' are not as transparent as once imagined. Her 
situation demonstrates how murky the ethical waters can become as soon as we 
begin to look at motivation. As a hyper-committed union activist dedicated to the 
collective good, did she abandon her private life, or did she find a worthwhile 
cause, or was she driven to resolve some intimate passion? Who and what was she 
fighting? How was her solidarity an imposition? 
Solidarity, service, love can be found wanting on closer inspection, taking their 
place within disguised strategies of individual struggle and survival. Other signs of 
105 
'bad faith' make their appearance in the narratives. Most significantly is the 
prevalence of 'simulation' within professional practice. Dora's narrative captures 
the condition of bureaucratic simulation found in the audit culture of Mexican 
schools: as she explains, procedures are created and implemented whose results 
are effectively inert, without consequences or effects. These are the ineffective 
administrative measures to which Fernando refers, currently being superseded as 
the Mexican state modernizes toward a new performativity and accountability 
discourse centred on academic results. Dora is made responsible for the 
maintenance of her part of a collective administrative simulation. She is all too 
aware that the authority allocated to her is not only invented by the institution; it 
is simultaneously undermined or denied by the broader political system. She 
knows that teachers submit plans to her not because they feel them to be relevant 
to their work, but because it is a bureaucratic requirement. In most cases these 
plans will bear little resemblance to what actually occurs in the classroom (see also 
Moore and Ash, 2003, on "ritualistic reflection"). She knows also that there is 
relatively little she can do to redress shortcomings in any meaningful way, and that 
her function is to police the letter of the law but not to rock the boat by demanding 
teachers uphold the spirit of the law. 
I mean the goal is for them to discover that planning is necessary, not 
that they fulfil a requisite of required planning as if it were an 
administrative document. [It should be] that what's planned is really 
what's being taught, so it can also be evaluated. (Dora) 
Dora's relationship to authority is qualified by this disjuncture between 
appearance and reality. Not only is she a reluctant judge feeling the diverse 
impositions of her role, she is also a reluctant judge with her hands effectively tied. 
Within her field of purpose, paradoxically she displays her sense of being without 
real purpose. Such simulation creates a parallel 'bad faith' universe at the heart of 
the school, a site where the appearance of learning substitutes for real learning. 
What does it mean for teacher identity to have to learn the art of simulation and to 
witness its collective manifestation? How can teachers keep faith with their 
institutional role when this role 'encourages' them to 'fake' knowledge and 
learning? 
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Keeping the Faith: Revisited 
From the new perspective on education being cultivated through her SAT 
experience, Dora is coming to align herself with Anna Freud's cautionary 
recommendation: "We must not demand too much from one another" (Freud, 
1930, p.121). This is evidenced by her fantasy invitation to her teachers to "take a 
holiday" from the normal business of work. This invitation is also extended to 
herself as she becomes gripped by the sense that she needs to relax. Dora imagines 
telling her teachers to "just do whatever you want to do; don't show me your plan; 
don't do anything." Ironically, she thinks "maybe that way things would happen." 
Things might happen when the system ('incarnate' in herself) stops manifesting its 
power and inciting compliance and/or resistance. Things might happen when she 
(the system) ceases to police education and adopts a receptive ethos. 
"Yesterday," explains Dora, "I was telling my roommate that now I'm more 
interested in the relationship - not between teacher and advisor - but more like the 
idea that they talk to me about how things are going for them". Like Igor, Dora has, 
at least conceptually, distanced herself from the function provided for her by the 
official agenda and its procedures. It is now another type of interaction she is 
looking to establish, one that does not turn around her investment in the systemic 
gaze and "categorical imperative", but emanates from her immediate relations. We 
can detect the tentative imaginings of a practice of truth-telling asserting itself 
above structure, and providing an ethical compass for agency and authority. As 
with Igor, there is some evidence that she is migrating toward a psychological or 
therapeutic ethics as a practice of self (Rose, 1999). This would appear to be 
moving her toward a different type of participation in games of power, one that 
might result in her wanting and needing to use "as little domination as possible" 
(Foucault and Rabinow, 1997, p. 298). She has seen through her games of power; 
seen through her position as judge of other teachers and of good practice; seen 
through the authority of her knowledge. She now describes her evaluative and 
prescriptive expertise in the following terms: 
I was just sitting there at my desk analyzing a book, comparing it with 
another, saying that it wasn't useful, or that it was useful, but based on 
my power: 'Look, I know and you don't'. (Dora) 
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Or, once more, this time looking at her own teaching: 
Today I realized why I always wanted the children to be quiet, because 
I'd get so worked up about—for example in my head I was all prepared, 
that from 9:00 to 9:15 we would do such and such, and then from 9:15 
to 9:45 such and such...[I] was very programmed. [And it was like things 
weren't] really bearing fruit in that way, because I was very rigid. 
According to me it was so the children learned and were prepared—
they are little things, 4 or 5 years old. I implemented some activities, but 
they were based in my neurosis: they weren't based in love, not based 
on their learning and growing, but that they had to learn, this group has 
to do well, we shouldn't even hear a fly in this group, nothing should be 
disorganized. (Dora) 
Dora has come face to face with her previously disguised intentionality, and can 
recognize her compulsion for order and progress as an imposition on the children, 
as an anxious exercise of power more than a natural concern for these infants' 
well-being. Once more, we may see as problematic that Dora seems to take 
personal responsibility for an overbearing concern for learning which is as much 
systemic as it is her own 'neurosis'. However, awareness of her own programmatic 
intensity can be seen as a first step to a broader critique of education's charged 
agendas for students and teachers, providing us with a poignant synopsis of 
traditional education's relation to the child and to the present. Dora's account 
captures education's fear of and hostility to the unintentioned 'now'. Ironically, it is 
precisely children's capacity to inhabit the present (especially through play) that is 
one of the iconic qualities of childhood, remembered with so much nostalgia by 
adults, yet also the target of so much individual and institutional constraint. Anna 
Freud identifies a vengeful spirit behind this oppressive tendency: 
This renunciation of the pleasure derived from his [sic] infantile 
impulses which is forced upon the child has two important effects on his 
mental development. He now pitilessly applies this standard which has 
been forced upon himself to the rest of the world. .... The moral 
indignation which is aroused by such acts [of sensual gratification] is the 
measure of the effort he himself has had to make to conquer his 
instinctive impulses. (Freud, 1931, p.61) 
Reading from Freud we might conclude that education is not aligned against the 
unintentioned now or the present as a negative, (i.e. as an absence of learning), but 
as a threatening positive (i.e. it is in such a present that instinctive, sensual and 
playful pleasures will take shape). Similarly, we might question how much the 
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Protestant work ethic favours work and its results, or how much it mitigates 
against idleness and its results ('The devil finds work for idle hands'). Foucault was 
clear that the modern subjects' governmentality aims not only at cultural and 
economic productivity, it aims to restrain the body and its idle pleasures (Foucault 
and Rabinow, 1991, pp.179-18'7). The creeping of idle or sensual pleasure into a 
teacher's discourse or practice is therefore a radical revolt from the intentionality 
of education. Witness, for example the systemic spasm that occurred when Rebeca 
proposed the introduction of one hour of silent reading a week in her Spanish class 
('But surely they can't be learning anything?'). From this angle, Carla's suspension 
of formal classes to tell jokes, or Dora's imagined invitation to her teachers to "take 
a holiday" from the normal business of work, are more than whimsical anecdotes. 
Some similar themes appear in the case of Rebeca. We find, for example, that she, 
like Igor, has modified her understanding and practice in evaluating her students' 
progress. She has not gone so far as Igor in incorporating a component of self-
evaluation, but she has shifted her focus from grading based exclusively on 
demonstrably acquired knowledge and skills, to grading that contemplates other 
more nuanced, personalized, intimate and subjective appraisals of performance, 
such as effort and attitude. That Rebeca is quite anxious about these modifications 
is evidence that they are both significant for her own identity as a teacher, and 
significant within an institutional context. Rebeca obviously feels that as a teacher 
she is a standard bearer for power-knowledge. An academic focus would appear to 
be her responsibility, and this also chimes with her own valuation of the 'virtues' of 
knowledge. However, subsequent to the SAT she feels obliged to enlarge her 
criteria for grading students: 
I realized up to what point I was being too rational and cold when it 
came to evaluating ... Now, for example, I see the students' progress 
much more globally and that makes me feel much prouder of them, 
something that just didn't understand before. I got on well with the 
students, but I only really saw their grades, that was that! And also, now 
it isn't so difficult for me to say: 'OK, academically maybe this student is 
a three, but they have tried hard, they've read a lot of books, which that 
grade does not reflect.' And so I can change the grade feeling myself to 
be morally legitimated, that I'm not cheating, or cheating the student, or 
the system, or myself. (Rebeca) 
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Rebeca goes on to explain the great disappointment students can feel when they 
know that they have worked hard, in part because of her encouragement and 
pressure, and at the end of the day are given a low score. Having been sensitized to 
the whole person in the SAT, Rebeca is now struggling with one of the central 
technologies of power available to government - examination, evaluation, and 
quantification (Foucault, 1991, pp.187-213). She feels the strain of being the 
instrument of government's obligation to describe its subjects and thereby 
individualize and totalize subjectivity: 
Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Lukacs, Habermas, and Foucault each, in his 
different way, suggested that calculation and calculability have become 
central not only in projects for the domination of nature, but also in 
relation to human beings. We have entered, it appears, the age of the 
calculable person, the individual whose individuality is no longer 
ineffable, unique, and beyond knowledge, but can be known, mapped, 
calibrated, evaluated, quantified, predicted, and managed. (Rose, 1996, 
p.88) 
The state, through teachers, acquires enormous power over the entire population 
as they are 'calculated' in schools. Likewise the teacher is invested with this 
power-responsibility by the state. We have probably all been witnesses of, or 
subject to, the creative and destructive power of these calculations as they 
identify-create successful and capable students, or identify-create failure and 
impotence. Rebeca is certainly aware of this process of creation-destruction, but is 
increasingly able to locate its bias toward the academic within the immediate and 
local reality of her relationships. How, she asks, do you grade an academically poor 
student with whom you have a very good relationship, a student who has engaged 
with you with trust and willingness? A low grade, she says, is lived by the student 
as a betrayal of the relationship, and she agrees that there is indeed a betrayal. 
I believe that I've always treated [the students] well, its something that 
they have valued in me. But didn't ever counted for anything, in the 
evaluation, never, never. And so, that made me uncomfortable also. For 
example, with this student I have a really good relation, which means to 
say that they also trust a lot in me, and then in some way they feel 
frustrated and betrayed, and I also feel as if I am betraying them. I 
didn't really understand why, or how to solve this. (Rebeca) 
This painful conflict is integral to her role as agent of the procedures of 
objectification identified by Foucault as central to the institutions of the state and 
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their administration of life (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, pp.188-205). Her 
difficulty is what to do with education's excess: all the information and experience 
that falls through the cracks between and within administrative technologies. 
We might suggest that Rebeca is situated on the interface between the three-
dimensional excess of reality and its multiplicities, and the two-dimensional 
technologies of calculation (Rose, 1999, pp.147-154.)22. As a result of her 
experience in the SAT programme she becomes more aware of the hubris of the 
power invested in her, the impossibility and 'unfairness' of its claims to be able to 
effect such a transposition, or its denial of the relevance of this excess. Rebeca 
attempts to move toward a resolution of these conflicts through the inclusion 
within her grading calculations of an appraisal of characteristics, qualities and 
activities that are not concrete expressions of academic achievement, but that form 
a part of her experience of her perceptions of the students and their relations in 
the classroom, including their relations to themselves (e.g. motivation), peers and 
herself. Through such fleshing out of the flatness of grades, Rebeca attempts to 
keep faith with the multiplicity of the classroom, but perhaps more importantly to 
maintain her faith in education itself and with her own identity as a teacher. She can 
no longer continue to disregard the quality of relationship, and the classroom as a 
relational space. 
Rebeca is aware of the limitations of her adjustment; it represents a remedial 
gesture, which, like Cecilia's adjustment to her difficult student, is designed to 
moderate the worst exaggerations of the system's obligation to knowledge. 
Factoring in subjective criteria such as attitude and motivation as a way of upping 
academically disappointing grades suggests that Rebeca is beginning to take the 
side of the student, and is perhaps reaching for Fernando's protective umbrella. 
What she is protecting is not only her students, it is the relationship she has with 
22 Rose asserts that human 'reality' or experience is (at least) three dimensional and is 
correspondingly nuanced and complex, whilst the technologies that have been developed to map 
the human sciences have tended to be two-dimensional. He uses the example of how human 
development was mapped by photographing babies 'in action'. These two dimensional photos were 
subsequently further simplified into line drawings that focused on what was regarded as the key 
information. Rose points out that considerable amounts of information are being accidently or 
deliberately lost in these processes, information that has effectively become 'excess'. 
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them, and for this reason it is also a protection of that part of her that has become 
invested in those relationships. 
Regardless of its rudimentary nature, Rebeca is probably correct in worrying that 
her practice of 'contextualizing' poor academic grades may at some point be 
challenged, as the education system she represents claims its power over our lives 
precisely on the grounds of its rationality and objectivity, that is, on its claim to 
reveal the truth about the educated subject. In this sense, the purpose of education 
is not only to furnish students with truth, it is also to extract truth from the 
students themselves. The teacher is not only a communicator, but also an 
interpreter, who, by means of examination and recording, is to create reliable 
knowledge about each individual student and the status of their 'soul' (Rose, 
1999). Rebeca's crisis of faith with education is situated precisely at this point 
where her identity as teacher is conflated with the identity of a technician of the 
"science of individualization" (Rose, 1999, p.139). 
But, if we are to accept Foucault's critique of modern power, then we cannot view 
this evaluative component as an add-on to the principal activity of teaching. 
According to Foucault, as an institution of the state charged with the totalizing and 
individualizing administration of a population, "the school became a sort of 
apparatus of uninterrupted examination" (Foucault, 1991, p.198). This permanent 
principle of examination 
[...] enabled the teacher, while transmitting his [sic] knowledge, to 
transform his pupils into a whole field of knowledge [...] the 
examination in school was a constant exchanger of knowledge; it 
guaranteed the movement of knowledge from the teacher to the pupil. 
But it extracted from the pupil a knowledge destined and reserved for 
the teacher. (ibid.) 
Rebeca's anxiety, her worry about perhaps unwisely taking things into her own 
hands and/or being challenged about her new practice, is not without good cause. 
She clearly has some awareness that hers is not an insignificant challenge to the 
order of things, though she may not appreciate the full 'revolutionary' weight of 
her reaction against the objectivity of academic grading. Rebeca, in full or partial 
consciousness, is purposefully interfering with procedures critical to the creation 
of a modern subjectivity and to the modern exercise of power over life. It is worth 
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quoting Foucault at some length on this subject because he is particularly 
trenchant in his appraisal of the historical power and danger of such apparently 
innocuous and justifiable procedures as grading students: 
The examination as the fixing, at once ritual and "scientific," of 
individual differences, as the pinning down of each individual in his 
[sic] own particularity (in contrast to the ceremony in which status, 
birth, privilege, function are manifested with all the spectacle of their 
marks), clearly indicates the appearance of a new modality of power in 
which each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and 
which he is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the 
gaps the "marks" that characterize him and make him a "case." 
... It is the examination which, by combining hierarchical surveillance 
and normalizing judgement, assures the great disciplinary functions of 
distribution and classification, maximum extraction of forces and time, 
continuous genetic accumulation, optimum combination of aptitudes, 
and, thereby, the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic, and 
combinatory individuality. With it are ritualized those disciplines that 
may be characterized in a word by saying that they are a modality of 
power for which individual difference is relevant. (Foucault, 1991, 
p.204) 
Foucault pinpoints that other purpose of pedagogy that Bernfeld alludes to when 
his fictional "Minister of Education, Machiavelli" asserts that the "crucial problem 
of education [is] organizational" (Bernfeld, 1973, p.71). It is in the organization of 
the subjects of education (their separation into bourgeoisie and proletariat) that 
education effects its principal achievement of conserving the existing distribution 
of power and shifting it incrementally toward the ruling and educated classes: 
There can be no doubt that education fulfils this function. World 
reformers and moralists, educators and religious men may grieve 
about it, or they may grow jubilant over some ephemeral symptom as 
if it portended a permanent reversal, but children of any age grow up 
and become men [sic] typical of their time and place. It makes no 
difference whether they received an education, whether it was good or 
bad, or what method it adopted. The individual differences between 
them disappear and what remains is the great common herd of citizen 
sheep that yields the wool which returns the cost of breeding, care, and 
multiplying, plus a profit. They all look alike as sheep will, although the 
shepherd boy assures us that each has a face of its own ... (Bernfeld, 
1973, p.83) 
Though the liberal instinct may feel duty bound to protest at Bernfeld's critique of 
education, its pitiless combination of psychoanalytic and Marxist perspectives, it 
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does provide a useful 'harmonic' for the Foucauldian vision of the school as the site 
of objectification through individualization. Bernfeld reminds us forcefully that a 
distinctive face, perhaps visible up close, does not alter an essential enslavement 
within the masses. 
Rebeca's situation is, perhaps, indicative of the deeply conservative nature of 
education. She worries and frets over striking out in a direction distinct from what 
she perceives as the norm. As an educated subject, she has been given her 
individuality, she is a "unique" case; but the corresponding ability or duty to act 
"uniquely" is not her default position; rather, it is something that she is beginning 
to learn as she begins to weigh her own concerns in the balance. In her small 
resistance to 'objective' academic grading, Rebeca may be seen to be asserting her 
idiosyncratic presence within education, and reasserting the subject of education 
as relational and social rather than "cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory". 
She fears that put under the microscope her grading habits may incite accusations 
of favouritism or randomness, and she is aware that her responsibility requires a 
careful re-negotiation if she is to systematically translate her new-found sensitivity 
to students into the official language of calculation without risk to herself. The 
possibility of this negotiation would seem to be becoming a difficult knowledge 
central to her own purpose as a teacher, perhaps of more import than her capacity 
to transmit her cherished Cervantes to students. This is precisely because it 
involves overcoming a perceived risk and a lived fear or anxiety. What is most 
important about Rebeca's new practice is that it results from the re-evaluation of 
two vital fears: on the one hand, the fear of stepping out of line with her 
institutional responsibility (the fear of discipline and punishment?), and on the 
other, her fear of betraying her relationship with the students (the fear of an abuse 
of her own power?). It appears that her experience in the SAT programme has 
obliged her to re-evaluate the importance of relationship and multiplicity, the 
unfathomable richness of experience, and to 'know' the magnitude of the total 
betrayal of this reality principle. One fear has vanquished another fear23. Rebeca 
23 As Slavoj 2iek notes of such transformations, the "turn towards emancipatory enthusiasm takes 
place only when the traumatic truth is not only accepted in a disengaged way, but is fully lived" 
(2011, p.xii). It is worth noting, that unlikeIgor and Dora, and perhaps to Ziek's disappointment, 
Rebeca does not demonstrate any signs of the intensity that might "transfigure totally who one was 
and what one thought" (Miller, 1993, p.361). She does not contemplate, for example, even in the 
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had been loyal to the principle of 'outing' inefficiency in her own students, and 
poor learning invariably had equalled a bad grade, regardless of quality of the her 
student relations. But upholding this principle came at a cost. Good relations 
become problematic if they are not accompanied by academic achievement. A good 
relation 
means that they also trusted in me a lot, and so in some ways they feel 
frustrated and betrayed [with a low academic grade], and I feel like I 
am betraying them. I didn't really understand all this, or have any idea 
how to resolve it. (Rebeca) 
We can imagine that only on the emergence of hurt within these relationships of 
trust did Rebeca begin to comprehend the dilemmas of painful multiplicity. If she 
had wanted to maintain a clinical, 'objective' approach to grading, post-SAT this is 
proving difficult to sustain. Rebeca is no longer oblivious to the potential for harm 
to those she describes as "the newly arrived" (which can be understood as 'the 
innocent'): 
You end up making them pay for many things, that they surely 
shouldn't have to carry the can for, because they are, how you might 
say, like the newly arrived in society. No? (Rebeca) 
Rebeca is not alone. Increasing concerns over grading echo throughout the 
narratives. For Muriel Rosa grading is her biggest problem with teaching. Conrado 
is adamant that he is in no position to judge his students. Igor has moved toward 
student self-assessment; he feels he could not know enough about the students to 
be able to assess their progress. Araceli, in characteristically rebellious mode, used 
her authority to wave failing students through the system, thus entering into 
conflict with her colleagues: 
My logic was crushing - it was 'How are you going to mess with this 
child because they've had a bad year, because their parents have 
separated! Leave them be! It is life that is going to fail or pass them.' 
form of fantasy, a utopia of life without grades. Generally speaking, hers is a quieter, more subdued, 
yet thoughtful and nuanced re-negotiation of the games of power within a generally accepted 
institutional and cultural framework. We might put this down to a cautious and thoughtful 
disposition, or that Rebeca is perhaps more invested by modernity than her Mexican counterparts, 
or alternatively infer that the sophisticated strategies and operations of pastoral power in the 
Spanish context do not offer much scope for revolt. Whatever the reason for her tentativeness, 
Rebeca's narrative provides evidence that the SAT programme has generated some transformative 
"terror" in her practice. 
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And so I banged my head against a wall, against my colleagues, because 
they lived according to the rules, lived normally. I was the abnormal 
one. And that is where I would get exasperated. (Araceli) 
Not all teachers are happy to be the gatekeepers of education's proximal zones of 
exclusion. The narratives reveal a desire to disown significant knowledge of 
students; perhaps curriculum 'knowledge' can be assessed, but these teachers are 
increasingly unsure that this partial information can be equated to merit. Their 
collaboration or compliance in this objectification of students is one of teachings 
difficult knowledges. Rebeca's narrative, and many others in the research, may 
indicate that some teachers are learning, post-SAT, to embrace the terror of what 
has been learnt and what 'must' be taught, and to assume responsibility of a faith 
in education's relationships as something that obliges them to transgress a faith in 
schooling. 
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Chapter 7: Questions of Purpose - 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Grouped together under the general heading "Questions of Purpose", I have 
attempted to group and present evidence from the research narratives which 
could be said to illustrate teachers' engagement with educational ideologies or 
discourses. As 2i2ek points out: 
[...] in order to pass from abstract propositions to people's "real lives," 
it is necessary to add the unfathomable density of a lifeworld context. 
Ideology is not constituted by abstract propositions in themselves, 
rather, ideology is itself this very texture of the lifeworld which 
"schematizes" the propositions, rendering them "livable". (Mek, 2011, 
p.3) 
As the testimonial evidence reveals, teachers cannot help but become enmeshed in 
the schematics of schooling, and of their own lives. But attention to teachers' 
experiences demonstrates that the "livable" facet of ideology is equally "unlivable." 
Textures of abstract propositions in the lifeworld are not always smooth, and 
might just as easily threaten meaninglessness, chaos and despair as bathe our life 
in order and purpose. School as institution and vehicle of "education, education, 
education"24 is one of the most densely ideological territories imaginable (Ball, 
1999), and the cost of survival, as 2iZek (paraphrasing Arthur Feldmen) warns, can 
be our lives: "the price we usually pay for survival is our lives" (2aek, 2011, p.xv). 
Whilst ideology is, by political necessity, always heading towards its "landings", the 
means by which it can manifest itself in people's lives, it is likewise always trying 
to take off again by unloading the inevitable complications of these necessary 
manifestations. Ideology seeks to present itself to us as cost free, or at the very 
least, more pro than con. 2aek hence describes 'ideology' as requiring: 
a reduction to the simplified "essence" that conveniently forgets the 
"background noise" which provides the density of its actual meaning. 
24 In the spirit of Tony Blair's and the Labour Party's 1997 electoral campaign agenda which 
promised to place education as priority number one, alongside the National Health System. 
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Such an erasure of the "background noise" is the very core of utopian 
dreaming. (2i2ek, 2011, p.'7) 
Moreover, 
What this "background noise" conveys is - more often than not - the 
obscenity of the barbarian violence which sustains the public face of 
law and order. This is why [Walter] Benjamin's thesis, that every 
monument of civilization is a monument of barbarism, has a precise 
impact on the very notion of being civilized: "to be civilized means to 
know one is potentially a barbarian". (ibid.) 
Thus, it is only by ignoring the myriad details of schooling that we can remain 
enchanted with its ends (purposes) and its means. The 'civilized' assumptions and 
pretensions of education, enshrined in theory and policy, are confounded by a 
complex reality which can be accessed precisely in the "thick description[s]" 
(Geertz, 1973) of qualitative research. Joseph Schwab (1956/1978), focusing on 
the school, maintains that educational theory and its curricula can never hope to 
encompass the complexity of the classroom. This complexity becomes part of the 
noise of schooling by which theory is disrupted. Hence the importance of 
educational research documenting such "background noise". Bibby (2011), for 
example, reclaims the concerns of primary school students subjected to the 
ideologies of modern education in Britain, and makes us all too aware of the 
discrepancies between education's pretentions and what is experienced and 
engendered in the subjects of education. As Britzman reminds us, "education 
demands that everyone get to the point" (Britzman, 1998, p.37), yet 
interpretations of the point may differ widely between authorities, teachers and 
students. The point as activity might be the same, but the point as experience or 
interpretation will vary from subject to subject. For one student the point of 
education may be humiliation, whilst for another in the same class it will be the 
confirmation of superiority. These wild discrepancies between ideology and the 
"texture[s] of the lifeworld" (2iek, 2011, p.3) are the means by which ideologies of 
purpose can be exposed as not transposable to the territory of classrooms, or of 
capturing the ethical cost of such a transposition. 
If Bibby's psychoanalytically informed research problematizes educational 
discourse by giving voice to students, the present research aims to give voice to 
teachers, who, I argue, are no less entrapped by their own anxieties and by 
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systemic demands upon them than their students. Insensitive teachers are not the 
problem, as we might infer from some of Bibby's portrayals of classroom 
dynamics; rather, teachers themselves are creatures bound to their intimate and 
social history. Why should Bibby suppose that teachers are duty bound to exhibit a 
greater freedom than their students? If education is one of the means by which we 
become invested by power, we might better assume that the longer we are in 
education, i.e. the more educated we are, the more 'barbaric' is our civilization. 
Anna Freud made a similar claim by speaking of the vengeful facet of oppression -
do unto others as has been done unto yourself - and there is every reason to 
believe that the main overall effect of public education generally on student values 
mirrors the effect that Philip Jacob identified as the effect of higher education on 
American students, which was "to bring about [the] general acceptance of a body 
of standards and attitudes characteristic of college bred men and women in the 
American community" (Jacob, 1956, p.6). 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Anna Freud is adamant that the 
purpose of education is to wage war on all those features of ourselves that 
threaten culture, civilization, economy, and authority. The educated subject must 
be disarmed at the same time as they are being re-armed to continue the fight for 
the order of things. The equation of war with education might seem extreme. 
However, such bellicose language perhaps helps us to comprehend the import of 
the struggles, the magnitude of permanent socio-political provocations occurring 
in and around education. 2iek, talking about the presentation of the Lebanon war 
in the film Lebanon, decries how a focus on the intimate traumas of war is an 
example of "ideology at its purest" in its ability to "obliterate the entire ethico-
political background of the conflict": 
Such a "humanization" thus serves to obfuscate the key question: the 
need for ruthless political analysis of what is being done in terms of 
political-military activity. Our politico-military struggles are precisely 
not an opaque History which brutally disrupts our intimate lives - they 
are a field in which we are always engaged, even if it is in a mode of 
ignorance. (Mek, 2011, p.58) 
Just as we cannot separate ourselves from politics, so politics cannot separate itself 
from ourselves. For this reason Foucault recurs to the "politics of ourselves", and 
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for this reason an introspective project of awareness and a critical attitude to the 
intimate present cannot be conflated with an excess of nihilism, as long as the 
subject knows themselves to be viscerally embedded in social history. Indeed, one 
might argue that it is only by such an attention to personal history that we come to 
see ourselves as invested by history, rather than our own creations (as the 
dominant ideology of liberal humanism would have us believe). 2iek, in his 
introduction to the same book, asserts that the "'spontaneous' state of our daily 
lives is that of a lived lie, to break out of which requires continuous struggle. The 
starting point for which is to become terrified by oneself' (2fZek, 2011, p.xii). As 
Britzman maintains: 
In psychoanalytic terms, for the self to be more than a prisoner of its 
own narcissism, the self must bother itself. It must learn to obligate 
itself to notice the breaches and losses between acts and thoughts, 
between wishes and responsibilities, between dreams and waking life. 
To think is to haunt one's thoughts, to be hunted by thoughts. 
(Britzman, 1998, p.32) 
Foucault, 2iek and Britzman, assert human fallibility in opposition to the 
positivist projects of and for humanity. Through this focus on the subject's 
fallibility, history's circularity becomes clear; we condition history at the same 
time that history conditions us. It is to ourselves, to our own subjectivity, that we 
must look if we are to trouble the embodied narcissism of ideologies, if nothing 
else because they are, ultimately, our own creation. Stripped of a punishing God, 
humanity can only blame itself for what has happened to it, there is nowhere else 
to look but in the mirror. 
What do the narratives of this research show about these teachers who have 
paused long and hard before the mirror? How has this experience recalibrated 
their purposes and their sense of purpose? How has it recalibrated for them the 
purpose of education? There are signs that seismic shifts are occurring in a 
territory that was obviously already criss-crossed by fault lines. To get a better 
sense of the pattern underlying the idiosyncratic and singular occurrences of each 
narrative, it is helpful to return to the background so that we might distinguish it 
from the foreground of transformations. Foucault's problematization of 
individualizing and totalizing technologies of power characteristic of modern 
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government is particularly illuminating in this respect (Foucault, 2000d). Likewise, 
in his related distinction between the universal and the specific intellectual we can 
find perspectives on purpose that are useful to this present discussion. 
Considering first the nature and problem of a power that is both individualizing 
and totalizing, we see its effects everywhere in education. Indeed, we might say 
that the purpose of education is to individualize and totalize. Bernfeld implies as 
much in his image of our educated subjects as a flock of sheep, each with its 
distinctive face (only distinguishable to the shepherd). Totalities are present as 
universals such as the unquestioning valuation of the curriculum, and in the norms 
of standards and development. They are also present in education as a compulsory 
"right", and its attempt to address the total human experience (physical, moral, 
intellectual, spiritual, creative). Education is totalizing also in its temporal claims, 
in the way it makes the present of the educated subject answerable to the past and 
to the future, tying each lived moment of learning to an academic-professional-
citizen trajectory. And conversely, individualization is present in the profiling of 
students, teachers and schools, profiling which fragments an individual from its 
'community' in the act of comparing it with that same community, captured as the 
norm. The subjects of education, and even its institutions, are atomized and can be 
organized according to principles convenient within the relations of power. 
If these are the underlying ideological purposes of education, in some ways 
indistinguishable from a Marxist critique of its 'bad faith' alliance with capitalism, 
we might ask if the experience of the SAT altered teachers' ignorant or knowing 
engagement in such purposes? To return to 2i2ek's point, have teachers become 
sufficiently terrified of their individualized/individualizing and totalized/totalizing 
selves to begin the work of continuous struggle for a new teacher identity and 
practice? There is considerable evidence in the data of teachers developing "lines 
of flight" (Deleuze, 1987) out of these personally and institutionally known 
territories. Regarding the total obligation to knowledge, Cecilia's 'meditation' 
experiment is briefly opening up another educational paradigm involving 'anti-
knowledge' and turning the students' gaze back on themselves, so that for a 
revolutionary five minutes the curriculum becomes the content of their own mind. 
Conrado, previously occupying the classroom in a totality of thought and 
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deliberation, is attempting to occupy the classroom through the more obtuse 
quality of presence, a presence shaped around the dialogue between his 
multiplicities, including the diktats of his body. Whereas being correct and fair had 
been his main concern, post-SAT his principal aim is to be creatively connected to 
himself and to his students. 
Creative connection sets the present time of teaching in dramatic relief to the 
totalities of curriculum and development, and favours the spontaneous emergence 
of significant experience among the group. In general, the over-arching valuation 
of knowledge at "a certain price" (Foucault in Miller, 1994, p.302) seems to have 
diminished as a result of teachers' experience in the SAT programme. This re-
appraisal of the cost-benefit analysis includes not only cost to the student, but to 
themselves as people and to their relations. Rebeca, for example, has indeed 
become terrified of her "cold" objectivity when grading. She is no longer so willing 
to trample over the trust of her students. Nieves is contemplating relinquishing her 
imposing demand that students finish her perfect physical education class with a 
shower. In so doing she concedes a space in her heart to the students' resistance to 
'total knowledge'. Seen panoramically, the totalizing purposes of education are 
being replaced or complemented within the narratives by post-SAT lines of flight 
toward practices and perspectives that redress the balance of education by 
recovering the idiosyncratic and contingent (Moore, 2004). 
This includes the idiosyncratic component of each teacher, and there is good 
reason to believe that the radical reflexivity of the SAT experience, though not 
touching upon professional identity directly, is easily transposed by these teachers 
to the professional realm and provides a stimulus for developing this identity on 
the lines proposed by Maggie MacLure (1993). Identity, for MacLure, is a matter of 
"arguing for yourself", and the narratives suggest that teachers are increasingly 
taking up this responsibility. Their purpose/identity is no longer so determined by 
reference to the 'universal' teacher, but rather to the teacher that I am, can or want 
to be. In Foucauldian terms this represents a shift from individualization (which 
implies the referent to totality) toward singularity (which implies an embedding in 
reality). "How does one really become an adult?", asks 2f2ek, responding, "By 
knowing when to break the specific rule one is committed to" (2iek, 2011, p.8). 
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Rules, imposed and self-imposed, are totalities, and becoming an adult, implies 
2aek, involves an awareness of the primacy of the exception, of the singular, and 
the ability to take on responsibility for taking Robert Frost's divergent, "less 
travelled" road25. Rebeca makes just such a move when she adjusts her grading 
system from an unbending rule of knowledge and learning to include the 
singularities and (inter)subjectivities of relationship. 
Rebeca's adjustment points to the vital question of transformation and becoming. 
Identity work is not only about arguing your `corner'; these teachers are 
increasingly able also to argue against themselves, not only conceptually, but in 
practice. The narratives provide examples of teachers like Rebeca, Cecilia and 
Conrado embracing a Foucauldian call to freedom by becoming other than 
themselves. Post-SAT teachers are, as Britzman suggests, hunting down their own 
thoughts. Cecilia, for example, targeted her hierarchical thinking with regard to 
academic success, and is practising an expansion of sympathy toward 'less able' or 
'difficult' students. Her growing concern is to be able to see and to embrace -
intellectually, emotionally and behaviourally - the singularity of all of her students. 
As Rebeca and Conrado demonstrate, it appears that contact with the singularities 
of self, including the singularity of an emergence of multiplicity, facilitates the 
contact with the singularity of students and promotes a reluctance to subject these 
students to the excesses of individualizing and totalizing power. Where the 
dominant discourse of education distributes individuals around the task of 
teaching and learning as a manifestation of an obligation to knowledge, the post-
SAT universe of these teachers would seem to be moving toward situating the 
obligations of teaching and learning within a knowledge of relationship. 
Bibby underlines that there is another, unofficial learning going in education, the 
learning occurring within groups. If schooling relies on the group economically, it 
wilfully ignores the group as a site of learning, focusing rather on what the 
individual learns or doesn't learn. Schooling occurs through the group, and yet 
education largely ignores its existence as providing grounds for learning. It seems 
as if this fundamental intentionality of education is undermined by the teacher 
25 From his poem The Road Not Taken. 
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development occasioned by the SAT-programme. These teachers are turning their 
attention away from classroom relations as arbitrated by knowledge, to relations 
arbitrated by a knowledge of a common humanity. It is these new relations, 
including new relationships with the self, that are increasingly foregrounded. As 
Bibby states: "It is in paying attention to the group's focus on itself and its 
members that both the group and the individuals within it can learn about and 
from themselves" (Bibby, 2011, p.77). Being confronted by these 'others' of the 
group is simultaneously a confrontation with the self. A comprehensive 
acknowledgement of otherness implies a questioning of the self, an opening up of 
its closed borders and an inevitability of movement and migrations in 
subjectivities and identities. 
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Section 3: 
Questions of Order 
The testimonies of this research suggest that what is most difficult in teaching is 
the ever-present threat of losing control, of chaos and disorder, of being out of 
one's depth and insufficient to the task in hand. The attempt to maintain a tireless 
order and stamp a directionality on education can be regarded as a reaction to this 
public and private fear of a loss of 'civilization' and collective and individual sense 
of meaning. This section explores how teachers' experiences in the SAT 
programme have generated new perspectives on the diverse orders of education. 
The 'orders' in question include the phenomena of authority and discipline, of 
organization and institutional hygiene, and the setting of priorities. This multiple 
reading of 'order' does, I hope, allow fertile associations to be made within the 
narratives of the teachers interviewed. 
As with section 2, this section is divided into 4 chapters. Chapter 8, Setting the 
Course?, explores the orders involved in determining what needs to be learnt and 
how to ensure that this is accomplished. These are the orders that teacher weave 
around their subjects of education in order to bring about and ensure learning. 
Chapter 9, Shoot the Messenger?, on the orders that are woven around teachers to 
ensure effective teaching. Chapter 10, Mine is not to Reason Why. . . ?, focuses on the 
internal, psychic structures that determine a teacher's identity, looking at those 
orders present in the fabric of their subjectivity that determine their relations to 
external orders, and their strategic perception of how to flourish or simply survive 
in the 'education game.' Each of these three chapters is divided into two sections 
which roughly correspond to pre-SAT problematizations of the field, and a post-
SAT return to the same field for evidence of transformations and Deleuzean "lines 
of flight." Finally, Chapter 11 presents a discussion and conclusion of the 
implications of the evidence presented in the previous three chapters. 
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Chapter 8: Setting the Course? 
For Foucault control and discipline are not unfortunate 'evils' of the education 
project; rather, discipline is a pedagogy in itself, perhaps the fundamental pedagogy 
of schooling, an "art of correct training": 
The chief function of the disciplinary power is to "train," rather than to 
select or levy; or, no doubt, to train in order to levy and select all the 
more. It does not link forces together in order to reduce them; it seeks 
to bind them together in such a way as to multiply and use them. 
(Foucault, 1991, p.188) 
Within the paradigm of disciplinary power, control is a primary responsibility of 
the teacher. Whether child centred or authoritarian, all 'meaningful' schooling 
necessarily involves the productive orientation of its subjects. There is ample 
evidence in the narratives that teachers are inevitably yet variably engaged in the 
practices of such discipline. Pre-SAT, Carla's authoritarianism ("Here there is order, 
full stop!") assumed that strict control was both the message and the medium by 
which content can be transmitted. But this order was not uncompromised, its edges 
fray into the reality of the classroom messily. Carla's tough line means, for example, 
that she was unable to respond when cracks of fragility manifest themselves on the 
smooth surface of things. She describes her dilemma when the girls in her 
dressmaking class would cry because of her harshness: "I would say, 'damn'. I felt 
that if I was to soften then I would lose my authority." This means a student's 
vulnerability not only interrupts the tone of the class, it also threatens to interrupt 
her projection of identity, and obliges her to interrupt her own spontaneous 
reaction which we can presume would be to 'soften'. This softening would have 
necessarily involved her 'changing course' in the lesson, and changing the course of 
her ongoing identity construction. The interruption of her first impulse represents 
a refusal to allow the situation to develop through its own gravity; rather, the 
pressure of an erupted sadness is calculated against the caution inherent in a 'loss 
of face' and a possible descent into the unknown. It is significant that Carla's 
recognition of fragility took the form of an internal expletive, as her more generous 
impulse was turned back on itself as private irritation. 
126 
Though we have to read between the lines, and assume an impulse to comfort the 
girl, if we are prepared to make this leap then the scene provides a graphic 
illustration of what Fritz Perls identified as the central issue of neurosis; self-
interruption and the loss of contact with the emergent present that this engenders. 
The neurotic is [...] a self-interrupter. All schools of psychotherapy take 
this fact into account. Freud, as a matter of fact, built his therapy 
around a recognition of this phenomenon. Of all the possible forms of 
self-interruption he chose a very decisive one, which he called the 
Censor ... [Unlike Freud, for me] what has to be tackled in therapy is 
not the censored material but the censoring itself, the form self-
interruption takes. Again, we cannot work from the inside out, but only 
from the outside in. (Perls, 1973, p.69) 
Perls' shift of critical attention, from interpretation to the observation of 
interruption, offers a psychological echo of Foucault's shift of critical attention from 
truth to technologies of power-knowledge. Interruption is a specific act, a 
technique, within intra-psychic relations of power, in turn connected to a 
multiplicity of events and objects in the external world. Just as in Foucault's critique 
of the subject of history, it is in the examination of the micro-physics of these power 
relations that the forces shaping the subject are revealed. Perls categorically states 
that: 
What we have to do is deal with the hows of every interruption, rather 
than with the censor - which is Freud's postulated why of interruption 
[...] As he [sic] becomes more aware of the ways in which he interrupts 
himself, he will inevitably become more aware of what he is 
interrupting [...] by concentrating on the interruption per se - on the 
hows of it, not its whys - the patient comes to an awareness of the fact 
that he is interrupting himself, and becomes aware of what he is 
interrupting. He also becomes able to dissolve his interruptions and to 
live through and finish one unfinished experience. (Perls, 1973, pp.69- 
70) 
Evidence seems to suggest, for example, that Carla interrupted herself through an 
enactment of irritation. What is it that she interrupted? She would seem to 
interrupt her own sensitivity, her own sense of responsibility to respond 
empathically to an 'outbreak' of emotion. It might be argued that she interrupted 
her own guilt at having provoked the situation with her harshness. And she 
interrupted the possibility of communicating 'authentically' with the affected 
student, or anyone else witnessing the event. Though Carla offers us a specific, 
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concrete moment of interruption, we might argue that the orders of schooling 
represent an entire project of interruption as it seeks to control and prioritize 
experience and behaviour. This effect of interruption would be true of all of the 
actors of the school, as a 'virtuous' chain of interruption (or command) is enacted. 
The desirable competences of teachers, for example, may themselves be seen as a 
form of interruption in which one set of behaviours is prioritized over another. 
However, a culture that establishes a certain order, a certain surface to things by 
means of the interruption of all things that fall outside these parameters, should not 
only be seen as an 'effect' of an oppressive power as it is traditionally understood; 
psychoanalytically derived perspectives on the group (e.g. Bion, 1961; Freud, 1921) 
emphasize the innate tensions existing in the paradoxical nature of our experience 
of the group. On the one hand we want to belong, and on the other we fear total 
engulfment by the collective and a corresponding loss of self. Group and individual 
thinking is necessarily interrupted as these opposites establish an 'eternal' dialogue 
around the play of 'spontaneous' impulses circulating within the group. Britzman 
asserts that thinking in groups (and presumably perceiving, acting and feeling) is 
made difficult by these paradoxical pressures. 
Carla's means of belonging to the group, and, indeed of creating the group in which 
she can belong, is an authoritarian domination of the group space. The cost of this 
group identity is the interruption of her tenderness and uncertainty. But there are 
other permutations along the continuum of authoritarianism-permissiveness. One 
example is Cecilia's problematic attempt to establish a progressive teaching ethos 
and practice. 
I wasn't achieving anything. Sometimes I would need to get very 
authoritarian in order to deal with a situation which, had I checked it 
earlier, would not have required getting to that. So, above all, it was a 
burden that provoked a lot of anxiety. (Cecilia) 
The idea of imposing a progressive regime upon herself brings to the 
foreground the paradox of Cecilia controlling her need for control: 
I had an ideology that was that the teacher had to be liberal, anti-
authoritarian, permissive, and this I imposed upon myself like a duty, I 
'had to be' like that, and that didn't work. (Cecilia) 
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Cecilia's self-interruption is exercised over her authoritarian impulses. The 
juxtaposition of Carla and Cecilia's experience, would seem to confirm that the 
fundamental issue at stake is not the what or why of interruption, but the act of 
interruption itself. 
As Carla and Cecilia's testimony shows there are many possible permutations in the 
establishment of priorities, order, control. Narrative evidence indicates that in 
Mexico the authoritarian mode, with its inherent problems and limitations, is 
predominant. Igor's pre-SAT authoritarian bias was typical of the position 
Fernando identifies as endemic in Mexican teachers. Unable to conceive of, or 
orchestrate, the communicative, goal centred classroom, and inheriting students 
with no habit of self-regulating productivity, teachers fall back on authoritarian 
domination of the space involving the closing down of horizontal relationships 
between students. By not delegating any responsibility for learning's agency to the 
student body, Igor positions himself at the zero-point of teaching and learning: 
Basically it was me who had to fill all the time, without needing, or 
more like, without wanting them to speak. Instead, I would be 
presenting the whole time, manipulating things so that they would 
keep quiet. (Igor) 
Time to fill, mouths to close, bodies to pacify; Igor's objective was to make himself 
into the only agent in the room. Here the order of schooling, as interpreted by Igor, 
approximates to 2iZek's "proletarian" subject who is reduced to "subjectivity 
without substance, to the void of pure subjective potentiality whose actualization in 
the labour [education?] process equals its de-realization" (2iek, 2011, p.313). 
Igor's obligation to control and colonize the subjectivity of the students, makes 
them dangerous objects, human bombs ticking with the threat of animation. The 
price of Igor's vigilance is mental and physical exhaustion, and though young he 
was already on the way to join many of his colleagues in the apathy of burn-out 
(Vandenberghe and Huberman, 1999). To elaborate on Blacker's (1998) hypothesis 
for the 'decadent intellectual', we might suggest Igor was succumbing to a danger 
equal and opposite to the "indignity of speaking for others" (Deleuze and Foucault, 
1977, p.209); the indignity of others talking through you. Igor's dominance of his 
students was not the prerequisite of his own freedom; rather, it was the 
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prerequisite of his own subordination to that other prescriptive force in the 
classroom, the curriculum. 
The ongoing furore over teacher quality, and the movement to establish 
professional competence as the determining factor of education's potential to build 
our citizenry, serves, among other things, to obscure the central role of curriculum 
in teaching and learning. Curriculum provides a meta-order for almost all that 
occurs in classrooms. Teachers' and students' relationship and their respective 
identities are mediated through curriculum's content, and it is through reference to 
this content that the school establishes itself as an "apparatus of uninterrupted 
examination" (Foucault, 1991, p.198). Whilst curriculum theory and development 
was not something teachers talked overtly about in the interviews, there is 
persistent evidence of disagreement concerning the quantity of knowledge 
prescribed by curriculum. The consensus among these teachers is that curriculum 
dictates 'too much, too soon' on the one hand (Carla's "Come on, hurry up!" 
captures perfectly the forced speed of schooling), and is redundant on the other 
(e.g. Araceli's comments on the accessibility of 'knowledge' through the internet). 
Schwab's (1956/1974) critique of the prioritizing of educational theory over 
practice claims overambitious curriculum agendas set themselves up against the 
rhythms of the group and/or are often irrelevant to the immediate situation - that 
is to the lives, relations and interests of the students. Curriculum's great conceit is 
the attempt to impose a universal order over the idiosyncratic orders and disorders 
of the local and contingent. This order is as much temporal as knowledge based. As 
Hull commented several years ago, even before the imposition of a very 
prescriptive national curriculum in England: 
the temporal rhythms that engage the pupil will not be those of [his or 
her] own learning but the imposed pace of the objectivistically defined 
'course', in which 'knowledge' means a predefined set of items of 
content each with its own time-value. (Hull 1988, p.131) 
The prevailing experience of curriculum in the narratives is of the systematic 
violation of the relational spaces of the students and teachers. If for government 
the problem with the curriculum is teaching and learning, very often for these 
teachers the problem with teaching and learning is the curriculum. Curriculum is 
frequently delivered and received on a precipice of dissonance; by its very nature 
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it is not "emergent" (Deleuze, 1989). Traditionally, the domination of curriculum in 
the classroom has been sustained within the relations of power, and by the 
application of an array of punishments for inadequate teaching or learning. 
However, coercion is no longer an option for Cecilia, whose marginal students are 
impervious to threat. Her reality asserts itself violently over the educational theory 
and Cecilia is forced to negotiate between the demands of theory and real 
conditions of her real students. 
The curriculum is the narratives' elephant in the room. Igor struggled every year 
without success to cram his curriculum into the allotted time, turning teaching and 
learning into a mad dash against the clock. Dora imposed a regimental distribution 
of time in the classroom to make sure her students advance according to the 
targets of a progressive Mexican preschool curriculum. Lorena describes her 
passion to "get to the souls of the children" and to make certain things happen in 
the children, for their own good. What Lorena does 'with passion', in the intimacy 
of her classroom, schooling does imperiously, scientifically, on a massive scale. For 
Lorena, difficult knowledge is about retreating, de-colonizing; what she feels she 
needs to learn is that "if a child doesn't want to finish [their work], well, so they 
don't finish". Fernando and Cecilia have learnt that real teaching requires them to 
defend their classroom and its relations from the overbearing pretentions and 
hubris of education. This, importantly, includes their own hubris. Choices must be 
made, priorities established and more modest limits set. These may often differ 
from the official order of things; Fernando and Cecilia have learnt the hard way 
that education's aspirational nature and their own professional aspirations can be 
a bad business for all concerned. 
If Lorena seems willing to learn a new order of humility, schooling appears often to 
be condemned to the perpetual repetition of its orders. Modern education is 
perhaps more remarkable for the persistence of historic demands and structures, 
for its familiarity, than for its newness (Moore, 2001). So what is it that schooling 
refuses to learn? And what does the resistance to such learning tell us about 
education? Such questions point toward the shadowy presence of difficult 
knowledge at heart of the education system. Does the school hide the knowledge of 
an order more difficult and unpalatable than the priorities of curriculum? Could 
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this knowledge refer to the relations between knowledge, power and subjectivity 
as expounded or 'unveiled' so forcefully by Foucault in Discipline and Punish? The 
suspicion that something is being done to us at school which is other than its 
express purpose is, according to Bernfeld, ubiquitous, and rightly so given 
education's attachment to economy and to power (1973, p.68). Bernfeld's view 
was that this something being done is ultimately prescriptive, education is not 
giving us the tools to construct our freedom; "more than preservation or 
reproduction of what has been attained, it becomes conservation for the purpose 
of preventing anything new" (Bernfeld, 1973 p.83). 
Setting the Course: Revisited 
Were Bernfeld's suspicions to be true, we might conclude that teachers exist not to 
ensure a new social order in the future, but rather to prevent the future occurring 
other than as repetition of the present. Such opinions might be seen as conjecture, 
far removed from the daily concerns of teaching. But Carla's reflections concerning 
teachers who are "excessively rigid" and those who "are not rigid enough" is of 
relevance. Students need discipline, but they also need love. The question is how to 
get the balance right? Defining her own position, Carla is clear that she had erred 
toward rigidity; she recognizes she had been excessively ordered, frequently 
offensive, and even traumatizing. Post SAT, greater understanding of herself and 
others is now providing a foundation for shifting this default position ("I became 
tough through suffering. But now I am more sensitive. I feel that I understand 
people more ..."). She also observes in the interview that other people have 
commented on her transformation. For example, a colleague commented "Carla, 
you have changed ... you are more tolerant". 
Carla sees, feels and comprehends herself in a new light. Her new point of balance 
is not only behavioural; it is perceptual, affective and conceptual. An examination 
of her narrative indicates that she is undergoing a complex reappraisal of 
sameness-difference in her inter-personal relations. However, she has not shifted 
along a horizontal axis toward the valuation of sameness as opposed to difference, 
nor vice versa. Rather, the shift seems to have occurred on a vertical axis between 
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the poles of intensity/proximity and lassitude/distance. It appears that Carla 
ignored sameness and difference, and that her changing perception involves an 
increasing awareness of both. Carla's new order is charged with intensity and 
proximity whereas her old order had been cold, inert and distant. 
With regard to sameness, Carla's default teaching style - authoritarian, institutional 
and rigid - had little to do with any pedagogic theory; rather, it originated in a fear 
of ridicule. Her struggle has been to assure sameness (acceptability) by not 
committing mistakes and striving for rigorous and unimpeachable perfection. This 
principle underscored many of her attitudes, feelings, beliefs, and behaviours. 
During the SAT, however, she was able to study and observe other modes of 
existence (e.g. personality types), both theoretically and in the flesh. Seeing other 
participants with different attitudes to error, and sometimes unashamedly 
displaying their fallibility, Carla was able to find comfort and to collapse a little into 
this shared humanity ("Why should I be scared of mistakes if we are all the 
same?"). 
It seems obvious to many that to be human is to err, but for Carla this was a 'truth' 
from which she felt she had been excluded, or from which she had excluded 
herself. The experience of the commonality of error gives Carla a greater freedom; 
she can relax the controls, joke, and laugh at herself with her students. 
Undetermined outcomes become more acceptable and a multiplicity of ways to 
share the space of learning makes itself apparent. She has loosened the chains that 
tied her to an institutional paradigm of determining how one 'gets on with the 
work of education'. She stops the class to tell stories, organizes parties with 
dancing, singing, and recitals. She even tried to introduce a meditation type 
exercise. 
With regard to difference, Carla battled the world on the basis that she "thought 
that everyone should be the same" as her. She expected students to have the same 
ordered capacity for work and this tendency to project is in keeping with Sigmund 
Freud's observation that "without any special reflection we attribute to everyone 
else our own constitution and therefore consciousness as well" (Freud in Britzman, 
1998, p.'7). According to Britzman, only special reflection, a straining of vision and 
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perspective, permits the integration of "the fragility of understanding others and 
distrupt[s] the wish for a continuity and sameness that attributes to others the 
same state of mind" (ibid.). The SAT provided Carla with this possibility of dis-
identification. She was able to re-calibrate her perception of otherness and 
difference, not as a 'failure' to comply to (her) standards, but as an inevitable 
expression of our humanity. Not all of her students will have the same hands for 
dressmaking as she does, nor the same obsessive dedication ("I realize now that, 
really, I am not the only one, but, yes, we are each unique in our own way"). Here it 
would be the recognition of her singularity, rather than her correctness, that 
justifies her belonging among her fellow humans, each unique. 
If this is so, Carla's transformation signifies a death; as Gilles Deleuze maintains: 
[...] once one steps outside what's been thought before, once one 
ventures outside what's familiar and reassuring, once one has to invent 
new concepts for unknown lands, then methods and moral systems 
break down and thinking becomes, as Foucault puts it, a "perilous act", 
a violence, whose first victim is oneself. (1995, p.103) 
There is every sign Carla is happy with her Deleuzean "deterritorialization". 
Semetsky interprets the Deleuze's concept of deterritorialization as "an event of 
leaving the symbolic home and cutting ties with the familiar territory, which thus 
leads to one's uprooting" (2006, p.95). "Uprooting", however, does not capture the 
sense of arrival in these narratives. Yes, something has been left behind, but only 
because something else has been found. Deterritorialization in this sense involves 
a colonization of something new, desirable, desired, or the re-colonization of a 
previously lost territory. The journey of these "nomadic subjects" (ibid., pp.91- 
104) is made possible by a movement toward rather than an expulsion from. It is 
not that they have become outside (uprooted) but have known the possibility of 
being inside something else (re-rooted). Deleuze uses the rhizome metaphor to 
capture the form subjectivity takes. Rhizome growth involves a shifting of the 
centre of gravity from one point to another, a starfish-like creeping towards new 
coordinates on the plane of existence and "rhythmic fluctuations between 
disequilibrations and restorations of equilibrium at a new level" (Semetsky, 2006, 
p.57). 
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In the case of Carla the new level at which she is re-establishing balance or 
equilibrium is consistent with a desire to be a good person - this remains a 
constant. However, her perception of what good is and how it might be attained 
has shifted. As well as a new order of intensity/closeness, Carla would seem to be 
establishing a new order for 'goodness,' for 'virtue.' The coordinates around which 
her sense of 'goodness' is regrouping, is captured in her references to the suffering 
of others and in her reaction to that suffering. For it is in relation to suffering that 
we see sameness and difference come together most powerfully in a new 
constellation of thought, feeling and action. This is exemplified by the following 
extract: 
Also, now with the facial expressions of the girls and other things, I 
realize sometimes that they are suffering. And sometimes just with a 
pat on the back or a word you say to them and they burst into tears. 
And now I am more careful about saying what I have to say. So now, 
with what I took from the SAT and what I've studied, if you could say 
that: 'Do you want to talk? Can I help you with something? Or do you 
just want to cry? Cry? You can do what you feel like. Come. Sit down 
here for a bit. Do you want a cup of tea?' [...] And if the girl begins to 
talk, well, we talk. And I say 'Look, my point of view is this. Not that you 
have to do that'. Before it was always 'Why don't you do this or that? 
You have to. You must this. You must that!' Not now. 'My point of view 
is this, what do you think? How can it be solved? And talking and 
talking the two of us look for a solution. (Carla) 
This is not only a touching scene; it importantly reveals how Carla is redefining 
herself around suffering. Her transition involves enacting a new equilibrium 
between sameness and difference, palpable in her capacity to involve herself in the 
other empathically whilst at the same time not confusing herself with the girl. 
Briefly, they occupy the same problem, they hold the same map, but Carla refrains 
from presuming she is looking and talking from the same place as her student. 
Talking and talking they look for a solution between them. 'Goodness', however, is 
no longer conflated with the practical utility of forcing resolutions; rather, it is the 
'goodness' of being there to listen and to converse. Imagining the scene, one might 
confer with Dewey in concluding that such communication is an act of wonder: 
[O]f all affairs, communication is the most wonderful [...] When 
communication occurs, all natural events are subject to 
reconsideration and revision: they are re-adapted to meet the 
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requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that 
preliminary discourse termed thinking. (Dewey, 1925/1958, p.166) 
Carla's narrative contains many indications that she is discovering a new order of 
communication in the classroom, a communication in which an open-ended fluidity 
is replacing the anxiety for 'correctness,' certitude and closure. This is an order 
which hints at a greater freedom and creativity in the relations of teaching and 
learning between Carla and her students. 
Foucault, Nietzsche, and Naranjo are all concerned with the recognition of the 
limits encountered by subjectivity, and the consequent need for creative practices 
of freedom amid an array of forces operating upon the subject from within and 
without. The (dis)order of creativity is a theme already noted in Conrado's 
determination to establishing a creative freedom in his practice (see Questions of 
Purpose). Conrado considers that this creativity must be uncovered, rather than 
incorporated; it is sensed as already being his. This theme of unfolding creativity is 
found in other narratives. Notably, Nieves at the age of 47 has taken up the cello 
and started painting. Paralysed in front of the blank canvas she becomes aware of 
her fear of this creative (im)possibility. It is a block, an interruption, she senses 
might have been of some use to her (something correctly learned at some point in 
her history), but knows that she must "let go" of this old learning if she is to escape 
a frustrating tentativeness. Though creativity is unfamiliar and difficult, she has 
known its power and reach ("I discovered myself painting full of energy and 
pleasure, and connected to ... plenitude"). Through such watershed moments she 
knows that another way of being in the world exists, a way that she hopes could 
inform her whole life, including her professional identity. 
Whilst it is obvious that Nieves is still elaborating this part of her psycho-emotional 
journey, she has already concluded that creativity is central to her freedom and 
even to a Nietzschean nobility. She feels that occupying creativity would give her 
"the sensation of being 'the best". Not an arrogant, comparative 'best', but the 'best' 
of a self-referential satisfaction, of her "it is mine" and "it is being me". No longer 
would she totally subjected by the Foucauldian gaze (1991, pp.206-213); she 
"wouldn't want so much to be likeable" nor to "please the student so much", she 
would not be always lost in an anxious, dependent identification with how others 
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see her; rather the new order of creativity promises the possibility of making 
something new, something previously inexistent. These concepts appear to be 
crystallizing for her as a knowledge experienced but not yet fully elaborated: 
How would I describe it? [...] this is really important [...]how do men 
look at me? How I don't know what? How do I position myself before 
them? How do I position myself before the students [...] You always 
have to be aware [...] I am always in relation to someone or something. 
That is where I was [...] Now it is okay. The important thing was that, 
and that changes things a lot. It changes your place, it changes [...] I 
don't know, I don't know [...] it is difficult for me to explain. (Nieves) 
It is not surprising that Nieves finds this difficult to explain. She is taking her first 
steps in a new territory. However, she becomes clearer when describing the all too 
familiar place she is trying to leave behind: "I had killed off a kind of strength ... that 
of 'I already am-. In contrast, Nieves is now rediscovering strength in feeling one's 
existence as the power necessary for being creatively alive. It is, she concludes, "the 
power of me". And it is this 'power of me' that now interests her. Whilst she has 
enjoyed the formal power associated with being head of a school, she is now 
captivated by this other power, and anxious to explore how its exercise might 
extend through the multiplicity of her intra- and inter-personal relations. What she 
expects and hopes to generate and communicate is a "fluidity" in which the most 
technical and most laborious things become easy. 
As with Conrado and Cecilia, Nieves is exploring a new, possibly transgressive 
order or priority that might hold or frame the dominant orders of the classroom 
and of teaching, making them easier, less overbearing. If professional identity is 
always bearing down upon the teacher as normative - creating anxieties, 
submissions, confusion, conflicts, judgements, exclusions - the cultivation of an 
identity of presence, of felt knowledge of I am, stands as a neutralizing force against 
all that would require us not so much to be and thus to do, but rather to do (a 
certain way) and thus to be. Nieves' addition of already to the statement I am, (as in 
"I already am") is critical. It makes clear that being and having value are not future 
projections of a status or style to be attained, a skill to be acquired, a competence to 
come. There is no longer anywhere to get to. And at the same time everywhere 
must be visited and included in this 'changed place'. If the journey of development 
and its learning begins in the knowledge of dependence, it can only come to 
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maturity through the knowledge of independence. As Blake et al. comment in 
reference to Ralph Waldo Emerson's description of self-perfection: "One must insist 
on oneself, and not imitate. As Emerson puts it: 'He must greatly listen to himself, 
withdrawing himself from all the accents of other men's devotion— (2000, p.157). 
The (re)discovery of this order of self-reference and its creative power appears 
throughout the narratives. It is endemic to teachers' experiences in and around the 
SAT programme. Igor stumbles upon his 'me' in a pedagogical 'epiphany'. Unlike 
Conrado, Nieves or Cecilia, Igor seems to have been struck by a 'bolt from the blue' 
in the act of teaching. On returning from the first retreat of the SAT programme, 
something new occurs: 
The first thing that I did was to look them in the eyes - I didn't know 
what was happening to me! - to identify the trust that they might have in 
me, and this gave me a great sense of security, and I shook them out of 
the routine and customs we had been working under. And from then on 
I began to see my changes, almost automatically. I had brought a work 
plan, and I interrupted that plan a little, and we began to talk. (Ivan) 
This me to be trusted would not appear to be the doer of professional competency; 
rather, it is the doer who looks his students in the eyes. It seems to be a seminal 
event in Igor's teaching career. Once more, there is a sense that nascent 
possibilities within Igor had been waiting for this moment. This innocuous arrival 
point is also a point of departure for all concerned. Igor describes an almost 
spontaneous 'conversion', from formulaic teaching to a life serving affirmation of 
himself as teacher in relationship with the 'other'. The philosophical and moral 
relevance of such a conversion can be seen in Blake et al.'s critique of the 
deadening effect of modern education's nihilism: "What we want, as [Jean-
Francois] Lyotard has it, what we want is intensity. With something like electric 
illumination, the teacher must conduct intensities" (Blake et. al., 2000, p. 62). And, 
quoting Lyotard: "To understand, to be intelligent, is not our overriding passion. 
We hope rather to be set in motion. Consequently our passion would sooner be the 
dance, as Nietzsche wanted . . ." (ibid.). There is an echo of Carla's testimony in 
Igor's conversion to the casual intensity of conversation. Both have arrived at this 
place of meeting, of dialogue, of dialectic. It is a long way from the orders of 
curriculum or of authoritarian unilateralism, in which conversation may be 
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permitted if it is seen to conform to education's demand "that everyone get to the 
point" (Britzman, 1998, p.37). Conversation, conversely, is the point, even when it 
is intentioned as in Carla's attempt to talk through a problem with her student. 
Conversation represents a bringing together of the message and the messenger, 
what is said and the person who says it are of the same order of importance and 
are essential features of the conversation as a meandering river of agency and 
meaning, in which one learns about the world and about the other and about self-
other relations. The reappearance of the (dis)order of conversation in the 
classroom perhaps provides us with an echo of the origins of Western education 
such as the Socratic debate, in which the engagement of conversational devices is 
at the heart of pedagogy and the pedagogic relationship. 
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Chapter 9: Shooting the Messenger? 
If conversation is an order to which teachers might aspire, a place of grace, of 
respite, of easeful intentioned and unintentioned learning, this order has not been 
readily accessible to the teachers in this study. In the dominant discourses of 
teacher identity and education there exists a tendency for message to colonize the 
messenger, just as Igor had become a conduit of curriculum. This colonized 
teacher, this conduit of curriculum rather than Lyotard's "conduct[or] of 
intensities" (op.cit.), represents a conflation of the message and the messenger, an 
operation by which the messenger is increasingly made responsible for the 
successes and failures of education's multiple messages. Even in the most marginal 
of educational spaces, a teacher such as Irene demonstrates that she was highly 
susceptible to the technologies of power and self that transect teacher identity. 
Facing a class full unmotivated students with no interest in the official curriculum, 
she confronted also an internalized demand to fulfil what was expected of her: "it 
was difficult for me to leave behind the demand that I had to teach what they'd 
said I had to teach. I had a boss, right?" Or, in a similar vein: 
I was always worried about what my superiors were going to say about 
me. Like, what would they say? Is she or isn't she achieving the 
established objectives? [...] It provoked a lot of tension, being in a 
situation in which you see yourself as impotent and you say: 'How am I 
going to do it?' (Irene) 
She has been assigned the responsibility to make certain things happen, to deliver 
the message, but does not feel either fully able to do so or free to do something 
else. 
Julia, likewise, explains that she and many other people working at her university 
sustain situations that are systemically untenable. The dominant climate stressing 
competence (Moore, 2004) means Julia lives these impossible situations as if their 
success or failure were her responsibility. Julia, and her colleagues, have assumed 
responsibility for questionable systemic 'orders' through the discourse and climate 
of professional competence. The personal cost of this is: 
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(...) a lot of tension, of course, because it is making out as if everything 
depended on me. Right? Lots of feelings of guilt, of not being up to it, 
lots of demands on myself . . . lots of effort in preparing things [for 
class] that at the end of the day weren't so dependent on me. (Julia) 
There are echoes here of the saviour discourse, a sense that difficult circumstances 
can and should be turned round by individual effort. However, motivation in 
assuming this responsibility differs: Araceli, Cecilia and Yvete were political 
'radicals' with a bellicose idealism, whilst Julia's concern was the perfection of her 
professional image in alignment with the priorities of the status quo. Julia's utopia 
was the utopia of the institutional agenda; she had aligned herself "completely" 
because "she never questioned anything" regarding the "implicit or explicit 
messages of the institution". Julia's 'not waving but drowning' account of her 
troubles echoes Fernando's Catch 22 for teachers - damned if you align yourself 
with the institution, damned if you don't. It is as if, she says, she had to hide 
something from the institution. Perhaps it is her fallibility she must hide. And 
perhaps also her rebellious desire to redefine 'to what' and 'for whom' she is 
responsible. 
If Julia was evidently concerned to shore up her image as a competent professional, 
such efforts are often sabotaged by circumstances, thus provoking an apparent 
collapse. Identity slippage is palpable at many points in the narratives of this study. 
However, at this point, in a small but illustrative divergence from the interview 
data, I would like, following Jaramillo (2010), to consider a particularly eloquent 
fictionalized case of 'identity trouble' in the classroom taken from the French film 
Entre les murs (The Class). The film is based on a autobiographical novel by 
Francois Begaudeau, author and former teacher in a tough multi-ethnic school in a 
Parisian banlieu. Begaudeau is passionate about his subject, French language and 
literature, and troubled by the conflicts in the classroom that threaten to eclipse the 
subject matter. A summary of the film is as follows: 
The trickiest member of the class is Souleymane (Frank Keiter), a boy 
from Mali with family problems and a temper. Souleymane cheekily 
tells Francois that he has heard the teacher "likes men" - and 
insolently says that this is not his own accusation, just something he 
has heard. Happily, Francois finds a way to get through to Souleymane: 
he turns out to take great photos of his family on his mobile phone and 
Francois gets him to use these pictures in an autobiographical class 
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project. It is a euphoric breakthrough. But things turn very sour when 
two girls are allowed to sit in on a staff discussion about standards and 
behaviour and gleefully report back some disobliging remarks to 
Souleymane, who is deeply angry and hurt after his class-project 
triumph, with no vocabulary to express his sense of betrayal. Francois 
himself is coldly furious at the girls' indiscretion and accuses them in 
class of behaving like "petasses" - "skanks" - crucially losing his cool 
and compromising his authority. That crude insult ignites a violent row 
which becomes toxic when Francois fails to mention the "skanks" 
provocation in his official report. When challenged, Francois airily 
insists he was not saying they were "skanks," merely that they were 
behaving as such - the same species of dishonest sophistry that 
Souleymane used with his "gay" jibe. (Bradshaw in Jaramillo, 2010, 
p.49) 
Clearly the film presents us with a world of complex personal and institutional 
relationships shot through with a shifting positioning of power. Jaramillo concludes 
that Begaudeau "exposes one of the essences of being human, of being a 
contradictory and flawed professional" (Ibid.). This flawed being is unequal to the 
disparate demands from without and within, and under such pressures one could 
say that a 'fall' or slippage is inevitable. Obviously, many forces have been at work 
upon and within Begaudeau in the unfolding of this scenario. Many surfaces to his 
teacherly identity are visible as he engages with a class of marginalized urban 
students, and at different points in the story, and sometimes simultaneously, he is 
'progressive', 'charismatic', 'competent', 'communicative', 'reflective' (after Moore, 
2004). But if we get a sense of Begaudeau's smooth surfaces - an essentially good 
man who is doing his best in difficult circumstances - we critically are missing 
access to his underlying motivations in the interpretation of his actions, his 
presence. What is it he is hoping to achieve (for himself)? What is it that he is 
hoping to avoid? In what way do these surfaces connect to his desire? Is it desire 
that holds together and makes sense of the apparent contradictions of his personal 
and professional identity? We could conjecture that it is Begaudeau's desire for 
connection that ties together his apparent contradictions: he wants to belong 
everywhere simultaneously and has possibly not understood the deep 
incompatibility between French 'high culture', institutional processes and relations, 
and the loyalties required in appealing to the immigrant youth culture. Begaudeau 
attempts to span these worlds, to be the messenger, and in so doing is tragically 
overstretched and undone. Consistent with this reading of the primacy of desire in 
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the glue that holds together his identity collage is the degree to which his teacherly 
identity collapses once 'connection' is usurped by conflict. Threatened by 'rejection' 
Begaudeau goes into free fall and lashes out violently at the 'enemy'. The teacher 
identities in service to 'connection' are not available to him in the negotiation of 
conflict, and under the pressure of collapse, strange and ugly utterances fly from 
what we presume to be an alter ego or from the subconscious. The progressive 
Begaudeau is, it seems, inhabited by monsters, and as the first monster raises its 
head and goes public, an explosion of implicit questions fills the classroom. Who is 
this man really? What does he stand for? What is he doing here? What does he 
want/desire? What are we to him? Who is he to us? What can we believe that he 
believes? And so on. All of these questions he could now equally ask himself. And 
whereas previously it might have seemed strange to us that he should ask such 
questions of himself, now it would appear not only justified but also necessary. 
Indeed, a reflexive turn (Moore, 2004) would seem to be the only viable or 'decent' 
recourse if he is to decipher what has occurred and establish his degree of 
responsibility within the bigger picture. 
Begaudeau has been revealed as blind to himself, and capable of the same 
dishonesties that he would previously have felt himself superior to and incapable 
of. But Begaudeau cannot be easily described as the villain of this 'morality tale', 
rather he is the chief protagonist within a culture of blindness in which most people 
do and say things without full access to the immanent/emergent reality of the other 
or of themselves. This is a world that would seem to be crying out for a Butlerian 
ethics in which the unknowability of myself provides a key to 'understanding' the 
other. As Butler says: "precisely my own opacity to myself occasions my capacity to 
confer a certain kind of recognition on others. It would be, perhaps, an ethics based 
on our shared, invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves' (Butler, 2005, 
p.41). A chastened Begaudeau at the end of the film would probably no longer be 
surprised that two young women attending a meeting would speak about its 
contents outside of that meeting. He would be more aware of the opacity of human 
behaviour and the need to see into desire in order to more fully interpret and 
predict intra- and inter-personal events. Such an ethics, after Foucault, would point 
to the need to work on the self, a care of the self that would include combating our 
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lack of self-knowledge as a necessary social and political practice. The felt and deep 
recognition of this individual and collective blindness can only occur where 
something has been seen that previously was not seen. We must know that we do 
not know ourselves in part as we surprise ourselves, but also in part as we come to 
know ourselves, as we shine a light into the darkness. 
Entre les murs would seem to imply that light will be shone on us whether we like it 
or not, whether it is our intention or not. The messenger will be interrogated, and 
maybe they will succumb to an order that is not their own. As Britzman (1994, 
1996, 1998, 2003, 2009) implies, the classroom is a stage whose dramatic action 
will almost inevitably pull at all that holds our carefully constructed teacher 
identities together, an external (dis)order taunting and harrying our would-be 
internal orders, and vice versa. Whilst Begaudeau's teacherly identity had many 
surfaces and could be described as 'rich', 'nuanced', 'complex' it can also be said 
that this identity was at the service of a simplifying principle. Begaudeau wants to 
make things nice, to reform, to smooth out the rough edges, to prettify, to turn a 
young rebel into a functioning [i.e. productive] member of society. He presumed an 
order in the world, a code of conduct (his own included), that was cruelly exposed 
as fantasy. Most importantly, this simplifying principle is exploded not by harsh 
social realities, or by students' resistance, but by his own 'ugliness'. His pedagogy 
falls foul of the limitations of his psycho-emotional transparency and integrity. His 
intention to set the world straight, one student at a time, is brought low by his own 
chaos. What this 'communicative' teacher finally communicates is that he is not 
what he appears: i.e. he communicates the very thing that he most wants to hide, 
the illusion of his own order. It is this illusion that might be what students, 
especially 'problem' students, most want to expose, to 'know'. Is the students' own 
'hidden curriculum' and sinister delight to break through a teacher's identity 
discourse to reveal its soft underbelly? 
It is a commonplace that one learns when one teaches. However, this learning 
usually has little to do with 'knowledge' and much to do with 'identity'. A difficult 
class 'teaches' the teacher the limits of their competency discourse, or 'charisma' is 
punctured by an acerbic and prescient comment from a knowing student. In the 
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case of Entre les murs, Begaudeau has suddenly become unknown to himself. He is 
in uncharted territory and will need to find the personal/discursive resources to 
proceed from his exploded/naked position. It is a most dreadful wreckage, and 
most poignant opportunity. There is both more and less to him than has been 
previously revealed or manifest. He has become Foucauldian Man in the sense that 
he has blindly stumbled on his own error, his own limitation and fragility. 
Begaudeau has tumbled from success to failure. Such a threat is ever-present in the 
narratives of this study, not only as the possible identity meltdown experienced by 
Begaudeau, but in the myriad accumulation of disconcerting details that make up 
Connolly's "fugitive difference" (1991, p.120) between concept and reality. Carla 
makes a much feared mistake on the blackboard and her 'perfect' identity dissolves 
among the mocking laughter of her students, and explodes in her vengeful 
recriminations. Rebeca surprises herself when she lapses suddenly from her 
purposeful attitude of respect and tolerance, using her position to belittle a difficult 
student in front of the class. Julia is haunted by the ghost of past, present and future 
failure. Fernando recognizes the errors of imposition and hubris committed when 
acting as head teacher. 
Whilst teaching identities have perhaps always been vulnerable to the complex 
dynamics of school life, they have also increasingly become the target of a critical 
political and systemic scrutiny. The prevailing mood in educational reform is to 
point the finger at a failing body of teachers (Moore, 2012). From the optic of 
teacher quality discourse, if education is failing, the argument goes, teachers must 
be responsible for this failure. Ironically, or perhaps as a perverse payback for 
teachers' complicity in demarcating success and failure for their students, it is a 
new focus upon these same student results that is now providing the means to 
examine teacher performance and to determine success or failure, no longer just of 
the student, but of the teacher also. Foucault's description of the school's 
"apparatus of uninterrupted examination" reveals the how the technology of 
examination is used by the teacher 
to transform his [sic] pupils into a whole field of knowledge [...] 
examination in the school was a constant exchanger of knowledge; it 
guaranteed the movement of knowledge from the teacher to the pupil, 
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but it extracted from the pupil a knowledge destined and reserved for 
the teacher. (Foucault, 1991, p.198) 
This remains true today, but this "exchanger of knowledge", in a final Foucauldian 
twist, has now engulfed the teacher themself. The onset of the performativity 
culture in teaching means that this "field of knowledge" about students has become 
a "field of knowledge" about teachers. Student grades no longer draw the line at 
holding students "in a mechanism of objectification" (ibid. p.199), they are now 
taken to provide a knowledge of the teacher also, and of the training and 
management of teachers. By such means, teachers have been made responsible for 
the curriculum and become subjected to its difficult knowledge (Moore, 2001, 
2004). By such means, we might conclude, the new neo-liberal order in schools has 
put the teacher, education's messenger, up against the wall. 
Shooting the Messenger: Revisited 
If these teachers lined up against the wall were to be given one last wish, what 
might that be? Might it be to communicate their experience to their accusers, to 
talk long and hard about their first-hand knowledge of teaching and learning? 
Might it be the wish to dissolve the uncertainties and frailties of their identity in 
Dewey's wondrous acts of communication? Unfortunately, the existence of the 
unconscious and of our will to ignorance (Bion, 1961) implies, ironically, that 
communication as an act of wonder can never be assumed as the default 
experience of teachers. However, where real communication does occur, 
"reconsideration and revision" (Dewey, 1925/1958, p.166) naturally ensue. This 
wondrous communication would constitute itself as a new order of being, a new 
order of experience. Even if such communication is difficult, Naranjo (2000) insists 
that to be 'miraculously' within actuality is the principal requirement that will 
permit learning for full and healthy maturation. As Whitehead says, "the present 
contains all that there is" (Whitehead, 1929/Cahn, 1997, p.263). This high value of 
actuality, transposed into educational context can be found Whitehead's golden 
rule: 
Whatever interest attaches to your subject-matter must be evoked in 
the here and now; whatever powers you are strengthening in the pupil, 
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must be exercised in the here and now; whatever possibilities of 
mental life your teaching should impart, must be exhibited here and 
now. This is the golden rule of education, and a very difficult rule to 
follow. (Whitehead, 1929/Cahn, 1997, p.265) 
This, as Whitehead indicates, is a heavy and difficult-to-assume responsibility for 
teachers. But the narrative evidence does reveal approximations to a new order of 
existence in a radical teaching present. Fernando is revealing on the subject of the 
difficult knowledge of actuality, and the learning that might occur in 
communication between subject (teacher) and object (school life): 
What I have learnt [...] is that [reflexivity] doesn't depend totally on 
oneself, but rather you have to let yourself run with experience, live, 
and catch yourself out in relation to life. (Fernando) 
Fernando comes up against himself at the moment he comes into contact with life 
and attempts to negotiate what occurs outside and inside. How is Fernando to 
understand himself, his environment, and the interplay of actions that occur there? 
The obtuse multiplicity of 'reality' looms before us not so much as communication 
but as information overload, or foreign languages, or noises (voices) we cannot be 
sure are language. As Fernando states, our thought is continually caught out and 
made possible by life. And as Dewey observed: 
To 'learn from experience' is to make a backward and forward 
connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy and 
suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing 
becomes a trying; an experiment with the world ...; the undergoing 
becomes instruction - discovery of the connection of things. 
(1916/1924, p.164) 
How do we learn to talk the talk of emotion and to walk the walk of awareness? 
How might the experimental discovery of emerging connections overcome the 
temptation to forge the world in our own image? If teachers experience their 
professional identity as fragile and hollowed out, permanently provoked by failure, 
how can this experience be reconfigured as complete, relevant and resistant? If 
movement is to be made in any of these directions, the cultivation of awareness 
would seem to be the baseline or medium by which we might approach a non-
philosophical opening to the world, a transformative practice that sustains and 
celebrates the "discovery of the connection of things" unfolding inside and outside. 
Britzman says the following regarding this challenge: 
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How is it possible for education as a discourse and as a practice, as an 
institution and as an experience, to listen to its own exclusions, 
repressions, and silences? What could education be like if its interest 
began with Winnicott's notion of "making elbow room for the 
experience of concern"? (1998, p.59) 
Winnicott's "concern" is reminiscent of 2aek's necessary "terror of ourselves" 
(op.cit., see Questions of Purpose). Such a concern, or terror, undermines the 
neutrality of our 'natural' orders, brings danger to surfaces that had appeared 
innocuous. Like the background music of a horror film, it renders the most 
ordinary act of going down some stairs into a matter of life or death. Based on the 
narrative evidence, it would seem that the SAT programme generates an ongoing 
concern in the teachers, and consolidates an interest in the excluded, repressed, 
and silenced. The narratives are full of new perceptions, new communications, 
new attentions, new interpretations and new feelings. Post-SAT, for example, 
Lorena is attempting to redistribute her attention from emotion to cognition. She 
has 'seen' her seduction of authority ("when things don't go the way I want"), and 
'seen' her seduction of the children ("I like all the children to love me"). She has 
reluctantly 'connected' with her sadness and her need for others, her dependency 
that spilled over into a tendency to control. She has perceived her use of perception 
to control and manipulate ("when I am with the students I am very aware of what 
is happening"). And she has seen how fear of rejection and disapproval prevent her 
from innovating more in her teaching. Perhaps, most importantly, she is 
questioning the 'rightness' of her passionate engagement with the children ("when 
I throw myself in with fire, I stand in the way of everyone, and that is what I do not 
want"). 
Lorena has begun this slow acknowledgement of her own implication in 
education's "interference" in the child (Britzman, 1998). Post-SAT, she faces the 
difficult knowledge of not knowing how much to demand, of herself, of her 
students, or when or how. She acknowledges the existence of a sadness; the 
sadness 
of not knowing, of not knowing. What do I do now? What now? That is 
what is waiting for me next term. Who am I now? It is the same thing as 
the sadness because who I am is [the same as] what I do. How I act with 
the children, how I act with everyone. I can really see that I am not that, 
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and don't want to be that, and [yet] I don't know how to do it any other 
way, because I have to learn, I have to learn such a lot. (Lorena) 
This admission of impotence is hugely significant. Lorena is wrestling with a 
communication of knowledge from that other educational discourse whose origins 
are psychoanalysis. This knowledge would have her comprehend that her 
"infantile strategies of attempting to rescue or secure the love one wants from 
another do not go away, but are instead elaborated throughout a life" (Britzman, 
1998, p.34). Such a realization could provide a reason to admit defeat in the 
project of maturation. If Lorena is to become equal to the event of her own 
learning, if she is to use learning to escape learning, then she must set in motion a 
line of flight from a territory dominated by the early fear of losing the other's love 
(Naranjo, 1994; Fenichel, 1954), to a territory energized by "the fear of losing self-
respect" (Bettelheim, 1979). 
Britzman comments that the "paradox is that self-respect can be made only from 
relations with others [...] in that uncertain quest for freedom" (1998, p.43). 
Lorena's paralysis before her students, her new-found caution, is both the 
recognition of a sense of shame-concern-terror in catching herself out as invasive, 
dependent, manipulative, and of the difficult knowledge that her desired freedom 
cannot be easily separated from the form her relations take with these students. 
Such knowledge renders her old orders uncomfortable and therefore inoperable, 
but does not defeat Lorena herself; rather, she perceives (and welcomes) the 
beginning of a new struggle to become equal to the challenge of the primacy of 
inter-connectedness. Despite acknowledging the level of autonomy available to 
teachers in state schools, she was, at the time of the interview, unfortunately still 
unsure if the school system, with its administrative imperatives, was a place where 
she could legitimately pursue this struggle. 
Lorena, very new to teaching, is just beginning to weigh up the possibility of new 
directions in her practice, including leaving and not returning. Igor, on the other 
hand, is obviously fully committed to his teaching identity and to the 
transformation of this identity in situ. Post-SAT, things immediately begin to 
change in Igor's classroom; he reorganizes the physical space, begins student self-
assessment, prioritizes and edits curriculum content, communicates his insecurity 
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on particular topics, relaxes the divide between the personal and professional, and 
opens himself up to feedback from the students on how he is doing. These are 
highly visible and multi-dimensional changes in practice, but he would appear to 
ascribe to them a common root within the teacher-student relationship: 
I told them that I wanted to look them in the eyes, and that I don't have 
anything to hide from them. That they can see me, and examine me, 
and let's move forward, nothing will happen. What is more, things do 
happen - there is trust. And now that you mention looking them in the 
eyes, I feel that I have begun to respect them more, respect them as 
human beings. (Ivan) 
Trust and respect provide a transformative medium in which Igor permits himself 
to put experiment in motion. Trust sustains his disruption of the status quo, and 
enables Igor to become a Lyotardian "conduct[or] of intensities". By privileging an 
intensity of trust, fear of fallibility and of the limits of control are postponed 
("Before I went to SAT I had a great fear of that, because everything was like really 
ordered, because I was frightened of chaos, disorder ..."). Letting go of the 
established order did not bring chaos, but "fluidity"; the discovery that he and his 
students have "something in common to work with, something that will take us 
somewhere productive or positive". That something Igor calls "love", and this 
move echoes Deleuze's "'I love'... instead of 'I judge— (Deleuze, 1989, p.141). Daniel 
Siegel also makes the connection between trust and love: "trust is a letting go, a 
willingness to rely on others for connection, comfort, and protection [...] a state of 
receptivity akin to [... the] notion of love without fear" (2010 p.74). 
Igor and his students attempt to set trust ("love without fear") in motion around 
teaching and learning. Two fields of difficult knowledge meet in this attempt, one 
illuminating the other through an admission that both teacher and student are 
emotional beings. This means that participation in classroom relationships and 
learning can be framed by an emotional reality - not only through the 'intensity' of 
Igor admitting to the class that he is not in a good mood, or receiving critical 
feedback from them, but also, for example, through the use of films to explore 
certain subjects in a way that permits him to "have them within the subject, and 
also in a human way", a way that he feels "strengthens the heart". It is this 
emotional connection that sustains the stuff of learning, the communication, 
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exchange and assimilation of knowledge. Whereas before this 'medium' had taken 
second place with respect to content, Igor appears to have brought 'form' into the 
foreground, instead of and beyond content. 
Igor is obviously taking risks. He has put aside the concrete polarity of 
authoritarian practice to search for a moral authority he calls "wisdom". Having set 
the classroom in motion, he must trust he will be able to sustain this intensity, and 
sustain also his possible collapse. Igor has reconfigured the confrontational 
alignment of forces that Megan Boler identifies in the classroom: 
What is [now] at stake [for Igor] is not only the ability to empathize 
with the very distant other, but to recognize oneself as implicated in 
the social forces that create the climate of obstacles that the other must 
confront. (1999, p.166) 
In wanting, asking for, and offering trust Igor is declaring (to himself as much as 
the students) that he does not want to be part of Boler's "climate of obstacles", nor 
does he want the students to be an obstacle for his own attempt to flourish. Earlier 
Boler (ibid., p.150) has concluded that "students and educator are not and will 
never be equals or peers within the institutional setting" (see also Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1977, on the concept of "pedagogic authority" and "pedagogic action"). 
But this seems to be too categorical to be of any use to teachers, like Igor, who 
might be hoping to diminish the distances between curriculum, teacher and 
student. Igor's testimony points to a possible ground of parity which is trust. 
Trust is not susceptible to power: In fact, the reverse is perhaps more true; where 
there is more (ab)use of power, trust is withdrawn. Students cannot be 
institutionally obliged to trust a teacher. Teachers cannot be institutionally obliged 
to trust themselves, a class, their head teacher, or the institution. Yet, as Igor has 
found out, where trust exists, obstacles appear to evaporate, things become easier, 
communication, creativity, and productivity seem to flow. And for this trust to be 
learnt, something genuine must be shared: 
Learning is enabled by means of common engagement in shared, 
transversal communication [...] effecting genuine self-expression in 
what Deleuze would call a haecceity - thisness - of a particular here-
and-now situation. (Semetsky, 2006, p.9'7) 
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The "thisness" of Igor's situation may be rooted in his appreciation of common 
humanity. He has become aware of sameness as much of difference, his position in 
the class tempered by this difficult knowledge of seeing himself in them ("I have 
caught myself feeling very fond of them, not a parental fondness, but the fondness 
of friends, of being on the same path and enjoying the company of everyone"). 
Bearing in mind Foucault's radical scepticism - "life ... is that which is capable of 
error" (2000e, p.476) - we could suggest that what this shared humanity hopes to 
be trusted with is its own fallibility. What we desire is that place where error is 
received, acknowledged, celebrated as necessary. It is in this recognition that we 
can become vital and creative, free. Eric Hoffer's "There can be no real freedom 
without the freedom to fail" (1963) captures the radical spirit of failure and its 
challenge to the normalizing powers whose technologies of examination are 
identified by Foucault (op.cit.). When Igor allows students to apportion part of 
their own grade he invokes the honesty and reflexive capacity of his students. 
More importantly perhaps, he invokes a principle of humility comparable to 
Blacker's (1998) "specific intellectual" in the acknowledgement of a limit to his 
omniscience and his de-colonization of students' territory ("you yourself know 
your own process in depth, not those who are around externally"). 
An ability to manage intensity with its heightened risks of failure is simultaneously 
the catalyst and fruit of trust. Exactly how Igor has learnt this possibility he does 
not say. However, the fact that his relational turn occurred immediately after his 
return from the SAT would indicate that a capacity and desire for "common 
engagement in shared, transversal communication ... effecting genuine self 
expression" (op.cit.) is probably the difficult knowledge elaborated by Igor during 
the SAT. 
Other testimonies also suggest the SAT offers teachers opportunities to experience 
a new mode of relations for teaching and learning. Carla, for example, emphatically 
describes her experience as a student in the SAT as exemplary. It placed her own 
teaching practice, reliant on its "masks" and the hypocrisies of respectability, 
knowingness, and authority, into dramatic relief with the "unassuming sincerity" 
she perceived at the SAT: 
152 
In the SAT what I saw was sincerity, love. There wasn't anyone who 
addressed us rudely, no-one was forced to sit at a desk, when it's better 
to be comfortable. If you are left handed, don't they [normally] try and 
make you right handed. Or don't they [normally] discriminate because 
of the colour of your skin, when we are all equal. There in the SAT, they 
didn't treat me differently because I am 58 years old and not 20. They 
treated everyone the same, with the same patience, the same interest. 
(Carla) 
Carla seems to imply this pedagogic "medium" favours trust. Such respect allows 
people to be "frank", "honest", and "discrete" in their participation. This pedagogy 
of being together made a deep impression on Carla, and was instrumental in re-
positioning herself as a teacher: "seeing up close all that suffering and everything, 
well, it makes us grow. Anyway, for me they made me more sensitive". Once more, 
we might surmise that it is trust - in herself, in the other, in relationship, in 
difference, error, things as they are - that is allowing Carla to relax the iron grip of 
the enforcer, just as the fist of the oppressor might open out into the giving-
receiving hand of the messenger. 
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Chapter 10: Mine is Not to Reason Why...? 
Conrado's description of himself communicates that he was 'born to follow' ("one 
can adapt to anything, and I have been adapting"). His declaration that "it used to 
be the staff team first, and me in second place", demonstrates a concern to blend in 
and to collaborate. His early teaching experience was in a small and harmonious 
staff team where "everyone played their part". However, as is so often the case 
when looking more closely at the teachers in the study, Conrado is more complex 
than this. He was not simply a follower; he was a critical follower, a selective 
follower, an ideologue whose capacity to "adapt to anything" should not be 
confused with an unquestioning acceptance of the status quo. It appears that 
Conrado had aligned himself with certain (progressive) ideals embodied in the 
small, committed and communicative staff team at his first school. When serious 
division emerged around a teacher's strike, Conrado felt that he could no longer 
face the children and withdrew from teaching. More than a crisis of insecurity, 
Conrado's view is that this was a crisis of faith in which "the values that I believed 
in fell apart, so there was no point in carrying on climbing the mountain because 
the mountain no longer existed". Something about this disappearing 'solidity' of 
the mountain is reminiscent of 2" iek's comments on the crisis of : 
the "totally mediatised subject," fully immersed in virtual reality: while 
"spontaneously" he thinks that he is in direct contact with reality, his 
relationship to reality is in fact sustained by complex digital 
machinery. Recall Neo, the hero of The Matrix, who all of a sudden 
discovers that what he perceives as everyday reality is constructed and 
manipulated by a mega computer. (2aek, 2011, p.314) 
Conrado's rude awakening is more than a disappointment with the group. There 
are undertones of a thwarted utopian drive toward transparent, collaborative 
relations. His ability to stand in front of the students appears to have been partly 
dependent on being aligned within an exemplary collective movement which could 
be trusted to build a better future. His testimony provides yet more evidence of the 
"fugitive difference" (Connolly, 1991, p.120) between the map of the territory 
plotted from the perspective of the ideal, and the actual experience of crossing the 
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terrain. The map hints at ascents and descents, at boggy wetlands, but no-one 
breaks out in sweats just reading the map, or becomes physically weary. Conrado's 
voluntary retreat from teaching as a result of this crisis is a graphic illustration of 
the 'reality gap'. It sheds an interesting light on Connolly's "I am not exhausted by 
my identity", for whilst Connolly means to stress that there is 'stuff within me that 
falls outside public/official identities, the word "exhausted" also has the meaning 
of 'tired' or 'drained'. Taking this slant of meaning into account, we could conclude 
that Conrado is effectively exhausted by his teacher identity, in as much as he 
appears unable to go on. Indeed, we may interpret Conrado's renunciation of 
teaching (he did not return for 7 years) as a manifestation of burn-out. The 
meeting of Conrado's internal (dis)order (identity/character) and the external 
(dis)order (structure/discourse) proved unsustainable. We can surmise that an 
exhaustion of identity, such as that suffered by Conrado on several occasions in his 
teaching career, bears some relation to a misalignment with 'reality' that causes 
the friction of resistance to the unfolding of events. As Britzman points out, Freud's 
early description of the ego claimed that, unlike the id, the ego "wears 'a cap of 
hearing' - on one side only ... it might be said to wear it awry" (Freud in Britzman, 
1998, p.44). Britzman clarifies this strange statement by saying that the "ego hears 
selectively and through distortion". In other words, the ego actively creates reality, 
and what we see as 'reality' has its roots in an imaginative faculty or disposition of 
the 'ego' which would, for its own purposes, stamp a certain order on the world. As 
Naranjo points out, extinguishing such imagination has long been the target of 
spiritual endeavour. He illustrates his point with two quotes: 
The essence of Nirvana consists simply in the extinction of the 
constructive activity of our imagination (Chandrakirti in Naranjo, 
1974, p.153). 
Sin being generally conceived as rebellion against the majesty of God, 
we have now to inquire after the source or instigator of this rebellion. 
In Rabbinic literature this influence is termed Yezer Hara. This is 
usually translated as "evil imagination" (Soloman Schechter quoted in 
Naranjo, 1974, p.154). 
In the modern, western paradigm, which values so highly the activity of thought 
and its 'rich imaginings', such statements can seem strange. However, Naranjo 
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clarifies this problematized imagination, or the problem of illusion versus reality, 
by reference to madness: 
If we look at the most acute forms of mental disease, there can hardly 
be any question as to the delusional quality of its manifestations. In the 
spheres of thinking and perception the psychotic patient displays a 
feeble grasp of reality. Delusional thinking, by no means exclusively 
psychotic, is also part of neurotic patterns or characterologic patterns. 
In neuroses, though, it is less obvious as it is implicit in feelings or 
behaviour rather that explicit in the form of thought disturbances [...] 
In fact all neurotic behaviour may be interpreted as stemming from 
misperceptions of reality, a reality wrapped in superimposed illusory 
threats. (Naranjo, 1974, p.154) 
Foucault, in Madness and Civilization, analysed the history of our understanding of 
madness from the Middle Ages through to the Enlightenment, and so charted the 
genealogy of our modern clinical definitions and understandings. For the classical 
thinker, such as Erasmus, the delusional condition of humanity and its imposition 
of a false order on to experience is endemic to society, and a particular feature of 
being human, born into folly: 
There is no madness other than in every man, because it is man that 
constitutes madness, thanks to the affect they have for themselves [...] 
the attachment to self is the first sign of madness; and such is the 
attachment that it causes man to accept error as truth, lies as reality, 
violence and ugliness as justice and beauty. (Foucault 2001, pp.44-45) 
This is by no means to say that Conrado was 'mad', rather that we should not be 
surprised to find madness, understood as orders or degrees of delusion, within his 
world view. Moreover, his own world view should not, perhaps, be separated from 
the norms of the social environment in which he was operating. Conrado's dream 
of unity, cooperation and collective action was a shared socio-political ideal, not 
his own invention. Indeed, to a lesser or greater extent this ideal is the very fabric 
of the school as institution. What Conrado lived and hoped for at his school, 
amongst his colleagues, "the mountain" they were climbing, can be understood as a 
vestige of liberal humanism's dream of and for the Man [sic] of Reason. Indeed, one 
might argue that Conrado's retreat from this idealized collective, his realization 
that "the mountain no longer existed", represents a moment of tragic lucidity on 
his part. By looking at the wider context, the boundaries between individual 
'madness' and collective 'insanity' become blurred. Naranjo uses a fable from 
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Kahlil Gibran, The Madman, to illustrate this point. All the residents of a city, with 
the exception of the king and lord chamberlain, drink from a bewitched well. The 
next day the enchanted population plot to overthrow the king because he is 
deemed by them to be mad. That evening the king and the lord chamberlain order 
the water be brought to them, and drink themselves, and then there was "great 
rejoicing in that distant city of Wirani, because its king and its lord chamberlain 
had regained their reason" (Gibran, quoted in Naranjo, 1974, p.155). We may smile 
on reading that such a thing could occur in "a distant city", but as Naranjo makes 
clear: 
[F]ew would argue today about the psycho-pathological quality of the 
model personality in our culture. So we may retain the notion that 
mental health is characterized by the perception of reality, while 
accepting that the ordinary human condition is somewhere in between 
extremes of delusion and perception of the truth. This intermediate 
condition is not characterized so much by the suffering of the 
individual as by the social aberrations that result from his [sic] 
perceptions. For this reason Fromm prefers to speak of "socially 
patterned defects" rather than neurosis. The dogmatic assertion of 
"truth" and "reality" by different groups sharing different notions of 
them is central to all prejudice. (Naranjo, 1974, p.156) 
It is interesting to note that Conrado, when he left his school, returned to the 
community of the village he grew up in, and took up a practical life of manual 
labour.26 His intellectual life stripped back, Conrado faced his self-delusions as he 
came into contact with 'reality' as event. Specifically, he describes his time working 
as a fruit picker among immigrant labourers, where in having to share a room with 
"an Arab" and a "black man", he comes face to face with his intellectually denied 
racism: 
And me: 'What have you always defended? What have you always said? 
You've said this and that, well, live it! So, from the point onwards I 
realized that intellectually I am not a racist, but in practice, in my 
feelings, in the here and now, yes it comes out [...] So, I went through 
that type of experience, like anybody who lives, but obviously, by not 
having work [as a teacher], by not having those five hours of teaching, 
the corrections, the preparations ... (Conrado) 
26 Coincidentally, considering Deleuze's treatise on the desert island (see Section 5, p.159) as a 
place that might promise us new beginnings, Conrado mentions that on his return to village life, he 
"felt like Robinson Crusoe" on an "island" of relative security surrounded by the islanders of his 
youth, whom he was coming to know again. 
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Two things are notable in this extract from Conrado's narrative: firstly, he clearly 
hit and recognized the limits of his own reason, the difference between what you 
profess and what you experience, the existence of other orders of being beyond 
intellect; secondly, he intimates that the institutionalized 'orders' of teaching were 
somehow opposed to this type of 'life' knowledge, as if the routine of the teacher 
were an impediment to 'real' experience. This second point is particularly difficult 
to square with our common conception of structured and disciplined work as the 
site in which we are tested and test ourselves. 
Though Conrado does not expand on that moment of crisis which obliged him to 
leave teaching for seven years, he does go into more detail about a subsequent 
crisis point in which he felt that "he was losing his head". Conrado, more than any 
other teacher interviewed, with the exception perhaps of Antonio27 and Araceli, 
appears to be threatened by the possibility of 'losing the plot' ("I was going to 
explode, I mean it was chaos, hell, a wave of a thousand ideas, a thousand stories, 
not one resolved"). Whilst this is a particularly dramatic expression of 'madness', it 
is perhaps just the exaggeration of his basic defence mechanism of 
intellectualization, of disappearing into a world of ideas, of protection through 
analysis of the environment, of avoiding risk through procrastination. Is it 
significant that this crescendo of thought coincided with the period in which he has 
assumed a position of authority within the teaching collective? However 
unpleasant this cacophony of thought may have been, it may still have been 
preferable to risking concrete, palpable decision-making and consequent action. 
As we might expect, illusion is omnipresent in the narratives, often only detectable 
in the form of its shadow, disillusion: for example, Yvete's belief that she was the 
personification of love, Reina's belief that effort and application were vital for 
belonging and acceptance (the dimensions of Reina's driven obsessiveness are 
most apparent in relation to her own daughter, who before she was one year old 
had a teacher of English and French to 'play' with, so that she would learn). Many 
of these 'neurotic' symptoms would perhaps go unnoticed in the workplace, indeed 
they might well be seized upon positively as evidence of commitment, 
27 Antonio is one of the Spanish interviewees. See Appendix 2. for a brief description. 
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determination, cooperation, leadership, confidence, responsibility, discipline, 
generosity. But Reina is clear that whilst her effort may have been appreciated by 
others, the problem for her was in her own self-relations. Her utilitarian attitude to 
her own infant daughter is indicative of the nature of this relationship, which has 
become more clearly defined as she steps back from it, becoming dis-identified: 
The process of [my] growth is bubbling, little by little, taking small 
steps towards serenity and towards affection. It's true. That's all it is! 
First of all, towards myself, because I have treated myself like a dog. 
(Reina, my emphasis) 
The serenity and affection that for Reina manifest themselves as alternatives to 
self-domination are perhaps attitudes, aptitudes, practices that would serve to 
dissolve many of the illusions under which and with which all these teachers 
struggle. The key turn for Reina is toward acceptance, including the acceptance of 
limitation, and toward appreciation (of things as they are). In short, the 
renunciation of an illusion of perfectability and the compulsion to force and 
manipulate reality, including one's own reality, in the service of a particular need, 
desire or fear. For Reina, her struggle is to stop struggling; the old order of 'total 
struggle' must be relinquished in favour of a new order of non-struggle, or of 
'selective struggle'. The self-labour of Reina can be seen to be concordant with a 
utilitarian paradigm of the technological and capitalist zeitgeist. We become our 
own tools, we labour upon ourselves, so that self may better serve itself. Whilst 
such labour, as it is proposed by Foucault's ethic of the care of self, may be radical 
once infused with a Kantian critical awareness of the present, it might equally 
reflect a colonization of the subject by socio-political or psycho-pathological 
(dis)orders, rather than freely elaborated states. Muriel's testimony demonstrates 
that she has come to see how she had become her own 'machine' seeking to 
produce the perfect product28: 
Now, when I look back it seems to me that in that search, with so much 
effort put into change-change, there was an error, which was that in 
28 The endlessly evolving software packages of Windows conjure up the idea of just such a 
ceaseless quest for improvement in the world of industry. In the case of the our pretentions 
towards ourselves, the title Myself v3.1, might capture the permanent insatisfaction that 
underscores the (self)obligation to betterment. Such a title implies that we have never truly 
arrived, we are only ever the version of ourselves that precedes and facilitates a forthcoming, 'new 
improved' version. 
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this change-change meant that I did not accept myself as I was, at any 
time. It seems that it was a big discovery. In the moment that I really 
began to accept myself, I really began to grow [...] I have accepted that 
I get embarrassed, that I feel guilty about many things, that I feel 
inadequate, that I feel useless [...] [and I no longer] try to stop it being 
noticeable, try to be something else that I am not and hope that nobody 
notices. (Muriel) 
Muriel's repetition of the word "change", thus creating a binary of "change-
change," can perhaps be attributed to her (unconscious?) recognition of the 
reproductive, cyclical, self-regenerating nature of her pathological searching. The 
potentially absurd rationale of "change-change" is apparent to those who critique 
the ideology of endless growth in a capitalist economy "which can survive only 
through its incessant expansion and for which this ever-expanding reproduction, 
not some final state, is itself the only true goal of the entire movement" (2 iek, 
2011, p.188). Nor can this restlessness be attributed only to capitalism, for Marx 
himself defined communism as the "society in which endless development of 
human potential will become an end-in-itself' (2iZek, 2011, p.189). Here we can 
see in operation the chicken-and-the-egg of individual neuroses and Erich 
Fromm's "socially patterned defects". Is Muriel and Reina's compulsion to run the 
'wheel of betterment' (with its supposition of eternal deficiency) just the individual 
expression of the "instrumental reason" that dominates modernity? For Muriel the 
true possibility of breaking the grasp of dissatisfaction does not lie in a movement 
forward (away-from) but toward; it is in the full acceptance of dissatisfaction itself. 
The Gestaltian discourse would see such this move toward as a "total involvement" 
in the situation as opposed to the "partial involvement" or the "interrupted" 
experience implied in the attempt to negate the unsatisfactory nature of the 
present (Perls, 1973, p.68). 
What might be considered as the "instrumental reason" practised by Muriel and 
Reina, may be "instrumentally" related to forces at work within society at large, 
but in their case the application would seem to be largely personal. However, in 
contrast, the socio-political face of the drive for "human potential" is visible in the 
testimonies of Cecilia and Araceli as the promise of an eternal spring of social 
upheaval. But even such narratives of struggle do not communicate a professional 
ideal of rational autonomy, providing evidence, instead, of a disconnection 
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between experience and what we generally interpret as reason. We are closer to a 
Foucauldian understanding of our reasoning faculty in which knowledge is no 
more than: 
an 'invention' behind which lies something completely different from 
itself: a play of instincts, impulses, desires, fear, a will to appropriate. It 
is on the stage where these elements battle one another that 
knowledge is produced. (Foucault in Miller, p.214) 
Araceli identified forces at work within her that have little to do with cool 
revolutionary rationality: 
My way of relating to the world has been the way of relating to my 
father [...] that anxiety to change that world [is rooted in] the desire to 
change my father and the way he looked at me, a fairer way, a kinder 
way, more understandable, clearer. (Araceli) 
The psychoanalytic term for the process Araceli is describing is transference - in 
this case, a transference that results in a generalized attitude to life, a form of 
being, a character trait. Araceli's highlighting of the effect of relations with her 
parents - a domineering, aggressive, absent father, an absent, depressive mother -
gives some indication of how her self-understanding is now linked to her sense of 
history. She now regards the particularities of her subjectivity not as natural, 
inevitable, reasonable, but as the product of the arbitrary circumstances of her 
history. She learnt a particular way of being, but it could have been otherwise. 
Araceli has paid a high price for this history, it has haunted her, and she has been 
its prisoner: 
Combining that internal world and that external world has always 
been very difficult. Or I lost myself completely in the external, or at the 
other extreme I disappeared inside myself. I was either very sociable 
or antisocial. The middle way, the shades of grey, have not worked for 
me, and sometimes they still don't. (Araceli) 
This statement would seem to hint at the dangers of the disunity of external vs. 
internal. Araceli now searches for a middle way, a penetration of opposites. It is 
this middle way to which Perls is referring when he says: 
The man [sic] who can live in concernful contact with his society, 
neither being swallowed up by it nor withdrawing from it completely, 
is the well-integrated man. He is self-supportive because he 
understands the relationship between himself and his society, as the 
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parts of the body instinctively seem to understand their relationship to 
the body-as-a-whole. (Perk, 1973, p.26) 
Araceli, in contrast, had been out of balance. This difficulty pervades her account of 
her teaching life ("My feeling was `I'm so lost, so alone, so crazy, such a monster"). 
Araceli's is a painful history of opportunity lost, and of continually being thrown 
out of balance. Her account speaks not of Blacker's "positive dissolution" (1998, 
p.363) in the world, but of a `negative dissolution' to the degree that she had lost 
any meaningful control over her actions, being compelled by her own `nature', and 
her own `nature' compelled by history. Her subjectivity was reactive rather than 
active29. This sense of being too much of the world, is a common feature of the 
narratives. Teachers defensively/aggressively manipulate themselves and their 
environment to create boundaries and occupy territories. 
Mine is not to Reason Why: Revisited 
Evidence of a `loss of self is omnipresent in the narratives, and stands in contrast 
to what might have been found in or compensated by teacher identity. If teacher 
identity had, for many teachers, contributed to a papering over of lacuna, making 
them invisible, the work of SAT appears to have facilitated an active, personal 
archaeology, as teachers become engaged in uncovering and recovering 
themselves. What must be confronted in this archaeology are the anxieties which 
the subject attempts to avoid in the act of burying those `artefacts' of experience 
that caused them discomfort. Fernando describes his facing down of the challenge 
of acting the clown (literally) in the SAT programme. As a clown he found himself 
"jumping into an abyss" previously unthinkable, terrifying. But why such fear? It 
seems logical perhaps to a great many of us, but perhaps we confuse logical with 
normal. What is there to fear in acting the fool? Fear of foolishness is a `reasonable' 
fear, most people work hard to be taken seriously. But the fear of clowning might 
contain a perverse twist, which is the fear of becoming ridiculous because you do 
not master the art of being ridiculous. The unreason of the clown threatens our 
29 Deleuze's discussion of the 'reactive' and 'active' forces within Nietzsche's Will to Power 
provides some clarity on how, according to Nietzsche the subject might be separated from our 
active, generative potential by reactivity (see Deleuze, 2005, pp.36-66). 
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adult aspirations just as it delights the latent anarchy of the child. It is, perhaps, 
this adult fear that haunts the strained and purposeful seriousness of classrooms, 
the fear that breaks out in Carla when she makes a mistake on the blackboard, the 
fear that we have forgotten how "to make significance out of the drama of 
helplessness" (Britzman, 1998, p.25). 
Significantly, perhaps, children generally find significant drama in their 
helplessness, it being met with tears, laughter, palpable fear, and determination. 
This drama maintains the child visibly connected to vulnerability, and, 
paradoxically, this is recognized as one of their characteristic strengths, a virtue. 
When Fernando talks about the need to recuperate his history, his child, he is in 
part talking about this same dramatis personae whose enactment, whose agency, is 
not to superimpose themselves on the world through power and control, but to be 
totally involved in the world through a complete, uninterrupted response to its 
vicissitudes. The guiding principle of a return to this engagement might be thought 
of as a knowledge of the journey itself, the knowledge of never arriving, the 
permanent preparation for the pregnant absurdity of a growth toward Death30. 
Semetsky reminds us of the a moral of 'imperative' of this principle: 
Too often we mature adults assume the position that Dewey 
(1925/1958) ironically dubbed the supreme dignity of adulthood, 
therefore betraying the very continuity of the growth process while at 
the same time trying to foster "growth" in our students. But for them to 
learn, shouldn't we too? As Noddings (2002) keeps reminding us, the 
aim of moral education is to contribute to the continuous education of 
students and teachers. 
For Deleuze and Dewey alike, the spiritual dimension is inseparable 
from organic life, and it is becoming-child31 that is an indication of this 
inseparability. How, when, where, under what circumstances, by 
30 Following on from the idea of the obligation permanent improvement that is the stuff of modern 
capitalism, and of humanism's project for Man [sic] (see p.130), the progress toward would seem to 
undermine our individual pretentions, just as obsolescence or bankruptcy undermines the 
pretentions of industry and commerce. 
31 
 Deleuze and Guattari have the following to say about their motif of becoming: "A becoming is 
always in the middle; ... it is the in-between, the border or line of flight or descent running 
perpendicular to both ... it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man's land, a 
nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the 
proximity of the other" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.29). For example, the (re)incorporation in to 
'adult' life of the child's eye view, including its gift for being surprised and fascinated necessarily 
decodes (or offers a line of flight) from adult norms of behaviour. 
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means of which events is one capable of becoming-child? (Semetsky, 
2006, p.122) 
It could be argued that one of the homo sapiens sapiens' greatest pyrrhic victories is 
to have left the childish/animal realm of responsiveness in favour of a realm of 
dominating protagonisms and proactive manipulations that is at the same time 
both powerful and fragile, susceptible to the anxiety of humiliation and decay. The 
psychoanalyst Aldo Carotenuto describes our "human, all too human" (Nietzsche, 
1996) lack of tolerance for anxiety as "the frustration of insignificance" 
(Carotenuto quoted in Britzman, 1998, p.25). Britzman asks the question, "What 
then is lost when insignificance and meaninglessness cannot be tolerated?" The 
narrative testimonies provide some clues about what has been lost by these 
particular teachers. Fernando lost his own history, the sensation of ever having 
been a child. Lorena lost her desire; she is only able only to say what she doesn't 
want ("I want to know what / want"). Yvete lost her sensitivity to herself, not 
comprehending her own mysterious tears ("I said, 'Why am I crying? I don't have 
any reason!—). Angeles became estranged from the calm banality of life ("My 
fantasies kept me fooled"). Julia felt "polyphonic", the words coming out of her 
mouth being those of others ("What would it be to be me, and not this 
polyphony?"). Reina lost a sense of worth, justifying her existence by hard work. 
Conrado lost the ability to stand his own ground ("It's as if I was in limbo, as if I 
wasn't able to see that I was insecure."). Muriel lost the simple satisfaction of being 
herself ("it's like I've been going along with this effort to not like myself and of 'I 
want to be something else', putting on layers and layers, putting on an armour that 
has prevented me, over many years, from making contact with myself, from being 
what I really am and want".). 
Such statements should not just be seen as evidence of 'neurosis,' but 
simultaneously as demonstrating an increasing ability among these teachers to 
distance themselves from neurotic traits or habits sufficiently to be able to see 
them. To be able to denounce these 'situations' represents a victory of reality over 
delusion, of perspicacity over blindness, a confrontation with meaninglessness and 
insignificance. If the delusional states that characterize the social madness of our 
commonplace neuroses depend for their genesis and survival upon the atrophying 
of our faculties of perception as a defence against the "vicissitudes of love and 
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hate" (Britzman, 1998, p.20), then the expansion of consciousness, the shining of 
light into shadowy corners of the psyche, represents an important opportunity to 
redress the most important loss of all, which is the loss of sensibility or 
consciousness. Britzman indicates as much when she says that the "ego's learning 
[...] is neither linear nor progressive but entangled in its capacity to touch and to 
be touched" (1998, p.12). 
The commonplace, functional neurotic displays what has sometimes been referred 
to as a "normosis", playing host to a parasitic delusion that depends for its survival 
on going unnoticed, on appearing 'natural', organic to the form of your own life. 
Naranjo states that "normality is a pseudo-objectivity", a "cognitive map" that 
should not be conflated with "objective experience": 
Such a map covers up our pathology; a layer of accurate fantasy covers 
our deeper layer of inaccurate fantasy, which only manifests itself as 
symptoms, unwarranted moods, dreams [...] Such dealings, therefore, 
do not stem from the total personality, but from the masklike censor 
with which the person identifies ... (Naranjo, 1974, p.159) 
The foremost challenge, then, is to bear witness against yourself, against that 
within you which may actually define who you are, and without which you fear you 
might turn to dust. Freud's image of the ego's cap of perception worn awry is 
useful here. Freud's analysis would imply that we must become aware of the 
particular slant of our own cap. What information from ourselves and from the 
world do we habitually filter out so that we can maintain our 'order of things'? The 
interviews with these teachers provide evidence of just such a cultivation of 
awareness, discernment, and a corresponding expansion in the teacher's field of 
sensibility and connectivity. Fernando maintains that "self-observation" has 
become second nature to him, a vital tool that enables him to move toward a total 
involvement in his own experience. In particular, he is able to see when he begins 
to "fragment" as a result of his labyrinthine thought patterns. This faculty of 
observation provides some sense of a globalizing consciousness that sustains the 
different (dis)orders of his thought. Fernando knows himself as someone whose 
analysis of reality veers continually toward the negative, the paranoid, hyper-
critical position often associated with the super-ego. Such compulsive aggression 
provoked an excess of cognitive noise in his life. However, post-SAT he claims that 
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he realizes when he has fallen into a diminishing cognitive spiral and is able not 
only to detain himself, but to establish "internal conversations that are even in my 
favour". We can imagine the pleasure of this dis-identification with tortuous 
thoughts, and a contrasting space made for agreeable, constructive, sufficient 
thinking. Fernando's new order of thinking means that he has ceased to lose sleep 
if he feels he has annoyed someone. 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that he feels he has gone too far in his adoption of a 
more a rough-and-ready attitude to other people's feelings. His latest shift as he 
negotiates this difficult terrain of conflict, paranoia and guilt, is toward a 
recognition of the inevitability of some level of conflict, but with an effort to 
recognize his own part in provoking any conflict that might occur. This is borne out 
by his new-found ability to "say sorry", a gesture or a recognition that had 
previously been impossible. Linked to this capacity to apologize are two important 
developments in his awareness of 'reality'. Firstly, he has become more aware that 
he is not himself without blemish; and secondly, he is able to sustain the possibility 
of unity in duality, of being neither wholly good, nor wholly bad. Having previously 
"navigated under the flag of being very good", (recalling Bollas' "violence of 
innocence" (op.cit.)), Fernando is now able to entertain the position of being 
simultaneously 'good' and 'evil', in so doing transcending their polarity. Error, 
perhaps, is now assumed not as proof of absolute evil, rather as one action among 
many. Thus error does not consign the subject to the state of unequivocal (and 
permanent?) guilt, so that Fernando might feel freer to admit his involvement in 
life's sordid "egotisms". Contained within what might be called the ethical 
relativism of this 'Fall', is the idea of the dissolution of the fixity of the subject. In 
this dissolved, unfolding subject, actions no longer emanate from an essence, or 
reflect back upon an essence; rather, the subject is continually being born anew in 
each moment. One is only as good or bad as one's last act. A wrong action does not 
make you a bad person, just as a virtuous act does not make you a good person. 
Curiously, the immediacy of this 'morality' is perhaps more exacting than the 
summative tendency of our evaluations of our 'goodness' in which a moral slip can 
be counterbalanced by previous virtue, or in which one mortal crime makes 
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consequent 'goodness' into an irrelevance (the murderer can never remove the 
stain of spilt blood). 
Fernando's new moral order would seem to be more complete, more real, more 
connected than the 'mad' and perhaps reactive assertion of his innocence, which 
made him, by default, an other-worldly, permanent victim of circumstances (Why 
me again, when I am trying hard to be good? or, Am I always being punished 
because deep down I am bad?). We might say that his cognitive ordering of the 
world had succeeded in removing him from its vicissitudes, whereas his growing 
appreciation of multiplicity is rooting him within reality, converting him from 
somebody to which things happened, to somebody who is totally implicated in 
their experience of the world. It is worth quoting at length Naranjo's description of 
the journey toward experience: 
Deepening our contact with reality entails far more than a shift from 
conceptualization to experience. Once the veil of reason and 
pseudoreality is removed, there is still the path from illusion to reality, 
from assumptions and distorted images of reality (now exposed) to 
true contact. Behind the screens of the ego there are deeper screens, 
based on less conscious but greater fears. (1974, p.170) 
According to Naranjo, two avenues for the transformation of delusion and 
ungrounded fear into 'reality' are available to us, both of which are present in any 
one approach to growth: 
One avenue is that of letting the delusional system "wear itself out" 
spontaneously as it is exposed to conscious scrutiny [...] we outgrow 
ourselves through reflective awareness and choice [...] 
The other avenue into reality, instead of attending to and expressing 
the area of delusion (symptoms, feelings, fantasies, or the stream of 
consciousness with its diverse ingredients), moves into reality and 
squeezes it, as it were, for more and more. This is the way of 
understanding, when rightly understood (as distinct from conceptual 
learning). Every drop of true understanding - which is experiential 
knowledge - kills some ghost in our fantasy life and opens up a way 
into the real, where we may find further understanding. (Naranjo, 
1974, pp.171-1'72) 
These two avenues share parallels with Foucault's vindication of truth, available to 
us in the practice of a critical attitude to the present, and revealed to us by our 
immersion in event, in experiences that test us (Miller, 1994, pp.271-272). 
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Fernando observes himself, questions himself, and he experiences new 
perspectives for understanding, not least in permitting the sudden and unusual 
experience of moments "of harmony [...] of beauty" in the situation that unfolds 
before his eyes. Fernando's description of these moments reveals a different order 
of understanding from his normally fragmented universe. It is the order of 
experience normally associated with the 'other reasonings' of the spiritual 
dimension of comprehension, an epiphany of connection and unity. 
The fact that such experiences of a universal "unification" are sporadically 
available to him ("[I] can feel things that I used to only think".) is what reassures 
Fernando that he is on the right path, that he is not as lost as he feared and 
sometimes still fears. Contact with the order of his own life is the stepping off point 
for a contact with the other. It could be significant, considering his interest in the 
recuperation of his childhood, that the 'epiphany' he describes encompasses a 
quality of innocence in its reference to a mood of peace and unity, before the 
division of the Fall by which the temptation to knowledge and choice (i.e. self-
determination) removed us from the grace of Paradise. 
Continuing on in these semi-biblical terms, it is worth recalling Araceli's odyssey 
because she herself frames her experience in dramatic, biblical terms. It is, 
perhaps, the narrative which most fully encapsulates the idea of being 'delivered' 
'saved' from oneself. Araceli admits she was considered "freaky", provoking either 
loyalty or loathing in her colleagues. She dominated, argued, bullied, manipulated, 
protected, triumphed, was defeated, raged, resisted and was, to use her own 
words, "neurosis taken to its extreme". In the SAT she was disarmed by a force of 
teaching and by the figure of a teacher to whom she was able to cede control; 
So it was then that I took my hat off, and I said, "At last I have found a 
teacher that first of all puts my feet on the ground!" And after doing 
that my search began from a different place. Mysticism and the esoteric 
were not important anymore. Instead, from the clarity of the day to 
day, observing myself, able to choose and not choose consciously. [...] I 
can choose, continue, or not continue, and if I continue, it is like 
Gurdjieff says, observe yourself, don't lie to yourself, and don't judge 
yourself, and to cross that is what I learnt in the SAT and in Gestalt 
[therapy] [...] I re-situated myself in the world. I felt like I had a place 
again, because my sensation was, I am so lost, so alone, so crazy, I was 
a beast. And the fact of re-finding myself [in my personality type] with 
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other people who are the same as me [...] it made me feel grounded [...] 
and comforted. Also, there is no salvation, but there is a path to being 
happy, given who I am. (Araceli) 
The image of Araceli taking her hat off recalls Freud's cap of the ego worn awry. 
Moreover, her gesture is important because it is a recognition of the authority of 
someone else. By this movement Araceli is returning to that place where another 
person can be looked up to. Such a person can teach in such a way that makes her 
resistance to learning impossible. Araceli's battle to unlearn what she has learnt, in 
order that she might become different to herself, and her final acquiescence to new 
learning from a particular teacher, at a particular time, echoes with Britzman's 
affirmation that the: 
study of learning is a study of how individuals attach, displace, forget, 
and disengage knowledge. And with these moves, the study of learning 
is inseparable from the study of love. (Britzman, 1998, p.31) 
In this study of love, in Araceli's flowering of admiring love for a teacher, what is 
exchanged becomes more than knowledge. What is exchanged is a contagion of 
understanding and a love of knowledge that is inseparable from a love of the 
communicator of that knowledge, the fusion of message and messenger. This is the 
ideal relational place of education, it is what teachers of both the competent and 
charismatic discourse aspire to, a place of moral authority. However, the 
narratives suggest it is uncommon for teachers to still be in relation to such a 
teacher themselves, and as such they are excluded from a continuing experience of 
what it might be like to look up to someone as having greater critical awareness 
and understanding of `Life' than yourself. The narratives of this study can therefore 
be read as being steeped in a sense of loss. At some point these teachers had been 
`abandoned' to continue the path of learning alone. In the testimonies of Araceli 
and Muriel there is explicit evidence of a search for the teacher, whilst this search 
can be understood as explicitly present in the alignments and orientations pursued 
by all the teachers. The experience of the SAT seems to represent a reconnection 
with an explicit susceptibility to this figure of Teacher. The recognition of the 
teacher's teacher (in Araceli's case she is referring to Claudio Naranjo) is 
something that perhaps the world of education is ontologically suspicious of and 
resistant to, but its rediscovery for teachers like Araceli and Juan (see detailed 
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discussion in Questions of Performance) mark a vital return to the imperative of 
learning, the perception of our smallness and the desire to continue growing. For 
these teachers 'Mine is no longer not to reason why, mine is no longer but to do or 
die'. In this re-discovery, they have found part of an answer to Marx's question 
"Who shall educate the educators?" The educators must educate themselves, not 
only through the cultivation of a critical relationship to themselves and to the 
other, but also in the cultivation of their teachers, or those whose thought, 
intervention, action and support might serve to sustain and orientate their 
continued growth toward maturity. 
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Chapter 11: Questions of Order - 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It seems obvious to assert that there are many 'orders' criss-crossing the school, 
that it should comprise a polyphony of forces, structures, priorities, imperatives, 
organizations: the orders of intra- and inter-subjective relations; the orders of 
knowledge (curriculum); the orders of space/time/number (timetables, age, class 
size and arrangements); the socio-political orders (economics, class, citizenship); 
or the orders of instrumental reasoning and mechanics of institutional life. 
Schooling can be said to represent the attempt to align these orders and to insist 
upon their compatibility and the 'naturalness' of their alignments. Power, it is 
argued, is in service to its population. 
These claims for schooling are refuted by Foucault's assertion that power is 
productive, i.e. that this same population 'served' by its institutions has in fact been 
'created' by those same institutions. The circularity of this situation is obvious, and 
the continued ability to argue that the school, indeed the whole global structure of 
democratic capitalism, gives us what we want, need, and deserve depends on its 
capacity to disarm and stifle other potentially dissonant orders. Within this 
critique, the work of school is to separate us from the power of our own 
dissonance, to silence our own noises, smooth over the bumps and smother or 
pathologize inconformity. Hidden in the apparent pragmatism of the aspirations of 
the modern state is a utopian tendency which, according to 2iek, may have been 
celebrated by Hegel: 
Hegel may appear to celebrate the prosaic character of life in a well-
organized modern state where disturbances are overcome in the 
tranquillity of private rights and the security of the satisfaction of 
needs: private property is guaranteed, sexuality is restricted to 
marriage, the future is safe. In this organic order, universality and 
particular interests appear reconciled: the "infinite right" of subjective 
singularity is given its due, individuals no longer experience the 
objective state order as a foreign power intruding on their rights, they 
recognize in it the substance and frame of their very freedom. (Ziek, 
2011, p.335) 
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2iek maintains that the impossibility of the permanence of this mirage of 
homeostasis between the universal and the individual is manifest in the necessary 
eruption of war, by which "universality reasserts its right over and against the 
concrete-organic appeasement inherent in prosaic social life" (ibid., p. 336). The 
eternal resurgence of the principle of negative universality, manifest as war, is in 
keeping with Freud's thesis in Civilization and its Discontents, and in his theorizing 
of the universal drives of libido and thanatos. Such drives speak of orders that are 
foreign to prosaic social life. Freud's foregrounded and insisted upon an alternative 
psychic order of organic drives and attachments that are prior to all other orders. 
Such an order does not lie comfortably, nor can be seamlessly co-opted by the 
dominant discourses of education; rather, educational relations finds at their heart 
a series of forces that both determine education's battles and simultaneously 
ensures an unwinnable eternal war. Here we can detect a parallel circular order in 
which the psyche creates an anxious drive toward civilization which in turn 
interrupts the psyche. We might say that the problem with this circularity is that it 
spins in the opposite direction to the productive power of the school as an 
institution. And herein, perhaps, lies the political agony of the psycho-social realm. 
From the point of view of society's attempt to construct an organic identity for 
itself, comprising the alignment of cellular individuals to socio-economic 
parameters, the complexities of the singular psyche represent an interference in its 
attempted orders. And, from the point of view of the singular psyche, society's 
civilizing socio-economic imperatives represent an interference of the turbulent 
vicissitudes of love and hate, and oblige us to dissimulate the 'real' struggles for 
power and dominion occurring in our relations to self and other32. 
In the history of modernity, there can be no doubt that Psyche has been eclipsed by 
the Enlightenment's social project and the apparent triumph of Logos. Freud, even 
as he courted science with his claim to academic, medical rigour, represented a 
radical return to the order of Psyche, a return that has yet to be fully recognized in 
the education system, not least because to do so would probably result in an 
excessive problematization of traditional education goals and practices. As 
Britzman says: 
32 See also Deleuze and Guattari (1987) on capitalism. 
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When ontology meets epistemology, when the subject of education can 
be extended to what is barely perceptible but still exerts its own force, 
the appearance of education can become complicated by its own 
others: the incognito, the unapparent, the contested, indeed the "what 
else" and the "elsewhere" of learning. In positing education as a 
question of interference (as opposed to engineered development), we 
have a very different epistemology and ontology of actions and actors: 
one that insists that the inside of actors is as complicated as the 
outside and that this combination is the grounds of education. Not only 
does the world impinge cruelly upon the subject, and not only does the 
subject's inner world constitute the be-all of understanding and 
misunderstanding: the subject lives both dilemmas in ways that cannot 
be predicted, authorized by another, or even deliberately planned and 
separated. (Britzman, 1998, pp.5-6) 
Perhaps it is not surprising that the school, whose civilizing or disciplinary 
function according to Foucault is both to totalize and individualize a population, 
and thus to create collective and individual identities, would resist, or actively 
oppose, the full weight and implication of this inner world which threatens to undo 
all attempts to plan and to separate. For Foucault, the school's deployment of its 
games of communication and relations of power has "the precise role of 
introducing insuperable asymmetries and excluding reciprocities" among all 
subjects within its reach (Foucault, 1991, p.212). From a Foucauldian perspective 
we should not be surprised by alienated, alienating teachers and students, as the 
school functions precisely as a machine of alienation. We should be more surprised 
when teachers like Erendida discover themselves as alienated, alienating, 
disenchanted with what Lacan would have called their "master-signifier"33 (Lacan, 
2001): 
I worked a lot under the inertia of what they said had to be - and 
sometimes they weren't even well thought out recipes - it was just 
working according to the recipe but without all the necessary 
ingredients. And so it was part of ignoring the most essential needs of 
the children [...] and I now understand that I didn't ignore them 
33 According to the Matthew Sharpe's entry on Lacan in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
master-signifiers "are those signifiers that the subject most deeply identifies with, and which 
accordingly have a key role in the way s/he gives meaning to the world. As was stressed, Lacan's 
idea about these signifiers is that their primary importance is less any positive content that they 
add to the subject's field of symbolic sense. It is rather the efficacy they have in reorienting the 
subject with respect to all of the other signifiers which structure his/her sense of herself and the 
world. It is precisely this primarily structural or formal function that underlies the crucial Lacanian 
claim that master signifiers are actually 'empty signifiers' or 'signifiers without a signified" 
(Sharpe, 2005). 
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because I'm evil, but because I was ignoring my own needs, and so it 
was difficult for me to recognize their needs. (Erendida) 
2iek uses a fragment from Kafka's "Couriers" to evoke a situation of 'order' 
without meaningful or significant reference: 
They were given the choice between becoming kings or the couriers of 
kings. In the manner of children, they all wanted to be couriers; as a 
result, there are only couriers. They gallop through the world shouting 
to each other messages that, since there are no kings, have become 
meaningless. Gladly they would put an end to their miserable 
existence, but they dare not, because of their oaths of service. (Kafka, 
quoted in 2aek, 2011, p.354) 
Though not exactly transposable to the situation of teachers like Erendida, Kafka's 
couriers do have some significant echoes within the orders of education. As 
Foucault maintained in his analysis of modern power, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between decision makers and the forces that 'make' the decision 
makers. We may identify a puppet master in the wings, but must suspect also that 
the puppet master is not without strings, albeit those that tie them to themselves. 
If Freud situates us as invested in the intimate history of a troubled development, 
Foucault demonstrates that we are equally invested by a collective cultural history. 
Both of these histories situate the order of unreason and universalizing forces in 
the heart of our autonomous Reasons. 
At the end of the day, teachers are bound by their version of the Hippocratic oath of 
service, which is a service to the continuity of our collective future. Even the most 
apparently autonomous teachers, agents provocateurs such as Cecilia or Araceli, 
share common ground with a systemic tendency; the status quo of schooling does 
not cease to be utopian in its claims to be preparing the coming generations to take 
their place in a history of ceaseless economic and social progress: the present of the 
child must be rigorously framed and qualified by this adult future. Likewise, it is the 
problematic dream of the 'good student'. Responsibility for fulfilment in the present 
is replaced with responsibility for fulfilment in the future. High performance across 
the board, regardless of real levels of interest for each student, has its rewards in 
the present (winning and doing well is applauded), but ultimately the purpose has 
little to do with the present, it is disconnected from any 'real' emergent value, 
rather it is required as evidence of a potential future performance and as a 
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construction of its foundations. The veracity of this is proved by the thought 
experiment of imagining what would happen in schools if students and teachers 
were to be de-coupled from the curriculum and from examination. Something very 
different would be occurring in our classrooms. Present time and physical presence 
would be experienced differently. One would suspect that Foucault's 'unruly body' 
might arise, Phoenix-like from the ashes. 
Whether schooling looks backwards, forwards, or both, it is certainly true that it is 
rarely occupying the present richly, deeply. Generally speaking the problem of 
tense is managed through the domination of the present as the emergent is forced 
into alignment with the past-future continuum. It is in this dominated present that 
Foucault's "discipline" practices its arts on the "docile body". To be effective within 
the past-future continuum of schooling the teacher must be able to harness the 
present, and this generally involves minimizing and/or aligning all the interactions 
of the classroom. As Britzman says, "education demands that everyone get to the 
point" (1998, p.37). The classroom is to be on-task, whether this be listening to the 
teacher (traditional) or doing group work (progressive). In short, teachers are 
responsible for exercising control, either through the orchestration of the 'voices' 
of the classroom toward a goal, or through authoritarian approaches, or both. This 
question of temporality is a fundamental problem for all teachers. To which 
temporality do they owe allegiance? In which tense is education to be conducted? 
Which time is education responsible for sustaining? It is, among other things, this 
'ordering' of time that makes teaching one of Freud's impossible professions. 
Looking at teachers' testimonies, we could conclude that the SAT programme 
consistently provides an experience which helps to make teaching a more possible 
profession. Fernando, in reference to the model of personality (the enneagram) 
used within the SAT, has come to the conclusion that "it is a key, and it works. If it 
is or isn't true, that we will never know. It is a key, and it opens doors". Fernando's 
'open door' image becomes more potent once we understand the open door as 
symbolic of the possibility of a freeing up of movement and communication. An 
open door is a place of connection. The orders of education, of teaching and 
teaching identity, are notable for a tendency to exclude, prohibit, separate, cordon-
off and isolate. If many of education's relations are characterized negatively as 
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non-relations, as a loss or death of relation, then the animation and dusting down 
of these dead zones represents an important departure from 'business as normal'. 
Previously closed doors that, post-SAT, seem to have been opened include: the 
door between the intimate and the public (e.g. Igor and Irene's sharing of their 
feelings in the classroom); between innocence and experience (e.g. Araceli's 
'cynical' belief in the possibility of salvation); between helplessness and utility (e.g. 
Carla's ability to listen to her students without imposing a resolution); between 
child and adult (e.g. Fernando and his 'Mary Poppins' umbrella); between struggle 
and ease (e.g. Reina's work of acceptance); between reason and un-reason (e.g. 
Julia's recognition of the 'madness' of many institutional normalities); between 
power and submission (e.g. Cecilia's empowerment through rendition to 'the 
system'); between professionalism and idiosyncrasy (e.g. Nieves' discovery of the 
'power to be me'); between the group and its individual members (Conrado's 
increasing ability to stand apart from the group but maintain key points of 
communication as part of the group); between obedience and rebellion (e.g. Dora's 
recognition of the dissimulations required in fulfilling her role); between service 
and selfishness (e.g. Yvete's ambiguities around her role in the union). 
In place of the hard surfaces of identity and practice, characterized by an 
impermeability to 'otherness', these narratives bear witness to a new (dis)order 
characterized by an increasing permeability between the layers and modalities of 
experience and between actors. This results in, and makes possible, an increasing 
ability to perceive and sustain multiplicity, and facilitates a move from an 
identification with teaching as essentially programmatic to teaching as potentially 
responsive. It is the (dis)order of a heightened connectivity, an access to more 
points of reference and sources of 'inspiration', that makes this responsiveness 
possible. Such responsiveness is not value neutral; it would seem, rather, to favour 
the here and now, the emergent, and a concern for the orders of relationship above 
the orders of knowledge and curriculum. In this sense we could say that the 
"intensification of subjectivity" (Foucault, 1997, p.239) that the SAT would appear 
to favour has conspicuous political consequences once we get down to a 
Foucauldian level of the micro-physics of power, or if we acknowledge with 2aek 
that what we must look for is "a refined search of signs coming from the future", a 
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"new radical questioning of the system" which might involve the "strategy of 
interrupting the smooth flow of our participation in the routines of daily life" 
(2011, p.363). 
Such interruption is one of the actions that make possible a radical process of 
'becoming'. This notion of 'becoming' contains a sense of an unfolding carried out 
under the momentum of experience (Deleuze, 1987). But 'becoming' is just as 
likely, if not more likely, to be a sedimentation of experience, a solidification of 
identity in time. Where we might suspect sedimentation and solidification, 
meaningful identity work does not occur under a ubiquitous law of growth; rather, 
at a certain point identity work becomes counter-gravitational and requires the 
input of considerable psychic energy in order that we escape the gravitational field 
of the solid mass of our existing concepts, values and orders. The denser this mass, 
the more energy will be required, the more difficult it will be. To extend the 
metaphor, with such an input of energy in small doses spread over time, or in an 
abrupt and violent injection into our psychic system, we may achieve an orbital 
position, more loosely attached to the centre, or we may escape the gravitational 
field altogether to drift into space, there facing the possibility of being swept up by 
some other gravitational field, some other persuasion or paradigm. 
Araceli, for example, would seem to have escaped the gravitational pull of a hostile 
world. This escape has been potentialized by an opening up to learning and a re-
enchantment with education, a return to the belief in the possibility of sanity, of 
exemplary dominion over self- and other-relations. Such a re-enchantment 
perhaps re-connects Araceli with an old demand towards those first others, her 
parents. As Britzman argues regarding these key relationships: 
Analyst Otto Fenichel noticed that what is actually demanded in that 
demand for that first love is closer to the child's (unconscious) desire 
to be the parent rather than to have the parent's love. The child desires 
the parent's position: "The child's longing for love and affection [from 
those first others] is simultaneously longing for participation in their 
omnipotence." If we consider this in an educational context, we might 
say that the student desires to be as important and as all knowing as 
she/he imagines the teacher to be; the student desires the teacher's 
omnipotent position. (Britzman, 1998, p.34) 
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'Omnipotence' is usually taken negatively, as pretension, wishful thinking, but faith 
in this possibility, at least in the other, is ultimately what makes teaching and 
learning possible. Belief in the power of the other, and what issues from them, 
persuades us to open up to a dangerous field of learning, which is the 
"intensification of subjectivity" (op.cit.). Araceli opened herself up to the 'realities' 
of her "normosis" and began to experience herself not only as no longer special, 
but also as no longer alone. From this embryonic sense of connection with the 
world, with its implicit, inevitable, unavoidable vulnerabilities, everything began to 
change: 
Everything was changed. In my daily relations, at work, in my 
friendships, at home. Everything was changed. I was situated in 
another place [...] and I was able to understand that when another 
person says 'I can't', then they can't [...] they can't [...]Then I began to 
break down and show myself as vulnerable in front of someone else, 
and say that things were happening to me, that I felt fear. And from 
there I was able to receive, at work, and in my daily life also, a 
compassionate love [...] I have been able to show myself, let my guard 
down and trust [...] trust in my work colleagues, and stop believing 
that I have to hold it all up. I don't have to sustain anything, not even 
myself. I give myself up to something bigger than myself [...] its like I 
am recuperating something that at one point I had, which is an 
absolute confidence in life. (Araceli) 
Araceli is most certainly a Lyotardian "conduct[or] of intensities" (op. cit). The 
difference is that her new intensity of faith is a life raft, allowing her to float 
through stormy seas, immersed, but sensing the possibility of a happy ending, a 
blessing, rather than the calamity of impending disaster. It is from the sense of the 
possibility of her own worldly happiness that she reaches out to people, no longer 
to save them, but to accompany them in their own journey. If Araceli's is perhaps 
the most intense of the narratives of growth and maturation, all the teachers 
interviewed revealed a shattering of some of the delusions of self and new 
attempts to penetrate and be penetrated by life. As such their collective sense 
holds true to St Paul's famous invocation to spiritual growth: 
When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought 
as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. 
For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I 
know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known. (St. Paul, 
1 Corinthians, Chapter 13) 
178 
St. Paul's reiteration of the word "child" ironically has the effect of reminding us of 
childhood, it insists on carrying us back to that place only to depart once more. As 
Semetsky reminds us, this turning away from childish things is, paradoxically, a 
turning toward the openness of the child to learning, to their permeability and 
transparency. We must become-child so that we may cease to be circumscribed by 
the interpretations of extinct realities that shaped the learning of our childhood. 
2" iek describes such retrospective metamorphosis by reference to the Hegelian 
dialectic process: 
in which we are dealing with a continuous metamorphosis of the same 
substance-subject which develops in complexity, mediates and 
"sublates" its content into a higher level: is not the whole point of the 
dialectical process that, precisely, we never go through a zero point, 
that the past content is never radically erased, that there is no radically 
new beginning? (2i'ek, 2011, p.306) 
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Section 4: 
Questions of Performance 
The 'performance' of the title of this section refers to the way in which teachers 
take up their function within the 'purposes' and 'orders' of education explored in 
the previous sections. This 'taking up' or 'being taken up by' includes not only a 
concept of agency, but also the idea of the 'show' and how the camouflages of 
teacher identity are learnt or not learnt, the different directions in which teachers 
push or are pulled, as they attempt to answer the call of teaching between the 
shadows of their unconscious and of the imposing edifice of the school. Three 
themes will be explored: Chapter 12, The Learner Teacher, looks at the question of 
how and what teachers need to learn in order to become teachers, about the 
'becoming' of teachers and its obstacles and potentialities; Chapter 13, The Arts of 
Getting By, takes up the question of how teachers prosper or perish within their 
identities, their survival or non-survival as they negotiate their way through the 
multiplicity of demands upon them; Chapter 14, Great Expectations, presents an 
examination of the wider cultural and individual expectations that gives the 
teachers' performance or non-performance such apparent import: What are 
teachers expected to deliver to us - and to deliver us from - and what do they 
themselves expect to deliver? The exploration of each of these themes involves a 
loose 'before' and 'after' (i.e. revisited) organizing principle, the former presenting 
expressions from the pre-SAT position, and the 'revisited' section presenting 
movements and transformations occurring as a result of the SAT experience. Once 
again, as in the previous sections, the use of the "revisited" motif here is similar to 
the "psychoanalytic definition of learning and development: new editions of old 
conflicts" (op.cit.). Finally, as in sections 2 and 3, the last chapter of the section, 
Chapter 15, Discussion and Conclusions, attempts to draw together the evidence of 
the previous chapters and place it within a the broader context of educational 
thinking and practice. 
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Chapter 12: The Learner Teacher? 
One of the recurrent issues in the narratives is the worry of failing to learn how to 
teach properly. Unsurprisingly, as the competence discourse proliferates, the 
threat/reality of incompetence looms larger. Erendida, for example, assiduously 
followed the prescriptions of government policy and reproduced inappropriate 
teaching out of blind obedience; no other option existed, nor did she possess the 
critical faculties or passion required to develop and practice alternatives. Not only 
this, she was compelled to excel in the performance of these adopted actions. She 
felt she had to dominate the procedures and practices that dominated her. 
Erendida is clear that the effort, the focus of her learning had been on her 
assimilation of the dominant discourse of competence. Difficult knowledge for 
Erendida involved the admission that her efforts to be competent might have been 
misguided, that doing what you are told is not necessarily 'innocent' and that 
uncritical and unimaginative dedication is not the same as diligence. 
Such knowledge is difficult and painful because the ideal of competence had been 
undeniably attractive to Erendida. She aspired to be effective, efficient and capable. 
However, self-doubt continued to abound in her professional world, especially 
when facilitating workshops for fellow teachers: 
I am very dependent on everyone else. I am insecure about what I 
know and what I can contribute to others even when I have prepared 
myself thoroughly. Every time I get up in front of a group, I always 
have a nagging suspicion that something is not quite right. (Erendida) 
Erendida's need for certainty was constantly frustrated by the evasiveness of 
unequivocal evidence. She struggled to read looks on faces for signs of approval or 
disapproval. The anxiety increased as she became engulfed in her difficulties in 
ascertaining her effect. Erendida's main problem was that her activity did not 
appear to be rooted in her own convictions. What she was doing was borrowed, 
just as her sense of its value was borrowed (from the faces in her group). We might 
say that post-SAT Erendida is beginning to learn the impossibility of attaining the 
security or a sense of 'rightness' through the reassuring gaze of the other; this 
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'other' is too polymorphous and polyphonic to satisfy her doubts. Erendida, so 
concerned to be a 'good teacher,' was unable to learn whether or not she was or 
was not a good teacher. Pre-SAT, all she knew was that she had tried. 
Erendida's predicament is telling. How do we know that we have learnt to teach, 
above and beyond teaching's obviously technical components? How does a teacher 
know Dewey's communicative act of wonder has occurred (op.cit.), or how it 
occurred? Where to look for the evidence? Who to believe? In the "cacophony of 
calls" (Britzman, 1991, p.223) that is education, what criteria can a teacher apply 
to determine their own satisfaction with their professional identity and practice? 
Teacher inspection and student exam results provide some external points of 
reference, but Erendida clearly remained unconvinced by external referents, and 
her narrative provides a clear example of the difficulties that arise around seeing 
and evaluating the self. Moore refers to 2isek as a way of understanding the 
difficulties that teachers such as Erendida encounter 
[...] as a result of a "gap" between "the way we see ourselves" 
(imaginary identification) and "the point from which [we are] being 
observed to be likeable to [ourselves]" (symbolic identification) (ZiZ"ek, 
1989, p.106) - typically linked, in the professional field, to the 
requirement for a 'symbolic mandate': for example 'I have been 
mandated to be teacher, but what must I be - what am I expected to be 
- within the terms of the symbolic order, the 'Other,' and within the 
terms of my own image of self, in order to justify my role as a teacher, 
in order to be able to explain my mandate to myself and others?' 
(Moore, 2004, p.159) 
In the case of Erendida, her identification with the 'Other' as the mirror through 
which she constructs her own hazy self image appeared to have been almost total. 
If her narrative demonstrates a powerful example of 'mirroring', the question of 
negotiating identity in relation to a symbolic mandate, - half imagined, half real - is 
common to all of the teachers interviewed. What is most interesting in the 
narratives, however, is the enormous variety regarding how people understand 
this symbolic mandate and position themselves within its shadow. If we can 
suppose that formally speaking the symbolic mandate does not vary greatly, what 
then accounts for the great differences that open up between teachers as their 
identities crystallize during the first years of teaching? How are teachers learning 
to be so different? Or how are they not learning to be the same? Milbray 
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McLaughlin and Joan Talbert (1990, p.1) turn their attention to the issue of 
difference when they ask: 
How is it that two teachers with the same educational background and 
professional aspirations who are teaching in the same objective school 
context - in schools with similar levels of resources and student and 
community characteristics, for example - can develop substantially 
different instructional goals, practices, and student learning outcomes? 
They conclude: "Research prompts us [...] to see effective teaching as the product 
of individual attributes and the settings in which teachers work and learn to teach" 
(ibid., p.2, my italics). Presumably they would not restrict this conclusion to 
"effective teaching" but rather see all and any teaching as the result of this mix. 
Other authors have drawn attention to the inconvenience of this 'obvious' yet 
forgotten fact of subjectivity. It has, unsurprisingly, been argued from different 
quarters that prior beliefs and perceptions act as "filters" and affect the ways in 
which pre-service teacher training programmes are experienced and approached 
(Alfonso, 2001; see also Hollingsworth, 1989; Weinstein, 1989; Wideen et al., 
1998; Britzman, 1991). Moore draws attention to the echo with John Mezirow's 
wider analysis of adult learning 
in which acquired 'meaning schemes' and perspectives effectively 
'protect' the individual from challenging existing assumptions and 
beliefs, acting as a mechanism through which new information, advice, 
and experience are accommodated within an essentially unchanging 
philosophy. (Moore, 2004, p.15) 
In terms that echo with Naranjo's assertion of the selective 'intelligence' of our 
'normal' psychology (op.cit.), Mezirow argues that our mental schemes 
constitute our 'boundary structure' for perceiving and comprehending 
new data [...] [allowing] our meaning system to diminish our 
awareness of how things really are in order to avoid anxiety, creating a 
zone of blocked action and self-deception. (Mezirow, 1991, p.49) 
This direction of analysis leads inevitably to an acknowledgement of the 
'defensive' function of the teacher identity structure. Whilst it is commonly 
assumed that teachers are proactive in accommodating themselves within the 
discourses of schools - i.e. that teachers take on the role - less attention is paid to 
the evidence that teachers proactively accommodate the discourses of school 
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within their pre-existing mental schemes. The evidence of this present study 
supports the view that teachers in their 'default' subjectivity tend not to interact 
`objectively' with the discourses of education. The examples of teachers being 
involved in `cheating' - grading inflation, making up results, altering students' 
results etc. - are graphic evidence of teachers `interpreting' the performative 
discourse of education. Reading between the lines in the narratives of this study, it 
is possible to conclude that the identity of teachers is constructed around a curious 
mixture of learning and resistance to learning. What distinguishes these teachers 
from each other, in terms of their attitudes, values and practices, would seem to 
have little to do with having learnt and assimilated different 'discourses' of 
professional identity; rather, much of what is distinctive about their identity, the 
significant difference, what makes them 'good' or 'bad' teachers (or good at some 
things and bad at others) is rooted in more general orientations towards life. 
Yvete, for example, originally 'learnt' to justify herself as a teacher principally 
through reference to her activism within the union, defending the rights of 
teachers. Conrado's mandate grew up around his membership of a co-operative 
staff team. For Carla, her sense of being a legitimate teacher is intimately bound to 
her being a gatekeeper of right and wrong, and good and bad. Reina's mandate 
derived from her willingness to put in the hours and be there for students. Cecilia 
first justified herself as a teacher through distancing herself from the institution of 
teaching. Juan seemed to derive his mandate from a sense of entitlement to a 
position (and power) that was to be enjoyed. These examples are representative of 
a fact that the mandate to teach is interpreted differently by each teacher, and that 
consequently the learning of a professional identity is different. So how to account 
for these idiosyncrasies? Is such apparently haphazard `learning' to be welcomed 
or stamped out? Or does the existence of these idiosyncratic differences make the 
project of a common educational practice the stuff of utopian dreaming, or 
totalitarian imposition? 
Certainly, the project of the competent teacher is challenged by the narrative 
evidence of this research, evidence that captures the experience of teaching from 
the inside, not its surfaces, not its performances. What stands out is that teachers' 
strengths and weaknesses vary considerably. Carla, presumably, has no difficulty 
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maintaining order in the classroom, but did have difficulty in creating an 
unthreatening or nurturing environment for learning, especially for the more 
'delicate' of her students. Lorena is nurturing, empathic, concerned to 'bond' 
emotionally with her students, but confused by the boundaries between 'self and 
'other', and had come to see herself as invasive. Teachers, it seems, inevitably 
interact with teacher identity discourse, and with the structures of schooling, from 
the ground of such strengths and weaknesses, from pre-established attitudes, 
beliefs, values and behaviours. As such, teacher identity takes shape in the 
"permanent provocation" (Foucault, 2000d, pp.326-348) between two agonistic 
forces, one which would move teachers toward the homogeneity of the technician, 
and the other toward the heterogeneity of the personal. 
We see a clear difference of interpretation in the narratives of Nieves and Juan. 
Whilst Nieves was clear that being a teacher meant setting boundaries and limits 
in her relations with students, Juan was a joker and merged in and out of the 
student body through his use of frequently caustic humour. If Nieves set 
boundaries with her students, she was unable to set boundaries with her 
colleagues, and 'won' her mandate in school through an undifferentiated 
involvement in all tasks. What Juan 'won' through the sense of his entertainment 
value, Nieves 'won' through being quintessentially useful and willing. These 
teacher identities are not therefore learnt independently of the person; rather, 
teacher identity becomes one more outlet through which the individual manifests 
their previous learning and their resistance to learning, their strategies for 
negotiating 'self and 'other'. The great problem, both for education authorities and 
for teachers themselves, is that it cannot be assumed that these strategies are 
entirely reasonable or responsive to 'reality'. In fact, even within 'normal 
psychology' the subject stubbornly remains subjective - their thinking, feeling, and 
acting in the present being 'conditioned' by previous learning (see Questions of 
Order for a more detailed discussion). The result is often a bad fit between visions 
of 'reality' (no one sees eye to eye), or a bad fit between what is expected and what 
is given and/or possible (the teacher is operating within their 'natural' and 
seemingly insurmountable limits as a person), or a bad fit between the contours of 
teaching identity and the real motivation or inner experience (the teacher is 
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divided between their exteriority and interiority and experiences teaching as a site 
of conflict). 
There is unequivocal evidence that teachers in the study have experienced and 
often are continuing to experience these 'bad fits' of teaching. And beyond the 
immediacy of their own experience, Cecilia, Nieves, Fernando, Erendida, Igor, 
Araceli and Julia all describe a generalized and systemic experience of 
incompatibilities among and within teachers. Cecilia is categorical in identifying 
the central problem of teaching as one of relations between colleagues. The unified 
staff team, she says, is a fiction. The staff room, and any possibility of consolidating 
a shared sense of the task in hand, and a fair distribution of the workload, 
flounders not only because of the difference in vision between one teacher and 
another, but also because of teachers' inability to negotiate these differences, to 
acknowledge and arbitrate their involvement in superficial and deep conflict, both 
intra- and inter-personal, that extends from the intimate and sublime to the 
collective and ideological. The cost of these conflicts, as they go unattended and 
abandoned, can be high, and the background of the narratives is littered with 
teaching's 'walking wounded,' the 'ghosts' of education who have long since given 
up on the dream of any deep professional satisfaction. Cecilia, with reference to 
these 'walking wounded,' has realized that: 
[...] those that are bitter, and those that are frustrated, and those that 
don't get on with the students, and those that spend all day complaining 
about the system, and how bad the kids are, and how bad the 
government is, and how bad the state is, and how bad the families are, I 
say, well, goodbye, I'm going, because it is they that are the most 
frustrated personally, they are people disconnected from themselves 
and from their needs, and I can see that very clearly because this job is 
like a mirror, the enthusiastic people that you see, that see potential in 
the kids, that something can be done, and that begin projects, and that 
have hopes, it's those people that are connected with themselves and 
the people that are frustrated and bitter, well, it seems like a disaster to 
me. (Cecilia) 
It is clear from this description, and others like it, that the problem of learning to 
be a teacher has a negative as well as positive component. Teachers, if they are to 
flourish and enable others to flourish, need not only to learn their pedagogic 
'trade'; from their immersion in the excess of inter- and intra-personal relations of 
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schooling they also need to not learn or unlearn certain possible lessons in favour 
of other lessons. If the construction of identity were a game of snakes and ladders, 
it is clear that making 'significant' progress in the relational cacophony of schools 
is as dependent on not stepping on the snakes as it is on finding the ladders. From 
Cecilia's perspective, and perhaps from her experience, the generic snake would 
seem to take the form of a polarized view of reality which she feels produces 
impotence, and eventually disengagement and inaction. As an ideologue she was 
anti-authoritarian, but in dialogue with her inner needs and anxieties, she came to 
see that she too had an authoritarian streak and a compulsion towards order. 
Obviously, the recognition of her own authoritarianism had important 
repercussions in her relationship to external authority. It allowed her to 
accommodate herself within 'the system', to become less of an abrasive 'bad fit'. 
We see a similar issue of polarization, though this time more self-referential, 
within the identity of Nieves. It seems that her professional identity is built to no 
small degree around the belief that to be liked/likeable she must be fully available, 
fully involved, she must say 'yes' indiscriminately. To say 'no' is to be unlikeable. 
This is, perhaps, a useful polarity to the school, but it exacts a high price on Nieves, 
and once she has seen through her 'strategy' with its lack of grounding in her own 
inner life she can see that she had been, in effect, one of the "living dead". 
It is perhaps easy to dismiss these personal and group positionings and actions as 
inevitable idiosyncrasies of human life, but this is to underestimate the real cost to 
teachers and to schools of the 'guerrilla war' that goes on between and within staff. 
What is at play is what might be regarded as most reprehensible in us - pride, 
vanity, vengeance, apathy, anger, dependency - but what is more at stake is power. 
As understood by Foucault, power is manifest within any relationship as soon as 
one group or person wants another group or person to think or behave in a 
particular way (2000d, pp. 336-342). As such, relations and games of power are 
unavoidable, and indeed the teachers' narratives demonstrate that perhaps the 
most difficult power games to negotiate are not those between teacher and 
student, or teacher and state, but within the professional body. The personal and 
collective cost of these power games can be compounded by difficulties in 
deciphering the different motivations and orientations around power and its 
187 
conflicts. Nieves' professional solidarity appeared, for example, to be innocuous 
(where is the harm in being helpful?), but it can also be understood as the means 
by which she asserted herself in a territory, through which she became 
indispensable, and through which her voice became a legitimized voice. Being 
helpful can, and does, have its payback. It is not surprising that someone as 
proactive and involved, someone as willing as Nieves, had become the head 
teacher of a school, and that this 'seizure' of formal power, built on the back of the 
informal power of her participation, interested her greatly. 
The learner teacher: revisited 
A central question of teaching for Nieves and Cecilia, like all of the teachers 
interviewed, concerned the ways that they were involved in intra- or inter-
personal conflicts (technical and relational) that were in some way detrimental to 
an expansive engagement in their own singular and social lives. Post-SAT, this 
question was addressed not through the narrow frame of professional identity, but 
rather through turning the gaze of inquiry on to the 'totality of life'. The first 
questions are not 'How do I teach and why do I teach like this?', but rather 'Who 
have I (we) become and why have I (we) become like this?' In Freudian terms, we 
may say that in the name of 'life' they had, through their participation in the SAT 
programme, explicitly turned their attention onto the manifestations of the 'death 
drive' within them, the ways in which their "psychic apparatus is subordinated to a 
blind automatism of repetition" (2iZ"ek, 2008, xxvii). 
Nieves' first reaction to the negativity buried within her modus operandi (what she 
calls her "mask of absolute happiness, of everything is ok, the mask of greyness") is 
to fight its terrifying dimensions. But she soon "reconciles" herself to the lie as 
having been necessary to her survival, fundamental to her life ("it has got me to 
here, and now we are a little friendly ... I even have some tender feelings towards 
it."). Nieves, it appears, is articulating a new modus vivendi that neither rejects her 
compulsion to service, nor is happy to tolerate the continued sovereignty of this 
strategy for achieving a sense belonging. Nieves is now able, conceptually at least, 
to hold simultaneously in the frame of her subjectivity not just the awareness of 
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the existence of a 'mask', but also the knowledge of "the cost and advantage of not 
listening to myself". 
The fact that professional identity can be so conditioned by the individual's psychic 
boundaries is deeply problematic for the dominant discourses of education, 
especially for a humanist-positivist understanding of education's unlimited 
potential. Not least, it represents a seemingly intractable problem at the heart of 
the competence discourse of 'good teaching' which would move teachers towards a 
living embodiment of a prescribed and learnable set of beliefs and practices. But 
teachers' interpretations of their role can be deeply problematic for teachers also. 
The narrative evidence shows that the idiosyncratic component of teacher identity 
is often an imposition of prior learning on the possibilities of the present, an 
extension of unconscious compulsion rather than empowered free choice. Juan 
was horrified to realize that the automatism of his irreverent joking had turned 
him into a "clown", entertaining perhaps, but not to be trusted or truly valued. 
Nieves came upon herself as a kind of "automaton", as "a mask" looking out on the 
other. Nieves and Juan have stumbled upon the horror and poverty of their own 
interpretation of teaching, and its secret motivations. 
All of the teachers interviewed had, to a lesser or greater extent, experienced the 
'shock' of seeing themselves as different than how they had imagined. A degree of 
(self)deceit was common, from Yvete, who believed herself to be the embodiment 
of affection for her colleagues, to Cecilia, who believed she spoke for intellectual 
objectivity in arguing with colleagues for the implementation of her ideas. It is this 
blindness to self that means the reflexive turn could be regarded as indispensible 
to teacher development or training. Moore includes the reflexivity project as 
necessary to initial teacher education, claiming that such a project permits 
students "to reflect critically on continuing experience in themselves", and "to 
contextualise these experiences within previous experiences" (Moore, 2004, 
p.144). Understanding travels in two directions: firstly, from the outside to the 
inside through examining "the way in which a personal life can be penetrated by 
the social and the practical" (Thomas, 1995, p.5); and secondly, from the inside out 
by making sense of "prior and current life experiences in the context of the 
personal as it influences the professional" (Cole and Knowles, 1995, p.130). As 
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Moore makes clear, these moves can shift the teacher toward an interrogation of 
desire within practice, and situate the teacher within the potentiality of unreason 
and vulnerability. Whilst some authors (Hargreaves, 1994; McLaren, 1996; Boler, 
1999) embrace this as a necessary recognition of the reality of professional life, 
Moore also sees dangers in slipping toward 'amateur psychoanalysis' or the 
pathologization of the individual teacher above the "macro blot" (Bernstein, 2000) 
of the system (Moore, 2004, p.145). 
Moore is clearly talking here about reflexivity as it has been practised in some 
'progressive' training programmes for teachers, in which reflexivity is embedded 
in and around the activity of teaching. As a cautionary note within this context, 
Moore cites Sigmund Freud's observation that it "will be enough if [his student of 
psychoanalysis] learns something about psychoanalysis and something from it" 
(Freud in ibid., Moore's emphasis). A reflexivity that tiptoes around the discourses 
of the psy-sciences can be seen to be limited by a lack of felt understanding capable 
re-situating the individual within an act of transformation, an unstoppable 
'insight', a Deleuzean line of flight, a leap of faith. Personality theory as expounded 
by Naranjo, and Mezirow's 'schematic subject', all present the subject as resistant 
to 'seeing' reality fully, even their own. Reflexivity, as a lay practice, still leaves us 
with the question of who is it that is being reflexive? To gain a transformative 
perspective on the eye that sees, or the voice that narrates our lives, it might be 
necessary to find another viewpoint, another eye, and this, perhaps requires a 
deep commitment to the pursuit of self-knowledge. 
Anthony Giddens defines the "reflexive project of the self" as consisting "in the 
sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives" (1991, 
p.5), a definition that could include almost anyone. Moore qualifies this loose 
definition by stipulating that reflexivity should be "authentically and constructively 
critical" and "challenging rather than confirmatory" (2004, p.142). Furthermore, 
this critical and challenging reflexivity should "use the past" (Mitchell and Weber, 
1991) as a means to "promoting better understandings of the present and perhaps 
promoting more rewarding futures" (Moore, 2004, p.142). The question is not so 
much whether Moore is correct in making this qualification of Giddens; rather, the 
question is, assuming he is correct, how can we ensure that such a reflexivity is 
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occurring. Here, one's answer depends on the degree of faith placed in the human 
subject's ability to be objective about their own experience and agency. Positivists, 
in this regard would see the gift of reason as sufficient to the task of thinking 
'outside the box', whilst sceptics might regard this reason as caught in its own 
labyrinth, and unavailable to the bigger picture of 'objectivity'. Can we, by an act of 
will and discernment, from within our 'normal' thinking and activity, gain access to 
the bigger picture which will allow us to contextualize our immediate experience? 
Such access is vital to the project of reflexivity: 
[W]ithin reflexivity, that which is being evaluated or reflected upon 
(that 'part of the picture') is not treated as if it were the whole of the 
picture, but is made sense of by reference to what is happening in the 
rest of the larger picture ... This suggests that as a prerequisite for 
reflexivity the practitioner is aware of the existence of that bigger 
picture in the first place, as well as of its potential significance and 
value. Furthermore, as Hartley (1997, p.79) has argued, it includes an 
understanding of - and a willingness to engage with - issues of desire 
in that bigger picture: 'the desire of the teacher to teach' and 'the 
desire of the learner to learn.' Hartley agrees with McWilliam's 
assessment (McWilliam, 1995) that this is "a 'risky' discourse," 
recognizing that "its initial effect is to disrupt and to look beneath the 
cool surface of the smug sensibilities of classroom competences on the 
part of both teacher and pupils"; however, he implies long term 
benefits in such disruptions, both for the teacher and for the taught 
(Moore, 2004, pp.149-150). 
If reflexivity is assumed as "a 'risky' discourse", then the radical reflexivity of this 
study might be considered to amplify that risk. It is, perhaps, a move, an 
amplification, that would raise loud alarm bells for Kathryn Ecclestone and Dennis 
Hayes, authors of a strident critique of what they see as a burgeoning 'therapy 
culture'. Entitled The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education (2009), its authors 
warn of the dangers of cultivating an impotent and de-politicized subject of 
education through a generalization across the school population of the vulnerable 
condition of a "diminished self' (p.146). This "diminished self" is none other than 
the 'poor, suffering client' as seen through the eyes of the psychotherapist: 
The paradox of therapeutic education, as we have argued, is that an 
obsession with the self means that you will not change the world, and 
nor will you change yourself: it is active engagement in the world that 
leads to confidence, self-esteem, fulfilment, or, to use the latest piece 
of therapy-speak, 'happiness and well-being'. The wish and will to 
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change the world characterises humanity: to turn humanity inwards is 
to diminish all our selves. (ibid., p.164) 
The last line of their extensive critique concludes: "What makes humanity is the 
intellectual and an education based on cogito ergo sum not sentio ergo sum". Whilst 
Ecclestone and Hayes are strident in their criticism, they also recognize "the need 
for empirical study of the effects of therapeutic education on teachers' and 
students' attitudes to learning and education" (ibid., p.147). At first glance the 
results of this empirical study would seem to confirm Ecclestone and Hayes' 
nightmare scenario of a group of professionals brought low by unnecessary and 
destructive self-analysis and a corresponding assumption of their fallibility. Even 
where there is a superficial confidence, teachers exposed to the 'discourse of 
diminishment' reveal themselves to be more fragile than they appear. Irene, for 
example, has learnt to admit that her compulsion to communicate control and 
security at all times ("I have to give the impression of competence") masks a 
permanent sensation of insecurity similar to that of Erendida. It turns out that far 
from being the 'competent' professional, Irene often feels out of her depth. 
All of the narratives testify to a learning that has initiated a 'fall from grace' and an 
explicit recognition of limitations and error. Yet if Ecclestone and Hayes might be 
disturbed by the seduction of such a discourse of diminishment, a deification of 
'poor me', two points can be made in defence of a recognition and embrace of 
teachers' fallibility and inexperience, of their being almost always 'out of there 
depth': 
1. Irene's admission of her insecurity, for example, is in keeping with the pre-
condition of education itself; if there did not exist a prior lack, an 'ignorance', there 
would be nothing to learn: "Were children born physically, intellectually and 
socially mature, there would be no education" (Bernfeld, 1973, p.31). Nor is there 
any reason to presume that "maturity" is reached at a particular age. Ecclestone 
and Hayes could be regarded as demonstrating a certain tendentiousness when 
they conflate with diminishment an admission of not having yet arrived at 
perfection, of not being wholly exemplary. Within the genre of tragedy, the claim to 
perfection is tantamount to hubris, and those that inhabit such self-belief are often 
ripe for being knocked down a peg or two. It is the function of tragedy to show that 
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we more often than not contain within us flaws and misconceptions whose 
ramifications might overturn our world, and thus to demonstrate to us that we 
never finish learning. King Lear was not above becoming 'diminished' by 
comparison with his inflated self-opinion at the outset of the play. Ironically, it is 
the mis-recognition of his majesty and power, and his resulting bombast that Lear 
reveals the seed of his subsequent diminishment, his humiliation at the hands of 
his dissembling older daughters. 
The critical issue for Irene was not the knowledge or admission of vulnerability, 
but the consequences of the full incorporation of this 'other' self. The question is: 
What does Irene do with this information? Lorena, for example, turned towards 
those parts of her self-other relations that are most repellent to her when she 
acknowledged her dependency upon the gaze of the other, and how this anxiety 
made her invasive of her students and invaded by the expectations of their parents 
and the school. But her vulnerability is not the equivalent of victimhood, or the loss 
of a "robust and confident sense of human possibility" as Ecclestone and Hayes 
(2009, p.146) imply; rather, new knowledge, perception, and understanding, she 
says, have fostered a new responsibility. What awaits Lorena now is the task of 
knowing what to do. Her paralysis does not result from diminished possibilities, 
but from the recognition of an excess of possibility. Asked which of her behaviours 
had become problematized, she responds "when I don't stop". Not being able to 
stop, being over-intense, over-engaged, over-demanding, is symptomatic that she 
has lost her "centre". But as well as wanting to overcome vulnerability, it seems 
Lorena feels the need to remain connected to its difficult knowledge; to make her 
peace with this antithesis of our contemporary Zeitgeist. "Calm yourself, relax" are 
her injunctions to herself ("and there is a point, yes, where I let myself go and ... 
and I relax"). 
Something here resonates with Blake et al.'s (2000) assertion that the "dominance 
of procedural reasoning and performativity is symptomatic of a thinning of our 
ethical lives"34 (p.96). Furthermore, as antidote to this cultural thrust, Blake et al. 
34 By which we are perhaps meant to undertand that it is the ambiguities and vagauries of non-
linear ethical problematization that gives rise to a depth and richness of experience and perhaps a 
'quality' of character. 
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invite us to resist "a hasty move towards explanation and the suppression of the 
unknown" (ibid.). Naranjo also stresses the path of no-action as a pedagogy. To this 
end he quotes the Zen teacher Shrinyu Suzuki Roshi: "Just to sit may be the most 
difficult thing. To work on something is not difficult; but not to work on anything at 
all is rather difficult" (Naranjo, 1974, p.145). Is Lorena's tentative exploration of 
relaxation indicative of a fattening of her ethical life, a positive exercise of Zen-like 
restraint rather than omission? If such relaxation keeps the unknown open, and 
involves letting her overbearing drive for resolution fall away, what is it that will 
appear from this 'wait and see'? Semetsky's juxtaposition of Deleuze and Dewey is 
particularly interesting on this question of delay whilst absorbed within a 
situation's totality: 
It is the totality of experience that emits signs, which by necessity 
exceed any pre-given system of significations. Conscious decision-
making will be deferred for a moment because the state of mind is as 
yet pre-reflective: "we defer conclusion in order to infer more 
thoroughly" (Dewey, 1991, p.108). We remember that Deleuze, 
asserting the production of subjectivity as unfolding and its reworking 
through knowledge and power, said that such a deferment would make 
a line [of flight] effectively fold into a spiral. (Semetsky, 2006, p.40) 
This spiral "means organization at a new level of complexity, therefore more 
refined inference and more complex meaning and understanding" (Ibid.). Lorena's 
suspicion of her own compulsion to 'not stop' would seem to accord with the 
possibility of a Deweyan virtue in deferral. Lorena wants to be able to pause, to de-
fer her own compulsion to interfere and to act. 
2. Perhaps even more important than her 'virtuous' deferral, Lorena's admission of 
still needing "to learn so much" creates a powerful connection with her own 
students. It echoes the child's grappling to position themselves in the world 
somewhere between what they desire it to be (fantasy) and how it argues itself to 
be in reality, as contestation. This is the child caught between a conviction of 
centrality and omnipotence, and a growing anxiety surrounding "the frustration of 
insignificance" (Aldo Carotenuto, quoted in Britzman, 1998, p.25). For Nietzsche, 
heroic maturity involves overcoming this frustration, or what he calls 
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ressentiment", by the "discovery of the special value of what is near to us" (Blake 
et al., 2000, p.75) 
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My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants 
nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in all 
eternity. Not merely to bear what is, to endure that which happens of 
necessity ... but love it. (Nietzsche, quoted in ibid.) 
Lorena's acceptance of being 'incomplete' involves on one level an amor fati as a 
sinking into the truth of one's situation, no matter how uncomfortable. Lorena is 
learning to sustain these uncomfortable truths. Similarly, Naranjo draws on the 
Buddhist philosophical tradition when he says that whilst practising meditation "it 
is especially useful to direct your attention toward your discomfort, in place of 
falling into the temptation of searching for a better place, a happier, more ideal 
state" (2004, p.287). Dewey echoes this pragmatic turn, framing it as a "religious 
reorientation" (not to be confused with the institution of religion) that 
brings forward the sense of security and stability by virtue of creating 
a better and more enduring adjustment to real life circumstances and 
situations. New values are created so as to help in carrying one 
through the frequent moments of desperation or depression and not 
submitting to fatalistic resignation. (Semetsky, 2006, p.105) 
Lorena had retreated from the knowledge/interpretation of rejection and the 
learning this might bring. In its place she was fully engaged in the work of 
manipulating herself and others into an obligation to 'love'. Her difficulty in 
relaxing this compulsion causes suffering ("I have to relax, but it's hard for me to 
relax [laughter], and that makes me sad, but it's a sadness that I am ..."). To attain 
peace, she needs to learn "compassion", and how "to stop and wait, to know how to 
wait. Things come. Calmness." 
Lorena's situation speaks of an expansive opening up of affect and percept as a 
developmental necessity. But, this is not just a step forward toward adult maturity, 
it is, paradoxically, a step back toward the maturities of childhood: 
The saying goes that children are natural philosophers, precisely 
because children have affects and percepts ... in abundance, and here 
are we, adults, children no more, whose routine conceptual thinking 
has been reduced to the level [...] of solely instrumental rationality [...]. 
(Semetsky, 2006, p.52) 
When Lorena talks about returning to her "centre", it seems probable that she 
means returning her attention to her abundance of affects and percepts, a deferred 
point of departure for a continual communication with otherness. This return, she 
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feels, is possible, and where it exists it can "spread to" the students. Although she 
has only experienced short moments or "flashes" where this has occurred, these 
have convinced her that such interiority manifests itself in "harmonious work, 
peace. There is better learning [...] and there is respect". Whilst this sounds 
formulaic, Lorena provides idiosyncratic evidence in commenting that where such 
contact exists: 
[E]ven the tone of voice is different. [...] Everything is different, even 
the way of holding a pencil is different. Yes, and it's nothing, it is this 
'click'. And a lot of teachers have had this 'click', but then (and I include 
myself) we lose ourselves in doing. (Lorena) 
Lorena in such a moment is receptive as opposed to performative and open as 
opposed to forcing open. What elevates the moment is not the singularity of the 
student's holding of the pencil, it is the perception/creation of this singularity in 
the perceptive field of Lorena. With singularity of this "click" comes wonder, and 
perhaps what Naranjo (1974) talks of as the "beginner's mind" of Zen, the un-
knowing freshness of things coming together as if for the first time. 
By dwelling on the testimony of Lorena I hope to have illustrated a common theme 
within the narratives. A psychologically and spiritually informed work of self-
knowledge, even where this requires a 'fall from grace', proves itself to be fertile 
ground for reconstituting the teacher as a radical learner. The radical learning of 
'who I am' would seem to transpose itself naturally and inevitably into what are, 
for each teacher, important revisions and experiments within teacher identity, 
within doing. The inward movement, criticized as 'indulgent' by Ecclestone and 
Hayes, rebounds outwards into new ways of perceiving and enacting action. The 
learning around identity that occurs is most powerful for the fact that it is 
idiosyncratic and is not beholden to a 'one size fits all' proposal for what 'needs to 
be done'. The commonality of this learning, if it is useful to name it, is in the 
experience of learning itself, an opening up to the anxiety and joy of the unfinished 
business of life and the knowledge that 'reality' exceeds our expectations. By such 
means, teachers involved in an investigation of their own 'living death' can be said 
to reconnect with the modus vivendi of education itself and thus, like Fernando, 
experience a "re-enchantment" (Bhaskar, 2002) with teaching and learning. 
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Chapter 13: The Arts of Getting By? 
Just as Igor's testimony shows how he sought to render his students inanimate 
through classroom control and curriculum prescriptions, education itself might be 
accused of 'sanitizing' teachers in professional and ethical discourses of good 
teaching. In this discursive matrix, parallels can be drawn between the 'fate' of the 
teacher and Foucault's portrayal of the traditional historian: 
The demagogue denies the body to secure the sovereignty of a timeless 
idea, and the historian effaces his [sic] proper individuality so that 
others may enter the stage and reclaim their own speech. He is divided 
against himself: forced to silence his preferences and overcome his 
distaste, to blur his own perspective and replace it with the fiction of a 
universal geometry, to mimic death in order to enter the kingdom of 
the dead, to adopt a faceless anonymity. In this world where he has 
conquered his individual will, he becomes a guide to the inevitable law 
of a superior will. (Foucault, 1991, pp.91-92) 
The situation that Foucault identifies as the tragedy of the historian finds an echo 
in the teachers' necessary accommodations within 'the system', and especially with 
what Moore and Edwards (2002) have described as the "pragmatic turn" within 
teacher identity development. Moore and Edwards' Professional Identities Project 
located four kinds of pragmatism within the testimonies of their interviewees - the 
contingent, the discursive, the strategic and the principled. According to Moore, 
these pragmatic nuances, often coexisting within the same teacher identity across 
time, share a commonality in that they 
(...) led the practitioner towards an orientation whereby they were 
able to occupy as it were a floating practical/ideological platform that 
shuttled back and forth between progressive and traditional 
orientations, enabling possible future re-migrations to these positions 
but also providing a 'third place' which had the capacity to become a 
more lasting pedagogical home. For some (particularly those I shall 
refer to as principled pragmatists and as discursive pragmatists), 
occupation of this middle ground was relatively comfortable, and 
indeed may have been undertaken in order to circumvent the 
problems of occupying (or continuing to occupy) a more 'extreme' 
pedagogical, ideological or philosophical position. For others (in 
particular, those I have identified as contingent pragmatists), 
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occupation of the middle ground was far less comfortable, though still 
a necessary price to pay for professional survival. (Moore, 2004, p.131) 
As the name suggests, what is central to all manifestations of the pragmatic turn is 
the placement of value on a notion of 'what works', on where effort can be applied 
to maximum effect, where costs can be reduced and gains maximized. It 
presupposes an economy of effort, and as such has much in common with the 
principles of 'economy' that lie within Foucault's description of disciplinary power 
(Foucault, 1991, pp.206-213). This emphasis on productive efficiency is most 
evident where pragmatism blurs toward dogmatism and the discursive, and thus 
"deflects pedagogic activity away from its political, socially oriented aspects too far 
towards an emphasis on the methodological and the practical" (Moore, 2004, 
p.138). Moore cites Dewey's dictum (1938, p.10) that "any theory and set of 
practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its 
underlying principles", which means: 
(...) we may need to be particularly concerned when pragmatism -
adopted as a 'theory and set of practices' - excuses itself from such 
internal investigation purely on the grounds of its own self-validating 
fundamentalism: that is to say, on the basis that it is inevitably and 
intrinsically good since it avoids the taking up of (inevitably bad) 
'extreme' positions. (Moore, 2004, p.138) 
Of all the narratives in this research, Cecilia's perhaps comes closest to a 
movement from an 'extreme' progressive position to a pragmatic position in which 
she no longer opposes the 'system' wholesale, but finds and accommodates her 
own freedoms within a given space. Whilst we might lament the implied reduction 
in her aspirations for education, and for her role in education, we cannot help but 
concur with her sense that the cost to her of maintaining her total opposition 
would have been too high, not least because she had become aware of her desire to 
occupy a more traditional authority in the classroom. Yes, Cecilia has been overtly 
"de-politicized" (Moore, 2004, p.139) by her pragmatism, but yet she seems to 
have found a professional modus vivendi that is satisfying and meaningful to her, 
one that has allowed her to remain a viable classroom teacher after 30 years at the 
'chalk face'. 
It seems, also, that Cecilia has not made that ultimate accommodation to an 
ideological or discursive pragmatism in as much as she can make a clear 
198 
distinction between her own goals and objectives and those of the wider 
educational culture. She is not a 'defender' of performativity per se, but she is 
interested in how she herself can get the job done in the knowledge that she 
occupies the 'no man's land' of the teacher, between the rock of the students, and 
the hard place of the law and policy. Nor is Cecilia's pragmatism contingent, tied to 
temporary circumstances in the environment; rather, she has appeared to have 
built a "durable" and singular practice "deliberately and proactively" (ibid., p.134), 
which, according to Moore is characteristic of a principled pragmatism. However, 
given Cecilia's bellicose history, given her oppositional roots, and her self-
conscious embedding in relations of power, it might be more productive to situate 
her pragmatic turn as owing much to what Moore refers to as strategic 
pragmatism. Although Moore describes strategic pragmatism as more prevalent 
among educational managers and leaders, there is much in Cecilia's report of the 
development of her teacher identity to indicate that her pragmatism is an exercise 
in pedagogic leadership in the immediacy of her classroom, and that she 
strategically situates herself within power as a trade-off between capitulation and 
self-determination; i.e. she 'plays the game' but still manages to set at least some of 
her terms of engagement. Within this trade off, there can be no winner, the most 
Cecilia can hope for is a permanent stand-off, a tolerance of the tensions within an 
unending antagonism. Should the spaces for self-determination that she has 
located be shut down by 'the system', she would have to review her strategy. 
If this notion of pragmatism and its nuances is a useful lens through which to view 
teacher identity development, there is perhaps something in teacher identity that 
it is unable to capture. This is precisely because pragmatism is almost 
automatically associated with a robust and phlegmatic activity. It implies the 
solving of problems in a realistic way, in line with present conditions. In this sense, 
it is important to distinguish between pragmatism's positive connotations and the 
possibility of a negative pragmatism, perhaps more akin to expediency. Whilst 
pragmatism is evident in the narratives of this study, it is expediency, with its 
associations of an improper convenience or a displacement of the problem more 
than a full engagement, that would appear to be more of a concern. Britzman's 
phrase, "getting by" (1998, p.24) would seem to come closer to this other negative 
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turn in identity. According to Britzman, it is the worry over the failings inherent in 
this "getting by" that has "overwhelmed educational discourse", presumably with 
the rise of the culture of accountability and performativity (nobody is allowed to 
'get by', they must succeed). This now intolerable modus (no)vivendi of 'getting by' 
refers us to the marginal identities that Britzman associates with learners, but it 
could equally well describe teachers: 
(...) such familiar strategies as slipping between the cracks of attention, 
doing just enough so as not to draw attention to oneself, doing less 
than what might be done, squeaking by, indeed making oneself 
disappear right before the teacher's eyes [student's/authority's eyes]. 
These furtive movements, might be thought of as the learner's 
[teacher's] means to defend herself or himself against the demands of 
[...]educators [students/authorities] or, more pertinently, against the 
demands of learning [teaching]. (Britzman, 1998, p.24) 
This description brings to mind not only the teachers interviewed in this study, but 
also the ever-present backdrop to the narratives which is formed by that mass of 
'failing', 'disaffected' teachers whose professional objective has been reduced to 
survival - not pragmatic professional survival, but the more forlorn and lonely 
survival of a (ghost of) self. These are the 'pitiable' colleagues of Igor, Erendida, 
Fernando, Cecilia, and Nieves. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the narratives that teachers expediently defend 
themselves from being overly exposed by and within a potentially 'dangerous' 
culture of education. Professional identities have been constructed in the full or 
half-knowledge of vulnerability, the knowledge that things best kept 'secret' 
threaten to spill out into the field of attention of students and colleagues. These are 
identities, therefore, in part constructed with the intention of avoiding these 
tragicomic accidents of visibility. In this sense, it is the lot of the self-respecting 
teacher to maintain an image, not limited to the ignominy of just survival or 
'getting by', but of that phlegmatic robustness typical of the professional. In this 
modus operandi the overwhelming concern is to maintain the appearances of 'self, 
no matter what that 'self is dedicated to. 
That this operation of identity involves (self-)deception is clear from the 
narratives. On finishing her workshop, Erendida wants to know if her nervousness 
(i.e. fear) was noticeable to the group; Muriel, hyper-trained and prepared, was 
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adamant that "nobody will realize that I don't know" ("and yet always with the 
feeling inside that I don't know"); Fernando was outwardly cooperative and 
modest, but quietly aware of an inadmissible competitive rivalry; Cecilia, the 
young progressive, egalitarian teacher, had an inconvenient authoritarian and 
competitive streak; Carla exploded into a spiteful rage when the students made fun 
of her spelling mistake on the blackboard; Rebeca found herself being deliberately 
cruel and humiliating to a difficult student in front of the whole class; Reina hid the 
extremes of her self-opinion, oscillating between great superiority and great 
inferiority ("I had that feeling of monstrous, ugly things, things that had to be 
hidden, that nobody could see in me"); Nieves' commitment and apparent humility 
of service contained a hidden scorn for her colleagues ("I do everything well, you 
don't"); Yvete 'mistook' her intimidation for a caring attitude, and her colleagues' 
compliance for agreement. 
Monsters and ugly things: the narratives are full of candid admissions of 
dissembling, and of the expedience of a manipulated presentation of self. At the 
end of the day, these teachers are not what they appear. Above all, they should not 
be mistaken for 'exemplary adults' as conventionally framed figures beyond 
reproach. Irene, extremely image-conscious, is eloquent on this point: 
I hide and repress, no? Like, I can't reveal how I am in all situations, 
and often I am very conscious [of that] [...] how we live with our backs 
to ourselves [...]. I see through the eyes of everyone else and am very 
tuned into everyone else, so I don't really live what is really mine, 
right? (Irene) 
Nor is such expediency to be found only at the individual level; the narratives also 
expose a systemic expediency, perhaps best described by the notion of 
'simulation'. The themes of simulation in education are found, for example, in the 
experience of Erendida. In the following extract, she identifies her 'lazy' 
submission to a system operating under its own 'false logic': 
I worked a lot under the inertia of what they said had to be - and 
sometimes they weren't even well thought out recipes - it was just 
working according to a recipe but without all the necessary ingredients. 
(Erendida) 
This short statement captures a characteristic predicament for teachers. The state, 
prescriptive and normative, details a compulsory course for teaching and learning, 
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perhaps without substantial or inclusive deliberation, but does not count on, or 
provide, the conditions in which this same course can be undertaken effectively. 
The teachers, muddling along, simulate compliance, the students simulate learning, 
and the state 'fabricates' a policy success story. 
Yet we can see embedded in Erendida's statement a different truth in which all of 
the 'players' are rendered powerless by reality. The state's 'educational recipes' 
are unable to respond to the enormous social, economic and political complexities 
of schools and of teaching and learning. The 'inert' teacher succumbs to the 
realities of impotence, renouncing the effort implied in resistance and the struggle 
for freedom or greater self-determination. The sense of collective and individual 
failure is latent in Erendida's statement. It is the failure of inept imposition, and the 
failure of docile acceptance. Erendida's description of her condition evokes 
Foucault's "docile body" being spoon fed and in so doing renouncing its creative 
and transcendent potential, Nietzsche's "will to power". Rather, her "inertia", and 
the lack of positive engagement with reality that this idea evokes, brings us closer 
perhaps to a 'will to powerlessness'. Erendida goes on to explain how she 
perceives that the relationship between a state-sponsored simulation in education 
and this same 'will to powerlessness' constellates within and around what she 
describes as a (deliberately?) sub-standard initial and in-service training for 
teacher. This results in teachers being sent 
to war without anything, even without shoes. And so along the way we 
take on the idea that we are absolutely useless. It seems to me that 
something like that is going on, and so each person [is left] to how he 
experiences the situation: some adjust, make themselves comfortable as 
it were, and others react, and others perhaps sink. I think it's part of the 
lack of recognition, of attention, of respect. (Erendida) 
Erendida is obviously referring to Mexico, but her statement might equally 
resonate with teachers around the world. Erendida identifies a double-sided will to 
powerlessness. The government on the one hand actively disempowers teachers, 
both by setting the agenda, and by creating standards which belie reality. The 
teachers, on the other hand, renounce the possibility of revolt. Testimony from the 
Mexican interviewees implies that an accommodation to this situation is the norm. 
This accommodation would seem to involve either throwing oneself 
202 
wholeheartedly into the 'game,' usually including the union game, or settling into 
the law of least effort in a world essentially free from accountability and 
retribution. For those taking the latter route, power, or resistance, could be said to 
be exercised not through revolt, but through apathy. The government agenda is 
subverted not by opposition but by being defused or diluted at the point of 
delivery. The subjects' victory' over government is in the freedom to pay only lip-
service to the official discourse, preserving the right to maintain alternative and 
parallel values. Igor testifies to this same culture amongst his colleagues: 
I work in a government school, and in this school, because we have 
tenure, and a union that protects us, there is a lot of absenteeism, a lack 
of initiative. Logically, because the union is here they can't fire us easily. 
So, I don't arrive at work, and if I arrive, I sit down and don't do anything 
to change the reality. In my case it gets to me, and it affects me badly, 
and I do things to try and make changes. But many are sat in their places 
and don't want to move from there because they are comfortable, and 
why bother if they are only going to earn the same amount. I tell them 
that what they will gain is satisfaction, but there isn't anything of the 
kind [...] it's very mediocre, very conformist. (Igor) 
It is hard to disagree with Igor's assessment of his colleagues 'mediocre' behaviour 
as 'conformist', especially if we take into consideration the possibility that, as 
Erendida observed, 'mediocrity' could be the hidden curriculum of the Mexican 
government (see quotation above). However, looked at from the lens of market 
democracies where the culture of performativity is now in place within schools, 
the possibility of a collective and permanent boycott of standards and procedures 
appears almost radical. It would appear that Mexican teachers, by virtue of their 
historical collective weight, are exempted from some of the greater incursions of 
state power into the lives of its subjects. In still being able to escape from the most 
rigorous demand for success that is the logic of the culture of performance and 
accountability, Mexican teachers might be said to still have access to a negative 
space in which negative freedom from the rigours of government, a freedom to fail, 
to lapse and to avoid, is still an option. 
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The arts of getting by: revisited 
We witness here a strange and bewildering, even cynical, game of appearances 
played out in the mirrors of others. Such games can be seen as fundamentally 
ideological, even on the individual level through the manifestation of a 'singular' 
personality, or of a professional identity. 2a"ek's analysis of a cynical potential 
within ideology is relevant to this individual and collective culture of schooling, 
constructed with the apparent complicity of so many different actors: 
The most elementary definition of ideology is probably the well-known 
phrase from Marx's Capital: `Sie wissen das nicht, ober sie tun es' - 'they 
do not know it, but they are doing it'. The very concept of ideology 
implies a kind of basic, constitutive naiveté: the misrecognition of its 
own presuppositions, of its own effective conditions, a distance, a 
divergence between so-called social reality and our distorted 
representation, our false consciousness of it [...] the main point is to see 
how the reality itself cannot reproduce itself without this so-called 
ideological mystification. The mask is not simply hiding the real state 
of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence. 
(2fZek, 2008, pp.24-25) 
The work, then, of the critical attitude is to undo the fiction of a continuous, 
smooth surface of reality that is ideology (personality?). Foucault's genealogical 
and archaeological methods represent just such an attempt to uncover our 
collective 'myths', and similarly, psychotherapy echoes this attempt at the 
individual level. But as 2fZek makes clear, the 'reality' of post-ideological society, 
the society of "cynical reason" (op.cit.), and, by inference, the reality of modernity's 
new human species, the "psychological being" (Rose, 1996), means that the 
exposure of 'naïve consciousness' through critique is no longer sufficient. What is 
necessary is a re-engagement through new activity, new procedure, that can give 
form and content not only to knowledge but, perhaps more importantly, to belief 
It is the existence of the habitualized automaton (Pascal, 1966, p.274) that allows 
for the gap between what we 'know' and what we do, and thus for the possibility of 
Sloterdijk's "cynical reason" and an apparent flourishing of the "cynical subject" in 
post-ideological society (1998): 
The cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the 
ideological mask and social reality, but he [sic] nonetheless still insists 
upon the mask [...] Cynical reason is no longer naïve like the ideologue, 
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but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows the 
falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden 
behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it. 
(2isZek, 2008, pp.25-26) 
If this situation is worrying then it becomes more so when such cynicism is the 
modus operandi of a ruling culture. Such 'structural' cynicism is captured in the 
testimony of Erendida as the Mexican government's facade of quality and rigour, 
which, according to her interpretation, provides the glittering surface for a 
'tolerance' of poor educational standards and the socio-political 'fruits' of a 
generalized level of 'ignorance'. Erendida's description would seem to conform to 
2iZek's assertion that: 
This cynicism is not a direct position of immorality, it is more like 
morality itself put in the service of immorality - the model of cynical 
wisdom is to conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of 
dishonesty, and morals as a supreme form of profligacy, the truth as 
the most effective form of a lie. This cynicism is therefore a kind of 
perverted 'negation of negation' of the official ideology. (2i2ek, 2008, 
p.26) 
Bearing this situation in mind, it would seem that any "re-enchantment" (Bhaskar, 
2002) with education, with teaching and learning, would necessarily need to 
address this 'negation of negation', or the negation of a negativity, that is 
cynicism's great deceit. For this reason, the appearance of the principle and 
practice of a Foucauldian truth-telling in the narratives is highly significant when 
juxtaposed with the duplicity that is prevalent in the pre-SAT 'universe' of these 
teachers. Teachers who have spent years learning to 'get by' through complicity, 
deception and evasion, post-SAT are beginning to consider the cost of their 
'dishonesty' as too high, and are attempting to build a practice of truth-telling by 
which they might re-new a sense of integrity. Rebeca, for example, has, post-SAT, 
begun to radically re-think herself in relation to power. At the heart of her shift is a 
transcendence of the cultural norm of remaining silent. This involves an 
overcoming of fear, caution and mistrust of speaking out. Rebeca describes how 
during her career she had always found speaking her mind with colleagues 
particularly challenging; she avoided 'rocking the boat', preferring to defer to the 
dominant culture of duplicity and/or non-engagement with conflict. Post-SAT she 
has begun to find the means by which to enact her own voice, to transgress and 
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transcend a silence that had previously made her complicit with a certain way of 
doing and hence being: 
I didn't know what was happening, but I did see it as something strange 
and it made me feel, I'm not sure if it was ashamed, I didn't know how to 
explain it. So, obviously, with the SAT I did come to understand a little 
better, and yes, I have changed my attitude as of two years ago. Like, for 
example, in speaking out a little [...] In ten years I had never intervened 
in the general meetings, something that is very significant, and suddenly 
my first intervention was two years ago. It was to complain, to say that I 
was not feeling at all comfortable. (Rebeca) 
Interestingly, Rebeca points to particular activity within the SAT programme as 
providing her with the experience that enabled her to understand the difference 
between any particular reaction as originating in an event itself, as a consequence, 
or as originating the perception of that event. This is the difference between "You 
are pressuring me" and "I feel pressured". Through this move, Rebeca has been 
learning to take responsibility for her thoughts and feelings, and this acceptance of 
responsibility has brought with it greater liberty of expression: 
If I feel pressured there I am taking responsibility, and that is undeniable 
because that's how I feel, and so I can share it so that someone else can 
understand how I feel without them feeling attacked [...] In my case, 
what I said was that I felt very unhappy with the final baccalaureate 
evaluations, and that was like a kind of earthquake. (Rebeca) 
Another curious detail of Rebeca's uncomfortable truth-telling is that she had 
previously gone to warn the head teacher that she was intending to bring up this 
point in the upcoming staff meeting. She saw this as an attempt to defuse any 
possible interpretation of this uncomfortable or dangerous truth as a surprise 
attack on management. Though she will not be dissuaded by the head from 
pressing forward with her personalized observation, it is obvious that she is 
anxious to avoid falling into oppositional or provocative games of power. Rather, 
she would appear to be interested in the power of truth itself, independent of its 
ownership. 
So, in her practice, Rebeca has identified a key question that Foucault signals as 
essential to the power games of modernity and governmentality: the access to 
truth. Power and government are, for Foucault, created and patrolled through 
claims to truth, a truth established through an 'objective' or cynical rationality. 
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Such truths, constructed through 'knowledge' of the social territory, inevitably 
disempower the individual in as much as they do not have at their disposal 
anything more than their limited perception of events, they cannot generate any 
totalizing truths and so are unable to describe reality. Rebeca's new-found strategy 
is to establish an alternative claim to truth based on her own experience of herself. 
Its power is that it is indisputable, and as such can provide legitimate grounds to 
enter into fields of uncertainty or into potential conflict with other truths. 
We find one other important example within Rebeca's narrative of what might 
approximate to a moment of "total transfiguration": having entered into a conflict 
with a difficult student in which she had felt herself to have reacted harshly, 
upsetting him in front of other students, she resolved to apologize to him: 
Afterwards I spoke to my colleagues, saying, `So, I apologized and we did 
such and such,' and so they said, 'What! Are you stupid! How could that 
even occur to you!? And I thought, 'I feel more at peace now.' And this, I 
think is a result of the SAT - that I dared to talk to him directly in that 
way, in a sense I was showing him my vulnerability, the fact that he can 
make me feel bad. I told him that clearly! And he understood perfectly! 
And what's more, he responded very well, and then I felt even better. 
(Rebeca) 
Rebeca has effectively made explicit the permanent provocations within the games 
of power of classrooms: students' resistance not only disrupts progress, it also 
undermines the authority and the comfort of the teacher; and likewise, teachers 
may abuse power and hurt, offend, humiliate and marginalize students. The 
reaction of her colleagues would indicate that this central experience of teaching, 
and of teachers' and students' power-impotence, is not generally open to explicit 
discussion between the opposing forces. Stereotypically, power is maintained in 
the classroom through a measured use of coercion/persuasion and the appearance 
of imperturbability, strength and resilience. But in the case of Rebeca, a dangerous 
truth - her own vulnerability - has assumed, perhaps momentarily, a power 
greater than the structures that contain and constrain it. 
We can detect at the heart of this example of 'transfiguration' the possibility of an 
encounter with an ethical authority founded and dependent upon truth telling. The 
importance of the production and ownership of truth in Foucault's thinking cannot 
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be overestimated. He even goes so far as to determine the challenge for the 
intellectual as the constitution of a new politics of truth: 
The problem is not changing people's consciousness - or what is in their 
heads - but the political, economic, institutional regime of the 
production of truth [...] The political question, to sum up, is not error, 
illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself. (Foucault 
and Rabinow, 1991, pp.74-'75) 
We might suggest that the production of truth as 'knowledge' is not perhaps the 
issue with these teachers for whom truth-telling is becoming a compelling ethos. 
What is certainly the case is that these teachers are challenging how truth is being 
represented in schools. The power games in schools are underscored by a 
particular way of representing reality. What is officially occurring in this reality is 
determined by what is said and what is left unsaid. What we see in the case of 
these teachers is a new-found impulse to communicate the incommunicable of 
experience, to point to 'the elephant in the room', to talk about what is happening, 
and in so doing they represent a new challenge to the status quo, both for their 
colleagues and for their students. Once more, Foucault is categorical in his 
assertion that a technology of truth banished from our scientific culture is 
precisely concerned with what is happening at any one time, rather than what is as 
unchanging and eternally true: 
One may suppose in our civilization a whole technology of truth that 
scientific practice has step-by-step discredited, covered up, and driven 
out. The truth here does not belong to the order of that which is, but 
rather of that which happens: it is an event. (Miller, 1993, p.271) 
We may suppose that the SAT programme, with its transversal emphasis on 
experience and on the here and now, might cultivate a renewed attention to this 
parallel and subversive truth located in the description of what is happening. 
Naranjo's ethos with respect to psychotherapy's search for truth is inspired by 
Fritz Perl's elaboration of the a-theoretical experientialism he called Gestalt 
therapy. Irene, for example, describes how she has begun to disrupt the ordinary 
dynamic of class control with her young students - involving the standard 
combination of persuasion and reprimand - with an open 'confession' of her own 
emergent feelings about what is or isn't occurring with the group. So, for example, 
she may openly declare herself to be angry, or to be sad. It is the irruption in the 
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here and now of a different perspective on truth, on what is important and 
permissible in the teacher-learner relationship. This new 'technique' produces a 
certain degree of shock in Irene's students. Her emotional truth breaks through 
from a parallel world, a world that is ever present but rarely referred to. Irene 
notes that whilst emotional life is mostly downplayed in schools, certain emotions 
are actively censored. We can identify here one of the effects of modernity's regime 
of truth - that truth is the fruit of reason and therefore incompatible with and 
threatened by emotion (especially so called 'negative' emotions) and corporality 
(especially sensuality). There are always, then, two or more worlds in the 
classroom: the world of teaching and learning, and the world of what Foucault 
termed the bios philosophicos, the animality of being human. It is radically and 
graphically juxtaposed in the sprawling energy of playtime, "life in its chaotic pre-
personal flux" (Miller, 1993, p.34-7), and the invested intentionality of docile bodies 
sitting at their desks waiting to be directed by the teacher. Indeed, we might argue, 
in the way of Bhaskar (2002), that the order of teaching and learning precisely 
depends upon the vital energy of children and the young. We find, then, in the 
organization of schools a schism between 'nature' and 'nurture' equivalent to that 
which Nietzsche observed occurring in the individual: "All instincts that do not 
discharge themselves outwardly turn inward. Thus it was that man first developed 
what was later called his 'soul" (Miller, 1994, p.217). If the school and the 
classroom have a 'soul', it is perhaps the product of this permanent provocation 
between the explicit and the hidden, the favoured and the disfavoured, played out 
year after year between students, teachers, management, parents, and 
government. 
Whilst truth-telling within this permanent provocation may well offer the 
possibility of a new therapeutic authority or ethos for the teacher, it is not without 
its dangers. All the 'truth-tellers' mentioned, perhaps with the exception of Igor, 
are obviously cautious, aware that there are dangers. Irene believes that sharing 
her emotional 'truth' with her young students can only be effective if used 
sparingly. She appears to link its value not to an innate quality, but rather as a 
contrast to normality. For Irene such truth works because it shocks. Likewise, 
Rebeca is aware that there are risks involved in sticking her neck out, in being 
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different as a teacher, and in pointing to 'reality' in staff meetings. Dora repeatedly 
refers her radical vision of a new way of working to the approval of her boss. It is 
obvious that where an energy for change asserts itself, this generates both 
excitement and anxiety. It brings with it the promise of a practice of liberation, or a 
vindication of the 'human', but at the same time this is infused with doubt and fear: 
Am I right? Am I justified? What events might unravel? How might I be punished or 
humiliated? In taking control or responsibility, how might I lose control or have my 
responsibility called to account? Furthermore, and most importantly, if truth-
telling can involve accusation, a pointing of the finger, a denouncement, a rigorous 
questioning, this gesture, this attitude necessarily involves the truth-teller in being 
held to account themselves: 'Those who throw stones', as the proverb goes, 'should 
not live in glass houses'. We can see this clearly in the testimony of Cecilia, who, at 
the beginning of her career, had believed herself to be a truth-teller aligned against 
a retrograde and oppressive system. Her denunciation of traditional authority, her 
sensitivity to the guises of authoritarianism, throws up the mirror to her own 
authoritarian tendencies as a teacher. By this means she is brought face to face 
with a more uncomfortable truth, that of her own 'involvement' in games of power, 
and her 'need' of authority. This retroflexive movement in Cecilia is presaged by 
Foucault's valuation of truth-telling: 
The main effect of this parrhesiastic struggle with power is not to bring 
the interlocutor to a new truth, or to a new level of self awareness; it is 
to lead the interlocutor to internalize this parrhesiastic struggle - to 
fight with himself against his own faults. (Miller, 1994, p.361) 
A Foucauldian truth-telling, in this light, is, perhaps, a viable antidote to the 
cynicism that 2aek points to as central to our experience of modernity. It 
represents an act of faith in the possibility of unmanipulated relations between 
and within subjects, and embodies a belief that community and the subject can 
withstand an uncomfortable multiplicity of truths. Such truth-telling, as a 
resistance to the 'ugliness' and 'corruption' of (self)deceit, takes its place within an 
aestheticism, in which 'Truth is beauty, beauty truth', and could be said to play a 
part in transforming the 'getting by' into "the arts of getting by" that Britzman 
places so painfully at the centre of a multiplicity of self and other relations to be 
210 
lived and deciphered within education. Indeed, Britzman asks us to consider a 
search for our own answers (truths) within the experiences of education: 
What, in education, do the arts of getting by mean to that other art, the 
art of learning [teaching]? How do learners [teachers] work through, 
and get stuck in, all the conflictive representations and theories of 
learning [teaching] offered by the course of their life in education? What 
obscure relations work within the capacity to think, to live, to love, and 
to dream as if learning [teaching] were the self's own work of art? 
(Britzman, 1998, pp.23-24) 
We can suppose that learning to shine the light of awareness into these "obscure 
relations" is the work of attempting to construct a sense and experience of 
subjective truth, but this learning is not enough, we must learn, as some of the 
teachers of this study are learning, to communicate this truth. In this way the 
subject, the identity of the teacher, like a work of art, might learn to stand 
unashamedly for itself. 
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Chapter 14: Great Expectations? 
Besley and Peters (2007, p.133) identify the following characteristics of liberal 
government according to a Neo-Foucauldian approach: it is not an ideology or 
political philosophy or economic theory, but rather a form of governmentality 
focused on how power is exercised; it demonstrates a self-limiting state through 
the encouragement of self-government; it represents an intensification of an 
economy of moral regulation first developed by the liberals; and it develops the 
relationship between expertise and politics, to be seen in a proliferation of the 
actuarial rationality, the prudentialism of purchaser-provider, and the audit, 
performance, and risk management cultures. 
The evidence of Mexican teachers would indicate that much of this apparatus of 
governmentality is not yet fully in place, and, where it does exist, is faced with a 
counter-culture whose origins can possibly be traced to Mexico's colonial history, 
the 1910 Revolution and consequent domination in the 20th Century of a one-party 
state. Under these circumstances it is only to be expected that different values and 
technologies of power were developed in order to regulate the individual's 
relationship to governmentality. Evidence from the narratives would seem to 
confirm that, even today, Mexican teachers have a different relationship to power 
than that experienced by teachers in advanced market democracies. We see some 
evidence of this in the description of the work culture offered by Igor. Firstly, many 
of Igor's colleagues, indeed perhaps the vast majority, appear not to have 
internalized the self-regulated moral discourse of performativity. In stark contrast, 
Igor's description would indicate that they act in accordance with a parallel 'norm', 
or work culture, perhaps encouraged by the teachers' union. They are 
conspicuously not 'normalized' by the explicit discourse of government and of 
modernity's championing of self-regulation and of professional expertise within 
the disciplines. If self-regulation is occurring, it is perhaps with other, amoral and 
a-professional aims in mind, for example, with a view to maintaining a network of 
'useful' relationships with influential figures in the union and among the education 
authorities. Secondly, whilst modern government demands visibility, as 
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exemplified by Foucault's emblematic architecture of control, the Panopticon, 
these same teachers remain on the margins. Mediocrity, the failure to comply with 
the (explicit) 'norm', is education's best known secret, the skeleton in the 
cupboard, and up until now the authorities, as Fernando confirms in his withering 
analysis of teachers' failings, have been unable/unwilling to press home the 
administrative route against even blatent under-performance. 
Erendida, however, does not see much freedom in teachers' accommodation 
within the existing system. Rather, she diagnoses a lack of responsibility: 
The thing is that now we have fallen into a type of negative energetic 
circle that keeps going round and round and we can't find the way out. 
So, stemming from this, from the type of education that we've had, we 
don't make ourselves responsible: we don't really position ourselves as 
adults, and we keep waiting for [the authorities] to provide for us [...] 
And they don't give and they're not going to. (Erendida) 
The teachers Erendida describes are infantilized within a Kantian "tutelage"35 and 
no attempt is made to construct a new future; rather, they remain docile bodies. 
From their (self-imposed?) docile position, she implies, they exist in naïve 
ignorance of the forces aligned against them, and it is only when they take up 
action and dare to raise their voices (in a long drawn out and highly politicized 
strike) that these forces make themselves fully and violently known. The link 
between responsibility and power is obvious here. It is by taking responsibility for 
their own future that these same teachers enter fully into an overt field of power, 
finding there both the potential to imagine "another type of life" and the true 
dimension of the forces that would have them remain in their historical condition. 
The teachers' strike in Oaxaca, which lasted many months and was a temporary 
focal point for a broader social uprising against the state government, was what 
Foucault would have termed a 'revolt': 
In the end, there is no explanation for the man [sic] who revolts. His 
action is necessarily a tearing that breaks the thread of history and its 
35 In his essay, What is Enlightenment?, published in 1784, Kant describes the its spirit in the 
following terms: Enlightenment is the emancipation of man from a state of self-imposed tutelage .... 
of incapacity to use his own intelligence without external guidance. Such a state of tutelage I call 
'self-imposed' if it is due, not to lack of intelligence, but to lack of courage or determination to use 
one's own intelligence without the help of a leader. Sapere aucle! Dare to use your own intelligence! 
This is the battle-cry of the Enlightenment. 
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long chains of reasons so that a man can genuinely give preference to 
the risk of death over the certitude of having to obey. (Foucault in 
Bernauer, 1994, p.64) 
The strike in Oaxaca was crushed and lives were indeed lost. Nevertheless, 
Erendida's testimony remains a potent example of how power and conflict is 
invoked when we cease to simply obey and conform. It would seem that the saying 
"With great power comes great responsibility" can effectively be reversed. With 
responsibility, understood as the will to self-determination, comes power. 
However, as Besley and Peters (2007) point out, the neo-Foucauldian 
interpretation of the liberal project of modernity demonstrates how modern 
government has effectively attempted to divulge great responsibility to individuals 
whilst simultaneously circumscribing the accompanying power to self-
determination. The truly modern subject has been invested with the responsibility 
to self-govern by the exercise of moral, economic, political and professional 
'freedom of choice', but these are only to be enjoyed within narrow parameters 
policed by government. It is, they argue, the consummate sleight of hand of good 
government to divulge responsibility to the subject at the same time as 
circumscribing their freedom. 
Teachers, charged with exercising their professional discipline at the interface 
between the state and its population, are at the epicentre of this phenomenon. 
Their 'permitted' access to power is precisely to be responsible for good 
government, both of themselves and of their students. Igor, Erendida and Dora 
have all, at some point in their career, demonstrated a concern to comply with 
their perception of the established parameters of being a good teacher. From 
within their limitations they feel responsible for the correct administration of the 
technologies of power and of self that constitute and traverse education and 
schools. Rebeca, also, feels "squashed" by the increased responsibility of moving 
from supply teaching to a permanent post where she has to make things happen 
and get results. This responsibility and the opportunity to consolidate her position 
and experience is both embraced and feared. The fear of adversity accompanies 
her sense of possibility. When she attempts to make things happen her way, by 
instigating an hour of silent reading in class, she confronts the "gaze" of the other 
actors in the school: 
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The head told me to write a letter to the parents explaining what I was 
doing [with the silent reading time]. A colleague said 'Don't even think 
about it! Because that is like setting a precedent and then, you'll see that 
we will have to give explanations for everything we do!' They should 
show a little trust in the fact that we are not crazy [laughter] and that we 
know how to do what we are doing, and that you are the teacher. 
(Rebeca) 
Behind the concerned gaze of the head are the triangulating gazes of the parent and 
education authorities in the trap of visibility denounced by Foucault (Foucault and 
Rabinow, 1991, pp.206-213) (watching them, watching you, watching them). So 
within this small drama, as Rebeca's colleague knows, the issue of domination and 
freedom are writ large. Rebeca's apparently innocuous proposal puts her suddenly 
at the heart of the school's permanent provocations of power and reveals the 
monolithic reality of schools' pyramid hierarchy. Rebeca's highly visible novelty 
upsets the flow of decision-making and created risk, raising the alarming question 
of who is to take responsibility for 'innovation'. On whose authority can this 
reading proposal be 'safely' undertaken? Though she successfully instigates the 
silent reading hour, Rebeca is made aware that self-determination, initiative and 
innovation are not the prime responsibility of the teacher; rather, it is to maintain a 
certain type of order based on a certain type of recognizable teaching. Whilst 
teachers may be tempted to feel that their relationship to the students is intimate, 
singular, it is in fact public property. They share responsibility for what happens in 
this relationship with the institution and community at large, and with the very 
reason of state: good government. Good government stretches responsibility across 
a terrain, and incites a culture of control. If a teacher has been beating students for 
years then, by the logic of good government, blame cannot rest on the teacher 
alone; rather it will spread within the institution and probably without. However, it 
is worth highlighting that in the case of Mexican schools, although individual 
teachers may be targeted for bad practice, it is unlikely the ripples will spread 
through and between different actors. A head teacher is unlikely to fear for their 
own job because they have not adequately monitored the activities of one of their 
staff members. As the narratives of Fernando, Igor, Erendida and Dora make clear, 
the administrative discourses and mechanisms of organization and accountability 
are effectively simulations of technologies of power. This does not appear to be so 
much the case in Spain where professional accountability is more conspicuously an 
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issue in the narratives. In this sense, at least in Spain, the teacher is not alone in the 
classroom, however alone they may feel, and their pedagogic decisions can only 
ever be taken in knowledge of the Foucauldian gaze. 
For both Irene and Rebeca, being subjected to authority has far reaching 
implications for their own classroom authority. Just as they feel themselves to be 
conditioned and controlled by the structure to which they belong, they recognize a 
tendency to be inflexible in their demands on students. In psychological terms we 
might say they are identified with authority. Control, as it were, passes through 
them to their students. Irene is able to see within herself a tendency to 
authoritarianism: "I think", she says, "it has to do with my pride, it is that 'you have 
to do what I say, when I say it—. It may be that Irene's conflicts with unruly 
students are aggravated by pride, but we should not overlook the structural 
questions in personalized situations of daily conflict. Firstly, teachers are expected 
to set the agenda for students to follow. This arrangement is at the heart of schools 
as institutions. Secondly, Irene's teaching agenda is not set autonomously. It is an 
expression of cultural and institutional values in which she is paid to be a 
stakeholder. Perhaps, then, Irene is just 'being a teacher' when she locks horns 
with her students. 
If Rebeca and Irene's narratives capture some problems of meeting the gaze of 
authority, narratives also touch on the questions around occupying the gaze of 
authority. Dora, for example, describes herself as naturally authoritarian and to all 
appearances would be suited to her position within the school supervision. 
However, her positioning had become complex and nuanced since she became 
aware of the double-bind inherent to her role: 
I'm the one who's always demanding things! I'm the one who goes by 
the classrooms and 'you give me your lesson plans, you give me your 
daily work log'; and then I tell my boss 'I wrote such and such'; 
'observe this', and 'let's see what you observed'; they make me the 
judge, [put me in a position to] govern, and like I said, I'm tired of that. 
(Dora) 
She is feared and respected by the teachers she supervises: 
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[R]espect in the sense of 'she's really tough'; or respect because 'she's 
going to say something', or because 'she likes things done right', or `do 
it right because she's going to come and see it'. (Dora) 
In assuming this role she also becomes obscured to herself and to others. She has 
become "too big to get close to" and earns respect, "but not a loving respect". 
Foucault pointed to the clash between the "recalcitrance of the will and the 
intransigence of freedom" (Foucault, 2000d, p.342) at the heart of the relations of 
power, but Dora's experience points to another "agonism" within power relations; 
the juxtaposition of role or function and of being a 'person'. This 'agon' is perhaps 
contained within Foucault's concept of "will" and "freedom", but it is worth 
bringing special attention to bear upon it as it would appear to be central to the 
individual's experience of power relations. Dora's official identity is taken on above 
and beyond the sense of herself as a person. She must become a vehicle or 
instrument for the technologies of power that define and justify the role. This 
brings to mind Rabinow's comment on Foucault's vision of how disposition or 
orientation is manufactured by good government: "The end of good government is 
the correct disposition of things - even when these things have to be invented so 
as to be well-governed" (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, p.21). In stepping into the 
invented role she is herself invented as governed and governing. 
In occupying this gaze of power there lurks also a possibility of 'permanent 
dissatisfaction'. Dora indicates as much in her pithy "like I said, I'm tired of that". 
Dora's experience conforms to Foucault's description of the power of the 
normalizing gaze as "one in which everyone is caught, those who exercise this 
power as well as those who are subjected to it" (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, 
p.19). For Dora dissatisfaction with the role leads to a dis-identification with that 
role; she has begun to see the costs of confusing herself with the responsibilities 
assigned to her within games of power. Writing on the potential outcome of his 
architectural utopia of control, the Panopticon, Jeremy Bentham makes the 
following claim: "Call them soldiers, call them machines: so they were but happy 
ones, I should not care" (Bentham, quoted in Miller, 1994, p.221). Herein lies 
Bentham's greatest expectation, that of happiness. But Dora is not happy, she is 
tired of being made to be judge, and, of course, of being judged as judge, 
inaccessible to both herself and others as a 'person.' However, there are 
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differences between Dora's experience and Foucault's critique of the Bentham's 
Panopticon which stresses the anonymity of the guard in the watch tower. Dora is 
not blessed with anonymity. She is exposed and vulnerable to the gaze of the other. 
If anonymity can be said to exist, i.e. the faceless bureaucracy, it remains once 
removed. Dora's gaze of power is 'cursed' by being able to see itself reflected in the 
eyes of the teachers she supervises. 
Dora and the teachers she supervises have been made responsible for maintaining 
a power game for which they are not responsible. Ideally, this game is to course 
through them but not be overly invested by them; they are to become it, but it is 
not to become them. Problems in these roles increase as interference increases, 
and Dora's autonomy or sovereignty is seriously challenged; she knows herself to 
be watched by those over whom she watches, and can imagine at least some of the 
judgements to which she is subjected. As she begins to hanker more for 
relationship, the formulaic interaction of the power games become increasingly 
sterile to her. Such interference is compounded by the fact that she herself knows 
the other position of the 'watched', having been herself a classroom teacher. The 
inter-changeability of roles within the power games, which traditionally has been a 
central feature of many government institutions, is a reality in the micro-physics of 
power that is perhaps overlooked by Foucault, and, once recognized, can be 
situated as an important ingredient within the layered dynamics of "permanent 
provocation". 
Dora is far from being alone in finding difficulties in assuming positions of 
responsibility/authority within the structure. Muriel has avoided becoming a head 
teacher because she knows that the job will consume her in a futile workload. Not 
only this, she is aware that to take up the responsibility of leadership goes against 
her tendency and practice of "opposition". 
If I set myself to doing the job [of head ...], that determination to do it 
well would be completely exhausting because I will work and work and 
work, and in the end I know that I wouldn't achieve anything, or at least 
now I know that not by those means, because it would all be my own 
work [...] instead of going forward with everyone together. [...] I have 
never known how to delegate to other people, and a head must know 
that. So, its as if I am very comfortable in opposition, good at seeing 
what is wrong [...] I'm very clear about where we should not be going, 
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but on the other hand I'm not sure about which direction we should be 
going. (Muriel) 
Muriel is competent at identifying failings; she is a critical voice in the machine, but 
she does not feel that she knows what the alternative would be. Like Lorena, she 
knows what she does not want, but not what she does want. She is unable to take 
responsibility for an alternative vision of education. One of Muriel's problems with 
assuming more responsibility is that she feels she would not know how to divest 
herself of that responsibility through delegating work within a team and so become 
less burdened herself. It is a paradox of good leadership that one of its chief 
features should be the capacity to divest responsibility in other people. Power 
involves making other people accountable, and engaging with the myriad ways 
people seek to resist being held fully accountable. A good head of a school must 
delegate responsibilities in such a way that other people are happy taking on work, 
even when challenging or even impossible. This, indeed, is an art of government. 
The elusiveness of the art of government is evidenced in the narratives. Muriel Rosa 
took up the challenge of headship and nearly drowned under a mound of work, 
spurred on by what she sees to be a neurotic omnipotence ("I can do it all"). 
Likewise, Fernando, a self-professed 'back-seat driver', left the comfortable 
shadows of 'leading from behind' to assume the clear and direct responsibility of 
headship. His attempts to make his colleagues dance to his energetic and exacting 
tune were resisted. With the benefit of hindsight he says that he would do things 
differently, accepting his colleagues more, "accepting how they are, their limits, and 
not trying to achieve my dreams through them". If Fernando were to take up a 
headship now, he would not be so goal oriented and would not seek to impose his 
'great expectations'. 
Great Expectations: revisited 
Foucault would perhaps concur with Fernando's renunciation of the conceit of 
power, and with Anna Freud's psychoanalytically inspired conclusion that "We 
must not demand too much from one another" (Freud, quoted in Britzman, 1998, 
p.9). Foucault's aesthetical asceticism was directed principally at the self, not the 
other. It is oneself that is to be the object of greatest critical (though tolerant) 
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scrutiny in an ethics he named as 'the care of the self'. The truth-telling explored in 
the previous chapter, The Arts of Getting By, is a practice that falls within Foucault's 
conception of the care of the self, which is, ultimately, the struggle to become what 
one is not, to transcend the givens of a subjected self. By stepping away from 
dominant forms of subjectification, the individual is free to turn the critical gaze 
upon himself or herself. It is in this practice of freedom (through thinking 
differently) that Foucault locates our potential to create a space for ourselves 
within the inevitable relations of power. But unlike 'utopian' thinkers like Marx, 
Foucault is cautious about some aspects of this freed reason. For Foucault, critical 
thought must be balanced by a 'tolerance' of the limits of reality; an awareness of 
these limits becomes integral to the challenge of the "complex and difficult 
elaboration" of self as an object: 
[T]his work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open 
up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of 
reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change 
is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change 
should take. (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, p.46) 
By way of illustration of the Foucauldian ethic of the care of the self, I would like at 
this point to return to the narrative of Cecilia, and to her journey of professional 
development previously explored in Questions of Purpose. Its end point, eminently 
Foucauldian, is the assertion of freedom of thought and action within the 
boundaries of our collective and individual historical condition. Cecilia gives the 
impression of having reached a situation of creative compromise or equilibrium 
between constraint and freedom. It is obvious that her tolerance of the legal limits 
of her situation is not 'docility'; rather, she has grasped where change is possible, 
and this accommodation has given her the freedom she currently feels. Whilst we 
can argue that Cecilia has 'sold out' on her youthful spirit of change, Foucault is 
adamant that he 
prefer[s] even these partial transformations that have been made in the 
correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude, to the 
programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated 
throughout the twentieth century. (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, p. 47) 
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It is to this point that Cecilia comes back at the end of the interview when asked if 
she would like to add anything. The interview has helped her, she says, to fully 
understand this point of freedom within limits. It is worth quoting at length: 
I realize that, yes, I have worked to understand what my objectives are 
when I'm going to give a class with my students, what it is that I want to 
achieve. This has helped me a great deal to feel calmer, not to be so lost, 
or going here and there. It helped me to know that these are my 
objectives, but that my own capacity is not infinite, that it is limited, and 
that I can only get to where I can get to, and there are things I can't 
resolve and stuff I can't cover, that I don't have the resources behind me 
because the problems are just too big for me, and I can't do anything, 
and there I am. And situating myself in all that, and also describing it 
now, I realize that this process I have been through allows me to go into 
the classroom with more tranquillity. Not believing myself to be the 
salvation, because that happens a lot to many teachers, and it happened 
to me as well, believing ourselves to be saviours of the world when we 
see that the family of a student is a disaster, that life is such and such, so 
we're going to do something. It's accepting that what there is sometimes 
is very complicated, and you can do some small thing, but you can't 
solve anybody's life for them. (Cecilia) 
Cecilia's renunciation of her aspirations to a 'radical' struggle would seem far from 
defeatist; rather, it is a renunciation pregnant with a Foucauldian humility, of 
'small expectations' and the attention to detail made possible by a philosophy of 
'less is more'. Just as Cecilia has experienced herself as fallible, Foucault bursts the 
myth of our collective progress, the glorious march of history and modernity, the 
assertion of Reason's power over the unreasonable forces of the body. In so doing, 
he leaves us standing at the crossroads of a complex historico-practical experience 
of subjectivity and faced with our own seeming impotence. It is Foucault's mystical 
turn, his alchemy, to then invite us to construct our freedom upon this apparently 
inhospitable spot, this ground zero. And yet Cecilia's journey in the belly of the 
whale would seem to lend weight to the possibility of a technology of self, an ethos, 
which might save us from the worst torments of permanent provocations and 
deliver us into some kind of realised tranquillity. Most importantly, bearing in 
mind the later work of Foucault, Cecilia's truce with the system has allowed her to 
turn the spotlight on herself, and it is here that the SAT programme appears to 
have been of particular importance. She underlines two situations as particularly 
relevant to her current perception of that "complex and difficult elaboration" of 
self that is becoming her goal. Both of these situations bear a relation to questions 
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of power. In the first, she recounts how the SAT programme helped her to discern 
her own highly camouflaged competitive behaviour within the staff team. Through 
the sharing of anecdotes of behaviour at work Cecilia was able to admit to her 
overt and covert strategies for domination, constructed around her ideas, 
experience and capacity. If unchallenged, their competitive edge remained 
invisible. However, if her positioning came under threat or was questioned, then 
conflict would arise. Commenting on the importance of her experience in the SAT, 
she says: 
In my professional relations it has been very useful for detecting 
situations of this type and helping me to situate myself. It's not that it 
never happens anymore, put now I position myself differently. Now it 
doesn't take me so much by surprise, and I don't get so angry with the 
other person. Before I used to think the other person was mad, 'that's so 
unfair, why are they boycotting everything I do, but why?' A great big 
thing was in play there that I didn't see, I didn't get it. (Cecilia) 
Having 'got it', Cecilia is now able to diffuse these situations, or at the very least see 
her own complicity in the competitive games of power that go on between staff. 
The second situation she highlights as needing work is her empathic potential with 
her students. Released from some of the tensions that surround the classroom, 
Cecilia is able to focus her attention on her relationship with the students. Here she 
is finding herself to be uncomfortably 'invested' by the dominant prejudice toward 
the rational and toward intelligence. In her actions and attitudes she feels she has 
been unable to transcend this bias. Asked what she feels she might have learned 
during the SAT that is reflected or has had an impact in her relations to the 
students, she answers as follows: 
For me, above all, the acceptance of myself; not questioning myself, 
accepting my limits and also having my objectives clear. Being clear that 
I am doing something that I believe in and consider to be worthwhile. 
And also [the SAT] has helped to improve the quality of my emotional 
relationships with students. That for me is the most difficult thing. 
Because with two or three I can do it easily, but not with the group, and 
especially not with some of them. So that for me has been the longest 
haul of any, to keep on expanding that [capacity]. (Cecilia) 
We see here Cecilia's dual position. She has achieved, she feels, an important 
degree of self-acceptance, which appears to express itself as a (Kantian) confidence 
in her own judgement. Yet at the same time we see that there is a struggle to move 
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beyond her limitations, and to expand her ability to connect and engage with 
students emotionally. We may detect a double empowerment or assertiveness: one 
that entails a practice of freedom within a restrictive system; and one that 
patiently asserts a 'higher' will over her limits. Once more, there are echoes to be 
found in Foucault: 
I shall [...] characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical 
ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits that we 
may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon 
ourselves as free beings. (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, p.47) 
Cecilia, true to this Foucauldian spirit, is 'carrying out work on herself, and this 
work feeds directly in to the power games experienced in the classroom. In so 
doing, the question is becoming whether or not she can dominate herself in order 
to acquire: 
[...] the management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the 
practice of the self, that will allow [her] to play these games of power 
with as little domination as possible. (Foucault and Rabinow, 1997, 
p.298) 
Moving on to the case of Igor, one might conclude that, post-SAT, an increased 
contact with the present has allowed him to re-think reward and punishment in 
his classroom. It is in this attention to the here and now that he has re-discovered 
the possibility of contact, transparency and honesty, as opposed to domination. He 
comes to the conclusion, for example, that students can be trusted to at least 
allocate a part of their grade. A small but important part of his matrix of power is 
thus re-negotiated with the students. Igor is no longer necessarily the person who 
can exclusively evaluate their progress and their capacity. 
Even more importantly in terms of re-negotiating power, Igor has promoted 
student feedback within his teaching. Whilst this is not formal, and will not have 
wider implications beyond the classroom, it is nonetheless a significant move, 
especially considering his previous authoritarian style. Unlike the official practices 
of course evaluation, a written report at the end of a course, Igor throws open the 
doors to immediate and open feedback from the group. His own performance 
would appear now to be under permanent reconstruction as a result of taking into 
account feedback from his students. Likewise, his students are subjected to his 
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feedback. Igor's new practices blur the boundaries of power relations and the 
traditional directionality from teacher to student. At the very least he is stepping 
into unknown territory, for himself as well as for his students. 
There is a parallel here to Foucault's advocacy of the breakdown of dualisms as a 
means of transcending our historical condition and thus "thinking differently". The 
most obvious example is from Foucault's personal life and involved the transitions 
between the dominant-submissive poles of sado-masochistic sex. By alternating 
between dominance and submission, and on the borders of pleasure and pain, one 
could transcend duality. We can see a similar transitioning occurring in Igor's 
classroom between judge and judged, teacher and learner. From what Igor says 
about his re-negotiation of power relationships, he appears to have been able to 
transcend historical limitations to establish a power dynamic which involves a 
considerable degree of porosity and flux. As Igor comments, transcending his 
previous identification with authoritarianism has involved: 
taking away some of my authority, power, but that authority, that power 
had become a burden and a source of fatigue for me. So removing that 
authority, that power, has left me freer and I do a better job, that is, it 
has many more benefits for me. (Igor) 
But according to Rose what we are seeing in the case of Igor might not be so much 
a taking away of authority or power; rather, in his assimilation of a new 
psychologically informed discourse and practice, we can see the evolution toward 
a new ethical leadership built around psychology and the operations of 
psychological expertise: 
[I]t is not only that the truths of psychology have become connected to 
our practices of the self, with the notions that normality, autonomy, and 
personal success can be achieved through the engagement of the self in 
a psychological regime of therapeutic remodelling. It is also that a 
psychological ethics is intimately tied to the liberal aspirations of 
freedom, choice, and identity. Therapeutic ethics promises a system of 
values freed from the moral judgement of social authorities. Its norms 
answer not to an arbitrary moral or political code but only to the 
demands of our nature and our truths as human beings. And it seeks not 
to impose a new moral self upon us, but to free the self we truly are, to 
make it possible for each of us to make a project of our own lives, to 
fulfil ourselves through the choices we make, and to shape our existence 
according to an ethics of autonomy. (Rose, 1996, p.97) 
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Whilst Rose appears be a little 'tongue-in-cheek' about psychological discourse, 
equating it to an extension of the rationale of liberalism, Igor seems to live his line 
of flight from the expectations of traditional authority not as the replacement of 
one discourse with another, but as a 'liberation'. Though we cannot definitively 
extrapolate such grand claims solely from the evidence of Igor's narrative as it 
stands, we can suggest that a qualitative shift has occurred with regard to his 
practice of authority. More than tweaking his book of classroom dos and don'ts, 
Igor's experience in the SAT programme would appear to have transported him to 
another dimension of power, to another type of authority. Igor actually uses the 
word "wisdom" to describe the attribute which permits him to operate within this 
new realm. This resonates with the following description of the trajectory of what 
Rose calls the "psychosciences": 
In rendering the internality of the human being into thought, in 
rendering it simultaneously visible and practicable, the psychosciences 
have made it possible for us to dream that we can order our individual 
and collective existence according to a knowledge/technique that fuses 
truth and humanity, wisdom and practicality [...] it appears that we can 
govern others, and govern ourselves, according to principles that are 
adequate to and worthy of our nature as human selves. (ibid., p.99, my 
emphasis). 
The 'wise' principle than Igor employs to usurp traditional authority would appear 
to be truth. We can see evidence that Igor has established, at least on a limited 
scale, a practice or field of parrhesia, or truth-telling. Whereas traditional power 
games will generally maintain a stratified access to truth, with a view to using truth 
as a faculty and operation of authority, in the tradition of parrhesia as practised by 
the Cynics, truth, beholden to no one and incontrovertible in its specificity, is 
power, is authority, and takes precedent over all cultural codes and political 
expediencies. Epictetus described the Cynic's compulsion to truth: The Cynic, he 
said, would not "wish to keep anything concealed that is his (otherwise he is lost, he 
has destroyed the Cynic within him, the man of outdoor life, the free man...)" 
(Epictetus in Miller, 1994, p.363). Truth becomes synonymous with freedom, and 
therefore synonymous with the struggle against power, oppression and subjection. 
Igor cannot be likened to Diogenes (the (in)famous, and possibly quintessential, 
Greek Cynic) because he is not openly or theatrically provocative, nor agitating for 
social revolution. However, he does permit provocation; he accepts being 
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'provoked' by the open critique of students, a provocation he has come to value 
more than his traditional authority. And surely there is something of Epictetus' 
spirit of the cynic in Igor's declaration to the students: 
I say to them that I want to be able to look them in the eyes, that I have 
nothing to hide from them, that they can see me, they can go ahead and 
examine me, nothing will happen, or more likely things will happen -
there is trust. (Igor) 
We can find certain parallels in the experience of Dora. There is evidence that she, 
too, is imagining a new basis for the power games, and, once again, truth-telling 
would seem to be a key element of these re-negotiated relations of power. Though 
she has not as yet put her imaginings into practice, Dora has begun to think 
differently about her practice of power within the game of supervision she enacts 
with the teachers under her official gaze. Tired of the procedural machinations and 
bureaucratic simulations of 'truth', Dora imagines breaking through the systemic 
inertia and arriving at a genuine and frank human exchange: 
I've even got the urge to arrive and sit down and not do anything, just 
see what [the teachers] tell me about how things have gone for them, 
what stuff they don't like. It's like I want to send them a letter and say: 
'write a letter about the things you don't like about me, go ahead, just 
say it.' Write that letter, what you don't like about me; like, just do what 
you want, but just do it quietly so the bosses don't see us! Do what you 
want, today's a holiday!' (Dora) 
As with Igor, for Dora truth-telling has replaced the established order of things. 
Dora is, however, still tentative about the prospect of going a little crazy at work, 
aware that she is not only stepping outside of herself, but also of procedural and 
cultural norms, thereby risking reprimand, ridicule, or marginalization. Even 
though at the moment of the interview her urges remain unrealized, it is still 
possible to infer that considerable shifts have occurred in her thinking. Perhaps we 
can detect in her proposed metamorphosis the goal that Foucault ascribed to the 
Cynics and the early Christian ascetics: 
to transfigure totally who one was and what one thought, creating, if 
necessary through the most immoderate and punishing of practices, a 
radically other sort of existence, manifest in one's body, unmistakable in 
one's style of life - turning ones bios, as such, into 'the immediate, 
explosive, and savage presence of truth'. (Miller, 1994, p.361) 
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Juan's testimony presents us with the explosion of a savage truth when, during a 
role play in the SAT, he is forced, literally, to face the fact of being a clown, a fool, a 
joker. The 'show' rings horribly true to his life in the 'real' world, and the abyss of a 
life of hyperactive, sloppy, irreverent, repetitive superficiality opened up before 
him ("Now I see myself as ridiculous in all those things I used to do."). Juan's was a 
painful and debilitating awakening from his "automatic" living, but at the same 
time he was grateful to learn there were things he needed to understand regarding 
the repeated patterns of behaviour in his life. Above all, he came face to face with 
the possibility of being without merit. He was, he concludes: 
Something that serves to make you laugh and doesn't have any value. 
That was my error, that I had no value, and that I felt that I could do it 
all! That there was nobody better than me. So, that was it. To realize all 
that I was doing from that clowning, and all that it had generated for me 
[...] I'm in a place where I need to be serious, and I am clowning around. 
That was it, that part there is what hurt me [...] so much arrogance, so 
much arrogance. (Juan) 
This realization of his own smallness, combined with the sensation of having been 
taught important things by somebody who knows more than him, has had a 
powerful effect on Juan, making him more serious about his own life as something 
requiring cultivation. If Juan's realizations will have arrived over the course of the 
SAT programme, his educational epiphany arrived during an experience in the 
third of the retreats, an exercise which is used to 're-enact' the experience of being 
born: 
When we began to die and to be reborn [...] (silence [...]quiet sobbing) 
[...]at that point I died (continuing in a clipped voice) [...] I died to what I 
was, and somebody was born that I needed to be born. It was like 
rebirth, but rebirth in all its positive aspects. [...] When I began to feel 
myself to be more cured, and to realize that everything that I had lived 
in my life is what made me who I am, so right there I said 'wow', if only 
all teachers could have this cure that you experience in the SAT, [...] If we 
all had that rebirth we could consider people in a different way, not only 
the students, but everyone, everyone! (Juan) 
Juan's tale seems to fit into the Hegelian dialectic of "truth arising from 
misrecognition" (2aek, 2008, p.66). Having misrecognized himself as worthy in his 
`previous' life, he lived in an expectation ofgreatness (the Fool who mistook himself 
for King), a fantasy that gave him license to do as he pleased, including to fabricate 
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truth in elaborate lies. It is the recognition of this mis-recognition that permits 
Juan to begin to elaborate great expectations for himself, expectations that require 
no less than a re-birth. Like birth itself, re-birth is a violation of our known 
universe, a (self-induced) expulsion into a new world. If Juan is perhaps 'guilty' of a 
second degree of mis-recognition when describing himself as 'cured', we can 
appreciate the courage involved in recognising his original mis-recognition. It is 
this courage, perhaps desperate, that gives him greatness. He describes the 
sensation of having received a mythical sword - a sword of light, a sword of truth -
and it is in relation to this pure object-idea, and the great responsibility that comes 
with it, that Juan acquires a new, though still tentative stature. He was not, after all, 
(originally) born great, but was achieving greatness in the recognition of this fact. 
The potential of this "truth arising from mis-recognition" (op.cit.) is elegantly 
illustrated by 2iek using the story of Elizabeth and Darcy's troubled love 'affair' in 
Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice: 
Let us take as a comical hypothesis that the first encounter of the 
future lovers was a success - that Elizabeth had accepted Darcy's first 
proposal. What would happen? Instead of being bound together in true 
love they would become a vulgar everyday couple, a liaison of an 
arrogant, rich man and a pretentious, empty-minded young girl. If we 
want to spare ourselves the painful route through the misrecognition, 
we miss the Truth itself: only the 'working-through' of the mis-
recognition allows us to accede to the true nature of the other and at 
the same time to overcome our own deficiency - for Darcy, to free 
himself from his false pride; for Elizabeth, to get rid of her prejudices. 
(ibid. p.6'7) 
Returning to Juan, his invitation to "consider people in a different way" takes on a 
greater significance. In his 'first' life he had been constitutionally incapable of 
seeing the worth in the other, but, as in Pride and Prejudice "the deficiency of the 
other is simply an objectification of the distortion of our own point of view" (ibid.). 
It is in the recognition of himself as 'ridiculous' that he can consider the other as 
potentially worthy, and it is in this recognition that he acquires his own moral 
stature. By shifting his expectations of 'greatness' from himself to the other, he 
achieves 'greatness'. Underlying this re-recognition of the multiplicity of 
experience is perhaps the greatest expectation of all and the hardest lesson of our 
troubled identities - that "the only way out is through" (op.cit.); only through the 
full experience of our madness, lack and disunity can we become sane, whole and 
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unified. Herein lies Juan's sense of his own courage, it is the courage of faith, belief 
in the giving up of belief, a commitment to his own 'ugliness' and imperfection that 
allows him to see, finally, nobility in others, and a (reflected?) nobility in himself. 
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Chapter 15: Questions of Performance - 
Discussion and Conclusions 
If the teacher, considered as a Deleuzean subject, is a "qualitative multiplicity", a 
complex folding of inner and outer, then this implies that they experience "the 
blurring of boundaries between epistemology, ethics, and psychology" (Semetsky, 
2006, p.20). Having accepted that such boundaries are inevitably blurred, the 
grounds for the negotiation of a subjectivity around identities such as 'good 
teacher' becomes unstable. Perhaps for this reason the narratives reveal the 
teachers in this research struggling hard to know what precisely they lacked or 
overdid in their efforts to become (good) teachers. Cecilia has learnt that there are 
no hard and fast rules on which to depend when trying to decide how to be good. 
Her critical eye has naturally alighted on the "terrible teachers", and she has seen 
for herself that terrible teachers come in all shapes and sizes: "I saw that there 
were different types of teachers with different styles, all the different ways to be in 
the class, and there were terrible teachers for every style". Teachers, according to 
Cecilia, are creative in finding ways to fail. Just as the terrible teacher takes a 
multiplicity of forms, Cecilia testifies to a quality in good teaching that has little to 
do with forms or ideas, which can vary, but rather with "something that happened 
in a more natural and spontaneous way in each group" (my italics). What is this 
"something"? Though she did not put this label on it at the time, she tentatively 
agrees with my interpretation of this description of the diversity of successful 
teaching in which I identified the differential "natural and spontaneous" qualities 
as akin to "authenticity". Cecilia's observations from experience mirror Palmer's 
The Courage to Teach (1998) which argues that no generalizations can be made 
about style: style should not colonize a teacher, rather a good teacher can 
(pragmatically) occupy/use styles, but first and foremost their work is to occupy 
the teacher role in a way that reflects who they are. 
Even if Palmer's stance falls outside much of the techno-rational discourses of 
modernity, it also appears commonsensical. However, Parker's invitation to 
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'authenticity' is not without its problems. As these narratives show, who a teacher 
is may not necessarily be all that pretty, nor a firm basis upon which to build a 
practice. But most perplexing among the problems with authenticity is perhaps the 
question of what exactly it means to be oneself, to be 'authentic'? Surely 'oneself is 
as much the problem as the solution? Surely, failing teachers are also being 
themselves? Surely post-Foucault or post-Deleuze, it is difficult to talk in any 
commonplace way about authenticity? Semetsky (2006, pp.19-20), for example, 
comments on Deleuze, 
The notion of being a fold points toward a subjectivity understood as a 
process irreducible to universal notions such as totality, unity, or any a 
priori fixed self-identity. As a mode of intensity, subjectivity is capable 
of expressing itself in its present actuality neither by means of a 
progressive climbing toward the ultimate truth or the higher moral 
ideal, nor by "looking for origins, even lost or deleted ones, but setting 
out to catch things where they were at work, in the middle: breaking 
things open, breaking words open" (Deleuze, 1995, p.86) (Semetsky, 
2006, pp.19-20). 
In contrast to Deleuze's actualized/actualizing subjectivity, Moore (1994, p.143) 
identifies a "unified, ideal, Cartesian" notion of self implicit in the dominant 
discourses of teacher identity (competent craftsperson, charismatic subject and -
to a lesser extent - reflective practitioner). Such discourses, he claims, run counter 
to the "material, constructed self: that is, the self as a 'text' which is formed at the 
intersections of various discursive practices and which can be 'read' both by others 
and `by the self itself". Favouring the reflexive turn as a means of experiencing and 
conceiving the self, Moore sees in this turn a greater fidelity to the multiplicities 
within identity and the "need for flexible responses to meet the demands of the 
specific and perhaps changing situation (the contingent) as well as taking full and 
constructive account of our own individuality (idiosyncratic)" (p.142). The 
reflexivity proffered by Moore also places: 
an emphasis on accommodation rather than assimilation (opening 
ourselves to the possibility of modifying our own understandings and 
behaviours rather than limiting our understandings and behaviours to 
what we have pre-decided), or seeking to force situations and other 
people into conforming to our unquestioned world view. (p.143) 
He suggests that teachers benefit from distancing themselves from dominant 
discourses because these: 
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have a nasty habit, if we let them, of getting in the way of teacher 
development, excluding much that is important for our consideration 
[...] heaping far too much responsibility for educational consequences 
on the individual teacher or pupil [so that] we need to be particularly 
careful to avoid being seduced by models of good teaching. (p.10) 
It would probably come as no surprise to Moore that Irene's old teachers, to whom 
she goes in search of advice on how to be a good teacher, explain to her that only 
her own direct experience will provide her with answers. It seems that Irene's 
experienced teachers are reluctant to proffer any recipes for good teaching. This is 
almost mythological in its evasiveness and might appear as a solipsistic, 
unprofessional attitude. Or does it recognize important truths about education, 
subjectivity, community and experience? Certainly, it echoes a Deleuzean spirit: 
what is authentic cannot be general, rather it is singular, here and now: 
thus making individuation a matter of contingency depending on the 
broad range of varied situations and the collective assemblages 
embodying each experience. (Semetsky, 2006, p.21) 
That Irene is forced back on the hard rock of experience by her one-time teachers 
concurs not only with Moore's positioning of reflexivity and Deleuze's 
multiplicities in the middle of experience, but also, according to Semetsky, with 
Dewey's pragmatism. As "transcendental empiricists" both Deleuze and Dewey 
"positioned the philosophical point of departure in the ordinary experiential 
situation" (ibid., p.25). As Boisvert (1998, p.15) underlines in relation to the 
(possibly) transcendental journey, "lived experience, that is where it must begin". 
Are Irene's old teachers Deweyan in spirit? Would they agree that "Only by 
progressive organization of 'inner' and 'outer' material in organic connection with 
each other can anything be produced that is not a learned document or an 
illustration of something familiar" (Dewey, 1934/1980, p.75)? These progressive, 
organic connections must surely result from an expansive maturation through 
experience: 
What [a person] gets and gives as a human being, a being with desires, 
emotions and ideas, is not external possessions, but a widening and 
deepening of conscious life - a more intense, disciplined and expanded 
realization of meanings [...] And education is not a mere means to such 
a life. Education is such a life. (Dewey, 1916/1924, p.447) 
232 
As Dewey indicates, a widened, deepened, more intense, disciplined and expanded 
realization of conscious meanings is both a means and an ends - a mode of 
subjection and a telos. But this telos does not end here. This 'state' of elaborated 
awareness is what enables another state, one in which "a system of affects replaces 
the strict and rigid moral code" (in relation to teaching and schooling one might 
imagine a sensibility to relationship, a devotion to contact with multiplicities 
replacing the fixities of curriculums, ideologies, roles and individual styles). The 
replacement of codes (morals, curriculum, etc.) with modes of experience requires 
new forms of certainty and uncertainty, new forms of responsibility and 
irresponsibility. It can occur only where power has been shifted from the static 
situations of law and normativity towards the flux of experience, of folding and 
unfolding, and the dynamic multiplicities of inside and outside, and of their lines of 
communication. In short, the 'subject-less subject' must be decentred and so 
'empowered' through an expansion across the psychic and social territory of 
subjectivity: 
[T]here are things one cannot do, believe, feel, unless one is weak, 
enslaved, impotent; and other things one cannot do, feel and so on, 
unless one is free or strong. A method of explaining by immanent 
modes of existence thus replaces the recourse to transcendent values. 
The question in each case: does, say, this feeling increase our power of 
action or not? Does it help us come on full possession of that power? 
(Deleuze, 1992, p.269) 
Does a teacher's performance of the performance of teaching "increase [their] 
power of action"? The narratives of this research confirm schools to be highly 
complex environments, their purposes and orders being multiple, and often 
contradictory. 'Finding' a teacher identity that works, that 'performs', and is in 'full 
possession' of its own power, its own self, is an interpretative practice rooted in an 
art of self-acceptance and naturalness, on discovering and creating a voice, a 
centre of gravity, that provides an 'art of getting by'. This is especially true in times 
of educational reform in which a "complex of overlapping, agonistic and 
antagonistic discourses" invariably "swarm and seethe around the teacher" (Ball, 
1999, p.14). Teachers must learn to construct, negotiate and chart a professional 
identity within what Britzman has called education's "cacophony of calls" (1991, 
p.223). The challenge is perhaps at its most acute for student teachers who have to 
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adapt themselves from an identification with the position of learner to the position 
of teacher, which has previously only been experienced as 'other' (Moore, 2004). 
Evidence from the three studies of teacher identity that inform Moore's reflections 
and conclusions in The Good Teacher lead him to concur with Coldron and Smith's 
hypothesis that teacher identities are "partly given and partly achieved" through 
"active location in social space" (Coldron and Smith, 1999, p.711). For the student 
teachers in Moore's studies: 
the balancing act between one's own preferred method of doing things 
and the preferred - often imposed and often antagonistic - methods 
and preferences of others appeared to be at the heart of the 
practitioner's self-worth, self-belief, professional satisfaction and 
consequent effectiveness in the classroom. (Moore, 2004, p.19) 
As Moore makes clear, such accommodations and their conflicts are not exclusive 
to the experience of student teachers, but represent a permanent backdrop to the 
professional life of the teacher. Regarding the negotiation of this contested 
territory, Moore's conclusion is that the psychological concepts of repression and 
transference - described by Freud as "new editions of old conflicts" (Freud, 1968, 
p.454) - can offer considerable help "to (student) teachers and the teachers of 
(student) teachers in making constructive, ultimately productive sense of 
classroom events, particularly during times of stress" (Moore, 2004, p.19). Moore 
affirms the classroom (and presumably the whole school) as a "site for the playing 
out of 'new editions of old conflicts", in which "emotional experience and response 
can impact negatively as well as positively on pedagogy and classroom 
management" (ibid.). This 'a-professional' perspective on teaching identity is 
supported by Britzman and Pitt, who argue that "teachers' encounters with 
students may return them involuntarily and still unconsciously to scenes from 
their individual biographies" (1996, pp.117-118; see also Felman, 1987; Gallop 
1995; Penley, 1989). 
Lastly, it is worth commenting on the possible wider relevance of the new 
performances that are taking shape in teachers post-SAT. It is tempting to view 
these transformations as singular curiosities, as heart-warming tales of spiritual 
and psychological conversion in cynical times. However, 2' iek, like Foucault before 
him, re-vindicates such 'oddities' as politically relevant, and speaks to the 
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possibility of a move toward the collective corruption of the State, as opposed to a 
necessary withdrawal. We can, he argues, escape the State whilst being in it, we 
can get beyond its parameters by going through, into them, just as the subject 
escapes themself by going through that same self: 
[T]here is no way - but also no need - to fully abstract ourselves from 
the "corrupted" order of the State: what we have to do is introduce a 
supplementary torsion into it, to inscribe into it our fidelity to an Event. 
In this way, we remain within the State, but we make the State function 
is a non-statal way (in a similar way to how poetry, say, takes place 
within language, but twists and turns it against itself, thus making it tell 
the truth)" (2fZek, 2011, p.201). 
How might the extra-statal performances of teachers post-SAT best be described? 
What is the torsion that the teaching and learning of the SAT programme appears 
to help teachers to introduce into the discursive mix of their specific 
environments? One perspective for understanding the shifts occurring within the 
teachers' narratives is the notion of the generative identity as explored by Mark 
Bracher (2006). Bracher, drawing on a Lacanian psychoanalytic ethics, concludes 
that the psychotherapeutic focus on a subject's desire is not narcissistic per se; "it 
is rather the case that if we pursue our own desire as far as possible, it will lead us 
not to a self-involvement but to a[n Emmanual] Levinasian care for the other that 
is prior to being - a care for the other that we must enact in order to become 
subjects in the first place"36. Bracher makes the link to Erik Erikson's concept of 
"generativity", understood as the "the instinctual power behind various forms of 
'selfless caring- 
 (Erikson, 1964, p.131). This generative impulse is manifest in our 
need to teach and help others thrive, develop and flourish, needs that are central to 
adult identity, marking the "the fulfilment of ... identity" (Ibid., p.130). Though the 
end result of Bracher's recurrence to the notion of a generative identity for 
teachers is perhaps similar to the conventional understanding of professional 
ethics, with its 'normative' focus on the care of the other, the crucial difference is in 
the admission of the self-gaze (or navel gazing) as a legitimate and perhaps 
necessary route for nurturing the generative impulse toward the other. An 
awareness of our own basic, ontological need for identity recognition (i.e. the need 
36 There are clear echoes here of a Foucauldian ethics of the care of the self as preparatory for 
assuming a formal role within relations of power. 
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to be recognized, in the first instance by our parents) and of the pain and anger at 
the negation of this identity and experience of ourselves is what permits the 
subject to take on an "interindividual" identity structure (Kegan, 1982), "in which 
our common humanity overrides our differences with all others" (Bracher, 2006, 
p.154). Or, in other words; 
[A]s we recover and metabolise the primal mutuality that is the origin 
and core of our identity, both the content and the structure of our 
identity are altered in ways that involve our coming to embrace the 
other as [...] an essential dimension of our identity, such that the 
maintenance of our own identity requires that we nurture the other. 
(ibid. p.153) 
The idea of an "interindividual" generative identity for teachers, arrived at in part 
through the practice of technologies of the care of self (psychotherapeutic and 
spiritual), becomes radical at the point at which the acts and events of connection 
that confirm such an identity run counter to the individualizing and totalizing 
technologies that are, according to Foucault, the hallmark of modern power. If 
modern power calculates and separates the individual (for example, using the 
ubiquitous technologies of examination), the in terindividual identity, constructed 
and lived around mutuality, turns its attention toward the myriad performances of 
communication and involves to some extent a change in direction or tone within 
dialogue; no longer is the teacher so concerned with their ability to `penetrate' the 
student with their own performance, rather they are more concerned with their 
permeability to the performances of the students, their susceptibility to the 
students' otherness. We see clear examples of this in the narratives of Carla and 
Cecilia. Both have, in the Lacanian sense, followed their desire to the point of 
awakening an enhanced care for the other. It is from the performance of this 
awakened susceptibility that they are seeking to exert a "supplementary torsion" 
(op.cit.) in the formalisms of teaching identity and practice. 
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Section 5: 
Situating the Research in the 
Field of Teacher Identity 
Given the thesis' stated objective of assessing the value of the SAT programme as a 
professional development for teachers, it is important to make some kind of 
general conclusion as to the degree to which the transformations within the data 
are solving the problems encountered by teachers in their professional life. 
Furthermore, this final discussion with its conclusions will explore how the SAT 
programme can be contextualized within the field of reflexivity and teacher 
identity and thus try to situate the research's 'findings' within contemporary 
problematizations of power-knowledge-subjectivity. Does the narrative evidence 
confirm that the SAT programme represents the possibility of conceiving a psycho-
spiritually inspired reflexivity that can make a meaningful contribution to the 
politics of teacher identity and the way teachers participate in power-knowledge 
relations? 
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Crises and exploding identities 
Within an institutional climate focused on the ends of education (e.g. exam results), 
it is relatively easy to overlook the frayed edges of the means, the possible cost to 
teacher, student, parents, and society of such an education. This research, however, 
returns us to the question of means, to what each subject (teacher) feels they have 
to do in order to meet, confront or negotiate the ends - post-SAT, these teachers are 
re-situating themselves within a system that defends itself from the chaos of the 
unconscious and of group relations through a deliberate (or obstinate) belief in its 
systems and theories. As Britzman argues: 
[T]he tension is that the institutional ethos of systematicity, or the 
belief that a system of operation can be transparent unto itself, 
forecloses any thought of the unconscious and, hence, the work of 
interpretation itself. Alan Blass (1998, p.426) locates the disclaimed 
tension: "Wherever one finds systematicity, one can, from a 
psychoanalytic point of view, ask the question of what unbearable 
piece of reality is being defended against by means of the system". 
(Britzman, 2003, p.99) 
If the dominant discourses of education present us with a virtuous rationale 
transecting the life of schools, an implacable necessity behind the way things are 
done, this research presents us with evidence of the messy contrast of the lived 
experience of schooling. Whilst containing the sublime or Imaginary (Jaramillo, 
2010) of education as an omni-present possibility, this lived experience is 
conspicuous for the omni-presence of intra- and inter-personal conflict and 
confusion. 
Whilst the narratives commonly reveal not acute crisis but chronic provocations of 
low intensity, the teachers' experience of the SAT programme often inserted itself 
into ongoing stand-offs with catalytic effect. Frequently this increased the 
discomfort and sense of crisis prior to the release of tension through some 
significant shift in practice or movement in teacher identity. What we might 
conclude is that teacher identities are often sustained as much by what these 
teachers don't know as by what they know. That is to say, their teacher identity is as 
much negative as positive, as much a product of what they 'successfully' ignore as 
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what they have successfully learnt. Identity is rendered unstable and vulnerable 
once we see it as vitally dependent upon a resistance to new-knowledge (see Bion, 
1961), a construct that keeps things out as much as it holds things in relation. 
Juan's crisis of identity, for example, which included depressions and hostilities, 
resulted from the admission of the easily available 'knowledge' that he could not be 
taken seriously. Across the narratives the new, SAT-derived, self-knowledge that is 
catalysing change is frequently none other than the elephant in the room, what was 
obvious to all but previously overlooked or denied. 
The persistent insistence of new-knowledge makes the fixing of identity a difficult 
task. It takes effort to remain the same, an activity of defence rather than a 
straightforward passivity. Britzman's work on teacher identity, like Moore's mobile 
discursive "positionings", highlights the process of becoming that underlines the 
projection of an identity through time, or the project of identity. Britzman argues 
that "Learning to teach - like teaching itself - is always the process of becoming: a 
time of formation and transformation, of scrutiny into what one is doing, and who 
one can become" (1991, p.8). The specific reference to teacher identity can also be 
framed within the increasing emphasis on identity in education generally, as 
pointed to by Wenger: 
Education in its deepest sense and at whatever age it takes place, 
concerns the opening up of identities - exploring new ways of being that 
lie beyond the current state ... Education is not merely formative - it is 
transformative . . . issues of education should be addressed first and 
foremost in terms of identities and modes of belonging and only 
secondarily in terms of skills and information". (1998, p.263, my 
emphasis) 
The notion of opened up, or even exploded, identities has been highlighted because, 
as Foucault, Anna Freud (1931) and many others leave clear, formal education is 
not per se expansive; rather, in its productive capacity it is as limiting and 
delimiting of the human territory as it is expansive. If negotiation of the conflicts of 
teacher identity is possible, there can be no doubt that the starting point for 
teachers is a highly prescribed or 'squeezed' space in which multiple demands 
from multiple sources are focused on the teacher's subjectivity. As Britzman notes: 
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Unless the narrations of practice are read through theories of discourse 
- that is, as representing particular ideological interests, orientations, 
communities and meanings, and as deploying relations of power - there 
remains the danger of viewing the teacher's practical knowledge as 
unencumbered by authoritative discourse and as unmediated by the 
relations of power and authority that work through every teaching and 
research practice. (1994, p.72) 
Once this is acknowledged it is easy to see how 'authentic' identity, 'real' becoming 
(or becoming 'real'), involves making overt those personal and professional 
discourses which have and would mediate the 'good', 'moderate' and 'bad' teacher, 
thereby developing a critical distance from those same mediations. MacLure 
(1993) claims that identity is a matter of "arguing for yourself', a hard-won effect 
of active engagement in the provocations around power-knowledge-subjectivity. 
As such, for teacher identity to acquire its own substance teachers must first have 
acquired (or be blessed with) a critical faculty that will allow them to see not only 
their positioning within structural games of truth and power, but also their own 
subjective agency within those same games. To expand on Foucault's metaphor of 
the gaze, the social and institutional gaze must be deciphered, but this can only be 
achieved once we have deciphered our own gaze, that invested vantage point from 
which we view our operations upon the world and its operations on us. Foucault's 
challenge, as such, is not only to resist the argument of the Other, it is also to resist 
the arguments of Self, or, in a reverse of MacLure's injunction, to 'argue against 
oneself. Paradoxically, to become a teacher it is perhaps necessary to resist being a 
teacher: to resist Power one must resist one's own powers, and, likewise, to fully 
assume the authority of a teacher it is perhaps necessary to have fully assumed 
personal and professional vulnerability and fallibility. 
If critical identity work, including the discourses of becoming, can have positivist 
undertones of a cumulative process of construction, perhaps it is necessary to 
make more space for this turn against oneself - for collapse, crisis, exhaustion, 
rupture, dead ends, futility, redundancy and despair as vital experiences necessary 
for opening up identities. Such deconstruction responds more fully to Foucault's 
genealogy as a method of interpreting who we are in the present, and to 
psychotherapy's anthropology of the desiring and dreaming subject. Britzman 
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draws our attention to this dreamt subject as juxtaposed to the educated subject of 
modernity: 
The field's dominant tendency is to choose the empirical child over the 
dream, the child the adult can know and control. But in so doing, 
education has reduced the child to a trope of developmental stages, 
cognitive needs, multiple intelligence, and behavioural objectives. And 
these wishes defend against a primary anxiety of adults: what if the 
dream of learning is other to the structures of education? And yet if we 
return to the question of the dream as a strange model for education, if 
educators are to choose the child who dreams, what Pontalis (1981, 
p.95) would call, as he thought about the work of Melanie Klein, "the 
question child," then education might come to reside in that very inter-
subjective place between the borders of knowledge and phantasy and, 
as Klein did, test its own knowledge against that of the child and so 
affect the adult. (2003, p.54) 
We do not have to take a large imaginative leap to conjure education's 'question 
teacher'. Indeed, a radical reflexivity, in evoking a teacher's desire, takes us a giant 
step closer toward the world of dreams and of children. It is, perhaps, precisely 
here, at the junction between the possibility of the 'question teacher', alive to their 
own creative/destructive desire and fantasy, and the 'becoming teacher', capable 
of making a deliberate move against themselves, that the identity work issuing 
from the teachers' participation in the SAT would seem to be taking place. In this 
sense, the radical reflexivity encouraged by the SAT programme takes aim at the 
solidity of the self-construct. 
'Becoming good': growth, enlightenment, healing (and power)? 
If a process of becoming referred to by Britzman and Moore (op.cit.) is 
unavoidable, the question is how can we ensure (individually and culturally) that 
the direction of travel in identity work is ultimately beneficial. This is especially 
true in an environment such as teaching, where 'becoming' frequently manifests 
itself as 'becoming burnt-out' or 'becoming cynical'. Psycho-spiritual practices 
exist with the intention of ensuring, within the inevitable accumulation of 
experience, a direction of travel that is deemed positive or fruitful. Naranjo's 
conclusion regarding the common themes of psycho-spiritual practices is that their 
central concern is implicitly or explicitly one of "developing consciousness", 
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including "the simple awareness and attention to the immediacy of experience" 
(1974, pp. 224-225). The developing of consciousness can be likened to Wenger's 
"opening up of identities" (1998, p.263) and points toward an end-state or telos 
as one that is characterized by the experience of openness to the reality 
of every moment, freedom from mechanical ties to the past, and 
surrender to the law's of man's [sic] being, one of living in the body and 
yet in control of the body, in the world and yet in control of 
circumstances by means of the power of both awareness and 
independence. (Naranjo, 1974, pp.228-229) 
This desired or cultivated end-state implies "self-acceptance" of a "self-reality" that 
is in flux. Above all it is an "experience of experiencing": 
For this is what consciousness means, what openness means, what 
surrendering leads into, what remains after the veils of conditioned 
perception are raised, and what the aim of acceptance is. And since 
experiencing is a personal matter it cannot be properly described, 
defined, or conveyed in words. It is a secret of secrets that remains 
unexplained, however much it may be talked about. (ibid., p. 229) 
In Naranjo's conclusion we are not far from Foucault's call for an "intensification of 
subjectivity" (op.cit) resulting from a cultivation of self. Indeed, Naranjo states that 
the complete human being may be described as more himself, more in 
contact with reality, more able to both participate and maintain 
detachment, more free and yet more able to surrender, more accepting 
of his nature and limitations, and more conscious. (1974, p.127, my 
emphasis) 
Whilst Naranjo underlines an enigmatic core to the flourishing of subjectivity, he 
also provides some pointers as to what it is that the 'intensified subject' can be 
expected to take up and/or leave behind. Given that the SAT is Naranjo's attempt 
to construct a vehicle for the teaching of this mode of being, we can assume that it 
is, broadly speaking, movements deriving from intensification that we should be 
noting within the narratives. 
It is clear from the evidence that the SAT 'provokes' a movement 'en masse' in 
certain directions, but that within this shift significant variants are occurring, 
variants that reflect the enneagram of personality's differentiated view of the 
problem of subjectivity, the different challenges faced by our 'immature' egos. 
Carla, for example, has become more indulgent and playful, whilst Juan has become 
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more serious. But what can be said, in most general terms about the collective 
movements that are apparent in the narratives? 
The general direction of travel can, for example, be interpreted from a Kleinian 
perspective as a shift toward an awareness and tolerance of an ambivalence 
characteristic of what Klein termed the "depressive" position and away from the 
idealizations, rejections and manipulations required to sustain the "paranoid-
schizoid" position37 (Klein, 1946; Segal, 1988). The ambivalence of the depressive 
state denies the subject the false privilege of standing apart from the 
unpleasantness of the world and incites a responsive movement toward 
"reparation", toward what in the language of the enneagram of personality is 
identified as the "virtues" that stand in the shadows of our defensive "passions". If 
the paranoid-schizoid or "passionate" position marks a defensive wall against 
experience, what stands out across the narratives is that these teachers, post-SAT, 
experience an increasing hunger for the ambivalences of 'contact', communication 
and relationship as an antidote/resistance to the threat/experience of alienation. 
This existential 'hunger' radiates as a manifestation of increasing consciousness in 
three directions - toward self-knowledge and contact, toward an 'authentic' 
exchange with the other, and toward a situatedness within the Other (the bigger 
picture). 
Post-SAT teachers appear to have re-calibrated their positions along a variety of 
axes, and thus have come to re-situate themselves within the map of the territory 
of schooling. Taking a closer, yet still panoramic view of the data, the following 
axes stand out as the most important, and in nearly all cases the movement made 
is a shift toward to the first of the two poles: 
37 "Klein posited that a healthy development implies that the infant has to split its external world, 
its objects and itself into two categories: good (i.e., gratifying, loved, loving) and bad (i.e. frustrating, 
hated, persecutory). This splitting [undertaken in the paranoid-schizoid position] makes it possible 
to introject and identify with the good. In other words: splitting in this stage is useful because it 
protects the good from being destroyed by the bad. Later, when the ego has developed sufficiently, 
the bad can be integrated, and ambivalence and conflict can be tolerated [within what she termed 
the depressive position]" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paranoid-schizoid_position). 
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Relationship vs. knowledge 
Multiplicity vs. simplicity 
Flexibility vs. rigidity 
Connectivity vs. compartmentalization 
Responsibility vs. representativity/impotence 
Authority vs. domination 
Risk vs. caution 
Fallibility vs. correctness 
Care/involvement vs. objectivity 
Local vs. universal 
The combined effect of what might be relatively small shifts along any particular 
axes generated, without exception, a significant change in the way these teachers 
negotiate their agency within the school. If one axis could be identified as catalytic 
and synthetic of the other axes, it would perhaps be the axis authority-domination. 
What teachers are exploring might be summed up as a new type of authority - new 
both in its derivations and in its manifestations. Whilst pre-SAT 'authority' was 
more likely to have derived from the teacher as a representative of power-
knowledge (a living, agentive nexus of structure or of ideology), post-SAT 
'authority' aligned itself to a 'morality' derived from the ability to negotiate the 
unfolding present of self and other by reference to the singularities and 
multiplicities of that present, rather than by recourse to the smooth surfaces of 
identity, curriculum and dogma. In Foucauldian terms we might say that it is an 
authority made possible by the teachers' access to a new order of truth, an 
alternative valuation of 'reality'. 
This authority, "interindividual" and "generative" (Brucher, 2006), appeals to 
connection, awareness, and transparency as opposed to the authority of 
representation, i.e. of being representative of power-knowledge in the classroom, 
or, conversely, representative of the forces of resistance (e.g. Cecilia, Yvete and 
Araceli). This representative authority blurs easily into the experience of being 
dominated and/or dominating through the demands of curriculum, official 
discourse, or ideologies. Often a teacher's problem, pre-SAT, was a capitulation to a 
universe of expectations and judgements. By re-calibrating their focus of attention 
many of these teachers have been able to supplant relations of power that are 
skewed toward domination with relations of power that derive from the authority 
of being more 'real', in as much as what is being proposed for teaching and 
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learning is more responsive to the idiosyncrasies of their here and now. Igor is 
clear, for example, that he has traded the manipulations of control and being 
controlled (by curriculum), for an authority that approximates to an Aristotelian 
"practical wisdom" or "phronesis" (Aristotle, 1934). 
The true importance of this new authority, however, lies not in its origins; rather, 
in the degree of 'autonomy' it permits the teacher who is opening up their identity 
to the risks of personal (creative) responsibility as opposed to the risks of 
representativity. Across the narratives, teachers, post-SAT, exercise their authority 
by either contemplating or taking up practices that are not externally defined, but 
are seen by them to respond to immediate conditions, including their 
interpretation of their own desire and capacities. These practices usually involve a 
positive component and a negative component. The positive component is what is 
proposed as congruent to the situation, and the negative component involves the 
relegation of external demands to a second order of importance. Both of these 
components can occur only in as much as the teacher has assumed the authority of 
a connection with 'reality' that takes precedence (at least at times) over the call to 
embody official discourse. 
The situatedness of this new authority has one very important feature: it is not 
absolutist. As the moment of the here-and-now is in continual flux there can be no 
absolute ideal in terms of concrete behaviour, meaning that few rules can be 
established. Consequently, the discourses of "perfection" that would fix good 
teaching around a certain set of initiatives and responses loses traction in the 
teachers' evaluation of their worth. What can subsequently take the place of an 
idealized image of teaching is the experience of being a "good-enough" teacher, 
(very much after Winnicott's notion of the "good-enough" mother). However, in 
the case of these teachers, this good-enough teaching, generally speaking, is 
arbitrated by the minimal but stringent demand of awareness, and the 
corresponding ability to formulate a response that arises from a connectedness 
with the emergent/immanent, even if this response may in itself not be 'perfect'. If 
these teachers are renouncing static notions of the perfection of their practice, 
they are, perhaps, embarking on a yet more difficult, though more vital road whose 
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end is "to become worthy of the event" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p.160). As 
Semetsky says of this becoming worthy: 
A concept inhabits the empirical happening; it is, as Deleuze and 
Guattari say, a living concept, but the ethical work consists in the will 
itself being transformed into affirmation so as "to set up, ... to extract" 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p.160) an event in this living concept. 
(Semetsky, 2006, p.110) 
These teachers are increasingly finding their challenge in discovering the singular 
manifestation of life within their classroom, a manifestation which includes the 
structures of curriculum and the "dark side of teaching" (Pajak, 1998), as well as 
the relations occasioned between the intensified subjectivities of themselves and 
their students. In some senses, we can say that it is the intensification of the here 
and now of the "empirical happening" (op.cit.) that permits a deconstruction of the 
colonisations of past learning and of the overbearing temptation of universalities. 
Situating Radical Reflexivity 
Moore (2004) recognizes the potential benefit for student teachers in developing 
an informed reflection on their actions which enables them 
to stand back a little from their own actions, and to address those 
actions through informed reflection rather that merely 'experiencing' 
them. To put it bluntly, in understanding the development of 
pedagogical practice, one needs to access not only what is 'immediate' 
and 'visible,' but also what is not always immediately accessible in the 
specific classroom situation - what is sometimes called 'the baggage' 
teachers bring into the classroom with them - which offers a broader, 
typically unacknowledged context both for developing practice and for 
understanding and facilitating it. (2004, p.20, my emphasis) 
This present research implies a loose continuation of Moore et al's line of research 
(1999, 2001, 2004) in as much as it documents the understanding and 
transformations that might be leveraged through a reflexivity directly informed by 
theories, practices and experiences generated by psychology, psychotherapy, the 
expressive arts and spirituality. In this way the participants' histories are 
textualized and con-textualized, and teachers can stand back, not just from their 
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teaching, but from who they have become and how they have learnt to occupy 
their social spaces. This overtly psycho-social focus thus goes a step further in an 
examination of the themes of structure and agency proposed by Coldron and 
Smith's "partly given and partly achieved" (1999, p.711) teacher identity. In 
drawing attention to the psychological 'structures' that may inform and delimit our 
agency, the notion of autonomy within the 'achieved,' chosen; and 'created' 
features of professional identity becomes further squeezed. As 'individuals' we 
make or interpret the present through the structures of our common and 
individual humanity. Our autonomy, therefore, is (pre)determined: we are not free 
to be 'what we are not'. The painful knowledge of our negativity, and the force of 
the 'unconscious', is, according to Britzman, resisted to our cost. However, if 
resistance to knowing is a significant dynamic in public life, there also 
is the possibility of using analytic insight to move beyond repetitive 
conflicts, with one provision: we must witness the unconscious. (2003, 
pp.109-110) 
The teachers' narratives generated in this research are fruits of an informed 
witnessing of the unconscious and the possible relationship between past 
experience and present 'performance'. In this sense, this research witnesses the 
learning that occurs when the infamous background 'baggage' of teaching becomes 
the foreground. 
If we imagine at least two default fields of discourse at work within the teacher's 
experience of teaching - the personal and the institutional - the SAT programme 
can be seen as providing a third field of discourse - the human subject - by which to 
triangulate and understand the teacher's positionings in education, and thereby to 
plot their professional topographies. The data suggests that by this means teachers 
are able to decipher with greater accuracy the particularities of the relationship 
between the personal and institutional discourses at the centre of professional 
identity and practice. If the early years of teaching are problematic in the sense of 
the teacher needing to 'dig themself in' to an identifiable position, Nieves' tale of 
teachers left behind by education reforms underlines the trap of these defended 
identities as static positions. This is the problem Foucault pointed to when he says 
that the human being can be characterized as a creator of forms, forms which can 
subsequently entrap their creator (Foucault, 2000e). It is, perhaps, this situation of 
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entrapment that the SAT experience throws most vividly into relief, the question of 
how the concerns of each teacher, and their strategies to address these concerns, 
have become problematic rather than life-enhancing. 
Seen in this light, one could conclude that the radical reflexivity proposed within 
the SAT programme should not, per se, be lumped with a defeatist, de-politicizing 
narcissism, as do Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) when they identify and accuse a 
therapeutic turn in education of encouraging a "rise in beliefs and images of the 
diminished self". They argue that therapy's constitutionally vulnerable self has 
"erode[d] a robust and confident sense of human possibility", the latter being 
replaced "by a deeply pessimistic and instrumental view of education" (p.146). 
However, in contrast to the accusations of Ecclestone and Hayes, the teachers' 
reports of the SAT as education are unashamedly positive, as are the repercussions 
in their teaching life. These teachers do not appear diminished by the admission of 
fallibility; rather, they appear to be edified and emboldened by the assimilation of 
their own shadow. 
Furthermore, if we agree with the Foucauldian critique of modern government, to 
discredit the therapeutic turn wholesale is to misunderstand power and its 
technologies as much as it is to discredit the potential reach of the psycho-spiritual 
turn. This power, these technologies, do not just oppress us, they make us and are 
productive of subjectivity (Marshall, 1996). This means that alternative 
technologies and practices of subjectivity are innately political in the sense that 
they provide differing narratives for the elaboration of our subjectivity, and thus 
for the way we are held within a productive power. The question is not whether 
such practices are political. The question is whether they result in the adoption of 
new social practices. Naranjo sheds light on the importance of (right) action: 
While reason can only conjecture, we need to act. And to act, we may 
need faith and intuition. My own intuition is that nothing is so 
dangerous to us at present as the attachment to the known. For as we 
probably felt at the time of our biological birth, in order to be 
collectively born to our next evolutionary stage we need to plunge into 
unfamiliar waters. 
Let me then end [...] with a quotation from the first literary work in 
history, The Epic of Gilgamesh, the Sumero-Babylonian story of the 
Deluge that is echoed in the Book of Genesis. According to the 
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Babylonian version of the legend, Enil, the God of the Wind, speaks to 
Utnapishtim, who alone has an ear sufficiently open to hear him in the 
surrounding noise: 
"Men of Shurupak," he said, "Tear down your house and build a ship, 
abandon your possessions and the works you find beautiful and crave, 
and save your life instead". (Naranjo, 2010, p.178) 
If Cecilia, as a young ideologue, wanted to tear down the edifice of school and build 
something new in its place, the boat she is now building against the ongoing 
'deluge of education' is constructed from a dismantling of the house of her own 
subjectivity. A "violence of innocence" (Bollas, 1992, p.180) has been replaced by a 
caution or humility of responsibility. Cecilia now sees her function and purpose as 
a teacher not as denouncing the gap between actuality and utopia, but as 
'bothering'38 (Britzman, 1998, p.32) her own participation in situations of 
domination (including self-dominations) and struggling to take responsibility for 
her subjectivity and its multiple relations. This difficult movement toward a 
specificity in teaching, toward total involvement and implication in one's own 
activity, whilst most distinctive in Cecilia, is poignantly present in all the 
narratives. It approximates to a Badiouian 'Event', 
which only exists for those who recognize themselves in it: there can be 
no Event for a non-engaged objective observer. Lacking this engaged 
position, mere descriptions of the state of things, no matter how 
accurate, fail to generate emancipatory effects - ultimately, they only 
render the burden of the lie still more oppressive. (2iek, 2011, p.xiv) 
Whilst some might view the dismantling of teacher identity and probing of 
education as an excess of reflexivity, an indulgence of narcissism, there are 
philosophical models that present the necessity of this 'destruction'. Given that the 
radical reflexivity work of the SAT programme occurs in a collective retreat from 
the world, Deleuze's reflections on the motif of the desert island can be seen as 
particularly salient to the present case. According to Deleuze the desert island 
presents us with a set of contradictions of mythological significance, being defined 
simultaneously by its fullness and emptiness, by its lands and by its seas. As such, 
Deleuze conjectures that the desert island presents us with "a prototype of the 
38 Britzman states that in "psychoanalytic terms, for the self to be more than a 
prisoner of its own narcicism, the self must bother itself." 
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collective soul" (Deleuze, 2004, p.13). This island sets the scene for a re-birth, a 
renewal, and beginning again: 
The island is the necessary minimum for this re-beginning, the material 
that survives from the first origin, the radiating seed or egg that must 
be sufficient to re-produce everything. Clearly, this presupposes that 
the formation of the world happens in two stages, in two periods of 
time, birth and re-birth [...]. It is not that there is a second birth 
because there has been a catastrophe, but the reverse, there is a 
catastrophe after the origin because there must be, from the beginning, 
a second birth ... The idea of a second origin gives the desert island its 
whole meaning, the survival of a sacred place in a world that is slow to 
re-begin. (Deleuze, 2004, p.13-14) 
There is something here that calls to mind, once more, Fernando's metaphor of the 
umbrella. Fernando, huddled under the umbrella with his students, implies that all 
that is needed for a second birth for education is contained in that circumscribed 
world under his metaphorical umbrella: 
What happened to me [when I left the SAT] was this; a recuperation of 
interest in the children. And I think that everything could begin right 
there [...] Motivation does not come from the circus, from the 
somersaults [...] What is really important in education? [...] From what 
point do we need to move? (Fernando, my emphasis). 
Fernando has subsequently dedicated a whole course to this question, conducted 
with a group of his students who are college level teachers. They debate priorities 
in education: 
What is the most important thing in education? So the first answers 
were around curriculum, around professional training, and in the end 
what was left was the idea of relation, and to that they could not find 
any 'buts'. (Fernando) 
Ethics and Resistance 
Pignatelli's (1993b) warning against the "totalizing, grand configurations" normally 
associated with dominant identity discourses is in keeping with Moore's assertion 
that an "anti-discursive" reflexivity provides some necessary redress to the 
competences discourse: 
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That we do resist, and very forcefully resist, the competences discourse 
(which is not the same as denying the need to be competent, or 
suggesting that there is nothing of any merit in identifying, sharing and 
being assessed according to our competence across a range of areas) is 
imperative if we are to have any hope of reclaiming teaching - of 
reclaiming our profession - from the politicians and bureaucrats fearful 
of the potential power of education to challenge and overturn the status 
quo. Whatever else we may say of it, reflexivity provides one avenue for 
teachers to take charge of their own learning and development on their 
own terms, in ways that specifically and systematically include the 
idiosyncratic, contingent aspects that are so crucial in their work (and in 
their understanding of their work) but which tend to be largely 
overlooked in the reductionist discourses of official policy. (Moore, 
2004, p.169) 
Once we add reflexivity to the mix, teaching slides away from the technical towards 
the ethical. It ceases to be simply a question of how to correctly apply such and 
such technique, and becomes a question of how to best occupy a particular space, a 
particular moment, no longer a only question of how to do x, but of what to do, who 
to be. 
Foucault's telos for the relationship of the self with the self, gives radical teacher 
identity work a clear ethico-political relevance within a broad 'church' of critical 
thinking in relation to subjectivity. Reflexivity, the work of self on self, is rescued 
from the possibility of self-absorption to the degree that it is embedded within a 
practice of freedom with political implications. As David Blacker writes about 
Foucauldian ethics of the care of the self; "This is not self-absorption, but being 
absorbed into the world: a losing-finding' of the self" (1998 p.363). Such political 
reflexivity ceases to be about teaching and learning per se; rather, it attains the 
status of a politics of ourselves, "a new ethic of self-creation that avoids the pitfalls 
of both narcissistic aestheticism on the one hand, and the alienation of political 
obsession on the other" (ibid.). Blacker, in respect of the specific intellectual, talks 
of "a controlled and self-regulated dissemination of the subject into the world, a 
positive dissolution" (ibid.). Undoubtedly, as the beating heart of the school as 
institution, teachers are unable to escape power, but may aspire to become "a 
channel or 'privileged junction' through which power can be directed" (ibid.). So, 
whilst not able to achieve a utopian liberation from power for themselves or their 
students, they can resist and avoid becoming lost to themselves within the confines 
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of school. That is to say, they can be fully implicated in this world (school), at the 
same time as not being of this world. For example, within Blacker's scheme for the 
specific intellectual professional competency is not the end in itself; rather, it is the 
means to an end, it is a practice rather than a result, an 'asceticism', a facet of the 
ethical teacher's honesty and attentiveness, a means of mastering one's causes and 
effects so as to avoid as much as possible being colonized by the other and/or 
colonizing the other. Competency for the 'specific', as opposed to 'decadent', 
teacher would be critically attuned to the deep effect this education might be 
having on the students. What are the students really learning in the classroom, from 
me, through me, despite me? 
Blacker is not alone in highlighting the importance of ethics. There are significant 
precedents for the ethical turn within teacher identity discourse. Not least, Nell 
Noddings (2002, 2005) draws our attention to the ethics of care as central and 
necessary to 'good' teaching and learning. Going further, Elizabeth Campbell (2003) 
lays out the case for placing ethical competency at the heart of teachers' 
professional status, as the singular skill of teachers. In accordance with Noddings, 
the ability to make considered and enlightened moral judgements that further 
individual and collective well-being are presented by Campbell as emblematic of 
good teaching. However, Campbell's faith in ethical competence is more 
conservative than it first appears. For example, she is strident in her assessment of 
teachers' professional obligations: 
Professionals are self determining and self regulating. And, while there 
are many elements in a teacher's world - relating to educational 
bureaucracies, the establishment of curriculum standards, and other 
examples of overall governmental policy - for which they cannot be 
responsible, they surely can be so when it comes to moderating their 
own behaviour. (p.78) 
Things are assumed by Campbell - autonomy, self-determination - which cannot be 
assumed in the Foucauldian multi-verse. The distinction between the professional 
teacher and the human student is all too easily made, and we are left in no doubt 
that this professional teacher is a saviour figure, an exemplary adult somehow 
floating free from the confines of intra- and inter-personal conflict. Campbell's 
ethical teacher finds themself in a curious position - they must be exemplary carers 
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within institutional conditions that limits the possibility and relevance of care. It is 
unclear where the ethical teacher should draw a line under caring for the wellbeing 
of the student. Would an ethical teacher, sensitive to the damaging effect of ongoing 
assessment, refuse to implement examinations? Are ethical teachers to rise up 
against the system and press for the interests of the students against the full weight 
of official prescription? Indeed, who is to define the interests of the students? Do 
the teachers' concerns for the interests of the student stop at the primacy of the 
prescribed curriculum? Or should we conclude that Campbell is advocating 
teachers adopt an obligation to the welfare of students which goes deep into the 
heart of education and could be described as critical, or radical? 
In contrast, Foucauldian ethics does not necessarily lead to what is conventionally 
termed 'ethical' or moral behaviour in the sense of becoming 'good' or 'caring'. The 
care of the self that Foucault was concerned to re-vindicate as a first principle of 
"ethico-political spirituality" (Connolly, 1993) is not primarily about being good or 
moral, it is primarily about becoming the master of one's own thoughts and actions, 
and hence is a project of creative freedom. If freedom, or practices of freedom and 
self-overcoming, are the holy grail of ethical work on the self, then teachers' care of 
the other could only pass through their own example of freedom: the care of the self 
is necessary precisely because the subject is born in chains and must free 
themselves through the cultivation of the self-relation, which includes the 
examination of those same chains. Taking as his example the ethico-political 
spirituality of the Hellenic aesthetic of care of the self, Foucault claimed this 
provided a 'training' that permitted its practitioners "to get prepared" for power, 
responsibility, beauty, and for death and posterity. Its aesthetics and ascetics were 
not pursued for the purpose of renunciation: 
but [for] the progressive consideration of the self, or mastery over 
oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of reality but through the 
acquisition and assimilation of truth. It has as its final aim not the 
preparation for another reality but access to the reality of this world. 
The Greek word for this is paraskeuazo ("to get prepared"). It is a set of 
practices by which one can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth into 
a permanent principle of action. Aletheia [truth, that which is evident] 
becomes ethos. It is a process of the intensification of subjectivity". 
(1997, pp.238-239) 
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As I hope to have argued, 'meaningful' teacher identity work results from a 
struggle between an unconscious/pragmatic capitulation to the status quo and a 
bellicose due diligence. As Butler (2005, p.49) argues, "self-reflection and social 
recognition [are] essential to any substantive account of ethical life". Foucault 
placed such reflexivity at the heart of a practice of freedom, inciting the subject "to 
learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from 
what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently" (1985, p. 9). The school 
and teacher identity are, undoubtedly, brimming with both silent thought 
(assumptions) and silenced thought (prohibitions and marginalizations). Both 
psychological and Foucauldian critique of subjectivity mean that identity as 
creatively elaborated can no longer be assumed; rather, what must be assumed as 
our starting point are degrees of blindness, alienation and/or capitulation. Nor can 
health, sanity, well-being be assumed; rather, what must be assumed is fallibility 
and its survival or its wreckage (as seen in teacher turnover, depression, 
addictions etc). Nor can neutrality be assumed; what must be assumed is politics. 
And neither can innocence be assumed; rather, what must be assumed is 
participation. If Foucault vindicates our potential for freedom, maintaining that we 
are freer than we think. It is, paradoxically, a freedom only made available to us 
through the awareness of the limits imposed on us and by us. Our (self-imposed) 
tutelage is only escapable by retracing and unravelling the mechanisms, practices, 
beliefs and truths by which we have become chained to our selves and our selves 
chained to history (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, pp.32-50). 
Matthew Clarke's (2009) exploratory paper draws on the ethical work of the later 
Foucault and, placing the experience of one teacher within this framework, 
demonstrates the contemporary possibilities of this type of (anti)identity work. He 
suggests that further research would be necessary in order to explore the validity 
and viability of this approach to identity. Such work, he claims, is important given 
the centrality of identity in teaching. This research responds to the necessity 
identified by Clarke. However, the specific situation in which identity is being 
explored in this research perhaps provides dimensions to the discussion that are 
not present in Clarke's paper: notably, the exploration in depth of the dialogue 
between professional and personal identities of teachers who are actively engaged 
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in contemporary practices of the care of the self. By this means, the research 
addresses the as-yet neglected realms of 'learning to be' and 'learning to live 
together' that form two of the four pillars of education as defined by Delors et al. 
(1996) - not through the reductive and prescriptive lens of civic minded education, 
but through a determined attention toward our experience of life; the intimate 
joys, aspirations, frustrations, fears, conflicts and meetings that constitute our 
humanness. Can such a 'learning to be' and 'learning to live together' be viably 
addressed from the grounds of psychotherapy and spiritual practice? And might 
such experiences with teachers help to redress the imbalance that has seen the 
well-being debate almost exclusively focused on students, leaving the teacher 
ethically bound to care for their students and for education "in a certain way, and 
at a certain price" (Foucault in Miller, 1994, p.302). 
Some Problematizations of the SAT Programme 
Up to now, I have not directed any critical attention to the SAT programme itself. In 
part, this responds to the thesis' objective to document and analyse the 
transformation of teachers as a positive phenomenon within an identity discourse 
of becoming (Britzman, 1991; Moore, 2004). However, as the thesis makes 
inferences about the value of the work of radical reflexivity as professional 
development for teachers, it seems important to comment on some possible 
limitations of the SAT programme with regards to the feasibility of its 'insertion' 
into the prevailing educational context. 
Regarding the possible philosophical objections, these might come equally from 
the 'progressive' or the 'conservative' sides of the political spectrum. From the 
'conservatives', we might expect a criticism of the SAT's Dionysian flavour, its 
open-ended objectives and apparently meandering, undisciplined pedagogic style. 
From the progressives or radicals, 2iek's critique of Foucault's aesthetic project 
for the individual would seem pertinent. If Foucault maintained the care of the self 
is inherently political, 2" iek makes it clear that this is a certain type of politics, a 
certain way of engaging in the socio-political field. 2iek draws attention to the fact 
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that Foucault encourages a break with universal or collective ethics and turns 
toward an aestheticization in which "each subject must, without any support from 
universal rules, build his own mode of self-mastery; he must harmonize the 
antagonism of the powers within himself - invent himself, so to speak, produce 
himself as a subject, find his own particular art of living" (2008, p.xxiv). For 2a'ek, 
this vision of the subject falls unquestionably and unfavourably within the 
"humanist-elitist tradition" (ibid.) epitomized by the Renaissance ideal of life 
created as a work of art through the mastery of the passions. 
2iek's observations on Foucauldian ethics would not seem completely unfounded, 
nor would its potential relevance as an extrapolated critique of the SAT 
programme. We may justifiably ask to what degree the SAT programme 
encourages teachers to withdraw from the messy world of collective thinking and 
action to concentrate upon a 'bourgeois' perfecting of their subjective singularity 
and their cellular activity as teachers. The evidence here is contradictory. On the 
one hand it points toward a disengagement from collective politics (e.g. Yvete, 
Cecilia, and Araceli), and on the other hand it points to an increased awareness of 
and sensitivity to the otherness of the group, and an increased ability to situate the 
self within this group (e.g. Carl, Igor, and Nieves). 
Furthermore, according to Rose (1996), our cultural fascination with psychology 
can be seen as symptomatic of the liberal project for the individual and the 
increasing omnipresence of the discourse of the psy-sciences within all spheres of 
human endeavour. Rose observes that the twentieth century saw the rise and 
hegemony of a new type of human species, the 'psychological being': 
This psychological being is now placed at the origin of all the activities of 
loving, desiring, speaking, labouring, sickening, and dying: the 
interiority that has been given to humans by all those projects which 
would seek to know them and act upon them in order to tell them their 
truth and make possible their improvement and their happiness. (p.197) 
Far from presenting us with a radically alternative discourse or discipline, Rose's 
identification of the 'psychological being' would imply that the SAT programme's 
invitation to self-knowledge is just one more example of the psychological turn 
that took root in Europe at the beginning of the 20th Century. If we agree with Rose, 
then we might conclude that the SAT programme, as representative of a 
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generalized psychological turn (see also Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009), does not 
embody a radical politics as such, but is itself an expression of a dominant cultural 
form now thoroughly enmeshed in the individualistic politics of neo-liberal, 
market democracies. What is more, the SAT's reliance on a prescriptive tool of 
personality (the enneagram) is potentially problematic from the Foucauldian 
perspective in as much as the enneagram can be considered as one more 
technology that creates our subjectivity in the moment it describes the 'truth' 
about us. This charge against the enneagram of personality is philosophically 
difficult to combat. Any argument in support of the 'validity' of the enneagram 
usually rests on its perceived 'usefulness' as a descriptive or analytic tool and its 
comparability with other such tools. 
Whilst these represent powerful arguments against attempts to position the SAT 
programme as politically radical, counter arguments exist. Firstly, it is important to 
remember that the school is not a neutral ground, but is already traversed with 
numerous implicit and explicit psycho-spiritual discourses. The question thus 
becomes one of determining the relative effect of teachers' introduction to the new 
psycho-spiritual discourse of the SAT programme. For example, we might argue 
that what is most important is to determine the relative ethico-political benefits of 
teachers becoming familiar with the psychology of the enneagram as a discourse, 
as opposed the psychology of deviance and disability that is currently pervasive 
within the classroom. Secondly, SAT's bricolage of psychological, spiritual and 
artistic practices means the subject is problematized and explored from a diversity 
of standpoints. As the name 'Seekers After Truth' suggests, the focus of the 
programme thus shifts from the naming of Truth to the seeking of truth through 
the opening up to experience. This seeking of truth can be likened to an ethos of 
permanent problematization of the subject through an expanding connection with 
experience, rather than an ethos of constructing or uncovering the essential self. 
Some credence can be given to this interpretation of the SAT programme's telos 
once we take into account the centrality of Buddhist philosophy and practice. 
Whilst the enneagram of personality seeks to reveal the condition of the ego (and 
amounts to a model or map of our ethical predicaments), this is simultaneously 
undermined by the Buddhist proposition of no-self, the insistence on the 
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fundamental illusion of the existence of an 'I' as an identity that persists across 
time. The function of 'identity work' is, ultimately, to release the individual from 
the illusory trap of identification with the ego, thus permitting their commitment 
to the 'eternal' creative principle and possibility of the emergent. In this sense the 
SAT programme could be described as embodying the principle that 'the only way 
out (of identity/ego) is through (identity/ego)'. We must cultivate our knowledge 
or problematization of the greatest danger (the moribund stasis of ego) if we are to 
become free of it. 
What is more than clear, both from an examination of the SAT's curriculum and the 
testimonies of the these teachers who are assimilating its knowledge and 
experience into their practice, is that the SAT's aims are fundamentally different 
from what we normally associate with continuing professional development 
(CPD), even that which could be classified as transformative (see Kennedy's, 2005, 
discussion on what she terms the transmissive, transitional, and transformative 
models of CPD). The SAT experience is lived as a radical departure from what these 
teachers have experienced as CPD (although it is generally more familiar to 
teachers already involved in some therapeutic milieu). We might say that the SAT 
takes aim at developing that quality in a person which can be loosely described as 
'presence'. Such 'presence' in teaching is the quality or capacity that Rodgers and 
Raider-Roth (2006) explore as an "alternative paradigm" for teacher identity and 
quality. They define presence as an engagement in "authentic relationship with 
students where know-how to respond with intelligence and compassion to 
students and their learning" (pp.265-266). The presence that facilitates such 
engagement is characterized by "a state of alert awareness, receptivity, and 
connectedness to the mental, emotional and physical workings of both the 
individual and the group" (ibid.). This attention to the cognitive and affective 
relations of the classroom is necessary not only as a palliative within the dominant 
climate of performativity, more importantly it is seen as key to student 
achievement. Research has demonstrated (Midgley et al., 1989; Pianta, 1999,; 
Roeser et al., 2000; Raith-Roder, 2005 a,b) that "the quality of these relationships 
is not a frill or 'feel-good' aspect of schooling, it is an essential feature of learning" 
(Rodgers and Raider-Roth, 2006, p.266). Furthermore, these relationships can only 
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flourish where teachers are able to employ their full "mental, physical, emotional, 
and relational resources" (ibid.), i.e. where they are fully present. The authors 
conclude that reflective (and presumably reflexive) teaching "cannot be reduced to 
a series of behaviours or skills, but is a practice that demands presence" (ibid., my 
emphasis). 
But, as mentioned above, the cultivation of presence might not sit well within a 
context that seeks to cultivate performativity, provoking what might be termed a 
culture clash. Whilst a debate around potential philosophical or political objections 
to the SAT's psycho-spiritual pretentions is important (see 2iek's critique of 
Foucault's aesthetic project above), or at the very least the recognition that 
objections might exist, what is perhaps more critical in the assessment of the SAT 
programme as a professional development for teachers is how it sits alongside or 
within the present culture of schools. In this sense, it would appear that its greatest 
strength (i.e. its radically different focus and practice) is also its greatest weakness 
in terms of its generalizability. The following can be said about the compatibility of 
the SAT with the culture of schools and teacher training: 
• The radical reflexivity it proposes is highly challenging, and voluntarily 
participation is therefore desirable. In the present cultural climate, most 
teachers do not engage in this type of soul searching voluntarily. 
Participation is therefore likely to remain a minority activity. 
• There is the possibility that teachers who do participate can come to feel 
more isolated within a school culture that is implicitly and/or explicitly 
hostile to many of the values, attitudes and practices promoted by the SAT. 
• In order for this type of reflexivity to become justifiably obligatory, the 
common understanding of what teachers are and do would have to change. 
We would need to evolve from a knowledge-based to an ethics-based 
concept of good teaching in order to justify subjecting teachers to the 
rigours of the SAT programme, or its equivalent, en masse. 
• The pedagogy of problematization at the heart of the SAT programme is 
perhaps best conceived of as remedial, rather than preventative. The SAT 
benefits greatly from the negative input of suffering and 'error' as 'fuel' for 
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its transformative work around identity. A SAT programme attended 
exclusively by student teachers in their early twenties is feasible, but would 
be a different experience from the diversity of participants that comes from 
a need-based entry into the SAT programme. The richness of the SAT is, in 
part, derivative of the gravitas afforded by the participants' acquired and 
cumulative awareness of error, folly and struggle. That is to say, the SAT as 
it currently stands, is to some degree oppositional, marginal, remedial, 
rather than preventative. 
• Far from bringing an immediate sense of order to life, participants often 
experience an increasing sense of chaos in the early stages of the SAT 
process. A principle of growth through disorder and crisis is one that is 
difficult to sustain within the results focused paradigm that currently 
dominates education. 
• There perhaps exists a temptation to hang too much upon the SAT 
programme, such that participants are expected, and expect themselves to 
have achieved permanent change as a result of participation. Generally 
speaking, it does not take long to realize that the SAT's principle 
contribution, as Fernando testifies, is a greater awareness of the exquisite 
multiplicity of our failings, and hence, of the permanence of the struggle to 
become "worthy of the event" (op.cit.) of life. In this sense, the SAT opens 
the door to a very long road of psycho-spiritual work, a lifelong learning 
that, ironically is at odds with our cultural paradigm of education as a 
preparation for the productivity of adulthood, rather than as a preparation 
for the closure of death as the Greeks were more inclined to believe. 
• The idea of a pedagogy of 'conscience' or 'awareness', connected indirectly 
to a pedagogy for 'love' (eros, agape, and filia), is central to the SAT 
curriculum, and represents the motor of a psycho-spiritual development 
that has as principal purpose a connection to the multiplicity of reality. This 
can be seen to stand in contrast to a dominant pedagogy for 'productivity' 
that depends upon selectivity in our awareness of who we are and what is 
occurring. The spiritual invitation within the SAT program, easily and 
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erroneously conflated with religion, is fundamentally incompatible to the 
philosophy and practices of modern schooling which set themselves the 
task of delimiting the reach of our educational aspirations to the approved 
fields within the sciences and humanities. Whilst the spiritual aspect of 
human life may be touched upon via the study of literature and the arts, 
there is little encouragement to situate this spiritual dimension as present 
and occurring in the here and now of the classroom. This means that the 
SAT programme is at odds with the purposes of education as they currently 
stand. 
• If the SAT programme opens up the possibility of an overtly spiritualized 
pedagogy, this does not mean that the addition of spiritual dimension is 
sufficient to bring about radical change in the education system. The 
narrative evidence points to the fact that the SAT has helped teachers to 
negotiate a more satisfactory way through the system as an act of creative 
resistance. Whilst this is no small achievement, we might conclude that the 
reflexivity of the SAT programme could only be truly radicalized were it to 
stand alongside other problematizations of power-knowledge-subjectivity 
that directly addressed the politics within an ethico-political spirituality. It 
would be interesting, for example, to research transformations in teachers 
who had both participated in the SAT programme and in seminars of critical 
thinkers such as Foucault. Would the transformational leverage of the SAT 
be increased or decreased or unaffected by sitting within a more overtly 
philosophical, political and pedagogic critique of education? 
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Conclusion 
There are grounds from which the reflexivity practised in the SAT programme can 
be challenged, both in terms of its political radicalism and its compatibility with 
the education system. However, the current research does provide considerable 
evidence that the intensely personal psycho-spiritual work within the SAT 
programme does 'carry-over' and catalyse significant changes in teacher identity 
and practice. The experience of the SAT as a tangential 'training for teaching' is 
regarded by participants as being decisive. Igor, for example, compares the null 
effect on his classroom practice of his Masters in Education with the immediate 
effect of the first SAT retreat. Teachers such as Igor experience the SAT as radically 
different from other teaching-learning experiences in its capacity to catalyze 
significant changes in perspectives on teaching's day-to-day practice. 
The research problematized and analysed teacher transformations using three 
conceptual-empirical fields: purposes, orders, and performances. Much has already 
been said about how teachers' problematizations of their professional experience 
can be understood in relation to these three fields. In an attempt to comprehend 
the central feature of the transformations that occurred across the three fields, I 
have identified, somewhat provisionally, the development of a new type of 
authority as providing the trigger for a great diversity of new practices among 
participating teachers. This new authority legitimizes transformations in identity 
and practice on the basis of an increased valuation and awareness of the here and 
now of the classroom, and of the needs, desires and capacities of all those present. 
Intra- and inter-personal contact and communication consistently make inroads 
into the formalities and prescriptions of education, allowing for more creative and 
responsive points of departure for new identity constructs and their 
corresponding practices. It is the authority of a new type of knowledge, the 
valuation of a new type of truth, the cultivation of a new attention in relation to the 
immediacy of the event that provides the foundation for teachers to overturn, or to 
modify, a status quo derived from internal and external expectations. 
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As a result, in general, teachers' working lives have become more satisfactory: they 
feel more balanced, more 'in tune' with their possibilities and limitations, more 
fully present ('warts and all!'), and more inclined to determine parts of the 
educational agenda according to their own reading of the situation. But what is the 
wider socio-political or educational significance of these individual 'revolutions'? 
Britzman is clear that a generalized problem of 'irreality' permeates education, the 
insistence and imposition of which results in multiple alienations: "Unless the 
teacher can confront the defences of idealisation and omnipotence in her or his 
own teaching, there will be no real contact with others" (2009, p.97). Whilst 
Britzman talks justifiably of the teacher, i.e. of the individual manifestation of 
"idealization and omnipotence", these symptoms or defences are, without doubt, 
also systemic. As Bion maintains, education and its relations are idealized (1961), 
and its structures, systems and theories assign an exaggerated power of 
universality. If teachers are expected to embody this dominant discourse of 
education, then their re-negotiation of their terms of engagement is not only a 
personal matter. Whilst these teachers are perhaps isolated in their re-
accommodations, this does not mean that their transformations are not politically 
significant; rather, what is required is to recognize their political significance 
through the articulation of atomized changes. 
The articulation of the atomized work of transformation is one of the aims of this 
research. This articulation is deemed necessary because, as Bibby points out: 
When governments act as if they know what the problems and 
answers are, they leave teachers and others involved in education 
powerless to act, unable to engage them in dialogue. The very real 
difficulties faced by individual teachers and learners in particular 
classrooms are, under these acts of abandonment, unthinkable. Real 
people in real schools struggle to act in a context where there is little 
listening. It would be surprising if the lack of listening did not cascade 
down; no one is holding the tensions and the anxieties. In rushing to 
act responsibly, no one takes responsibility; caring about has replaced 
caring for. (2011, p.138, emphasis in original) 
Listening to the testimonies of these teachers reveals the struggle of a group of 
teachers against "abandonment", the struggle to assume responsibility and "care 
for" the marginal but persistent voices of Pontelis' question child (1981, p.95) and 
their own question teacher. If we place this attention to the self in the context of 
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Foucault's ethics, then we can see how this might represent a necessary 
preparation to take one's place in reality and assume, with Foucault, that within 
the attitude of modernity the 
high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to 
imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by 
destroying it but by grasping it in what it is [... thus creating] an 
exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted by the 
practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and 
violates it. (Foucault and Rabinow, 1991, p.41) 
This aesthetic formulation of a 'revolutionary' engagement with reality finds a 
political echo in Foucault's insistence in the necessity of renouncing the utopian 
pretentions of universal revolutions in favour of the individually implicated and 
engaged work within what Foucault (1995) called the "micro-physics of power" 
(i.e. the local and concrete practices of power that are evident in the technologies 
created and adopted by institutions such as prisons or schools). Furthermore, the 
transformations occurring around the SAT programme also acquire a political 
texture in the light of Badiou's proposal to replace the projects of purification 
(revolution) with practices of subtraction: "instead of 'winning' (taking power) one 
maintains a distance towards state power, one creates spaces subtracted from the 
State" (2iZ'ek, 2011, p.182). 2" i2ek, as mentioned previously, qualifies this idea of 
"abstract[ing] ourselves from the 'corrupted' order of the State" with the invitation 
simply to "introduce a supplementary torsion into it [... whereby ...] we make the 
State function in a non-statal way" (ibid., p.201). This is what would seem to be 
occurring within the micro-physics of the atomized experiences of these teachers. 
Whilst the testimonies do not speak of a co-ordinated 'revolt', they are ripe with 
torsions and imaginings that escape systemic prescriptions. 
Take, for example, the case of Law vs. Love - given the emphasis that the SAT 
programme places on a pedagogy for love, and the fact that the possibility of 'love' 
within education is evoked repeatedly in the narratives of teachers, it is worth 
bringing to mind 2i2ek's insistence on the political importance of the dimension of 
love as radically different to Law (which can be understood as the mode through 
which the state functions). To introduce the 'discourse' of Love into the mechanics 
of the State is to act in a non-statal way, it is to attain distance and difference: 
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Once we become fully aware of the dimension of love in its radical 
difference from the Law, love has, in a way, already won, since this 
difference is only visible when one already dwells in love, from the 
standpoint of love. (2iek, 2011, pp.153-154) 
In the light of 2" iek's avowal of a radical dimension of love, apparently innocuous 
comments, in which teachers often grapple awkwardly with this (almost) 
unmentionable word, achieve a greater stature. Take, for example the following 
statement by Nieves: 
I have toned down my rigidity. I have toned down my judgements [...] A 
teacher always wears the cap of judgement. One moment one has to 
evaluate. Another moment one has to write a report and all that, but ... I 
have toned that down, and [in its place] I have put ... I would say 'love', 
although it is a big word. But, yes, there is something like love and of ... 
It's like, ayyyy, empathy. It's like, ayyy, like this, like all of you [SAT 
collaborators]. That's it! ... (laughter) ... Look, this is what I am learning, 
at the most basic level, no? (Nieves) 
It is precisely here, perhaps, in this shift of dimension described by Nieves, in the 
love and nurturing required and fomented by the care of the self, and in the 
awareness of its radical difference from the Law, that the SAT programme and the 
teachers involved in the research can be seen to be thinking differently even whilst 
they are bound to the limitations of reality. It is a Foucauldian thinking that 
manifests itself in the spaces forged by the SAT programme. Such thought 
is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to 
present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as to its 
meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to 
what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, 
establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (Foucault, 
1991, p.388) 
Despite evidence that psycho-spiritual endeavour can contribute to learning to 
'think' in the Foucauldian sense, there exists a generalized caution and trepidation, 
even among those who sympathize with the psychotherapeutic traditions (e.g. 
Britzman, Moore, Bibby), to recommend that teachers could benefit from the 
experience of psychotherapeutic enquiry. The wariness does not seem to stem 
from the impracticalities and costs of individual therapy (difficulties that are 
alleviated in group practices such as the SAT); rather, they seem to dwell in the 
fear of labelling the teacher as 'needing' therapy. Underlying this fear is, possibly, 
the notion of psychotherapy as curative, and therefore requiring the identification 
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of 'illness', rather than as a practice and discipline of self-relation. Bibby, for 
example, says the following: 
Access to psychoanalytically informed supervision for teachers could 
be helpful - it is always helpful to have someone to help us think - but 
happiness is not something that can be taught, bought or bestowed, 
and policy directives suggesting that it might be are extremely 
problematic. (2011, p.136) 
Bibby's tentative embrace of the potential that psycho-spiritual practices have to 
"help us to think", and a possibly erroneous emphasis on "happiness" as opposed 
to maturation and critical awareness is worrying when coming from what is 
supposedly the 'supporters' camp. I would contend that it is possible, even 
necessary, to envisage a re-vitalization of formal education from the grounds of 
those alternative pedagogies of the psycho-spiritual, a re-vitalization that could 
take the form, first and foremost, of an experience and practice of self-enquiry 
among teachers. It is my hope and intention that this documentation and analysis 
of a practice of psycho-spiritually informed radical reflexivity contributes to a 
collective capacity to detach ourselves from the dominant paradigms of education 
and teacher identity and to reflect on them as problems and as fields of possibility. 
On the basis of the evidence of this study, it would seem reasonable to conclude 
that if we were required to situate the discourse of the SAT programme, then it 
might be reasonable to look to Janet Alsup's terminology and definition of 
"borderland discourse" as the best way to capture its point of departure, its ethos. 
Borderland discourse, says Alsup, is discourse 
in which disparate personal and professional subjectivities are put into 
contact toward a point of integration. Such integration can lead to 
cognitive, emotional, and corporeal changes, resulting in identity 
growth or increased metacognitive awareness. (2006, p.205) 
Naranjo intimates something similar when he says the following about his 
perception of what teachers need as an antidote, not only to the immediacy of their 
own intimate, personal histories, but also to the historic conditions which have 
determined the climate in which they are required to live and work, and required 
to foster the lives and the works of the coming generation: 
Teachers, more that anyone, need an experimental complement to the 
present scientific, humanistic, and pedagogical curriculum; a novel 
266 
curriculum that would comprise self-knowledge, interpersonal repair, 
and a spiritual culture based on lived experience (and thus free from 
dogmatism). (Naranjo, 2010, p.158) 
The findings of this research would seem to indicate that Naranjo is not wrong in 
'lobbying' for the attractiveness and usefulness of the "experimental complement" 
and "novel curriculum" that is exemplified in the SAT program. If the resulting 
cultivation of a "true being" (ibid.), can be critiqued as essentialist, the experience 
of the teachers in this study reveals that this 'true', dis-identified being, is capable 
of operating from an expanded and more inclusive sense of themselves (warts and 
all). Far from simplification toward a stable core of 'essence', this critical self-
knowledge seems to permit a greater degree of intra- and inter-connectivity to be 
established and maintained by these teachers. Whilst the study is far from 
exhaustive, it marks a stepping-off point, providing, I hope, a sufficiently 
interesting panorama of potential "identity growth" to stimulate further curiosity 
in academics, administrators and practitioners alike. Specifically, I hope it will 
motivate further examination of the implications of such findings within the 
debates around teacher professional ethics, teacher training, development, and 
well-being. 
267 
References 
Aichhorn, A. (1983) Wayward youth, (Northwestern University Press). 
Alfonso, C. (2001) Understanding student teachers' perceptions of the teaching and 
learning of English as a foreign language through their analysis of computer-
generated materials. Unpublished PhD thesis, Kings College, University of 
London. 
Andrews, M., Sclater, S., Rustin, M., Squire, C. & Treacher, A. (2000) Introduction, 
in: M. Andrews, S. D. Sclater, C. Squire & A. Treacher (Eds) Lines of narrative: 
Psychosocial perspectives. (London, Routledge), 1-10. 
Aristotle (1934) Nicomachean ethics, (H. Rackham, Trans.) (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press). 
Atkinson, D. (Draft chapter titled, 'Pedagogy against the state: Initial thoughts 
about learning', from forthcoming book) 
Bernauer, J. (1994) Foucault's ecstatic thinking, in: J. Bernauer & D. Rasmussen 
(Eds) The Final Foucault. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press). 
Bernstein, B. B. (2000) Pedagogy, symbolic control and identity: Theory, research, 
critique, (Rev. ed. edn) (Lanham, Md.; Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers). 
Besley, T. & Peters, M. (2007) Subjectivity & truth: Foucault, education, and the 
culture of self, (New York, Peter Lang). 
Bettelheim, B. (1979) Surviving and other essays, (New York, Vantage Books). 
Bhaskar, R. (2002) Reflections on meta-reality: Transcendence, emancipation, and 
everyday life, (Sage Publications). 
Bibby, T. (2011) Education - an 'impossible profession'? Psychoanalytic explorations 
of learning and classrooms, (London, Routledge). 
Bion, W. R. (1961) Experiences in groups, and other papers, (Tavistock 
Publications). 
Blacker, D. (1998) Intellectuals at work and in power: Toward a Foucaultian 
research ethic, in: T. S. Popkewitz & M. Brennan (Eds) Foucault's challenge: 
Discourse, knowledge, and power in education. (New York, Teachers College 
Press). 
Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R. & Standish, P. (2000) Education in an age of 
nihilism, (London, Falmer). 
Boisvert, R. D. (1998) John Dewey: Rethinking our time, (Albany, NY, State 
University of New York Press). 
Boler, M. (1999) Feeling power: Emotions and education, (London, Routledge). 
Bollas, C. (1992) Being a character: Psychoanalysis and self experience, (New York, 
Hill and Wang). 
Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.-C. (1977) Reproduction in education, society and culture, 
(London and Beverley Hills, Sage). 
Bracher, M. (2006) Radical pedagogy: Identity, generativity and social 
transformation, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan). 
Britzman, D. (1991) Practice makes practice: A critical survey of learning to teach, 
(Albany, NY, SUNY). 
Britzman, D. (1994) Is there a problem with knowing thyself?: Towards a post- 
structuralist view of teacher identity., in: T. Shanahan (Ed.) Teachers 
268 
thinking, teachers knowing: Reflections on literacy and language education. 
(Urbana, IL, National Council of Teachers of English Press). 
Britzman, D. (2009) The very thought of education: Psychoanalysis and the 
impossible professions, (Albany, NY, SUNY). 
Britzman, D. & Pitt, A. (1996) Pedagogy and transference: Casting the past of 
learning into the present of teaching. Theory into Practice, 35(2), 117-123. 
Britzman, D. P. (1998) Lost subjects, contested objects : Toward a psychoanalytic 
inquiry of learning, (Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press). 
Britzman, D. P. (2003) After-education: Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, and 
psychoanalytic histories of learning, (Albany, State University of New York 
Press). 
Butler, J. (2005) Giving an account of oneself, (New York, Fordham University 
Press). 
Campbell, E. (2003) The ethical teacher, (Maidenhead, Open University Press). 
Clarke, M. (2009) The ethico-politics of teacher identity. Educational Philosophy 
and Theory, 41(2), 187-200. 
Cohen, L. & Manion, L. (1994) Research methods in education (London, Routledge). 
Coldron, J. & Smith, R. (1999) Active location in teachers' construction of their 
professional identities. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 31(711-726. 
Cole, A. L. & Knowles, J. G. (1995) Methods and issues in a life story approach to 
self-study, in: T. Russel & F. Korthagen (Eds) Teachers who teach teachers. 
London, Falmer). 
Connolly, W. E. (1991) Identity/difference: Democratic negotiations of political 
paradox, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press). 
Connolly, W. E. (1993) Beyond good and evil: The ethical sensibility of Michel 
Foucault. Political Theory, 21(3), 365-89. 
Convery, A. (1999) Listening to teachers' stories: Are we sitting too comfortably? 
Qualitative Studies in Education, 12(131-146. 
Craib, I. (2000) Narratives as bad faith, in: M. Andrews, S. D. Sclater, C. Squire & A. 
Treacher (Eds) Lives of narrative: Psychosocial perspectives. (London, 
Routledge), 64-74. 
Deleuze, G. (1987) Dialogues (with Clare Parnet), (H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell, 
Trans.) (New York, Columbia University Press). 
Deleuze, G. (1989) Cinema 2: The time-image, (H. Tomlinson & R. Galeta, Trans.) 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press). 
Deleuze, G. (1992) Expressionism in philosophy: Spinoza, (M. Joughin, Trans.) (New 
York, Zone Books). 
Deleuze, G. (1995) Negotiations 1972-1990, (M. Joughin, Trans.) (New York, 
Columbia University Press). 
Deleuze, G. (2004) Desert islands. 
Deleuze, G. & Foucault, M. (1977) Intellectuals and power: A conversation between 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, in: D. F. Bouchard (Ed.) M. Foucault, 
language, counter-memory, practice: Selected essays and interviews. (Ithaca, 
New York, Cornell University Press), 205-217. 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1987) A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia 
ii., (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press). 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1994) What is philosophy?, (H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell, 
Trans.) (New York, Colombia University Press). 
269 
Delors, J. (1996) Learning: The treasure within: Report to UNESCO of the 
international commission on education for the twenty-first century, (Paris, 
UNESCO). 
Denzin, N. K. (2000) Narrative's moment, in: M. Andrews, S. D. Sclater, C. Squire & 
A. Treacher (Eds) Lines of narrative: Psychosocial perspectives. London, 
Routledge), xi-xiii. 
Dewey, J. (1916/1924) Democracy and education, (New York, Macmillan 
Company). 
Dewey, J. (1925/1958) Experience and nature, (New York, Dover Publications). 
Dewey, J. (1934/1980) Art as experience, (New York, Perigree Books). 
Dewey, J. (1938) Experience and education, (New York, Macmillan). 
Ecclestone, K. & Hayes, D. (2009) The dangerous rise of therapeutic education, 
(London & New York, Routledge). 
Felman, S. (1987)Jacques Lacan and the adventure of insight: Psychoanalysis in 
contemporary culture, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press). 
Fenichel, 0. (1954) The means of education, in: H. Fenichel & D. Rapaport (Eds) 
The collected papers of Otto Fenichel. (New York, W. W. Norton), 324-334. 
Foucault (1983) On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress, in: H. 
L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds) Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and 
hermeneutics (2nd ed.). (Chicago, University of Chicago Press). 
Foucault, M. (1969) Archaeology of knowledge, (1991 edn) (London, Routledge). 
Foucault, M. (1980) Christianity and confession, a lecture given at Dartmouth 
College, Hanover, New Hampshire. 
Foucault, M. (1985) The use of pleasure: The history of sexuality (vol. 2, (New York, 
Pantheon Books). 
Foucault, M. (1994) The ethic of the care of the self as a practice of freedom, in: J. 
Bernauer & D. Rasmussen (Eds) The final Foucault. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press). 
Foucault, M. (1995) Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, (2nd Vintage 
Books ed. edn) (New York, Vintage Books). 
Foucault, M. (2000a) The ethics of the concern for self as a practice of freedom, in: 
P. Rabinow (Ed.) Ethics. (vol. 1, in Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault) (London, Penguin). 
Foucault, M. (2000b) Philosophy and psychology, in: J. D. Faubion (Ed.) Aesthetics, 
method and epistemology. (vol. 2)(London, Penguin). 
Foucault, M. (2000c) Technologies of the self, in: P. Rabinow (Ed.) Ethics: The 
essential works of Michel Foucault. (vol. 1) (London, Penguin). 
Foucault, M. (2000d) The subject and power, in: J. D. Faubion (Ed.) Essential works 
of Michel Foucault, vol. 3, power. (London, Penguin ). 
Foucault, M. (2000e) A preface to transgression, in: J. D. Faubion (Ed.) Aesthetics, 
method, and epistemology: Essential works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. 
London, Penguin), (69-87). 
Foucault, M. (2001) Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of 
reason, (London ; New York, NY, Routledge). 
Foucault, M. & Rabinow, P. (1991) The Foucault Reader, (Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books). 
Foucault, M. & Rabinow, P. (1997) Ethics: Subjectivity and truth, (London, Allen 
Lane). 
270 
Freeman, M. (2000) When the story's over: Narrative foreclosure and the 
possibility of self-renewal, in: M. Andrews, S. D. Sclater, C. Squire & A. 
Treacher (Eds) Lines of narrative: Psychosocial perspectives. (London, 
Routledge), 81-91. 
Freud, A. (1931) Psycho-analysis for teachers, (B. Low, Trans.) (London, George 
Allen and Unwin). 
Freud, S. (1921) Group psychology and the analysis of the ego, (London, Hogarth 
Press and Institute for Psychoanalysis, 1953-1974). 
Freud, S. (1923) The ego and the id, (London, Hogarth Press and Institute for 
Psychoanalysis, 1953-1974). 
Freud, S. (1921) Group psychology and the analysis of the ego, (London, Hogarth 
Press and Institute for Psychoanalysis, 1953-1974). 
Gallop, J. (Ed.) (1995) Pedagogy: The question of impersonation, (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press). 
Geertz, C. (1973) The interpretation of cultures, (New York, Basic Books). 
Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern 
age, (Cambridge, Polity Press). 
Hargeaves, A. (1994) Changing teachers, changing times: Teachers' work and 
culture in the postmodern age, (London, Cassell). 
Hartley, D. (1997) Re-schooling society, (London, Falmer). 
Hoffer, E. (1963) The ordeal of change, (New York, Harper and Row). 
Hollingsworth, S. (1989) International action research: A casebook for education 
reform, (London, Falmer). 
Jacob, P. E. (1956) Changing values in college, (New Haven, Hazen Foundation). 
Jaramillo, N. E. (2010) Liberal progressivism at the crossroads: Toward a critical 
philosophy of teacher education, in: V. Hill-Jackson & C. W. Lewis (Eds) 
Transforming teacher education: What went wrong with teacher education 
and how we can fix it. (Sterling, Virginia, Stylus). 
Kegan, R. (1982) The evolving self Problem and process in human development, 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press). 
Kennedy, A. (2005) Models of continuing professional development: A framework 
for analysis. Journal of In-Service Education, 31(2), 235-250. 
Klein, M. (1946) Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of 
Psycho-Analysis, 27(99-110). 
Lacan, J. (2001) Escrits, (A. Sheridon, Trans.) (London, Routledge). 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1966) The savage mind, (London, George Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, Ltd.). 
Maclure, M. (1993) Arguing for your self: Identity as an organizing principle in 
teachers' jobs and lives. British Educational Research Journal, 19(4), 311-
322. 
Marshall, J. D. (1996) Michel Foucault: Personal autonomy and education, 
(Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers). 
McLaren, P. (1996) Critical pedagogy and predatory culture, (Albany, NY, SUNY 
Press). 
McLaughlin, M. W. & Talbert, J. E. (1990) The contexts in question: The secondary 
school workplace, in: M. W. McLaughlin & J. E. Talbert (Eds) The contexts of 
teaching in secondary schools: Teachers' realities. (New York, Teachers 
College Press). 
271 
McWilliam, E. (1995) Education: A risky enquiry into pleasurable teaching. 
Education and Society, 1(1), 119-131. 
Merton, R. K., Fiske, M. & Kendall, P. L. (1956) The focused interview, (Glencoe, 
Illinois, Free Press). 
Mezirow, J. (1991) Transformative dimensions of adult learning, (San Francisco, 
Jossey-Bass). 
Midgley, C., Feldlaufer, H. & Eccles, J. S. (1989) Student/teacher relations and 
attitudes before and after the transition to junior high school. Child 
Development, 60(981-982). 
Miller, J. (1994) The passion of Michel Foucault, (New York, Doubleday). 
Mitchell, C. & Weber, S. (1996) Reinventing ourselves as teachers: Private and social 
acts of memory and imagination, (London, Falmer). 
Moore, A. (1999) Beyond reflection: Contingency, idiosyncrasy and reflexivity in 
initial teacher education, in: M. Hammersley (Ed.) Researching school 
experience: Ethnographic studies of teaching and learning (London, Falmer), 
134-153. 
Moore, A. (2001) Teaching and learning: Pedagogy, curriculum, and culture, (New 
York, Routledge Falmer). 
Moore, A. and Ash, A. (2002) 'Developing reflective practice in beginning teachers: 
helps, hindrances and the role of the critical o/Other'. Research paper 
presented at the British Educational Research Association Annual 
Conference, September 2002, University of Exeter. 
Moore, A. and Edwards, G. (2002) 'Teaching, school management and the ideology 
of pragmatism'. Paper presented at the second Knowledge and Discourse 
Conference, June 2002, University of Hong Kong. 
Moore, A. (2004) The good teacher: Dominant discourses in teacher education, 
(London, Routledge Falmer). 
Moore, A. (2012) Teaching and learning: Pedagogy, curriculum and culture (2nd 
edition), (London, Routledge). 
Naranjo, C. (1974) The one quest, (London, Wildwood House). 
Naranjo, C. (1994) Character and neurosis: An integrative view, (Gateways). 
Naranjo, C. (2000) Gestalt therapy: The attitude and practice of an atheoretical 
experimentalism. 
Naranjo, C. (2004) Cambiar la educacion para cambiar el mundo, (Victoria-Gasteiz, 
Spain, La Llave). 
Naranjo, C. (2010) Healing civilization (Oakland, CA, Rose Press). 
Nietzsche, F. (1996) Human, all too human: A book for free spirits, (R. J. Hollingdale, 
Trans.) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). 
Noddings, N. (2002) Educating moral people: A caring alternative to moral 
education, (New York & London, Teachers College Press). 
Noddings, N. (2005) Happiness and education, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press). 
Pajak, E. (1998) Exploring the 'shadow' side of teaching. Journal of Curriculum 
Theorizing, 53(2), 187-211. 
Palmer, P. J. (1998) The courage to teach: Exploring the inner landscape of teacher's 
lives, (San Francisco, Josey and Boss). 
Pascal, B. (1966) Pensees, (Harmondsworth, Penguin). 
Penley, C. (1989) The future of an illusion: Film, feminism and psychoanalysis, 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press). 
272 
Perls, F. (1973) The gestalt approach and eye witness to therapy, (Science and 
Behaviour Books). 
Pianta, R. (1999) Enhancing relationships between children and teachers, 
(Washington, DC, American Psychological Association Press). 
Pignatelli, F. (1993) What can I do? Foucault on freedom and the question of 
teacher agency. Educational Theory, 43(4), 411- 432. 
Pignatelli, F. (1993b) Dangers, possibilities: Ethico-political choices in the work of 
Michel Foucault. Philosophy of Education, (Proceedings of the 49th 
Conference of the Philosophy of Education), 378-387. 
Pontalis, J. B. (1981) Frontiers of psychoanalysis: Between dream and psychic pain, 
(C. Cullen & P. Cullen, Trans.) (New York, International Universities Press). 
Raider-Roth, M. (2005a) Trusting what you know: Negotiating the emotional 
complexities of classroom life. Teachers College Record, 107(4), 587-627. 
Raider-Roth, M. (2005b) Trusting what you know: The high stakes of classroom 
relationships, (San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass). 
Robson, C. (2002) Real world research: A resource for social scientists and 
practitioner-researchers, (2nd edn) (Oxford, Blackwell). 
Rodgers, C. R. & Raider-Roth, M. B. (2006) Presence in teaching. Teachers and 
Teaching: theory and practice, 12(3), 265-287. 
Roeser, R. W., Eccles, J. S. & Sameroff, A. J. (2000) School as contexts of early 
adolescents academic and socio-emotional development: A summary of 
research. The Elementary School Journal, 100(5), 443-471. 
Rose, N. (1996) Inventing ourselves: Psychology, power, and personhood, 
(Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press). 
Rose, N. (1999) Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self (London, Free 
Association Press). 
Schwab, J. J. (1956/1978) The practical: A language for curriculum, in: I. Westbury 
& N. J. Wilkof (Eds) Science, curriculum, and liberal education: Selected 
essays. Chicago, University of Chicago Press). 
Segal, H. (1988) Introduction to the work of Melanie Klein, (London, Karnac). 
Semetsky, I. (2006) Deleuze, education and becoming, (Rotterdam, Sense 
Publishers). 
Sharpe, M. (2005)Jacques Lacan. Available online at: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lacweb/#SH4a). 
 
Siegel, D. J. (2010) The mindful therapist, (New York, N.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc.). 
Silverman, D. (2000) Doing qualitative research: A practical handbook, (London, 
Sage). 
Sloterdijk, P. (1998) The critique of cynical reason, (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press). 
Suzuki, D. T. & Fromm, E. (2003) Budismo Zen y psicoanalisis, (Mexico, Fondo de 
Cultura Economica ). 
Suzuki, S. (1973) Zen mind, beginner's mind, (Boston, MA, Shambala Publications, 
Inc) 
Thomas, D. (1995) Treasonable or trustworthy text: Reflections on teacher 
narrative studies, in: D. Thomas (Ed.) Teachers' stories. Buckingham, Open 
University Press). 
273 
Vandenberghe, R. & Huberman, A. M. (1999) Understanding and preventing teacher 
burnout: A sourcebook of international research and practice, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press). 
Weinstein, C. S. (1989) Teacher education students' preconceptions of teaching. 
Journal of Teacher Education, 40(20), 53-60. 
Wenger, E. (1998) Communities of practice: Learning, meaning and identity, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). 
Whitehead, A. N. (1929/1997) The aims of education and other essays, in: S. M. 
Cahn (Ed.) Classic and contemporary readings in the philosophy of education. 
New York, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.), 262-273. 
Wideen, M., Mayer-Smith, J. & Moon, B. (1998) A critical analysis of the research on 
learning to teach: Making the case for an ecological perspective on inquiry. 
Review of Educational Research, 68(2), 130-78. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1986) Aggression, guilt and reparation, in: Home is where we 
start from. New York, W.W. Norton), 80-89. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1993) Playing and reality, (London, Routledge). 
Yin, R. K. (1994) Case study research: Design and methods, (Newbury Park, 
California, Sage). 
Yin, R. K. (2003) Case study research: Design and methods, (Third edn) (London, 
Sage Publications Ltd.). 
2iiek, S. (2008) The sublime object of ideology, (London; New York, Verso). 
2iek, S. (2011) Living in the end times, (London, Verso). 
274 
Appendix 1. — The psycho-spiritual concepts and principles 
of behind the enneagram of personality. 
As interpreted by Naranjo, personality crystallizes in infancy and early childhood 
as a response to anxieties regarding physical survival, pleasure and love 
(acceptance). The development of personality represents a strategic response to 
these anxieties, and, as the enneagram's name suggests ('ennea' is Greek for 
'nine'), nine basic strategies for the elaboration of their personality are 'available' 
to the developing child. Each of the nine strategies is denoted by its relation to a 
particular emotional focus or leaning within the character, known as the 
"Passion". These passions originate (with two additions) from within the Christian 
ethical doctrine of 'sin' or 'error', and are: Wrath, Pride, Vanity, Envy, Avarice, 
Fear, Greed, Lechery and Sloth39. They represent the central organizing principle 
around which diverse personality traits are formed. In the case of Avarice 
(number 5), for example, what is of interest is not material avarice (though this, 
indeed, may be present) as much as an affective and psychic avarice stemming 
from a defensive or guarded position in the world. The Avaricious character40, or 
strategy, is wary of excessive and potentially dangerous involvement in the world. 
The Avaricious strategy, one of retreat from the cut and thrust of the social and 
physical world, precipitates a search for dominion over a reduced territory, or 
solace in extraordinary love and intimacy, or dependence on certain 
extraordinary ideas or people (a type of potency by association). Underpinning 
these movements is the fear of impotence. Rather than confronting the pain of an 
foreshadowed frustration, the Avaricious character pre-empts the projected 
frustration through an attitude of chronic or deep resignation, underneath which 
might lurk the seething rage of the infantile castration of will41. 
Such strategies developed through character were perhaps correct responses to a 
particular situation in childhood (the Avaricious character might indeed have 
been impotent in relation to their parents as an infant, and may well have avoided 
39 The nine "Passions" are organized and presented in a mandala-like diagram comprising an outer 
circle around which the 9 emotional points are distributed. These points are connected within the 
circle by a series of straight lines that form a symmetric pattern. This organization of the passions is 
not accidental; rather, it reflects and communicates large amounts of information as to the 
relationship between the different points, and about the points themselves. 
40 The terms 'personality' and 'character' are interchangeable. 'Personality' has more scientific 
associations, whilst 'character' is more rooted in our social and narrative history. Whilst Naranjo 
refers to the "Enneagram of Personality", he more commonly uses 'character' when describing nine 
different types in recognition of the terms Greek root, charaxo, 'to engrave', conjuring up what is for 
him the necessary sense of permanence and constancy. 
41 
 Whilst psychodynamic explanations can be linked to personality, it is important to note that in 
practice personality is principally defined and described by concrete behaviour in the present. So, 
whilst origins can be ascribed to any character, their most important diagnostic feature is their 
surface, their discourse, and the immediate manipulations or exclusions that this discourse effects 
over the subject and the other. 
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unnecessary suffering through a resigned reduction of demands upon the world). 
However, character is seen as problematic to the degree that it has become 
structurally defining of an entire life, imposing its homogenous vision on changed 
landscapes, commandeering the self and coercing reality. Character, in this sense, 
favours an internal structure over agency (understood as a spontaneous and 
flexible response to evolving internal and external circumstances), and requires a 
selective and manipulated attention to certain features of the internal and 
external world that has become automatic, mechanical. 
Character, then, has become 'self, or rather, 'self' has become character. Central to 
Naranjo's understanding of the self is the idea of a 'fall from paradise' which he 
equates to a "degradation of consciousness" and a corresponding corruption of our 
emotional and motivational capacity and activity. Whilst every individual is 
conceived with the full potential to live spontaneously from an integrated whole 
self, or 'I', in which our intellectual, emotional and instinctual faculties are intact, 
unrestricted and communicated through awareness, our contact with a non-
nurturing or actively hostile reality, usually in the form of parents, obliges each 
child to interrupt their contact with this 'I' and descend to a "lower" world: 
Let us say that we have come to be in this lower world that we inhabit 
after the fall from Eden - the personality that we identify with and 
implicitly refer to when we say "I" is a way of being that we adopted as a 
way of defending our life and welfare through an 'adjustment,' in a 
broad sense of the term, and that usually is a rebellion more than a 
going along. (1994, p.5) 
This new "I", constructed reactively, is the "manipulative" or "counter-
manipulative apparatus" that Naranjo denominates as character: For it is this 
character, a "composite of engraved traits", that is the axis around which our 
'fallen' life spins and around which we attach a sense of identity: 
We may say that the individual is not free anymore to apply or not the 
results of his [sic] new learning, but has gone "on automatic", putting 
into operation a certain response set without "consulting" the totality of 
his mind, or considering the situation creatively in the present. It is this 
fixity of obsolete responses and the loss of the ability to respond 
creatively in the present that is most characteristic of 
psychopathological functioning. (Narajo, 1994, pp.5-6) 
Naranjo identifies two important characteristics of this everyday psychopathology. 
Firstly, the individual is unaware of the loss or limitation of their full potential: 
"blind in regard to its own blindness, and limited to the point of believing itself 
free" (ibid.). Secondly, this is not an unlucky condition of a few blighted 'neurotics', 
but rather our collective and inescapable reality. Character, or personality, may be 
more entrenched in certain instances, and some adopted strategies more obviously 
detrimental or difficult to live with, but the creation of a 'false self is an existential 
necessity and part of a collective fiction or illness sustained by our culture. 
It is through awakened awareness that we are finally able to perceive our natural 
'pathology' as expressed through our personality/ego/character, and from this 
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insight begin to know and turn toward - or re-know and re-turn to - our free 
condition. To arrive at this original "I" we must wage "Holy War" against our 
deficient motivation, the passionate drives and cognitive fixations that 
contaminate, repress, and stand in place of instinct. We must cultivate awareness, 
cultivate attention. However, the hoped-for point of arrival, 'essence,' is not to be 
viewed as some fixed metaphysical point, rather it is the dissolving of fixity by a 
wash of spontaneity, a continuum of liberated and liberating intra- and inter-
personal relations. In this space, response is conditioned neither by internal nor 
external structures, but flows from a close and critical attention to what is 
occurring in the here and now, in reality: 
The distinction is similar to that proposed today by Winnicott between 
the 'real self and the 'false self,' yet it may be misleading to speak of 
essence, soul, true self or atman as if the reference were something fixed 
and identifiable. Rather than speak of essence as a thing, then, we should 
think of it as a process, an ego-less, unobscured, and free manner of 
functioning of the integrated human wholeness. (ibid., p.10) 
To live from our essence can, says Naranjo, be likened to living in the Tao of 
Eastern mysticism. And the Tao is perhaps best described by describing what it is 
not. So Naranjo's differentiation between character and essence, 'false self and 
'real self, at the beginning of Character and Neuroses serves primarily to set the 
stage for his subsequent detailed description and analysis of what is not essence, 
i.e. the historically invested and contingent structures of character/personality/ 
ego. There are similarities with Foucualt in this sense: Naranjo is concerned to 
describe the prisons of our self-identification, but not to detail where the path 
might lead once the door has been opened. Like Foucualt, he is concerned to return 
us to the indeterminate Bios philosophicus, the unmanipulated flow of life in full 
consciousness. If the structure of the Enneagram presents us with 'ways out,' 
practices and attitudes that facilitate a desidentification with character - for 
example each Passion has its corresponding Virtue (e.g. Pride vs. Humility) and 
two integrative paths leading to other points on the Enneagram - within the SAT 
experience a 'cure' or path to 'healing' is perhaps left deliberately vague, and the 
participant is left staring out on the exploded and unruly ethical landscape of 'who 
we are' and the myriad permutations of what we might become. 
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Appendix 2. — A seven page extract from the interview 
with Reina, conducted in Spain, August 2008 (total 
trascript length 17 pages) 
C: Let's see, from the moment you perceived your character in the introductory 
course, which was your first encounter, what is it that began to change. I imagine 
things started to change in the way you lived your work, how? What where the 
first things to change? 
R: Work is where things have been last to change, because I think that there is a 
very hard nucleus in me, so that other aspects of my life changes before work. For 
example, I separated, a different style of relations with my friends and the like, and 
work has been the last. 
C: And you feel that is because...? 
R: Yes, there's a very tough nucleus. 
C: Of what? A nucleus.... 
R: It is because it has been the motor of my life, Charlie. I was a ugly girl, a clumsy 
girl, a girl with an apparatus, a girl with glasses. My sister was a girl, a beautiful 3, 
marvellous, so in my house she's the girl, look how lovely, how delightful...and 
she's older, very intelligent, very responsible, so that was my life, it was what gave 
me the right to exist. That is not so easy to get at, it's like there, how do I get at 
that? It is what has been the most difficult thing for me to enter into. In fact, for me 
the SATs at first helped me to understand and comprehend my students better. 
Obviously, its about the thing of how much I can have a more personal approach, 
that's to say, when one sees a 5 you say, What's happening to them? Sat all alone in 
the corner, not talking, without opening their mouths, it doesn't cause any offense. 
Perhaps at one time I might have felt a degree of scorn, without realizing it. Why 
aren't they interested? Why don't they get involved? Why don't they participate 
with the rest of the class? And other strange things like that. So to look at the 
person with affection has been very useful for me, in the sense of having less 
prejudices with the students, poor ... 
C: And what is the result of having less prejudices, let's say, for them? How do you 
think that they have experienced this? What could they say about you now? 
R: That they wouldn't have said before? Well, I think that they feel more 
comfortable, more accepted, and afterwards they will come to the office and tell 
you things, and that is rare in the faculty because the relations are usually very 
distant, there is a very big difference between professor and student, and perhaps 
they feel a little more ... well, it's that there is a truly a care for humanity, and then 
there is a part of enjoying making use of that knowledge that you have - perhaps 
you ask a question and they think , "uyyy, how did she know? Why has she touched 
on that point?" So there is also an element of satisfaction for one's ego - the person 
tells you, "yes, that's right, that is what is happening". So... 
C: zDo you have any examples of this? 
R: I have a French student, Tomas, who studied in France and has come here to do 
his doctorate. He is exceptional, I think, perhaps, a 7. Anyway, he had a problem 
because he didn't know much Spanish grammar, but he was working in the 
institute as a reader and was doing some wonderful things with the students - 
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theatre, exchanges - but the doctoral work was theoretical, and it was demanding 
and so he didn't know how to focus, what to do. So I said to him, look Tomas, don't 
worry, we'll think of something between the two of us, something in which you feel 
comfortable in making progress, and I can feel more comfortable, also, than with 
the detailed grammatical analysis that was, at the end of the day, the work we were 
both doing. So that we can think of something elegant. That year he was a reader in 
French and so what we have tried to do is in the institute, among the subjects, the 
course on citizenship education was new and people didn't really know what to do 
with the course, what was going to be taught, many people against this type of 
thing. So to take advantage of the course, the course contents in French, that way, 
we can kill two birds with one stone. So, what he has done is work on the contents 
of the course, using them to teach French. This will be his final work then, and he is 
happy, me too. Here is an example of taking advantage of the qualitities in function 
of their character so that one can achieve the work. 
C: What would you have done before? 
R: What would I have done before? Well, most certainly I would have passed him 
on, definitely I would have said that he went to work with one of my other 
colleagues, tried to get him off my back, because obviously I would have thought 
that I'm not up to doing an academic work of that type, and that it had to be of that 
type and not any other, so that he should go to another colleague. I would have got 
out of it ... in fact, that is what I have done! 
C: So, in some way you are more, you have become more flexible in your dealings, 
and in what you feel you can take on? 
R: Exactly. 
C: So, also there is more flexibility inside you? 
R: Efectively. And there is more acceptation of values that before I did not, that I ... 
C: More courage? 
R: More courage also. Now I feel that that is also valid, that part of this that is 
teaching, it is also valid. 
C: So you feel that during the first years the principal change was in the way you 
saw the students? 
R: Yes, the students. 
C: And with regards to your colleagues, the same? 
R: Regarding my colleagues, perhaps in the beginning the same, yes, and perhaps 
now a little more . . . I am beginning to dare a little more to take things on, to not 
feel so tiny, tiny, tiny. And this is so wonderful, wonderful, marvellous, stupendous. 
And it has a lot to do not only with my character type, but also with the personal 
therapy that I am doing, with my father. I took my father down a peg, I took down a 
peg all men. All my colleagues are men, all of them, so that from the get go the 
opinion of a man always appeared to be more valid to me than the opinion of a 
woman. So, clearly, looking at it from there, it has been a mixture of things, when 
things began to move at work it is also a result of much personal work in therapy. 
So now, obviously, explications and reasons, I now know I will be receiving till the 
day that I die. So now I don't need more explications and reasons, at all, now these 
are of no use to me, and before if someone had an explication or a reason, it was 
because they knew the truth. 
C: Above and beyond, more important than your own truth? 
R: Yes, of course, because on top of it they think much more than me. 
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C: So, in giving reason to someone else, did you feel a certain rancor, or did you 
give it for real? 
R: Really I believed it, and I gave them the reason. Total surrender. Also, I had the 
feeling that I took advantage of them, as I felt more stupid and spent the whole day 
with them, like I took in their reflections, their studies, all their work. No? So, I had 
the sense that I took advantage of them. I've had that sensation a long time, of 
being there in a dependency, but dependent because it suited me, because I learnt 
lots and everything I worked on with them, I also worked with in my classes, I 
sucked it all in. And, in fact, I used to say, I used to ask myself, "what de they see in 
me? Why am I a part of this team? What is my place here? What the hell am I doing 
here? It's great for me, but how am I of use to them? One thing is the friendships, 
but work is something else, it's also about money and, you know, and this year I 
have left, at least from part of the team and from many things... 
C: Sorry? You have left? 
R: I left, I've left. 
C: From where? 
R: For example, we had a project IMASDE ... 
C: What is that? 
R: A project that the state has given to the university. A project of investigation and 
development. So, in academic terms that is the bees knees, being given a project is 
not easy, and its like if they do give you a project you should be really proud. They 
give you a load of money, and, well, they gave us a project, and this year I began to 
feel that no, that I didn't have anything to offer to it, that I wasn't at ease, that I 
wasn't really producing anything, that no, and I left. Well, obviously, this is the first 
time that I don't just go along with what the others say, whatever you say right 
now. It has been dreadful, they felt betrayed, because I left them in a bind, so I have 
begun to ask myself as a result of this, if I have always been a nobody, right?, that I 
was rubbish? Why are they so angry now that I've left the project, if in reality when 
a person who doesn't offer anything is leaving everyone says ok, great, right? 
Great, because they didn't do anything. But no, it has been very difficult, they 
haven't stopped talking to me, but almost. 
C: So, how, or from where, did you take the decision not to work in the project? 
R: In that project? 
C: From where did you decide? 
R: From not being able to carry on. 
C: Drawing a line? 
R: Effectively. The first time in my damn life that I've put a limit. I have a daughter 
of 8 ...I'd never sat down with my 8 year old daughter to watch a film, with calm. I 
sat down, but I wasn't calm. I sat down because as a mother I have to spend time 
with my daughter, etc., but always thinking. But this year I've done it, I have spent 
time with my daughter, so just thinking about being in another project like that, 
knowing what it is like, being 5 years in another one of those, I could see that I was 
going to loose many things. I feel hugely embarrassed, it's amazing all the things 
that I have learnt, but I simply can't give up on a little room to breathe. They all 
blamed my personal process, the SAT, my therapy and all that. That I was loosing 
my head a little, and let's see where this will all end! No? 
C: This was last year. 
R: Last year. 
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C: And how did you feel that they responded to you almost with violence, that in 
some way to you, to the expression of your need, to your prioritizing other aspects 
of your life? 
R: Other aspects of my life? At first I felt totally misunderstood and very hurt 
because they weren't only my colleagues, they were my friends. But just to think 
that they were people with whom I'd shared such a lot, that they were in that 
moment incapable of feeling . . . well, at first I felt really guilty for doing it, guilty 
until the moment that I started to fell angry on seeing their reactions, so 
aggressive, no? I said, fuck that, and from feeling guilt I went to feeling angry. First 
that. And then, in passing, it was also useful to say, to feel appreciative, because 
they really were angry, and I felt that I really cared about them, so I tried to turn 
the thing round and say that their huge anger is because they are really upset that 
I'm leaving. Because, it is true that perhaps looking at it academically, its not my 
thing, or their way of doing things is not mine, but I do have a place, even a central 
place, of union, like a mother. 
C: So you are the feeling part within a group, the heart in a group of heads? 
R: That's it. So, when that goes you feel a little like "what's happening, what can I 
hold on to? And a bit of a sense of humour, a lot, and of course I didn't really value 
that. I felt like I was a type of that, of mummy, of adornment, handing out affection 
and fun, but that that didn't really have any value in the project, and so when I see 
what has happened, it's a shame. 
C: That you are needed in some way? 
R: In some way, yes. 
C: So you, as I am understanding it, have had two changes? I'm not sure if there are 
more up till now. First is that you began to 'see' your students more. 
R: My students. 
C: In another way? And to deal with them as they are. And the other is that recently 
you began to place limits? 
R: Limits, yes, there. That is very difficult in the faculty, the fact that I am no longer 
in the project means that my curriculum, those academic things, it implies a big 
cut, it implies not publishing, that they don't give me access to research. Another 
thing happened this year - they denied me a field of research, a research field is a 
good thing. Recently what they have invented is that you, that in your academic life 
you choose a series of publications, you present them and a commission decides if 
those publications are valid to warrant giving you a six-year field of investigation. I 
did it and came up with a pile of papers and such. I could have died, it is the worst 
thing that could have happened to me, the worst, but I did it two years ago with a 
great deal of effort and they have refused. And that has been crucial to me, because 
up to now, Charlie, I had achieved everything through effort, thinking that I wasn't 
up to it, that I was a fraud, thinking all of that, but I had managed it, I had achieved 
everything I had set myself. This is the first time that I didn't. 
C: And this rejection, have the resources given to you by the SAT or other 
therapeutic spaces helped you to take on board this `no'? 
R: It's like if I'm not up to it, and that is what happened to me, I think I would not 
have...imagine it - if it was the purpose of your life, and they say 'no', I would have 
got angry, it would have put me out of joint, I would have set myself to publish 
more for the next time, I would have gone off the rails, oh my God! 
C: So these processes have given you a little perspective? 
R: That's right. 
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C: To put this element of your life in its place? 
R: Actually, I don't think so, yet. But the day will come when I will sit down to 
celebrate with champagne the day they denied me that research field. Do you 
know what I mean? I know that that moment will arrive, it hasn't yet, right now I 
can accept it just, I can say 'ok', that's very good, and it helps to console me. I can 
see that the path of sacrifice doesn't always lead to glory, no? 
C: Yes. 
R: Not necessarily. You can kill yourself and maybe you won't achieve anything. So 
it's not that automatically, because it's is a crazy thing about tenacious 4s - if I do 
this, then I'm going to get a reward, or something like that? 
C: And the difficulty of dealing with the frustration? Did you used to have difficulty 
in dealing with frustration? 
R: Totally, totally. 
C: Can you give me an example? Do you have and example from the past of you 
struggling really hard, and then along comes the frustration and ... 
R: No, I can't, I can't even allow it to arrive, I swear. Look, it's so terrible, it's so 
terrible that I can't admit it. For example, with men, I have thrown myself on top 
on men so as to avoid the possibility of a 'no', that is, not even ask him, straight in, 
boom. And obviously the majority of men let themselves be carried away, for sure 
by something so direct. What happens afterwards is another thing. It is as if I 
haven't entered, I'm going to tell you this, I still haven't entered into the game 
because just thinking about coming up against a 'no', I avoid it, up to now I either 
throw myself on top, or even if I like someone I don't do anything because it might 
just be a 'no'. 
C: `No' is devastating, or was devastating? 
R: No is devastating, totally. I can't. I've felt things in life, inevitably. I had a 
daughter, but wanted a son also, and I didn't get pregnant. Finally, I got 
inseminated and I didn't get pregnant, and I was trying and trying and trying. And 
that was, really, a `no' from life, that was a 'no' from life that I had to accept, but... 
C: Hard? 
R: Hard, because it contributed to the separation from my husband. 
C: Your tenaciousness there? 
R: Yes, my tremendous zeal. He didn't want to keep on it that way, and I did. 
C: You would do it differently now? 
R: Completely, completely. Now I would let life be, much more, obviously. And with 
my daughter also. I believe that with my daughter, there is stuff there, right? But if 
I hadn't entered into therapy and in this process, I think I would have plagued my 
daughter with demands, like I do to myself. Even now, in spite of everything, I feel 
very demanding towards her. Before the age of one my daughter had a teacher of 
English and French who would come to the house to play with her so she would 
learn. 
C: When? 
R: One year ... I'm really crazy, Charlie, during the pregnancy I was delirious. 
C: With determination? 
R: With the effort! I read all the books that I could during the pregnancy, and so on, 
and when I was breast feeding I would note down on a piece of paper which breast 
I used first - and if it was the left on the previous feed, I started on the right. 
Obviously, the first year of my daughter's life I lived between (aaarrrghhhh) work 
and the perfectionism of my task of motherhood. 
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C: Do you feel then, it appears that before in some way you put all your value, or a 
big, big part of your value in work, in you academic career, etc. etc ... where do you 
find value in your life now? 
R: Now, my own process of personal growth, my daughter, and below that 
everything else. It isn't that work is not in an important place, its not that, but ... 
C: And how do understand that process of growth? 
R: The process of growth is bubbling, little by little, taking small steps towards 
serenity and towards affection. It's true, that's all it is, first of all towards myself, 
because I have treated myself like a dog. So, it's being able to give a little more care, 
a little more affection. But, if I give it to myself, I also give it to others. So, my dream 
is that, to be at peace, and, well, with the love of others. And, also, with my 
students, to feel more and more at ease with them, to truly help them. Now, 
something very maternal is appearing with my students that wasn't there before. 
Also, I think that having a child, even that, I have become more loving, more 
flexible. You think that the person you have in front of you could be your child. Hoe 
would you treat them? With regards to my daughter, it comes out a lot, a lot of 
tenderness has been awoken in me, a tenderness that I didn't have. 
C: When you have your students in front of you now, what is it that you would 
want for them? 
R: What I really want, what I would like is that they find their path, and I'm not so 
interested if they know a lot or less, rather in giving them the tools with which they 
can look for a path. I'm quite happy about this, because, academically I now know 
that our career, philology, is really a luxury. But I think that in teaching Spanish 
they can find an academic future. So I try to train them, give them that, work with 
them, because this is a really practical way of finding a meaning to what one is 
doing. I believe, from experience, that if you put yourself in a very theoretical 
plane, and you have a young person in front of you, in a tutorial, I don't know . . 
they don't understand, they don't know what the devil it is for. So the best thing is 
to approach it from the other direction, to say "Imagine that in a class you have to 
explain when you use the imperfect or when it is the indefinite, when you say 'he 
was arriving' and when you say 'he arrived', or, I don't know what, you say "How 
would you explain this to a foreigner?" What kind of explication is that? That is not 
an explication. So, starting from the need to say, ok, I don't know, but first you have 
to establish the need that a person might have to search for the information. You 
can't give information without a person having a need to look for it. So from that 
point, I try to tell them the truth about what we are doing here, also because if I 
don't do that then I feel purposeless. Right? That what we are doing here is of use 
to you, and of use to me. "You'll see, trust me. Wouldn't you like to be able to 
answer someone who asked you that question. Well, come on, come on, do it!" 
C: So , your perception of education has changed, or of the pedagogic process has 
changed, evolved, moving away a little from the academic question towards, lets 
say, the resolution of lived problems. 
R: Yes, experiential. To get people and say to them, "OK, what do you need to 
resolve this?" And so, starting from there, I concentrate on those things, because 
obviously you have to listen to be able to respond. That's it! 
C: Is this an unusual stance in the university? 
R: Oh yes, totally. 
C: Are you the black sheep for the students then? 
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R: No, because it's true, well, I think that us in my department are a ray of light. In 
our faculty, and in the branch of humanities, well, I don't know about teaching 
physics or chemistry, perhaps it is more practical and it needs to be, but in clearly 
in the area of humanities, literature, history, linguistics, it really is a rare thing. I 
can see that my advantage is that I have, from the beginning, worked with 
foreigners, and they have to resolve everything. And I have had to make the class 
interesting, and I have people in front of me who say to me "teach me how to use 
it". So you get very good learning. A lot of this way doesn't come from having had 
to be really in touch with . .. before I knew. I learnt afterwards, first of all I braved 
the class, and then I learnt afterwards, but really it's very unusual to do it like this. 
There is an attachment, I see it clearly, there is an attachment to "I'm going to teach 
what I know", if it is any use to the person in front of me, great, if not, well I'm 
sorry, but that is what I know and its what I'm going to teach, and that's that". So, 
sometimes those are marvellous things, and others you have no idea what to do 
with them. Truly useful, for me when I was a student, really useful - nothing!! I 
know this is a little strong, but it was only when I entered into the classroom that I 
began to learn. And there is not one course in the whole philology degree about 
teaching methods, just about how to give a class, what to do, to not talk to the 
blackboard because nobody can hear you, from such a simple thing as this to how 
to seat people so that they don't finish the course still not knowing the names of 
their fellow students - it's like, here we are sharing the same shebang, and you 
don't know the name of the person sitting next to you. That drives me mad, but if 
you do something even the students get a little shocked, the think its funny. So, 
little by little things are changing and younger people are entering, but there is still 
the shadow of the grand lecture, of the figure... 
C: Something very dry? 
R: In some cases. I remember with affection some lecturers, even with that style, 
because of their great knowledge - that is also a little my paranoia - but, yes, let's 
say that in today's world, without being in favour of running away with utilitarian 
values, but really one has to think in some way that these people will have to earn 
a living, the people in front of you, and perhaps I will be reading a wonderful poem 
by Machado, but how do we do it, why do we it? 
C: Before you mentioned that in some ways what is most important to you at this 
point is that these students find their path, that this question of 'seeking' has 
become of more important to you, for yourself and for others, than the academic 
training... 
R: Than the academic training? 
C: Let's say academic-professional. 
R: Yes, that is true. Right now that makes me, it makes me feel a little g uilty. 
C: You feel a little guilty? 
R: Yes, a little guilt. 
C: Deep down that is what you feel? 
R: Deep down that is what I feel, now it is a physical thing, you say, I need it. One 
has to make the decision, I feel a little impotent, but I prefer it. 
C: How would you put it then? If before you looked for your worth as a person 
through work, what is it that you look for in work now? 
R: What do I look for in my work now? Right, before it gave me a place in the 
world. What do I look for now? 
C: A good question, right? 
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R: It is a good question. Obviously, I'm only trying, beginning to let out the stuff 
that I was saying before, trying to make it something more creative, something that 
surprises me more, to see how / am in all that, to see what I can do, what occurs to 
me: something much more creative. I hope that it satisfies me, a pleasure, like 
when you cook a good meal and you feel brilliant. So, that more than the other 
stuff. 
C: So, it's not so much about satisfying some external criteria, rather it's satisfying 
you interest in living creatively? 
R: Correct. Sometimes I say this because they rejected my applications, because 
I've taken some blows from outside also. But I don't think so. Perhaps partly it is 
that I was very disappointed, or the frustration of that, that I said, ok, that road is 
not for me. 
C: Sorry, I didn't understand the bit about 'blows'. 
R: Yes, that they didn't accept my application for the research field implies a 
rupture in my academic career. So perhaps, to console myself I say to myself that 
academic life is not important really, and I get out of it, like escaping. It's like I 
don't know how much there is of avoiding the frustration and how much there is of 
genuinely enjoying what I am doing, that is why I don't talk about it with great joy. 
C: You mentioned creativity as a factor that you now identify as a source of 
pleasure for you, that you would like to embed in your work - Are there other 
things, qualities, or skills or madness that you would like to nurture or live there? 
R: Well, there is a part, the dramatic part of the 4, the histrionic part, the theatrical 
part that is wonderful in a class. I can have my guaranteed public, permanent, it's 
true, and many times I think that I would like to be an actress or singer and be on 
stage and things like that. I've suffered and seen the harm I do myself by being sat 
in a classroom. So I enjoy a great deal now that possibility and I get a little crazy, 
quite crazy. I start to explain I don't know what with a knife placed here, and man, 
it's a faculty very . . . I was thinking -"Well, they may forget about Chomsky, but 
they will never forget ..." 
C: The teacher who taught them! 
R: With a knife, like the plastic Halloween knives, going through my head. And I 
began to feel more at ease, so I said "When I explain Chomsky 1 feel like this, I feel 
like a knife is going through my head because it's such a construction, my God! So, 
well, it's also a creative side in my work. 
C: So, you are revealing the actress in you that had been repressed? 
R: Definitely. 
C: Shall we say, in an expressive way? 
R: Expressive . . . so instead of hiding this, well, I'm not going to hide it. What's 
more, I going to exaggerate it, so, great, I have a good time. 
C. So that your more histrionic side can be put to good use? 
R: Correct. 
C: And for positive things? 
R: Yes. 
C: Before, it's interesting, this subject of 'histrionics' - of hyper-emocionality. How 
was that in your work before, how did it manifest itself? 
R: Yes, true, true. To feel myself with sufficient solidity, the tranquillity to say, ok, 
in my way - it is not better or worse - whether it results in this thing, or another 
thing, I'm gong to do it my way. 
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C: What experiences in the SAT can you recall that helped you on this journey? 
What things have you done here that help you, that have prepared you for this? 
R: Obviously, theatre was fundamental for me. I remember that I was so scared 
that I spent the week sick in the stomach, so much fear, so much fear. So much fear, 
and yet when I did it, it was so easy. So that when it was over it was a happy thing, 
very funny, and I stayed with that a little. Catalina, who lead the work with me, said 
to me that it appeared as if I was beginning to value easiness. I couldn't believe it, 
because after a week of suffering I was needing total expiation, to stand there as 
the actress whilst they shouted at me and hit me. But it was so carefree, so 
superficial, that came out so effortlessly - like, there it is! But I didn't stay like that. 
I didn't remain in that place, so, well, I'm trying to value ease and so on. In any case, 
I feel that in spite of all the things that continue to plague me, I feel that in a class of 
foreigners I'm truly useful. I am. 
C: Without effort? 
R: Practically without effort, yes I am. And I go to classes with pleasure, with great 
pleasure. In the faculty, no, so I believe that I continue to feel that it is not the place 
for me, but ... 
C: Would you be able to renounce the faculty at this moment? 
R: No. 
C: Can you imagine a moment when you would be able to? 
R: Yes, I think I can. 
C: What is missing? 
R: Well, firstly, the issue of money. It's obvious that it puts the food on the table, 
and to give my daughter such and such. I don't think it is only an economic thing, I 
don't know, I don't know. But it must be a big part. There is also a big question 
about honesty there. In spite of the act that I feel I do as best I can, that they are not 
paying me and then on top of that I'm tricking everyone, so I try hard, and I think I 
can be moderately useful, but perhaps my conscience would be clearer if I wasn't 
doing it. 
C: Is it an effort that you continue to enjoy? 
R: In the faculty? 
C: In the faculty. 
R: Perhaps, but I continue to think that perhaps now . . . something in me says that 
in the faculty they need a certain level, and there I find some consolation by saying 
"well, you can win a place, but in reality if I knew more I still couldn't adapt. 
Perhaps a change, changing my subject for example, trying something else ... 
C: Theatre? 
R. Something like methodology, more than the theoretical, and leave the theory to 
other colleagues, find a way to assign it, so that I could take a look at workshops on 
writing, philology, other teaching that wasn't exactly theoretical linguistics 
because I feel very distant from linguistic theory at this point. I know that it is what 
I have learnt up till now, but when I pick up a book on linguistics theory a 
tremendous laziness fills me. 
C: You don't like it? 
R: It seems very hard. 
C: You don't like it? 
R: I don't like it. At this point, I don't like that. 
C: Is it hard for you to admit that? 
R: It is very difficult for me to say it 	  
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Appendix 3. — Consent form (English Translation) 
DECLARATION OF CONSENT 
Dear Participant 
With the aim of attending the ethical questions implicit in research, the following 
function of this form is to inform the participant bout the nature of the research, 
the way in which the information generated in the interviews/focal groups will be 
used, and to whom the results will be made available. 
Firstly, this research has the provisional title Humanising education for the 21st 
century: an evaluation of therapeutic tools in the professional development of school 
teachers in Mexico and Spain. It will focus specifically on documenting the tools and 
the therapeutic experiences of teachers during the SAT programme. 
This interview is intended to recall and document your individual experience and 
to explore how it is that the its learning and perspectives have affected your vision 
and practice as a person and as a teacher. Your reflections and opinions will be 
Aracelilized in the light of information generated from other participants with the 
aim of establishing common themes and areas of difference, with the hope of 
establishing the importance and effectiveness of the SAT as a professional training. 
The information, in its Aracelilized form, will be presented within a doctoral thesis, 
and subsequently could be published in books or articles so that it forms part of 
the academic and political debate about the future of education in the 21st century. 
Also, the transcripts of the interviews could be shred with other academics, for 
example, the doctoral supervisor. 
It is understood that some of the information could be delicate, and for this reason 
need to ask beforehand for you consent in the use of the information in the form 
described above. Ideally, I would ask for your consent to quote you using your real 
name, but the option also exists to be quoted in anonymity, or that the information 
remain totally confidential (it will not be quoted, nor will your real name be 
included). 
To clarify your level of consent, please tick one of the following options: 
Authorize the use of my interview in the terms specified, 
and with the use of my name. 
Authorize the use of my interview in the terms specified 
in anonymity. 
287 
I want the interview information to remain completely 
confidential. 
Nombre: 	  
Firma: 	  
Fecha: 	  
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